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The thesis explores the nature of the Islamic education systems in Indonesia and Malaysia and 
the different approaches taken by these states in managing these systems. Despite their close 
geographic and cultural ties, the two countries have dramatically different Islamic education, 
with that in Indonesia being relatively decentralized and discursively diverse, while that in 
Malaysia is centralized and discursively restricted. By employing theoretical models provided 
by the state-in-society and historical institutionalism approaches, I argue that the post-colonial 
state in Malaysia has been more successful in centralizing its control over Islamic education, 
and more concerned with promoting a restrictive orthodoxy, compared to the post-colonial 
state in Indonesia due to three factors: the ideological makeup of the state institutions that 
oversee Islamic education; patterns of societal Islamization that have propted different 
responses from the states; and control of resources by the central government that influences 
center-periphery relations. First, the thesis contends that state institutions that oversee Islamic 
education in Malaysia are more ideologically aligned and focused than their counterparts in 
Indonesia, which then allows the state in Malaysia to exert more coherent influence over 
Islamic education. Second, the wave of Islamic resurgence from the 1970s affected Indonesia 
and Malaysia differently. Islamization forced the state in Malaysia to engage with the political 
threat posed by Islamic activists, which resulted in increasing centralization of the Islamic 
education system by state, with the goal of subduing Islamic opposition and controlling 
Islamic discourse. There was no similarly grave threat to the legitimacy of the state in 
Indonesia, removing the impetus to centralize control over Islamization or promote a 
restrictive orthodoxy. Finally, the state in Malaysia has at its disposal more resources to 
manage Islamic education, including by absorbing private Islamic schools, compared to the 
state in Indonesia. Less state subsidies and financial control, however, also means that 
financially viable private Islamic schools in Indonesia can operate somewhat more 
independently than their counterparts in Malaysia. In short, this thesis shows that the three 
aforementioned factors can help a state to minimize influence from the society and exert its 
dominance, in this case by centralizing control over Islamic education.  Specifically, they help 
us understand the markedly different landscapes of Islamic education in Malaysia and 
Indonesia. 
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Functionalization of Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia 
 
Both the pen and the sword are the instruments of the ruler to use in his affairs.1 
Introduction 
There I was sitting among the ustadzs (male religious teachers) in the teachers’ lounge of a 
pesantren (Islamic boarding school) in Indonesia’s South Kalimantan province, drenched in 
sweat from the sweltering mid-morning Borneo heat while being plied with an endless supply 
of piping hot sweet tea and lumpia (fried spring rolls), when the moment of research epiphany 
struck. The television was showing an ever-popular infotainment program when suddenly a 
story came on about an inter-religious celebrity couple and their recent controversial 
marriage. The news caught the ustadzs’ attention and they started to discuss and debate it 
from wide-ranging theological points of views. As a Malaysian it was quite a scene to behold. 
In my personal experience, such an “unorthodox” marriage would provoke near universal 
condemnation from the general Malay Muslim community, let alone in the deeply 
conservative environment of an Islamic school. The spirited debates in the teachers’ lounge 
naturally brought questions to my mind: What kind of Islamic education system has allowed 
for such a discourse to arise? Why are Indonesia and Malaysia so different?  
These questions eventually led me to investigate how and why Muslim-majority states use or 
functionalize Islamic education to further enhance their legitimacy. Through the analyses of 
the Islamic education systems presented in this thesis, I illustrate the varied ways through 
which states in the two countries have tried to use those systems to promote hegemony. I 
show that the combined influence of ideological hegemony of state Islamic orthodoxy and a 
strong centralizing tendency on the part of the state explain the severely restricted discursive 																																																								
1 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: Volume 2, translated by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967), p. 46. 
	 2 
space of Islamic education in Malaysia. On the other hand, the broad autonomy enjoyed by 
Islamic schools and the strong presence of heterodox values in the state Islamic orthodoxy 
explain the relatively open discursive nature of Islamic education in Indonesia. 
Differences between Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia 
There are three key differences between Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia that can 
shed light on the proposed research puzzle. Firstly, Islamic schools in Indonesia greatly out-
number those in Malaysia, even after taking into account the size of the Muslim population. 
At the latest count, there are 47,221 formal Islamic primary and secondary schools in 
Indonesia spread out over the vast archipelago (roughly one school for every 4,387 
Muslims).2 In comparison, there are 1,804 Islamic schools within the national education 
system in Malaysia (roughly one school for every 9,616 Muslims) and they are 
overwhelmingly concentrated in peninsular Malaysia.3 In Indonesia, the sheer number of 
Islamic schools, the country’s disparate geography, with its attendant cultural diversity, and 
inadequate budgets pose logistical and financial challenges to the relevant ministries in 
Jakarta when trying to implement a coherent Islamic education curriculum and enforce 
compliance from local educational offices and schools.4 In contrast, the smaller number of 
																																																								
2 Buku Saku Statistik Pendidikan Islam Tahun 2013/2014, Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, 
Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia. http://pendis.kemenag.go.id/ebook/saku20132014/ (accessed on 
15 October 2015); Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010, Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, p. 130. 
3 Data KAFA, Sekolah Agama dan Masjid (Putrajaya: Bahagian Kemajuan Islam, Jabatan Kemajuan 
Islam Malaysia, 2013), p. 30; Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report 
2010, Department of Statistics Malaysia: 
https://www.statistics.gov.my/index.php?r=column/cthemeByCat&cat=117&bul_id=MDMxdHZjWTk1SjFzTz
NkRXYzcVZjdz09&menu_id=L0pheU43NWJwRWVSZklWdzQ4TlhUUT09 (accessed on 12 October 
2015).  
4 The 2015 budgets for Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs are Rp 88,3 triliun (USD 6.5 billion) and Rp 56,4 triliun (USD 4.16 billion), respectively. 
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara Tahun 2015, Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia: 
http://www.kemenkeu.go.id/wide/apbn2015 (accessed on 12 October 2015). The Ministry of Religious 
Affairs announced in 2015 that it is allocating Rp 24 triliun (USD 1.78 billion) to improve the quality 
of madrasah education in the next five years. “Kemenag Siap Tingkat Mutu Madrasah,” Sinar 
Harapan, 13 August 2015 (accessed on 15 October 2015). 
	 3 
schools coupled with the larger budget of ministries in charge of Islamic education allow the 
state to strengthen its hold over even supposedly autonomous Islamic schools in Malaysia.5 
Secondly, most Islamic schools in Indonesia are privately owned and managed, while in 
Malaysia, the majority of Islamic schools are either under the management of the Ministry of 
Education or the State Islamic Council (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri).6 Private status provides 
Islamic schools in Indonesia room to operate autonomously, since they are not completely 
dependent on the Ministry of Religious Affairs for funding. But as we will soon see in 
subsequent chapters, this operational autonomy comes with the stiff price of not having 
enough resources to properly manage the schools. The public status of Islamic schools in 
Malaysia, on the other hand, means that they can be effectively managed by a central 
authority, be it the Ministry of Education or the State Islamic Councils, especially when it 
comes to curriculum content, teachers’ certification and appointment, choice of textbooks, 
examinations, and the like. In short, a streamlined standard can be established for Islamic 
education, either under the aegis of the ministry or the state religious authorities, with the 
trend leaning towards increasing centralization by the ministry. We will explore these 
differences in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Thirdly, there is a higher degree of institutional coherency in Malaysia than Indonesia when it 
comes to educational operations and objectives. Despite the constitution guaranteeing the 
sultans and by extension, the Majlis Agama Islam Negeri, wide latitude in managing Islamic 
affairs, including Islamic schools, within their jurisdiction, the reality is that Islamic education 
																																																								
5 JAKIM’s overall budget for 2015 is RM 783,256,900 (USD 188.8 million), a big part of which is 
used to fund an elementary Islamic education program called Kelas Al-Quran dan Fardhu Ain 
(KAFA). Meanwhile, Malaysian Ministry of Education’s budget for 2015 is RM 40,848,327,200 
(USD 9.85 billion). Anggaran Perbelanjaan Persekutuan 2015, Kementerian Kewangan Malaysia, pp. 
118, 636: http://www.treasury.gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4298:anggaran-
perbelanjaan-persekutuan-2015&catid=447&Itemid=2473&lang=ms (accessed on 12 October 2015). 
6 93 percent of madrasah in Indonesia are private. Madrasah @ Indonesia (Jakarta: Direktorat 
Pendidikan Madrasah, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, 2014), p. 11. 
	 4 
in Malaysia is overwhelmingly dominated by the federal government in Putrajaya. Despite 
occasional political differences, state institutions along the horizontal (Ministry of Education 
and JAKIM) and vertical (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri) axes of governance typically work in 
concert with each other especially in regard to curriculum content, school supervision, 
teachers’ training and placement, and a host of other operational issues. In contrast, in 
Indonesia, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture have 
been historically at odds with each other when it comes to the overall nature and future 
direction of Islamic education in Indonesia, especially with regard to the issue of “single-roof 
education” (pendidikan satu atap). The 1999 decentralization laws further exacerbated the rift 
between these two institutions. The role played by the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and their local offices, which will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 2, further complicates the picture. Suffice it to say that lack of institutional coherency 
within and between the state institutions that oversee Islamic schools in Indonesia means that 
it is much harder for the state to imprint its ideological stamp on the Islamic education system 
as a whole. In Malaysia, by contrast, the state has been relatively unified and effective in 
shaping Islamic education.  
Research questions     
Two main research questions drive this thesis. The first question is comprised of three parts: 
To what extent and under what circumstances do the states in Indonesia and Malaysia 
functionalize Islamic education for their own political ends? How do they engage in such 
functionalization?7 To what extent have such efforts been successful? A state shapes and 
controls Islamic education, I will argue in this thesis, when Islam, in its socio-political 																																																								
7 Functionalization here refers to the state using Islamic education as an instrument to propagate and 
enforce an ideology on the society as a means to preserve its legitimacy and perpetuate its hold on 
power. Islamic education can be functionalized through centralized control of Islamic schools, 
curriculum, teachers’ training, textbook content and selection, and teachers’ appointments, among 
others. This thesis, therefore, strives to explain why the states in Indonesia and Malaysia adopt 
different approaches when it comes to functionalizing Islamic education in their respective countries. 
	 5 
iterations, constitutes a potential basis for or threat to state legitimacy. States are likely to 
functionalize Islamic education when Islam assumes a saliency as a potentially potent 
organizational and oppositional socio-political force, which the state also has the opportunity 
to exploit. If outright repression alone is not enough to quell Islamic-based opposition to the 
state’s legitimacy, winning hearts and minds through ideological cooptation can become an 
important state imperative. The state attempts to gain control of Islamic education through 
centralizing efforts such as insisting upon standardized curriculum and textbooks, centralized 
teachers’ training, certification and placement, national examinations, appointment of school 
principals, and so on. Typically, the state also colludes with the religious authorities to 
establish a set of orthodox values to be instilled through the Islamic education curriculum 
that, I will argue, buttresses its legitimacy while stamping out competing religious 
interpretations.  
The second research question is: Why has the state in Malaysia been more successful in 
exerting centralized control over Islamic education than the state in Indonesia? This thesis 
argues that the ability of the state in Malaysia to consolidate its control over Islamic education 
has been due to the state’s ability to minimize the influence and centrifugal pull of the Muslim 
society at large. In particular, the state in Malaysia has been able to gain control over Islamic 
schools and Islamic education curriculum with minimal pushback from opposing Islamic 
groups. In contrast, the state in Indonesia has not been able to centralize control over Islamic 
education even during the highly centralizing period of the New Order regime (1966-1998). 
There are three factors that determine the state’s resiliency and adaptability in interacting with 
Muslim society in pursuit of its Islamic education prerogatives: i) the ideological makeup of 
the state institutions; ii) patterns of Islamization in the society that necessitate different 
reactions from the state; and iii) the control of resources by the central government that 
influences the interaction between the center and its periphery. 
	 6 
Let us briefly consider each of these issues in turn. First, less intra-institutional resistance 
such as disagreements among departments or intransigent staff allows a state institution 
possessing a clear ideology to be more coherent when organizing Islamic education. Similar 
dynamics are also applicable to inter-institutional relations between state institutions that are 
part of the Islamic education system. In Malaysia, there is a high degree of ideological 
conformity within and between state institutions that manage Islamic education, even at the 
local level where long-standing traditions and cultural particularities remain pervasive and 
influential. The case studies of Islamic education in Kelantan and Sarawak in Chapters 3 and 
4 respectively best exemplify what I term a “federalized” institutional mindset: local 
educational agents of the state believe the only way to improve the overall condition of 
Islamic education locally is through the heavy involvement of the federal government in 
Putrajaya. In Indonesia, in contrast, the ideological makeup of the institutions that oversee 
Islamic education is more fragmented and they are regularly at odds with each other. This 
institutional and ideological incoherency in turn hampers the efforts of the state in Indonesia 
to assert more control over the Islamic education system in the country. Case studies of Aceh 
and Nusa Tenggara Timur in Chapters 3 and 4 best illustrate this shortcoming, as do the 
discussions of the single-roof education system and funding for Islamic education in Chapter 
2. 
The second factor is patterns of social Islamization. The wave of Islamic resurgence in the 
late 1970s hit Indonesia and Malaysia in markedly different ways. The heightened fervor of 
political Islam that reverberated across the Muslim world at this time did not take on a similar 
urgency in Indonesia. Suharto’s New Order regime did not have to contend with galvanized 
domestic Islamic socio-political forces that could pose a serious threat to its rule. On the 
contrary, a decade later the regime decided to exploit Islam as a counterweight against the 
	 7 
rising challenge of a nationalist faction within the military.8 While the regime did embark on 
Islam-oriented projects such as building more mosques and Islamic schools, promoting the 
MUI and establishing the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals or ICMI, its 
legitimacy did not depend on being publicly perceived as Islamic, which therefore allowed it 
to engage less with political Islam without significant political repercussions.9 Meanwhile in 
Malaysia, the Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s sparked the growth of a stridently vocal 
Islamic civil society movement that challenged the legitimacy of the hitherto secular state 
from an Islamic perspective. Instead of crushing the Islamic opposition and remaining secular, 
Mahathir Mohamad’s regime decided to Islamize the state, co-opt Islamic civil society and 
actively engage in the religiously charged public sphere, so as to burnish the state’s Islamic 
credibility to rule.10 In contrast to MUI in Indonesia, which is semi-official and has a 
narrowly prescribed scope of authority, JAKIM in Malaysia was from the early 1980s until 
the present day officially entrusted as the main driver of the state’s Islamization efforts, 
replete with significant powers in matters pertaining to Islam. In short, Islamization dynamics 
in Malaysia posed a credible threat to the state’s legitimacy, thus eliciting a reaction from the 
state to shape the Islamic public discourse in its favor, including by tightening its reins on the 
hitherto decentralized Islamic education system. No such threat arose in Indonesia, so that the 
impetus to refashion Islamic discourse was commensurately less. 																																																								
8 For more details of the New Order regime’s flirtation with Islam during this period, see William 
Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation,” Journal of Asian Studies 55.3 
(August 1996): pp. 613-634; Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara Dalam Politik Orde Baru (Jakarta: 
Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 318-352; Robert Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in 
Indonesia (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism 
and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 
83-89; Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004), pp. 
149-182.  
9 Robert Hefner, “Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle 
Class,” Indonesia 56 (October 1993), pp. 1-36. 
10 For studies on the Islamic resurgence phenomenon in Malaysia, see Judith Nagata, Reflowering of 
Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and Their Roots (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1984); Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among the Students (Kuala Lumpur: 
Pelanduk Publications, 1987); Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: 
Fajar Bakti, 1987). 
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The capacity to disburse resources to financially struggling Islamic schools is the third factor 
that contributes to the state’s ability to limit the pressure and influence from the Muslim 
social actors and at the same time increase its control over the Islamic education system. As 
shown in the previous section, state institutions in charge of Islamic education in Malaysia 
such as the Ministry of Education and JAKIM have been well endowed with resources, in 
comparison to their counterparts in Indonesia. Resource superiority allows the central 
government in Malaysia to overcome the federal system that theoretically provides Islamic 
schools with some measure of autonomy (Article 3 of the constitution).11 In contrast, the 1999 
decentralization laws in Indonesia further complicate the efforts of the central government in 
Jakarta to distribute more resources to the Islamic schools, and hence have weakened its 
position vis-à-vis the Islamic education system. The issue of resource distribution within the 
federal/decentralized dimension of Islamic education system in Indonesia and Malaysia will 
be discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4. In short, the control and distribution of resources 
affect the dynamics of center-periphery relations, which, in turn, determines the degree of 
control the state has over Islamic education in the country.  
Introducing the thesis 
The remainder of this chapter contains three main sections. The first section engages with a 
theoretical discussion on why and how states want to control national education systems, 
particularly Islamic education systems. This section sketches out the importance of 
ideological hegemony to regime maintenance, whereby molding the education system into a 
certain ideological shape serves as one of the means to achieve that end. We contrast states’ 
normative ideas about what they hope to achieve vis-à-vis ideological hegemony with the 
everyday practice, which occur when a state imposes its values on a society, in this case 																																																								
11 For more details on center-periphery financial relations in Malaysia, see B.H. Shafruddin, The 
Federal Factor in the Government and Politics of Peninsular Malaysia (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), pp. 48-99. 
	 9 
through a national education system. This discussion leads to an exposition of Joel Migdal’s 
“state-in-society” approach.12 Delving into the specific focus of this thesis, the section 
proceeds to describe the “functionalization” of Islamic education by some Muslim-majority 
states to serve specific political objectives and how these efforts did not always produce the 
desired results. Finally, this section explores the relationship between Islamic orthodoxy and 
the state, namely in the specific orthodox values found in the curriculum. The second section 
discusses how and why state institutions might form their own identities and objectives that 
result in the general structure of a state being incoherent and fragmented. Here, literature on 
historical institutionalism is used to shed light on the formation and durability of institutional 
identity and how institutional identity helps or hinders attempt by states to achieve ideological 
hegemony. The third section discusses how the theories of state, institutionalism and 
orthodoxy fit with the argument of the thesis. I explain why the state in Malaysia has been 
more successful in centralizing its control over Islamic education than the state in Indonesia. 
STATE IDEOLOGICAL HEGEMONY AND NATIONAL EDUCATION 
According to Michel Foucault, the productive aspect of state power cannot be expressed 
solely in the context of repression, or what he calls the “juridical conception” of state power. 
The power of the state traverses through the society, in which it “induces pleasure, forms 
knowledge, and produces discourse.”13 In other words, a state can only maintain its legitimacy 
and impose its ideological hegemony through a dialectical relationship with the society. 
Antonio Gramsci describes the construction of ideological hegemony within the society as  
[t]he phase in which previously germinated ideologies become ‘party’, come into 
confrontation and conflict, until one of them, or at least a single combination of them, 																																																								
12 Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform Each Other and 
Constitute One Another (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
13 Colin Gordon, ed., Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 by 
Michel Foucault (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 119. 
	 10 
tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself over the whole social area, 
–  bringing about not only the unison of economic and political aims, but also 
intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages 
not on a corporate but on a ‘universal’ plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a 
fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.14  
Cultural theorist, Raymond Williams, defines hegemony as  
[a] set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as 
reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the 
society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very 
difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.15  
In such conceptions, the ideology of the state has to be perceived as natural in order for state 
legitimacy to be durable. To this end, the state needs to form what Antonio Gramsci calls 
“historically organic ideology,” where such ideologies have “a validity that is ‘psychological’; 
they ‘organize’ human masses, they form the terrain on which men move, acquire 
consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.”16 In other words, the state’s ideology has to be 
perceived as an integral part of the natural order of life. Therefore, it is imperative for the 
state to establish “non-repressive” components that are able to socialize the population in its 
values, generate support through indoctrination and serve as a complement to the blunt 
repressive arms of the state such as the army, police, judiciary and so on.17 Louis Althusser 
terms the non-repressive components of the state as the “ideological state apparatuses,” of 
																																																								
14 David Forgacs, ed., The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935 (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000), p. 205. 
15 Raymond Williams, “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” New Left Review I/82 
(November-December 1973), p. 9. 
16 Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, p. 199. 
17 Gramsci states that “the ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony in what became the classic terrain of the 
parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent variously balancing 
one another, without force exceeding consent too much.” Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, p. 261. Max 
Weber observes that “physical force is often the last resort and that every system of legitimate 
domination attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy.” Quoted in Jacques 
Berlinerblau, “Toward a Sociology of Heresy,” History of Religions 40.4 (May 2001), p. 339.  
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which the schools, media, civil society, to name but a few, are part. The main function of the 
ideological state apparatus is to reproduce the dominant values in the society, which Althusser 
argues are those which legitimate capitalist relations of exploitation.18 However, domination 
typically also involves concession. Gramsci posits that  
[h]egemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of 
the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise 
equilibrium should be formed – in other words – that the leading group should make 
sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind.19  
In short, a state cannot expect to be strong and resilient if it relies only on brute force and 
stands aloof from society. The state has to become part of the society and instill its values 
through the aforementioned ideological apparatuses. Among other things, this logic has given 
rise to the introduction of mandatory mass education over the last 150 years.          
The rapid expansion of mass education began in the late 19th century as many states around 
the world started to modernize and implement systematic ways to manage and discipline their 
populations. The well-being of the nation and its security depended on the control over the 
minds and bodies of the populace both as a source of legitimacy and as a human resource for 
the country’s economic needs.20 Mass education served as a means to mold and classify the 
population from a young age. For example, compulsory schooling for elementary-aged 
children became mandatory in England in 1880 and France in 1883.21 Methods of disciplining 
and classifying students included, among others, creation of uniform timetables and curricula, 
imposition of mandatory exams and other evaluative measures, and class placement according 
to test results. Scientific management of national education became part of the state’s 																																																								
18 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other essays (London: NLB, 1971), pp. 145-49. 
19 Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, p. 211. 
20 Stephen Ball, Foucault, Power, and Education (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), p. 43. 
21 Ibid., p. 42; Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-
1914 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 309. 
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repertoire to make governance and inculcation of state ideology more efficacious and orderly: 
“The government, particularly the administrative apparatus, needed knowledge that was 
concrete, specific and measurable in order to operate effectively.”22 Theoretically, schools 
serve as institutions of acculturation of young impressionable members of the population by 
reproducing the dominant cultural and economic norms within the society established by the 
state ideological hegemony.23 Standardized curriculum, meanwhile, functions as a means to 
form a “large-group consciousness” that engenders a homogeneous student body, and 
subsequently, population. The Third Republic in late 1800s France, for instance, dealt with 
the socially and culturally fragmented French society at the time by implanting and increasing 
a sense of unity, patriotism and order under the overarching idea of French nationhood in the 
elementary school curriculum.24 In this perspective, homogeneity of worldviews and social 
behaviors would lead to social stability, which, in turn, reduces the transaction costs of 
governance.25 In short, leading officials of the European states began to see a political utility 
in the expansion and management of mass education to legitimize their rule as they 
modernized and as the state organs became intertwined with the capitalist economy in the late 
19th century.26 Thus the stage was set for national education to become an indispensable part 
of state-making and nation-building projects throughout the world. 
																																																								
22 Hubert Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 137. Quoted in ibid., p. 53. 
23 A contention also made by Pierre Bourdieu, “Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction” in 
Jerome Karabel and A.H. Halsey, eds., Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1977); Basil Berstein, Class, Codes and Control, Volume 3: Towards a Theory of 
Educational Transmissions (London and Boston; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 54-75; Samuel 
Bowles and Herbert Gintis, “Capitalism and Education in the United States” in Michael Young and 
Geoff Whitty, eds., Society, State and Schooling: Readings on the Possibilities for Radical Education 
(Surrey: The Falmer Press, 1977).  
24 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 331-338. 
25 Michael Apple, Ideology and curriculum (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1979), pp. 61-81. 
26 Foucault contends that similar “production of truth” process is also applicable, albeit with certain 
modifications, to socialist countries. Gordon, Power/Knowledge, p. 133. 
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The everyday reality of ideological hegemony in mass education 
In practice, however, states’ attempts to achieve ideological hegemony through mass 
education are rarely monolithic. Local state actors such as officers from the local educational 
offices, school principals and teachers mediate and re-interpret directives and policy 
prescriptions from apex state officials, according to their own particular experiences and 
preferences. Ioan Davies notes that 
The extent to which education is able to counter the political elite’s policies will 
depend in part on its own economic independence, in part on patterns of socialization 
which are strong enough to resist the norms of the system, and in part on the 
persistence of centres of local political power which are able to back alternative 
schemes.27 
One factor that has the potential to subvert the state’s ideological hegemony in the classrooms 
is the idea of the “hidden curriculum.” Michael Apple defines the hidden curriculum as 
“norms and values that are implicitly, but effectively, taught in schools and that are not 
usually talked about in teachers’ statements of end or goals.”28 In this interpretation, 
classroom interactions – learning and teaching – can contain unstated yet deeply rooted and 
unquestioned assumptions that form the perimeter of what one can or cannot discuss in class 
(a dominant hidden curriculum). They can also nurture “subversive” teaching and learning 
practices that challenge the dominant assumptions. An example of the dual-sided dynamics of 
the hidden curriculum can be clearly seen in some “pro-opposition” Islamic schools in 
Malaysia. Teachers strive to offer their superior version of “truth” in the classrooms and in so 
doing distinguish the school’s ideology from that of the ministry, but this “truth” is 
																																																								
27 Ioan Davies, “The Management of Knowledge: A Critique of the Use of Typologies in the 
Sociology of Education” in Michael Young, ed., Knowledge and Control: New Directions for the 
Sociology of Education (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971), p. 275. 
28 Apple, Ideology and curriculum, p. 84. 
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dialectically developed within the limiting confines of the conservative ideals embodied in 
and underpinning the state’s own educational visions.29  
Proponents of the cultural and economic reproductive role of mass education mentioned 
earlier such as Michael Apple, Pierre Bourdieu, Basil Berstein and others also claim that 
hidden curriculum functions as a subtle way to further embed dominant cultural and economic 
values, which in this context refers to those related to the capitalist mode of production, in 
classroom learning.30 The state institution in charge of national education and its local agents, 
in short, tolerates differences of ideas in the classroom as long as the disagreements are 
delimited within this invisible discursive boundary. To illustrate, in the Malaysian Islamic 
education system, heavily dominated by state orthodox values (discussed later in this chapter), 
“deviant” Islamic beliefs such Shia and Ahmadiyah are discussed in the classroom but only 
within the immutable context that these beliefs are completely wrong and that only the 
dominant version of Sunni Islam is acceptable. It is this immutable context that forms the 
invisible discursive boundary allowed by the dominant hidden curriculum.   
On the flip side, teachers and students can also use the hidden curriculum as a counter-
hegemonic means to defy the dominant narrative of the state as embodied in the national 
curriculum. Social actors such as students and teachers are not simply passive automatons but 
endowed with personal agency shaped by the particular values of their local community, 
group identity or the school itself.31 For example, despite official attempts to instill values 
such as punctuality, conformity and obedience, some students purposely show up late to class, 
goof off and make fun of their teachers while at the same time satisfying the school’s 
minimum requirements. Such students are carrying out acts similar to what James Scott terms 																																																								
29 Interview with the principal of SABK al-Fitrah, Tanah Merah, Kelantan, 31 July 2013. 
30 Henry Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 
1983), pp. 48-50. 
31 Michael Apple, Education and Power (Boston, London, Melbourne and Henley: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1982), 91-134; Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education, pp. 107-11.  
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“everyday forms of resistance.”32 In most cases, state hegemony as projected through the 
dominance of national curriculum – hidden or otherwise – is simply too powerful for teachers 
and students to confront it in a more forceful or direct manner. As such, the employment of a 
hidden curriculum by teachers and students as an act of resistance typically serves as an 
empowering tool on an individual or small group scale but is rarely enough to inflict serious 
lasting damage on the overall system. In the case of Malaysia, the hidden curricula of the state 
and the schools generally revolve around similar conservative Islamic ideals, even for schools 
that are known to be pro-opposition. Therefore, pro-opposition schools can claim moral 
victory by possessing the “higher” truth than the state but in a practical sense these schools 
still remain under the firm control of the state due to their precarious financial situation, as we 
shall see in Chapter 3. Even Islamic schools that are somewhat financially autonomous from 
the state also find it more acceptable to frame their political opposition via the conservative 
ideals promoted by the state Islamic orthodoxy as evidenced by the case of integrated Islamic 
schools in Chapter 5. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the use of hidden curriculum as a means 
of resistance in the classroom is moot due to the heterodox Islamic values propagated by the 
state, which allow schools to openly teach and practice their own religious ideals, be they 
progressive or conservative. Examples of ideological openness allowed by the state in 
Indonesia are amply illustrated by the pluralist Islamic school in Nusa Tenggara Timur in 
Chapter 4 and the deeply conservative integrated Islamic school in Depok in Chapter 5.   
A state’s projection of hegemony onto the national education system is not always coherent 
and totalizing. Instead of looking at a state exercising its power as an autonomous entity, 
																																																								
32 Scott gives the examples of peasant resistance to everyday forms of injustice and repression in rural 
Malaysia in acts such as sabotage, boycott, theft, and others. James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: 
Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 
248-73.   
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existing above and outside the social realm with its own prerogatives,33 a state should be 
studied through its dialectical relationship with the society. In analyzing the function of power 
within the state-society relations, Foucault avers that 
Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which 
only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in 
anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is 
employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; 
they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the 
vehicles of power, not its points of application.34 
In the context of state hegemony in national education, ideological dissemination simply does 
not flow unilaterally from the state to the society. As Eugen Weber illustrates in his densely 
detailed and vivid study of French society in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Third 
Republic’s ideological project to instil a strong sense of French nationhood among the 
socially and culturally divided population through the national education system only became 
successful when the majority of French people began to see the utility of attaining education 
beyond the rudimentary level, in order to pursue job opportunities in the expanding national 
economy, bureaucracy and the military, and to increase their social prestige by being 
educated. Also crucial was the state’s heavy investment in improving public infrastructure 
such as roads and school buildings and making education free, all of which made attending 
school a more accessible and pleasant experience for many rural children.35  
The state and the society, according to Joel Migdal, constitute each other as their components 
interact with each other at various levels of governance. Migdal treats the state as just another 																																																								
33 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Back In (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
34 Gordon, Power/Knowledge, p. 98. 
35 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, pp. 303-338. 
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social organization, which is to say that the state is not immune to contestations between 
various social groups. He then posits a new definition of the state, which expands on the 
traditional notion coined by Max Weber. Migdal argues that the state is “a field of power 
marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, 
controlling organization in a territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” 
(emphasis in original).36 The significant feature of this definition is the distinction between 
the state’s image and its actual practices. The image of the state is one of coherency and the 
projection of a unitary whole; in practice, however, the state consists of multiple parts that 
might not work in harmony and might even act in contradiction to the overall goals set by the 
state’s apex leaders. The multiple parts of the state can be influenced by various social forces, 
political interest groups, religious organizations and others, situating them in the midst of a 
tug-of-war between the normative aims of the “unitary” state and the actual demands of the 
society. In the context of projecting ideological hegemony via mass education, the ideology of 
the state is first shaped at the top by the apex officials’ interaction with social forces at the 
center of power. A good example is when top state officials formulate policies based on 
electoral calculations in order to further entrench their political incumbency, as we shall see in 
Chapter 2, which explains how Malaysian policymakers flip-flopped over the policy to teach 
Science and Mathematics in English. As the ideology wends its way to the periphery through 
various levels of governance, it is further re-shaped by the state’s local agents and local social 
forces that might be influenced by unique local cultures and political dynamics or even by an 
individual school’s long-standing traditions. Therefore, the analytical lens must be trained on 
the process in which state ideology is shaped and contested through dialectical interactions 
between components of the state and the society, rather than merely focusing on the endpoints 
(state and society as two separate mutually exclusive wholes).              
																																																								
36 Migdal, State in Society, pp. 15-16.  
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According to Migdal, there are four levels of governance where contestation of state authority 
can take place.37 First are the trenches i.e. the lowest rung of the institutional bureaucracy; 
second are the dispersed field offices (one step above the trenches), staffed by “implementors” 
or essentially mid-level bureaucrats; third are the institution’s central offices, most likely in 
the capital and staffed by upper-level bureaucrats; and finally the commanding heights, which 
is where the image of the state is crafted and projected for public consumption. The 
interactions within and between these four levels of state organization in conjunction with 
their engagement with various social forces present what Migdal calls “pressure points”: 
arenas of domination and opposition in state-society relations that in the end shape the 
capacity of the state to effectively assert its ideological hegemony.38 In regards to mass 
education, the so-called “trenches” are the local schools; “dispersed field offices” are the local 
educational offices; “central offices” are the high-ranking officials at the Ministry in-charge 
of formulating the educational policies; and lastly “the commanding heights,” consist of top 
national politicians who see the political utility of mass education and wish to instrumentalize 
it. In regards to the argument of the thesis, the pressure points chart the flow of the state’s 
hegemonic control of Islamic education, starting from the formulation of values that are part 
of the Islamic education curriculum at the apex (commanding heights and central offices) to 
the implementation and enforcement of the curriculum at the local level by central offices and 
dispersed field offices, and finally to schools’ compliance in the trenches. I will argue 
throughout this thesis that, compared to Indonesia, the state in Malaysia at the apex (the 
national politicians, the Ministry of Education and JAKIM) has been more successful in 
exerting its ideological dominance on the local levels as represented by the local educational 
offices and schools by exacting near total compliance with state Islamic orthodox values (to 
be explained in detail later in this chapter). In Indonesia, by contrast, the state Islamic 																																																								
37 Ibid., pp. 117-24. 
38 Ibid., pp. 126-34. 
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orthodoxy is characterized by heterodox values, which result in local educational offices and 
schools having a broad autonomy in practicing their own Islamic ideals. 
Figure 1.1: Joel Migdal’s “pressure points” in the national education system 
 
Overview of the post-colonial states in Indonesia and Malaysia, 1950 – present 
Since the end of World War II, the nature of the post-colonial state in Indonesia has 
undergone more changes than the post-colonial state in Malaysia. The post-colonial state in 
Indonesia can be divided into four eras: parliamentary democracy in the first half of 1950s; 
the Guided Democracy period (1959-1966); the New Order period (1966-1998); and the 
Reformasi period (1998-present). The first government formed in 1950 was parliamentary in 
nature, as a way to unite various disparate political currents under a single form of 
governance. Weak cabinets, intense political rivalry between various mass organizations and 
the then President Sukarno’s proclivity for a unitary state undermined political stability, 
which resulted in rebellions on the Outer Islands, namely in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi. 
The parliamentary system finally broke down in 1959 when Sukarno declared Indonesia to be 
a “Guided Democracy” and consolidated power in the hands of the President.39 The 
centralizing tendency of the state became more intense during the era of the New Order 																																																								
39 Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: 
Equinox Publishing, 2007). See also J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Singapore: 






regime as the state expanded its reach over every aspects of Indonesia’s social, political, and 
economic life.40 After the fall of Suharto and the New Order regime in 1998, the Indonesian 
state underwent a massive decentralization process that transferred control over matters such 
as education and economic activities to the local level.41 The state in Indonesia, even at the 
height of its centralizing drive during the New Order period, has never been able - or has been 
simply unwilling - to assume control over the predominantly private and autonomous Islamic 
schools and shape the Islamic education curriculum to legitimize the regime legitimizing; in 
other words, it has never fully functionalized Islamic education. The state throughout the 
Indonesian post-independence period, regardless of its nature, simply has not relied on being 
perceived as Islamic in order to be legitimate. 
Meanwhile, the post-colonial state in Malaysia has been from its inception in 1957 federal in 
form. Despite being federal in nature, the state in Malaysia has always been highly 
centralized, with the political and economic power overwhelmingly concentrated in Kuala 
Lumpur and Putrajaya.42 Moreover, the state in Malaysia has always been under the control of 
the UMNO-led federal government since independence, which sees no reason for changing 
the system that has managed to sustain it in power thus far. The centralizing juggernaut of the 
Malaysian federal government first reared its head when it abolished local government 
elections in 1965.43 A year later the federal government interfered in the internal politics of 
Sarawak, which had just joined the Malaysian federation in 1963, by helping to engineer the 																																																								
40 R. William Liddle, “Regime: The New Order” in Donald Emmerson, ed. Indonesia Beyond Suharto 
(Armonk and London: An East Gate Book, 1999), pp. 39-70. 
41 Greg Fealy and Edward Aspinall, eds., Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and 
Democratisation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). 
42 Francis Loh Kok Wah, Old vs New Politics in Malaysia: State and Society in Transition (Petaling 
Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2009), pp. 16-20; Mohamad Agus 
Yusoff, Malaysian Federalism: Conflict or Consensus (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia, 2006); Francis Loh Kok Wah, ed., Sabah and Sarawak: The Politics of Development and 
Federalism (Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1997); Shafruddin, The Federal Factor.  
43 Report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry into the Working of Local Governments in West 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1972).  
	 21 
ouster of Sarawak’s first Chief Minister and a vocal advocate for autonomy, Stephen Kalong 
Ningkan (more details on this particular episode in Chapter 4). From the constitutional point 
of view, the oversight of Islamic affairs solidly resides within the authority of the sultan and 
the State Islamic Council (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri) in each state in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see throughout this thesis, the federal government’s dominance over 
Islamic affairs is unmistakably apparent, even in a state such as Kelantan, which has long 
prided itself on its unique Islamic traditions and legacy (see Chapter 3). The centralizing 
efforts over Islamic affairs took on an acute sense of urgency in the late 1970s as the hitherto 
secular state faced strident opposition from Islamic political activists who questioned its 
legitimacy. Instead of quashing the Islamic dissent and remained secular, the already highly 
centralized state decided to bring Islamic affairs under its control as a way to mould the 
Islamic discourse into a version that buttressed its legitimacy. Islamic affairs, the final 
preserve of state autonomy in Malaysia, has now been subsumed by the federal government 
hellbent on burnishing its religious credibility to govern. 
Functionalization of Islamic education in the Muslim world 
Historically, attempts by Muslim rulers in the pre-nation state era to coopt Islamic education 
as a means to strengthen their legitimacy were complicated by the nature of traditional Islamic 
education, which was decentralized, informal, and highly autonomous. The advent of modern 
state-making in the late 19th century, which included a comprehensive attempt at codifying 
syariah laws by the Ottoman Empire, led to a major revamp of traditional Islamic education 
across the Middle East.44 Throughout most of Islamic history, Islamic jurisprudence has been 																																																								
44 The pedagogical method in traditional Islamic education is generally similar across the Muslim 
world, which, among others, places heavy emphasis on rote memorization and recitation of seminal 
texts, oral transmission of knowledge with a clear intellectual genealogy (teacher-focus), no regular 
exams, and no fixed curriculum and schooling term. For an overview of traditional Islamic learning, 
see Jonathan Berkey, “Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, Education, and the Problem of 
Muslim Identity” in Robert Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture 
and Politics of Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 40-58. 	
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a wide-open field replete with diversity of opinions and vigorous debates among jurists; the 
existing four Sunni madhhabs (schools of thought) – Hambali, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanafi – 
are a prime example of this long-standing tradition of scholarship. The interpretive authority, 
defined as the intellectual and moral credibility to clarify and shed meanings on Islamic 
precepts contained in the Quran and Hadith (reported sayings and practices of Prophet 
Muhammad), was widely dispersed and decentralized throughout much of Islamic history, 
with no group holding sway over others.45 But the late 19th century saw rapid codification of 
syariah law, particularly within the realm of the Ottoman Empire.46 This codification served 
as a means for the Empire to streamline administration across its vast and disparate territories, 
and was a desperate attempt to beat back the encroaching Western colonialism by 
“modernizing” its legal system to make it less capricious, so as to prevent the Western powers 
using it as a pretext to interfere in the Empire’s internal affairs.47 The European-influenced 
positivist nature of the codification of syariah law within the realm of the Ottoman Empire, in 
turn, spurred the establishment of Islamic educational systems that produced Muslim scholars 
who were well-trained in the workings of the newly established syariah codes called 
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Majalla.48 The power to interpret Islamic tenets, at the turn of 20th century, shifted 
significantly from the jurists of yore to the graduates of this newly established education 
system. The codified syariah law required its practitioners to possess a specific set of skills to 
interpret and enforce the law that was unavailable to the students of the traditional learning 
system. The field of Islamic jurisprudence, which hitherto had been wide open and dynamic, 
was now circumscribed within the limiting confines of the codified syariah law and its 
practitioners by the early decades of the 20th century. Therefore, the Islamic education system 
unwittingly became a battleground in which supremacy over the Islamic religious interpretive 
authority was fought. Since Islamic matters were decided through this newly codified syariah 
law system, the graduates of the Islamic education system who were trained in understanding 
and discharging these laws became the holders of the religious interpretive authority. Thus, 
the newly standardized Islamic education system became an arena of ideological contestation 
as the state and various social actors tried to shape its content and pedagogical culture, and 
consequently determine the type of graduates that the system produced.49 
Since the advent of modern state-making in late 19th century and early 20th century, all 
modern Muslim-majority states have deemed the functionalization of Islamic education to be 
integral to regime maintenance and legitimacy as they confront the challenges of 
modernization, post-colonial nation-building, and presently, the forces of globalization.50 
Functionalization refers to “processes of translation in which intellectual objects from one 
[Islamic] discourse come to serve the strategic or utilitarian ends of another [Islamic] 
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discourse that is amendable to the state.”51 In this case, the implications that state-making and 
regime maintenance have for Islamic education have generally been in the shape of structural 
changes: the abolition or radical overhaul of the traditional Islamic education or its 
incorporation into a more coherent and homogenous national educational system. Notably in 
Oman, which was the focus of his study, Dale Eickelman lists three effects as Muslim states 
in the Middle East have embarked on the grand project of standardizing and nationalizing 
mass education, including Islamic education, among their population since the 1950s.52 These 
effects result in the creation of authoritative discourse through selective access to texts and 
teachers; the transformation of religion as a concrete system and its ideas reified and 
objectified; and lastly, standardized language and ideas of mass education that encourage a 
sense of affinity among the students, not unlike the notion of “imagined community” put forth 
by Benedict Anderson in his seminal work on nationalism.53 In a nutshell, Eickelman 
contends that the post-colonial mass education project in the Middle East has turned Islamic 
intellectual tradition from its aforementioned autonomous, amorphous and fluid character to 
something that is concrete, rational, and systematic (objectified and reified). The 
objectification of Islam and Islamic learning narrowly circumscribes Islamic discourse into 
this newly delimited space and creates a clearly defined standard of ideals promoted by the 
post-colonial state. In practice, however, states’ attempts at functionalizing Islamic education 
for the purposes of regime maintenance often do not attain their desired results, which is to 
shape public opinion in the regimes’ favor. In the same study of Islamic education trends in 
selected Arab countries, Eickelman observes that “even when mass higher education is used 
to sustain old patterns of belief and authority, its very structure engenders new ‘authoritative’ 
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ways of thinking about self, religion, and politics.”54 The new “authoritative” way, in this 
context, can either lead to the strengthening of a state’s ideological hegemony or the 
empowerment of countervailing ideological forces hostile to the state. Both outcomes will be 
illustrated in some detail in the next section. 
State functionalization of Islamic education in the Muslim world    
In the wake of the objectification of Islam and the conversion of syariah principles into 
positive law, beginning in the late 19th century Middle East, mass education has become a 
hotly contested arena for interpretive authority between the modernizing Muslim-majority 
state and various religiously-inspired socio-political movements. In Egypt, for example, in the 
1950s, the Free Officers’ Revolution led by Gamal Nasser replaced the traditional educational 
system, long known for its polyvocality of Islamic knowledge and interpretive authority, with 
the attempted hegemony of a single national educational system. This attempt aimed to fuse 
the state’s interpretation of Islam, Arab nationalism and socialism into a single ideology.55 In 
the aftermath of the Six-Day War with Israel in 1967, which resulted in the defeat of the Arab 
forces, the general public mood in Egypt soured on Nasser’s Arab nationalism project and 
many people began to turn to Islam for a political alternative. Nasser’s successor, Anwar 
Sadat, promptly capitalized on the Islamic resurgence trend within Egyptian society by 
actively promoting Islamic symbols in public (along with releasing many Muslim 
Brotherhood activists from prison and, in light of the heightened Cold War, re-orientating the 
regime’s political and economic compass to the West and capitalism).56 However, as Gregory 
Starrett shows, the state’s initiative in fact had the unintended consequence of diminishing its 
authority and control of public discourse over the years, giving rise to Islamist movements 																																																								
54 Eickelman, Mass Higher Education, pp. 645. 
55 Starrett, Putting Islam to Work, pp. 77-80; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, 
Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 30.  
56 Starrett, Putting Islam to Work, pp. 80-86. 
	 26 
that were opposed to the state, which, in turn, led to their violent repression.57 In short, the 
state’s attempt at functionalizing Islam and Islamic education, both during the Nasser and 
Sadat eras, did not achieve its desired results. 
The same can be said for Iran, where the modernizing efforts carried out by the Shahs, which 
also included a major overhaul of the traditional education system and marginalization of 
Islamic education, failed to keep the monarchy in power and prevent the 1979 revolution, 
which was in large part fueled by the students of the Islamic schools or hawzah. In the Shah’s 
case, he underestimated the potency of Islamic opposition to his rule, particularly in the 
traditional Shiite educational centers such as Qom, which ultimately contributed to his 
downfall.58 The Imamate leadership that succeeded the Shah realized early on the sheer 
importance of using schools to inculcate the young Iranian minds with revolutionary ideals 
and reinforce the political socialization the students received outside of the school. The 
religious leaders of the 1979 revolution cast it as an “ideological revolution”, which aimed to 
shake up the cultural foundation of the country, as opposed to a “non-ideological revolution” 
that only seeks change in political leadership.59 The republic’s leadership promptly revamped 
the national curriculum and textbooks to include new normative ideals of what a citizen of the 
new Islamic republic should be.60 According to one author, the state’s effort to instill 																																																								
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revolutionary ideals through the education system has been generally successful, partly due to 
the Imamate leadership enjoying a high degree of legitimacy from the public. The schools 
serve as a complementary socializing agent, which helps to reinforce values learned through 
families, mosques, and workplaces. In other words, there is a high ideological congruity 
between what is going inside and outside of the schools, which leads to a relatively seamless 
process of values inculcation.61    
Turkey, despite its staunchly secular nature throughout most of the 20th century, has also tried 
to functionalize Islamic education to further strengthen state legitimacy since Islam remains a 
vital component of the daily lives of most Turkish people. Secularism, in the Turkish context, 
does not mean the complete separation of religion and state; instead, the state allows a role for 
religion in the public sphere as long as the state controls and defines what the proper functions 
of the said role are.62 In other words, the Turkish state arrogates to itself the interpretive 
authority to articulate and enforce what it deems to be “Turkish Islam”, which is comprised of 
three components: Islam that is devoid of “superstitious” and “backward” elements; 
modernism; and nationalism.63 The ideals of “Turkish Islam” saturate the curriculum content 
of religious studies in state schools, which the state hopes is enough to mollify those Muslims 
who seek an Islamic education within the state school system. Nevertheless, as Kim Shively 
vividly demonstrates in her ethnographic study of the informal Quranic study group in the 
suburb of Ankara in the late 1990s, the state’s instrumental efforts at repurposing Islamic 																																																																																																																																																																													
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education for its own ideological ends were met by pious Muslims with deep suspicions and 
dissatisfaction at the inadequacy and overly general content of the religious studies 
curriculum. Muslims in search of more substantive and meaningful religious education 
increased enrollments in the state-sanctioned Imam-Hatip schools and private Islamic schools 
such as the ones in the Fethullah Gülen educational network.64 In short, the secular state’s 
effort to co-opt and remake Islamic education in its image throughout the 20th century had 
failed, and similar to the aforementioned case in Egypt, spawned a galvanized Islamic 
oppositional force within the society, which culminated in the electoral dominance of the 
Islamic party, Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002.  
Mass education in Pakistan has seen a significant philosophical overhaul since the late 1970s 
when then President, Zia-ul-Haq, utilized Islamic discourse to buttress the legitimacy of his 
presidency and win public support for Pakistan’s role in the Soviet-Afghan war. Pakistan’s 
National Educational Policy in 1998 stated that “the ideology of Islam forms the genesis of 
the state of Pakistan. The country cannot survive and advance without placing the entire 
system of education on sound Islamic foundations.”65 The state’s Islamic ideology here 
conflates the national identity of being a Pakistani and the Islamic faith. The identity of a 
Pakistani Muslim, a redundancy in the official view, is defined against others who do not fit 
the ideals laid out by the state, be they foreigners (namely Hindu Indians), non-Muslim 
Pakistanis or fellow Muslims who happen not to share a deeply conservative religious 
outlook.66 The intensification of conservative Islamic influence in the Pakistani society during 
the Zia-ul-Haq period also resulted in the preservation and growth of traditional madrasah. 
Some of these madrasah housed many of the Afghan refugees fleeing across the border and 																																																								
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also produced students who went to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Many of these 
madrasah students later ended up forming the highly repressive Taliban government in the 
newly liberated Afghanistan while still maintaining links with some of the traditional 
madrasahs in Pakistan.67   
The obvious overall pattern here is that despite the best effort by states to manage the Islamic 
education system and coopt the Islamic discourse, the highly Islamized public sphere that 
stems from state-sanctioned religious education might unintentionally result in the 
strengthening of countervailing Islamic social forces, which can put a damper on the states’ 
efforts to use Islamic education as a means for social control and maintaining their legitimacy. 
As discussed previously, the relationship between the state and the society is a dialectical one 
in which components of both constantly influence and reconstitute one another. The question 
then is what are the ways that allow the state to gain an upper hand in this dialectical 
interaction, at least within the realm of Islamic education, where it can exert its ideological 
hegemony while minimizing the pressure from the social forces. When it comes to Islamic 
education in Malaysia, the state had been powerful and adaptable enough that it is able to 
shape the nature of social resistance against its attempts to promote its version of Islamic 
values and principles in the curriculum. For example, Islamic schools that are suspicious of 
the state’s Islamization effort in the educational arena might still appropriate the state-issued 
curriculum and pedagogical methods and make them more genuinely Islamic as an act of 
defiance against the state’s claim of interpretive authority, a form of hidden curriculum 
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mentioned in the previous section.68 Nevertheless, it is a resistance that is shaped by the 
discursive boundary set by the state Islamic orthodoxy.  In Indonesia, on the other hand, no 
such dynamics occur since the pluralist nature of the state Islamic orthodoxy allows Islamic 
schools a broad autonomy in interpreting the national curriculum based on their ideals, not the 
discursive boundary set by the state. In short, the state’s ability to functionalize Islamic 
education as a means to exert its ideological hegemony depends on how effective it can 
manage the Islamic discourse without resorting to full-on repression. 
Islamic orthodoxy and the functionalization of Islamic education 
In order to better elucidate the notion of functionalization of Islamic education in a Muslim-
majority country we need to discern the values and norms the state wants to propagate in the 
Islamic education curriculum, how and why these values make their way into policy-making, 
and how embedded and influential their role is within the state institutions overseeing Islamic 
education. In other words, we need to identify what is the state’s Islamic orthodoxy. This 
thesis contends that the different state Islamic orthodoxies one can find in Indonesia and 
Malaysia influence the three factors that shape these states’ ability to deal with pressures from 
social groups. As mentioned before, functionalization of Islamic education is part of the 
state’s attempt to monopolize religious interpretive authority especially when the state’s 
legitimacy precariously rests on having a religiously favorable image in the eyes of the 
Muslim public, which is the case in Malaysia but not Indonesia. The conventional notion of 
orthodoxy proposes the state to develop its own interpretation of Islam, socialize that 
interpretation widely among the public through mass education, and mete out proscriptions 
and punishments against alternative interpretations. The idea that a state Islamic orthodoxy is 
essentially a form of power dynamic is described by Talal Asad:  																																																								
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Orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship – a relationship 
of power. Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust 
correct practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there 
is the domain of orthodoxy.69  
To merely explain orthodoxy in terms of a linear power relationship where the state 
unilaterally imposes its ideological will on the society at large is to overlook the complex 
process that gives shape and substance to the orthodox values and norms. Foucault’s comment 
in the previous section regarding the web-like structure of power relations between the state 
and the society and the production of “truth” forms the basis on which the idea of orthodoxy 
is developed. One very detailed definition of orthodoxy describes it as 
[a] superordinate compulsory organization composed of a leading class in cahoots 
with other classes and social groups that 1) controls the means of material, intellectual, 
and symbolic production; 2) articulates “correct” forms of belief and praxis through 
the work of rationalizing and consent-generating intellectuals (and/or priests); 3) 
identifies “incorrect” forms of belief and praxis through these same intellectuals; 4) 
institutionally manages deviant individuals and groups through coercive mechanisms 
(e.g., physical and symbolic violence, excessive taxation, ostracism, etc.) or through 
“re-education,” compromise, accommodation, and so on.70        
This definition of orthodoxy is only partially complete when applied to the context of this 
thesis as religious orthodoxy is not necessarily related to dominating and controlling other 
religious points of view, as we shall see in the Indonesian case. As stated before, state 
functionalization of Islamic education assumes different shapes and meanings depending on 
the political exigencies of the particular time and place in history. Therefore, it is also 
instructive to analyze Islamic orthodoxy in a similar light, namely in construing orthodoxy 
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and its contents “[a]s fluid, as developing in a dialectic with heterodoxy.”71 Orthodox values 
and norms change over time in direct relation with the prevailing heterodox ideas and 
practices, and with regard to state functionalization of Islamic education; these changes can be 
seen in official policies, the contents of curricula, textbooks and teachers’ training manuals, 
and the types of enforcement at the local level.  
In the case of Malaysia, the critical juncture that is the start of the Islamization wave in the 
late 1970s, entailed abrupt institutional change, resulting in the reconfiguration of orthodox 
values and the rise of conservative brand of state Islamic orthodoxy. The Islamized society 
since the late 1970s presented a potent challenge to the state’s legitimacy by framing the 
public discourse in an Islamic context, and thus prompted the state institutions to change and 
adapt. Similar institutional dynamics did not happen in Indonesia. The state Islamic orthodoxy 
in Indonesia remains moderate and is still shaped by the heterodox Islamic practices in the 
society. In Malaysia, the state leaders determined they needed to coopt or quash competing 
values and norms with cooptation being the preferred strategy as it lowers the cost of 
governance; highly repressive strategies tend to generate hostility and resentment in society. 
In Indonesia by contrast, the Islamization of the society that occurred in the 1980s did not 
pose a similar threat to the legitimacy of the New Order regime. The Islamic resurgence 
mostly made its presence felt in the socio-cultural sphere, which in turn strengthened the 
preexisting ideological diversity within the Indonesian Muslim society.72 It is the dominance 
of heterodox values in the society that ultimately shape the character of state Islamic 
orthodoxy in Indonesia.  
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In addition, state institutions are also not immune to significant changes within the society. 
Change agents can infiltrate into the state institutions at the same time that the institutions are 
undergoing change in values and norms, in which case, the presence of change agents (a topic 
we return to below) within the institutions can hasten the institutional identity transformation 
process. Institutional complexity, a concept that will be discussed later in this chapter, also 
plays a crucial role in determining the ideological cohesiveness of a state institution. In a 
nutshell, the more complex the inter- and intra-relations between and within state institutions 
the less ideologically cohesive the state is, which this thesis argues lead to the formation of a 
more moderate and heterodox state Islamic orthodoxy, such as the one we see in Indonesia. 
The opposite argument can also be used to explain the formation and strength of the state 
Islamic orthodoxy in Malaysia.     
To illustrate, the Malaysian educational policies during the first twenty years after 
independence in 1957 were predominantly secular in orientation but underwent a drastic 
change in the late 1970s and early 1980s during the early years of the Islamic resurgence 
trend in the society (more discussion on this in Chapter 2). This was a point of critical 
juncture that upset the existing institutional ideology and identity, and made state institutions 
become more conservative and Islamic. The values and norms of the state Islamic orthodoxy 
were developed in the 1980s by the policymakers within the government, spearheaded by the 
chief architect of the Islamization process, Anwar Ibrahim, whom the former Prime Minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad, recruited away from the opposition-friendly Malaysian Islamic Youth 
Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM). This process occurred in a constant 
discursive engagement with the Islamic ideas and principles of PAS, the opposition Islamic 
party that was challenging the regime on the grounds that it lacked religious legitimacy to 
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govern.73 As the interplay of religious discourse between the state and its Islamic opposition 
produced more conservatism, so did the official orthodoxy which it engendered.74 These 
orthodox values and norms were then incorporated into the mass education system as the state 
tried to employ every means at its disposal to gain an upper hand in its battle of religious 
discourse with the opposition. The monolithic character of the state Islamic orthodoxy in 
Malaysia in turn allowed the state to exert more centralized control over Islamic education.  
Meanwhile in Indonesia, the Islamic revivalism that radically altered the socio-political 
landscape in Malaysia in the late 1970s barely made a ripple in the society, at least not until 
about a decade later. Even then, the identity and ideology of the institution overseeing Islamic 
education (MORA) remained unaffected and the influence of the arbiter of Islamic orthodoxy 
in Indonesia, MUI, also did not increase despite the apparent rise in pietism among the 
Indonesian Muslim population from about the mid-1980s.75 The heterodox nature of state 
Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia is an indication of a state that is more divided and penetrable 
by various Islamic groups with ideologies that run the gamut from the progressive Jaringan 
Islam Liberal to the mainstream Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah to the deeply 
conservative Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Front Pembela Islam. In short, both the states in 
Indonesia and Malaysia encountered a similar exogenous pressure – Islamic revivalism – but 																																																								
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they came up with starkly different responses, producing very different state Islamic 
orthodoxies.  
Islamic orthodoxy and state institutions 
A state Islamic orthodoxy by definition must be promoted by state institutions as a means of 
controlling religious discourse. In order to explore the nature of the Islamic orthodoxy 
propagated by a state at any particular moment in time – in this thesis we are concerned with 
the Islamization period in Indonesia and Malaysia from the late 1970s onward – we need to 
consider the political utility for the state in formulating and institutionalizing certain values 
that make up the state Islamic orthodoxy. One important aspect of orthodoxy is its 
characteristic as an “institutionalized ideology”, meaning attempts at monopolizing religious 
discourse through formal coercive powers of the state apparatus.76 In other words, orthodoxy 
can only function within the framework of state institutions, which renders it official. While 
Islamic orthodoxies have existed since the beginning of Islam, the use of orthodoxy to prop 
up regime legitimacy in the Muslim world was irregular and capricious since the orthodoxy 
itself was highly dependent on the influence of the individual ruler and the feudal kingdom of 
the day. It was the rise of modern states in the Muslim world in the late 1800s with their 
attendant bureaucracies that gave orthodoxy a stable institutional home and provided its 
enforcers with more intrusive and coherent coercive powers. In short, an interpretation of 
Islam only becomes an orthodoxy if a state adopts it. In the words of Hamid Dabashi, “it is 
the political success of a given interpretive reading that renders a religious position 
‘orthodox.’”77  
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Since we have already established that Islamic values have to be ensconced within the state 
institutional structure to render them an orthodoxy, now we want to look at how and why the 
states in Indonesia and Malaysia adopt different types of Islamic orthodoxy. As mentioned 
before, this thesis contends that institutional objectives and institutional complexity play a 
crucial role when it comes to determining the nature of state Islamic orthodoxy. The 
Malaysian and Indonesia cases clearly illustrate the ways these two factors shape the nature of 
Islamic orthodoxy and its influence in the field of Islamic education. JAKIM represents the 
face of Islamic orthodoxy in Malaysia and enjoys the status as an official component of the 
state with the clear purpose of Islamizing the state bureaucracy and the society, along with 
guarding the sanctity of Islam in the country.78 JAKIM has at its disposal the state’s means of 
coercion, which then allows it a monopoly on religious ideas and practices; in other words, it 
enjoys hegemonic control over religious interpretive authority.79 Therefore, Islamic values 
promoted by JAKIM are indistinguishable from the ones adopted by other state institutions. 
All the relevant state institutions share a clear institutional objective and cohesion.80 The 
hegemonic influence of JAKIM’s orthodox values is evident in the curriculum content of the 
Islamic Studies subject (Pendidikan Islam) at the senior high school level, which will be 
discussed in detail in the next sub-section.  
In Indonesia, MUI, on the other hand, is a membership-based organization and only a semi-
official part of the state in Indonesia, with the proverbial other foot planted in the society. As 
such, MUI lacks a core clarity of institutional purpose beyond certain policy areas such as 																																																								
78 “Putrajaya: Jakim benteng negara tangani Syiah, Islam liberal, IS,” Malay Mail Online, 10 
November 2015 (accessed 10 November 2015); “Who else can defend Islam if not Jakim, says 
director-general,” The Malaysian Insider, 18 November 2015 (accessed on 18 November 2015). 
79 “Jakim critic Tawfik Ismail faces sedition probe,” The Malaysian Insider, 24 November 2015 
(accessed on 24 November 2015). 
80 The ideological agreement between the center (JAKIM) and the periphery (Majlis Agama Islam 
Negeri) is best exemplified in a recent concerted condemnation against G25, a moderate Islamic group 
consists of retired high-ranking Malay civil servants, which calls for the dissolution of JAKIM. 
“Abolish G25, says Kedah mufti,” Malaysiakini, 9 December 2015 (accessed on 9 December 2015).  
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halal certification and Islamic banking.81 When it comes to instilling the state with its 
religious values, MUI often finds itself at odds with other institutions within the state due to 
its deeply conservative views. MUI is not empowered with the state’s means of coercion to 
implement and enforce its orthodox values, unlike its counterpart JAKIM in Malaysia. MUI 
also faces challenges to its claim for interpretive authority from major Muslim organizations 
such Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which are far more moderate and arguably more 
influential than MUI. Hence, despite MUI’s claim to be the voice of orthodoxy in Indonesia, 
the reality reveals a more contested arena where heterodoxy retains major influence. The lack 
of a clearly defined institutional objective and ideological fragmentation between various 
state institutions, which result in the dominance of heterodox practices, define the values of 
Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia and its pluralist ideals (more discussion on this in Chapter 2). 
The curriculum of the Islamic Knowledge (Pengetahuan Agama Islam) subject at the senior 
high school level is a clear reflection of these heterodox and more moderate values, as 
opposed to the more monolithic and conservative values one find in similar curriculum in 
Malaysia. Simply put, in Malaysia, Islamic orthodox values are homogenous and consistent 
throughout the state and society; in Indonesia they are varied and highly contested with 
heterodox practices in the society exercising continuing influence.  
Orthodox values in the Islamic education curriculum in Indonesia and Malaysia 
There is plenty of topical overlap between the Pengetahuan Agama Islam curriculum in 
Indonesia and the Pendidikan Islam curriculum in Malaysia, both of which are taught at the 
senior high school level. The topics mainly revolve around matters of faith (aqidah), marriage 
and family, personal conduct, history of Islamic civilization, history of Islam in Indonesia and 																																																								
81 “Gus Mus: MUI Itu Sebenarnya Makhluk Apa?” Tempo, 1 April 2015 (accessed on 15 June 2015); 
Tim Lindsey, “Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of the 
‘Islamic Economy.’” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 48:2 (July 2012), pp. 264-272; H. 
Wahiduddin Adams, “Fatwa MUI dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-Undangan,” in Fatwa MUI 
dalam Perspektif Hukum dan Perundang-Undangan (Jakarta: Puslitbang Lektur dan Khazanah 
Keagamaan, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, 2012), pp. 593-597. 
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Malaysia, and Muslim communal life, which includes governance and citizenship. These 
common topics, however, are where the similarity ends since the values that inform the 
content of the common topics are very different. The need of the state in Malaysia to 
legitimize itself from the Islamic perspective and the state’s response to the growing religious 
conservatism in the society are manifested in the religious values incorporated in the 
Pendidikan Islam curriculum. Likewise, the lack of political utility of Islam as a regime 
legitimizing force and the prevalent heterodox Islamic practices in the Indonesian society 
allow the Pengetahuan Agama Islam curriculum to adopt a more moderate and inclusive 
interpretation when it comes to defining the religious values embedded within the curriculum.       
We will look at three common topics to illustrate the differences in Islamic values and 
interpretations in the two countries’ curricula: faith (aqidah), marriage, and governance/civic 
responsibilities. Examples are drawn from the study guidebooks for Pengetahuan Agama 
Islam and Pendidikan Islam at the senior high school level, which are widely available in 
major bookstores in both countries. When it comes to aqidah, it is clear that pluralist values 
are dominant in the Indonesian curriculum. For instance, the curriculum sees freedom of 
religion and religious pluralism as a human right and an essential component of the 
Indonesia’s state motto Bhineka Tunggal Eka (Unity in Diversity). One textbook for senior 
high schools, by using Quranic interpretations from Surah Al-Kahf verse 29 and Surah Al-
Baqarah verse 256, states that:  
In dealing with the differences in faith and religious practices, Muslims and non-
Muslims must have the freedom of religion and to conduct the teachings of their 
religions, and cannot interfere in each other’s affairs. Islam forbids compulsion in 
religion.82 
																																																								
82 The original excerpt: “Dalam menyikapi perbedaan keimanan dan peribadahan itu, umat Islam dan 
kaum kafir hendaknya bebas beragama dan menjalankan ajaran agama yang dianutnya, dan tidak 
boleh saling mengganggu. Islam melarang memaksa orang lain untuk menganut sesuatu agama.” 
Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMA Kelas XII (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2007), p. 4. 
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In regard to religious pluralism and the need for heterodox practices in fostering a tolerant 
society, the textbook states: 
We have to realize that the words of God are very broad and multi-interpretative, so 
much so that we have to be aware of and respect the existence of many streams within 
a religion.83     
In contrast, the curriculum for Pendidikan Islam in Malaysia contains no such endorsements 
of pluralism. It is very specific when it comes to defining what constitutes as the real teaching 
of Islam and what groups are considered deviants. The only acceptable version of Islam is the 
Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah (followers of Quran and the reported practices of the prophet 
Muhammad) version and Islamic sects such as the Shia, Khawarij, Qadiyani (Ahmadiyah), 
Bahai and Taslim are categorized as deviant teachings (ajaran sesat).84 Furthermore, 
according to the curriculum there is no freedom of religion for Muslims and conversion out of 
Islam is punishable by death.85 This stands in sharp contrast to the previously mentioned 
example in the Indonesian textbook that does not list any deviant Islamic groups and places a 
strong emphasis on non-compulsion in Islam. 
The topic of marriage is another example where we can tease out the differences in 
interpretation and ideological orientation between the curricula for Islamic education in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Two glaring omissions, among others, in the Indonesian textbook 
can be found in its Malaysian counterpart: the right of a husband to hit his wife and 
polygamy. The Malaysian version explicitly permits the husband to hit his wife due to nusyuz 																																																								
83 The original excerpt: “Kita harus sadar bahwa firman Allah swt., sangat luas dan multitafsir 
sehingga perlu sama-sama menyadari dan menghormati lahirnya berbagai aliran dalam satu agama.” 
Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMK dan MAK Kelas XII (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga, 2011), p. 11. 
84 Success Pendidikan Islam SPM (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Fajar, 2012), pp. 201-208. 
85 The study guidebook even lists four benefits why death sentence is appropriate for apostasy: 1) as a 
warning that Islam is not a religion which can be toyed with; 2) to prevent Muslim community from 
breaking up and becoming chaotic; 3) to stop any acts that belittle and besmirch Islam; and 4) to 
prevent apostasy from defiling the greatness of Islam [author’s translation]. Nexus Tuntas SPM 4-5: 
Pendidikan Islam (Petaling Jaya: Sasbadi Sdn. Bhd., 2014), p. 47. 
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(disobedience), which includes the wife’s refusal to have sex with the husband, leaving the 
house without the husband’s permission, behaving badly against the husband, disobeying the 
orders of her husband, and allowing an unrelated man into the house without the husband’s 
knowledge.86 Instead of nusyuz, the Indonesian textbook places emphasis on the equality in 
marriage by stating that both husband and wife have equal rights and status in a marriage and 
should be treated equally in the eyes of law.87 While the practice of polygamy is legal for 
Muslim men in Indonesia, the textbook simply does not discuss the issue under the broad 
topic of marriage. In contrast, the Pendidikan Islam subject in Malaysia devotes one lesson 
plan to the matter of polygamy, essentially sanctioning the practice as long as the man fulfills 
all the requirements, which are: not having more than four wives, acting justly with all the 
wives, and being physically and financially capable.88 These two issues – the right of a 
husband to hit his wife and polygamy – represent a conservative interpretation of Islam, 
which is clearly the ideals espoused by the curriculum in Malaysia; their omissions in the 
Indonesia curriculum, conversely, are an indicator of a more moderate Islamic interpretation.   
The topic of governance/civic responsibilities is another telling illustration of whether Islam 
serves a political utility to the state’s sense of legitimacy. Treatment of the topic can indicate 
whether the state is using an Islamic interpretation to justify the political status quo. In the 
Indonesian curriculum, there is no evident attempt by the state to use Islamic values to prop 
up its legitimacy and extract compliance from the Muslim populace. The only lesson plan 
concerning citizenship and governance mainly touches on how the plural Indonesian society 
can remain united and harmonious while people respect each other’s differences. There is no 																																																								
86 According to the book, the husband has to follow these criteria when hitting his wife: 1) not using 
too much force that can cause injuries; 2) not hitting sensitive body parts such as face and stomach; 3) 
only hit with the objective of teaching the wife a lesson and making her atone for her mistakes; and 4) 
hitting with a non-lethal implement [author’s translation]. Success Pendidikan Islam SPM, p. 229.  
87 Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMK dan MAK, p. 67. 
88 The lesson plan also lists the benefits of polygamy, which are human reproduction, taking care of 
orphans and divorcés, preventing vices, and attaining blessing in this life and the hereafter. Ibid., pp. 
235-37. 
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mention of the relationship between the citizenry and the political leadership.89 Meanwhile, 
the Malaysian curriculum lists a host of citizens’ responsibilities toward their political leaders, 
namely: obedience (which must be provided as long as one is not forced by the leaders to 
commit sins); unconditional support even if one does not like the leaders; and advising the 
leaders through proper and closed channels so as not to publicly shame them and the country 
in the eyes of the world.90 Under the topic of citizenship the Malaysian curriculum also 
justifies the use of repressive laws to save the country from its enemies and maintain 
stability.91 In short, it is clear that the state in Malaysia is actively trying to inculcate values in 
the Islamic education curriculum that it believes can legitimize its rule and preserve the status 
quo, as opposed to Indonesia, where no such attempt can be found.92       
The religious values one finds in Islamic education curricula in Indonesia and Malaysia are 
reflections of the states’ dialectic relationships with Muslim society at large. The values found 
in the Indonesian curriculum reflect the heterodox nature of Islamic practices in the society 
and the weak saliency of Islam as a rule-legitimizing force. The state in Indonesia does not 
have to compete with other socio-political Islamic forces for religious credibility, which 
typically results in a very conservative interpretation of Islam, as we can see in the Malaysian 
case. The heterodox nature of the state institutions also explains why MUI, as the self-
proclaimed arbiter of Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia, has not been able to exert a more 																																																								
89 Pendidikan Agama Islam untuk SMK dan MAK, pp. 119-24. 
90 The lesson plan also states that the implications for defying the leaders include destabilizing the 
country, adversely affecting the economy, and giving opportunity for enemies to destroy the country. 
Success Pendidikan Islam SPM, pp. 311-12. See also “Disloyalty to leader is disloyalty to God, 
Muslims told in Friday sermon,” Malay Mail Online, 18 March 2016 (accessed on 18 March 2016); 
“Murid perlu ditanam rasa taat pada pemimpin, negara – Mahdzir,” Malaysiakini, 30 April 2016 
(accessed on 30 April 2016).  
91 The lesson plan argues that enemies of the country can be thwarted by keeping surveillance on 
suspicious activities, taking legal actions against any threatening activities, and establishing preventive 
laws that can nip the threat in the bud. Ibid., p. 308. 
92 There were charges that pro-government views were also incorporated in the senior high school 
national exam (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia, SPM) questions for Pendidikan Moral, a Pendidikan Islam 
equivalent subject for non-Muslim students. “Partisan politics in SPM Moral exam?” Malay Mail 
Online, 19 November 2015 (accessed on 19 November 2015).  
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muscular and deep-reaching role in imbuing the state – including the education system – with 
its conservative values. In essence, there is a low degree of congruency between the values 
advocated by MUI and the values contained in the curriculum for Pengetahuan Agama 
Islam.93 Nevertheless, this is also not to say that values found in MORA’s Pengetahuan 
Agama Islam curriculum is representative of Indonesian Muslim society as a whole. 
Heterodox values within Indonesian Muslim society are still highly contested as evidenced by 
the discrimination and violence against the followers of Ahmadiyah and Shia and church 
closure controversies in some parts of the country. The fact that these heterodox values are in 
constant state of flux across the society indicates that no one Islamic interpretation holds sway 
over others. In essence, the pluralist approach of the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia 
allows for Islamic interpretations of all ideological stripes to co-exist and compete with each 
other.    
In contrast, in Malaysia there is a high degree of congruency between the values espoused by 
JAKIM and the values found in the Pendidikan Islam curriculum. JAKIM regularly revises 
and streamlines the curriculum and textbooks for Islamic education and expects total 
compliance from teachers and students.94 JAKIM acts as, borrowing the words of Althusser, 
the “state ideological apparatus”, which tries to reproduce its own Islamic values in the 																																																								
93 The hardline values propagated by MUI stand in stark contrast to the more moderate ones found in 
the Pengetahuan Agama Islam curriculum. For example, MUI issued a fatwa in 2005 that declared 
pluralism, liberalism and secularism to be against the tenets of Islam. MUI had also issued fatwas 
against Shia and Ahmadiyah groups. Himpunan Fatwa MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: Sekretariat Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, 2011), pp. 40-41, 46-47, 87-95, 96-99. When it comes to marriage, MUI adopts a 
patriarchal view that a wife must choose family over career. “Tidak Mentaati Orang Lain Selain 
Suami,” Mimbar Ulama, February 2004, p. 45; “Perkahwinan; Antara Karir dan Keluarga,” Mimbar 
Ulama, May 2004, pp. 42-44. In regard to politics and governance, MUI is highly nationalistic and 
supports a more centralized Indonesia as it sees decentralization as a precursor to widespread 
heterodox Islamic practices (and a weakening of its role as the country’s arbiter of Islamic values). 
“Usul Majelis Ulama Terhadap RUU Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah Dan Konsep Satu Atap 
Mahkamah Agung,” Mimbar Ulama, April 1999, pp. 28-29; “Menyoroti RUU Pemerintahan Daerah 
dan Peradilan Satu Atap: MUI Kembali Datangi DPR,” Mimbar Ulama, April 1999, pp. 33-34. Also 
see Syafiq Hasyim, “Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Pluralism in Indonesia,” Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 41:4-5 (May-June 2015), pp. 490-494. 
94 Pelan Tindakan Strategik JAKIM 2009-2014: Memacu Transformasi Pengurusan Hal Ehwal Islam 
(Putrajaya: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, 2009), p. 61. 
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society as a means to legitimize the state’s hold on power.95 A highly religious and deeply 
conservative Malay-Muslim society partly informs the values held by JAKIM and other state 
institutions, which the state, in turn, reproduces in the society albeit in a form that is amenable 
to its political goal, which is to sustain its legitimacy.96 In other words, a monolithic 
interpretation of Islamic values shared by both the state and the Malay-Muslim society in 
Malaysia allows the state to minimize disruptive influence from the Islamic social forces that 
can challenge its legitimacy, especially the opposition political party PAS.  
INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE 
If the analysis of state-society relations is the first prong of this thesis’ framework, studying 
institutional dynamics forms the second prong; in particular it uses the conceptual tools 
provided by the extensive work done in the area of comparative historical institutionalism.97 
																																																								
95 JAKIM’s view is clear when it comes to obeying political leaders: “Allah hina rakyat tidak hormat 
pemimpin, kata Jakim,” Malay Mail Online, 11 March 2016 (accessed on 11 March, 2016). 
96 A Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey by the Pew Research Center of eleven countries with 
significant Muslim population that gauges the population’s views on ISIS, an international Islamic 
terror group, shows that higher number of Indonesians (79 percent) are not in favor of ISIS compared 
to 64 percent in Malaysia. More tellingly, 11 percent of Malaysians have a favorable view of ISIS 
compared to only 4 percent in Indonesia. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-
significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/ (accessed on 19 November 2015). A 2011 survey by 
Goethe Institute and Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in collaboration with the Merdeka 
Centre for Opinion Research in Malaysia showed that almost 81 percent of Muslim youth (15 to 25 
years old) in Malaysia defined themselves as Muslim first, not Malaysian or Malay while more than 
70 percent wanted the Quran to replace the Constitution. 
http://www.goethe.de/ins/id/pro/jugendstudie/jugendstudie_en.pdf (accessed on 1 February 2016). These 
two surveys serve as an indicator of the deep religious conservatism that is prevalent within the 
Malay-Muslim population in Malaysia.  
97 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, 
and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, 
Institutions and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Kathleen Thelen, “How 
Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis” in Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences, eds., James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 305-336; Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, “Historical 
Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science” in Political Science: State of the Discipline, eds., 
Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), pp. 693-721; James Mahoney, 
“Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 (Aug. 2000): pp. 521-23; 
Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring politics: Historical 
institutionalism in comparative analysis (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992).           
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In the context of this thesis, the conceptual tools provided by historical institutionalism allow 
the analysis of state institutions involved in Islamic education throughout the modern history 
of Indonesia and Malaysia (from the late 1800s to present time) i.e. why these institutions 
come into existence and act in certain ways at certain periods of time. Historical 
institutionalism focuses on the role of timing, sequencing and interactions between various 
socio-political-economic forces (endogenous and exogenous) that lead to the creation of a 
particular type of institution. An institution, as seen by historical institutionalists, is a product 
of a “critical juncture”, a seminal moment in historical time when the aforementioned factors 
interact to produce major change. This approach helps to explain why certain institutions 
come into existence at a certain point in time and not others, and the unique characteristics of 
the said institutions. By mapping out the process of institutional formation and trajectory in 
various chapters of history, one can deduce why and how an institution develops a particular 
identity and behaves in a certain way. Historical institutionalism also looks at the constraints 
provided by the institutions in molding not just the behavior and strategies of political actors 
but also their goals. In other words, every act of a political actor must be analyzed beyond the 
limited scope of that actor’s self-interests since those interests do not appear in a vacuum but 
must be explained in a larger context, with reference to the role of institutions and their 
limitations, which again, are significantly influenced by various socio-political-economic 
forces. According to two leading historical institutionalists, “by shaping not just actors’ 
strategies (as in rational choice), but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations of 
cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint 
on political outcomes.”98 In short, historical institutionalism contributes to the middle-range 
theory that “explicitly focuses on intermediate variables in order to integrate an understanding 
of general patterns of political history with an explanation of the contingent nature of political 																																																								
98 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical institutionalism in comparative politics” in Sven 
Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring politics: Historical institutionalism 
in comparative analysis (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 9. 
	 45 
and economic development.”99  With regard to the thesis, the intermediate variables here refer 
to factors such as the culture and ideology of institutions that deal with Islamic education in 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and which affect how these institutions shape the behavior of actors 
who actively participate in the Islamic education system and in society at large.       
Comparative historical institutionalism also tries to tackle the question of why institutions in 
general can be resistant to change by introducing the concept of path dependency, defined as 
“historical causation in which dynamics triggered by an event or process at one point in time 
reproduce and reinforce themselves even in the absence of recurrence of the original event of 
process.”100 This essentially means that actions of the past determine the limit and scope of 
decisions that can be made in the present. The durability of institutional logic (the institution’s 
internal culture and driving philosophy), seen in this analytical light, can be explained through 
the ability of the institution concerned to adapt and reinforce its norms and beliefs over time 
as various processes from within and without the particular institution intersect and interact to 
produce what is called “positive feedback”, which, in turn, helps to sustain the institution in 
the long run.101 Feedbacks are the causal chains of events that in the end reinforce institutional 
logic and durability, which explain why some institutions are more resistant to change than 
others. 
Another essential notion introduced by comparative historical institutionalism is “institutional 
complexity.” Institutional complexity refers to the balance of power and the nature of 
interactions between various components of the state. Dan Slater uses this concept to illustrate 
																																																								
99 Ibid., p. 28. 
100 Paul Pierson, “Path Dependency, Increasing Returns and the Study of Politics,” American Political 
Science Review 94.2 (1997), p. 195. 
101 Ibid., p. 195. 
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the durability of Suharto’s New Order regime and its ultimate downfall.102 The more complex 
an institution and its interactions with other institutions within the state, the more 
opportunities provided for vested institutional actors who want to preserve the status quo from 
forces of change and also for agents of change – from within and without the institution – to 
alter the status quo; in other words, institutional complexity presents a competitive 
atmosphere between actors who clamor for change and those who want to the institution to 
remain static. The types of opportunities offered by institutional complexity determine the 
types of agency that either want to preserve the status quo or challenge it. Slater develops his 
notion of institutional complexity in the context of authoritarianism, showing how varying 
institutional arrangements and dynamics provide agentic opportunities and thus prospect for 
institutional change that can either lead to the durability of the authoritarian regime or its 
eventual collapse.103 Within the narrow scope of this thesis, the concept of institutional 
complexity is used as a complementary analytical tool, along with the aforementioned notions 
of feedbacks and path dependency, to describe the process of ideological formation in state 
institutions that deal with Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia and the reasons why 
the institutional ideology manages to persist over time or simply fade into irrelevancy.  
Comparative historical institutionalism and Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia 
This study aims to explain why, when it comes to exerting its hegemony via Islamic 
education, the state in Malaysia has been more successful in minimizing the influences from 
the society than its counterpart in Indonesia. Comparative historical institutionalism is useful 
in explaining the characteristics needed by the particular state educational agencies involved 
in Islamic education – i.e. the national ministries and their local offices – to carry out their 
																																																								
102 Dan Slater, “Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in 
Indonesia” in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, 
Agency, and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 132-167.  
103 Ibid., pp. 138-140. 
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functions as the ideological apparatus of the state. The conceptual tools provided by 
comparative historical institutionalism allow us to study the behavioral dynamics of the 
educational institutions across time and space, dynamics which lead to formulation of 
different, and on occasions, conflicting types of policies and (non)uniformity of policy 
implementation and enforcement at the local level. In other words, these tools help us to 
understand what kind of institutional logic allows for a certain Islamic educational policy to 
be formulated at a certain point in time and what factors determine the implementation 
success or failure of the said policy. For instance, one major focus of this thesis is how and 
why the state institutions in Indonesia and Malaysia formulated specific Islamic educational 
policies in response to the Islamic resurgence from the late 1970s and how the particular 
characters of these state institutions affected the viability of the formulated policies. As state 
bodies tasked with ideological inculcation, institutions overseeing Islamic education also 
become an arena of contestation between competing interests within and without the state 
looking to shape the identity and raison d’être of the institutions. The complexity of these 
institutions, their inter- and intra-relationships, along the vertical (center-periphery) and 
horizontal (inter-ministerial) axes of governance, determine the types of policies being 
formulated and how these policies are implemented and enforced. 
To illustrate in the context of this thesis the concepts discussed previously such as critical 
juncture, path dependency and institutional complexity, let us turn to one of the institutions 
that is the focus of this study: the Malaysian Ministry of Education. Islamic revivalism in the 
late 1970s can be seen as the impetus for the institutional “critical juncture” that forced the 
Ministry of Education to adapt to the rising religious conservatism in the society and 
transformed the hitherto irreligious institution by infusing it with more religious values and 
norms, which it then propagated across society through its curriculum, textbooks, teachers’ 
training programs, collaboration with local Islamic NGOs, and so on. Some of the graduates 
of the orthodox-influenced Islamic education system ended up working within the Ministry, 
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thus continuing the cycle. This unbroken cycle of inculcation, dissemination and 
reinforcement of state Islamic orthodoxy forms a “positive feedback” mechanism within the 
Ministry of Education and the Malaysian Islamic Development Agency (Jabatan Kemajuan 
Islam Malaysia, JAKIM), which explains these two bodies’ intra- and inter-institutional 
norms and cultural orientation and their engagement with the socio-political trends in the 
outside world (in this case, Islamic revivalism), and how they manage to remain relevant to 
this day. In other words, both the state institutions – Ministry of Education and JAKIM – and 
the deeply conservative Malay-Muslim society feed off each other with the state trying to 
shape the religious discourse in its favor. 
Similarly, in the Indonesian case, there are historical forces and feedback mechanisms that 
explain the particular characteristics of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) and why they tend to be less intrusive in 
managing the Islamic education system than their Malaysian counterparts, despite the 
pervasive influence of Islamic revivalism and the highly centralized nature of the Indonesian 
unitary state during the New Order period. Heterogeneity in Islamic practices is very 
prevalent in Indonesia with major Islamic groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah 
and Persis commanding strong grassroots support that allows these groups to remain 
autonomous throughout their history. As such, the ideologically moderate nature of MORA is 
a reflection of the diversity in the ways Islam has always been interpreted and practised in 
Indonesia, where no group has so far managed to monopolize the religious interpretive 
authority and impose its own values on others despite the best attempts by the hardline MUI 
to do so. For example, the curriculum for Islamic education (Pendidikan Agama Islam) is a 
culmination of MORA’s moderate institutional ideology, which can differ wildly from the 
views espoused by MUI, as explained above. Another reason is that the same critical juncture 
of Islamic resurgence that hit Malaysia in the late 1970s did not take place in the same way in 
Indonesia. Suharto’s New Order regime was firmly ensconced in rule, with political 
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expression of Islam safely emasculated, which precluded any significant Islamically-inspired 
challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. The regime, in turn, did not feel the need to coopt 
religious discourse in order to remain legitimate and so there was no move toward instilling 
pro-regime orthodox values in the Islamic education curriculum, in contrast to the Ministry of 
Education in Malaysia. Nonetheless, similar to the Malaysian case, some of the graduates of 
the Indonesian heterodox-infused Islamic education curriculum ended up joining MORA and 
going on to perpetuate the pre-existing institutional culture and ideology; in other words, 
acting as “positive feedback” mechanism by reinforcing the institutional status quo. 
Reinforcement of institutional norms through feedback mechanisms as found in both the 
Malaysian and Indonesian cases makes the state institutions that deal with Islamic education 
resistant to change over time.   
Institutional complexity, which plays an integral part in opening up windows of opportunity 
for agents of change to influence institutional dynamics, can be analyzed through the 
interactions and history of relationships between all the institutional actors with interests in 
Islamic education. In the Indonesian case, the longstanding uneasy relationship between 
MORA, MOEC and their local offices, and the quasi non-governmental status of Indonesian 
Islamic Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), the standard bearer of Islamic orthodoxy in 
Indonesia, contribute to why policies on Islamic education are more fragmented and why the 
state’s control over Islamic education in the country is relatively weak.104 Meanwhile, in 
Malaysia, the near-uniform institutional objectives of all the agencies in charge of Islamic 
education such as the Ministry of Education, its local offices, JAKIM, and State Islamic 
Agency (Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri, JAIN), allow the formulation of more coherent 
Islamic educational policies and their effective implementation and enforcement at the local 
																																																								
104 Two major issues that animate the uneasy relationship between these institutions especially in the 
era of decentralization (post-1999), which will be discussed at length in Chapter 2: the single-roof 
education system (sistem pendidikan satu atap) and funding for madrasah.   
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level. This thesis argues that the institutional complexity is higher in Indonesia than Malaysia, 
which then produces more opportunities for institutional agents to either preserve the status 
quo or effect incremental changes over time. The near ideologically monolithic state 
institutions in Malaysia result in less opportunity for institutional changes to take place, which 
produces the preservation of the status quo. Institutional complexity in the Indonesian case, 
on the other hand, allows for more opportunities for change to emerge. In short, different 
levels of institutional complexity can help to explain why Islamic education in Indonesia and 
Malaysia has taken such divergent trajectories.           
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK IN THE CONTEXT OF THESIS ARGUMENT 
As mentioned in the opening section of this chapter, one of the questions this thesis asks is 
why has the state in Malaysia been more successful in minimizing the influence of Islamic 
socio-political groups compared to the state in Indonesia, and has thus been able to centralize 
its control over the Islamic education in the country. There are three factors that shape the 
state’s ability to deal with the pressures from Islamic groups, and thus determine its capacity 
to exert more dominance, in this case, in the field of Islamic education: the ideological 
makeup of the state institutions; the patterns of Islamization in the society that necessitate 
different reactions from the state; and the control of resources by the central government that 
influences the interaction between the center and periphery. The thesis explains these factors 
within the theoretical framework laid out in the preceding sections, namely by employing Joel 
Migdal’s state-in-society approach and comparative historical institutionalism. Three paired 
case studies in each country – Aceh, Nusa Tenggara Timur and West Java in Indonesia and 
Kelantan, Sarawak and Selangor in Malaysia – are used to illustrate in empirical terms the 
points argued by the thesis. 
The paired comparisons are chosen for specific reasons. Aceh in Indonesia and Kelantan in 
Malaysia have generally similar socio-cultural backgrounds. Both are Muslim-majority areas 
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that take pride in their long-standing Islamic learning traditions and piety, so much so that 
they both earn the moniker Serambi Mekah (Verandah of Mecca). Nusa Tenggara Timur in 
Indonesia and Sarawak in Malaysia are Christian-majority areas in Muslim-majority 
countries. They are chosen to explore dynamics of Islamic education within the Muslim-
minority communities in these areas, areas that might be expected to be backwaters for 
Islamic education. Lastly, West Java in Indonesia and Selangor in Malaysia are chosen for 
comparison due to the popularity of integrated Islamic schools in some Muslim-majority 
suburbs in these two areas. Integrated Islamic schools are largely located in the middle- and 
upper-middle class Muslim neighborhoods that tend to be religiously conservative. These 
schools represent the aspirations of well-to-do Muslims to provide the best religious and 
general educations for their children. They are chosen as case studies because they represent 
the educational cutting edge of the Islamic resurgence. 
Joel Migdal proposes that the state and society are mutually constitutive and that the various 
components of the state might not always work in harmony with each other due to their 
susceptibility to exogenous social pressures. As already noted, Migdal identifies four areas of 
contestation within the state, which he calls “points of pressure.” In the context of this thesis, 
these refer to points in the hierarchical institutional structure that manages Islamic education 
in Indonesia and Malaysia: the executive and ministerial level (commanding heights); the 
policy-making bureaucracy inside the overseeing ministries (central offices); local 
educational offices (dispersed field offices); and the schools (trenches). The capacity of the 
state to implement and enforce its Islamic educational policies depends on how these pressure 
points interact with each other. The thrust of the argument, which strives to refine Migdal’s 
conception of state-society relations, is the ability of the state to minimize the discrepancy and 
conflict in and between these pressure points so that it is able to project its hegemony more 
coherently. One way for the state to ensure that the pressure points are working harmoniously 
is by cultivating a uniform institutional culture and identity across the axes of governance.  
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It is therefore imperative to study the factors that shape institutional culture and identity at the 
aforementioned points of pressure. The thesis argues that the formation of an institutional 
identity starts with a critical juncture, an exogenously-induced rupture marked by a 
momentous time in history. In the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, the first critical juncture 
was in the late 1800s and early 1900s, in which we can trace the identity formation of the 
institutions that oversee Islamic education to the colonial period when the Dutch and British 
first introduced mass education. The interplay between colonial educational policies and their 
specific policies on Islam and the Muslim population was a major factor in shaping the nature 
of Islamic education for years to come. In particular, the dynamics between these two major 
factors – colonial educational and Islamic policies – are integral to explaining why and how 
state institutions overseeing Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia assumed certain 
types of characteristics at the time of their establishment.  
The thesis argues that educational institutional identity was more decentralized and 
fragmented in Indonesia than in Malaysia as a result of the effects of colonial policy. While 
both the Dutch and the British adopted a laissez faire approach when it came to their colonial 
educational policies, the British exerted more oversight over the national education system by 
providing conditional financial assistance such as grants-in-aid and introducing Islamic 
instruction in Malay vernacular schools as a way to revive lagging enrollment from Malay-
Muslim students. The increased bureaucratization of Islam in British Malaya that started in 
the early 1900s, which placed many private Islamic schools under the control of state 
religious councils (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri) and later the Ministry of Education, also 
explains why state educational institutions in Malaysia assumed a more centralized form than 
their equivalents in Indonesia. These particular institutional characteristics – the degree of 
centralization and bureaucratization of Islam – formed a set of constraints that shaped the 
future trajectory and propensity for change of the institutions. Between the 1950s and 1970s, 
the ministry in Malaysia did not actively try to centralize its control over Islamic education, 
	 53 
lacking political motive and facing constitutional constraints that reserved the management of 
Islamic schools for state bureaucracies. It was only in the late 1970s when the ministry started 
to exert more influence over Islamic schools. 
When the second critical juncture appeared in the late 1970s in the form of the Islamic 
resurgence, it brought about different opportunities for institutional change within the 
ministries in Indonesia and Malaysia. The Malay-dominated civil service and the ascendancy 
of pro-Malay policies, a result of the 1971 New Economic Policy (NEP), provided prime 
opportunities for newly empowered Malay-Muslim activists to Islamize the state institutions 
and to use the deep reach of the state to inculcate the Malay-Muslim society in their own 
values, giving rise to the state Islamic orthodoxy as discussed in the previous section (and 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2). The same critical juncture did not have a similar effect 
on state institutions in Indonesia. The New Order regime did not deem it necessary to engage 
in Islamic discourse for political legitimacy, and thus provided no opportunities for change 
agents to transform the institutional culture within the state. This essentially meant the 
preservation of the pre-existing decentralized and fragmented status quo. 
Finally, ideological hegemony and state Islamic orthodoxy are two important inter-related 
concepts that inform the ability of the state to functionalize Islamic education for its own 
political ends. In the Indonesian case, this thesis argues that the political end for the state in 
functionalizing Islamic education is to promote unity based on diversity of religious and 
cultural practices especially in the Reformasi era (1998 to present). The values that make up 
the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia are moderate and inclusive in nature, which is a 
reflection of the influence that various Islamic social groups of many ideological stripes 
exercise in shaping the overarching ideological orientation of the state institutions in 
Indonesia. The lack of institutional cohesion in Indonesia, marked by the dearth of common 
goals among various state institutions, results in a porous Indonesian state that can be 
influenced with relative ease by Islamic social groups with varying ideologies. This lack of 
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common institutional goal, when compared to the more institutionally cohesive Malaysia, is 
because the state in Indonesia does not depend on dominating the Islamic discourse for its 
legitimacy, unlike its Malaysian counterpart, which has the explicit institutional agenda to 
Islamize the bureaucracy and the society. The ideological coherency of state institutions in 
Malaysia and their shared institutional goals of propagating a single unchallenged 
interpretation of Islam, run almost seamlessly from the center to the periphery of governance. 
The high degree of ideological congruency between various state institutions and the Malay-
Muslim society allows the state in Malaysia to exert its ideological hegemony in the form of 
state Islamic orthodoxy more effectively with minimal interference from countervailing 
Islamic social groups.105 In Indonesia, in contrast, the incoherent overarching institutional 
goals of the Indonesian state lead to more divided and permeable state institutions prone to 
influence from social groups, which, in turn, weakens the state’s ability to exert its hegemony 
in the field of Islamic education. The 1999 decentralization laws further exacerbate the 
Indonesian state’s weak control over Islamic education when the matters of education are 
transferred to the local levels while religious affairs remain at the center (more discussion on 
this subject in Chapter 2). In sum, the heterodox Islamic practices in Indonesian society shape 
the values that make up the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia but at the same time 
contribute to the inability of the state to exert more dominance due to the ideological 
incoherency among the state institutions, in this case, the ones that deal with Islamic 
education.  
																																																								
105 In 2008 the Malaysian government via the Prime Minister’s Office, of which JAKIM is also part, 
established Islamic Consultative Council (Majlis Perundingan Islam, MPI), which currently consists 
of 87 members from various backgrounds such as civil servants, academics, ulama, CEOs, and heads 
of major Islamic NGOs. MPI’s main function is to act as a “think tank” that helps the government to 
implement development policies based on Islamic principles. Mesyuarat Majlis Perundingan Islam: 
http://www.islam.gov.my/en/mesyuarat-majlis-perundingan-islam (accessed on 15 February, 2016). For a 
list of MPI members, see http://e-muamalat.gov.my/sites/default/files/VVIP/a8-
_majlis_perundingan_islam.pdf (accessed on 15 February, 2016). See also “Deputy minister admits 
Putrajaya funds Islamic groups, including Isma,” Malay Mail Online, 13 February 2016 (accessed on 
13 February, 2016).  
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METHODOLOGY 
In preparing this dissertation, I employed two main methods of research: semi-structured 
interviews with state officials in charge of Islamic education, Islamic school principals and 
teachers, and advocates for Islamic education; and archival, which also includes various 
libraries. In Indonesia, I interviewed officials at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) 
and their local offices (kantor wilayah) in Banda Aceh, Kupang, and Bandung. I also spent 
time interviewing several officials at the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, MUI) headquarters in Jakarta and the heads of its provincial chapters in Banda 
Aceh and Kupang. In Banda Aceh, I also interviewed the head of the Dayah Education 
Development Agency (Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Dayah, BPPD). I visited two modern 
dayah in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar, one madrasah in Kupang, and two integrated Islamic 
schools in Depok. During these school visits, I managed to talk with the principals and 
teachers and observe one period of classroom learning and teaching in each school. While in 
Jakarta, I also interviewed the head of Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu (JSIT) and visited its 
office in a suburb south of Jakarta. When it comes to archival research, I visited the collection 
of Mimbar Ulama periodicals at the MUI’s headquarters and the extensive in-house 
publications at MORA. I also spent time at the national archive in Jakarta, provincial archive 
in Banda Aceh, provincial libraries in Banda Aceh and Kupang, and university libraries at 
Universitas Indonesia and Universitas Islam Negeri Jakarta. 
In Malaysia, I interviewed officials at the Ministry of Education and its state offices in Kota 
Bharu, Kuching, and Shah Alam. I also talked with several officials at the Islamic 
Development Agency (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, JAKIM). I visited two Islamic 
schools in Kelantan, one in Sarawak and two integrated Islamic schools in the Selangor 
suburbs of Bangi and Gombak. During these schools visits, I interviewed the principals and 
teachers and observe one period of classroom teaching and learning. I also managed to 
interview the head of Musleh schools, a main network of integrated Islamic schools run by 
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IKRAM, an organization of predominantly Muslim professionals. Archival research in 
Malaysia was carried out at the national archive and national library in Kuala Lumpur, 
JAKIM’s library, state libraries in Kota Bharu and Kuching, and the libraries at Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia and Universiti Malaya.      
ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized into six chapters, three of which consist of paired comparisons of 
similar Islamic educational settings in Indonesia and Malaysia. Chapter 1 has outlined the 
research questions, argument, and hypothesis. It also framed the thesis in a larger theoretical 
and comparative picture by drawing from literature on sociology of education, modern 
Islamic education in the Muslim world, state-society relations, institutionalism, and 
orthodoxy.  
Chapter 2 delves deeper into state functionalization of Islamic education and national 
education in general in Indonesia and Malaysia by tracing the trajectory of the state 
institutions overseeing mass education and the variation of policies from the colonial period 
until the present day. The chapter starts with a discussion of educational policies during the 
late colonial period (late 1800s to 1950s) when the Dutch and the British tried to introduce 
and implement standardized mass education in the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya, 
respectively. In the post-colonial era, mass education became inextricably enmeshed with the 
nationalism project as the states in Indonesia and Malaysia tried to formulate new national 
identities and inculcate their standardized values through the national education system. The 
national education system was transformed into a political battleground as various groups 
contended for their ideological views to be heard, which, in turn, affected the nature of the 
state institutions dealing with national education, and Islamic education in particular. The 
chapter ends with an overview of the organizational structure and functions of the state 
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institutions and types of Islamic schools that comprise the Islamic education system in 
Indonesia and Malaysia.      
Chapter 3 uses case studies from Aceh in Indonesia and Kelantan in Malaysia since these two 
areas are socio-culturally very similar, particularly when it comes to their deeply conservative 
Islamic cultures. The chapter strives to illustrate in detail why, despite the two area’s shared 
legacy of Islamic learning, Aceh has been able to preserve the uniqueness of its Islamic 
educational tradition while Islamic education in Kelantan is slowly being “federalized” by the 
government in Putrajaya. The modern Islamic education system in Aceh and Kelantan traces 
its formation to the late colonial period and early years of independence when various socio-
political groups jockeyed to become the sole representative of Islamic authority in both areas. 
These local power dynamics coincided with efforts by the centralizing states in Indonesia (up 
until 1998) and Malaysia to impose their own ideals through the national education system. 
Islamic education became a contested arena between advocates for the preservation of local 
Islamic learning traditions and agents of state educational institutions who saw local traditions 
as both a threat to the state’s legitimacy and an opportunity to be exploited in order to buttress 
the state’s legitimacy. In the end, it is argued that, despite the present progress of Islamic 
education in both areas, Aceh has been more successful in preserving the uniqueness of its 
learning tradition than Kelantan, where the federal government over the past four decades has 
been slowly ensuring that learning conforms to national standards.     
Chapter 4 presents case studies from Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) in Indonesia and Sarawak 
in Malaysia. The reason for the comparison is because both areas have Christian-majority 
population and lack long-standing traditions of Islamic learning, and therefore it is interesting 
to explore the dynamics of Islamic education in these two Muslim backwater areas. The thesis 
argues the differences in political strength of the respective Muslim minority groups mean 
that Islamic education in Sarawak is much better off than in NTT. At the heart of the chapter’s 
argument is a matrix of power relations and tolerance, in which concessions made by the 
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minority group are measured against the political dominance of the majority group. In NTT, 
the Muslim-minority group is politically weak, so much so that the Christian-majority group 
is able to extract many concessions from the Muslim-minority group without threatening its 
own social and political dominance. In Sarawak, on the other hand, the Muslim-minority 
group is politically dominant. It does not have to concede much when it comes to political 
power and control of resources due to the heavy backing from the Malay-Muslim dominated 
federal government in Putrajaya, while at the same time keeping check on the social and 
political domination of the non-Muslim majority group. The chapter lists three factors that 
explain the discrepancy of political strength of Muslim-minority groups in these two areas: 
historical legacy, post-independence political dynamics, and center-periphery relations. In 
NTT, the weak reach of the central state from Jakarta, coupled with the heterodox values 
inherent in the state Islamic orthodoxy, allows local Islamic schools and education offices to 
adapt Islamic education to the multi-religious context of the region . In short, despite the lack 
of local autonomy, Islamic education in Sarawak seems to be better off than in NTT.     
Chapter 5 focuses on the rising popularity of integrated Islamic schools among urban middle- 
and upper-middle class Muslims in Depok, Indonesia and Bangi, Malaysia, Muslim-
dominated suburban enclaves in the outskirts of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, respectively. The 
chapter argues that due to their genesis in the Islamic socio-political movement in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, integrated Islamic schools serve as an ideological training ground for 
future cadres for the Islamic political movement. Presently, integrated Islamic schools in 
Indonesia are generally affiliated with the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera, PKS) and other ideologically like-minded modernist Islamic organizations while 
their counterparts in Malaysia typically sympathize with the opposition despite their 
Islamically conservative ideological orientation. In the context of the broader argument, this 
chapter shows how financial autonomy and state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia and Malaysia 
allow for the aforementioned dynamics to take place. Not being financially dependent on the 
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state provides integrated Islamic schools in both countries the discursive space to promote 
their conservative brand of Islam and political indoctrination since financial autonomy equals 
less supervision and onerous bureaucratic demands from the state. State Islamic orthodoxy in 
each respective country also plays an important role in the said discursive space. Heteredox 
values of the Indonesian Islamic state orthodoxy mean that some schools can even promote a 
deeply conservative version of Islam that might run counter to state’s more tolerant and 
inclusive interpretation of Islam. In Malaysia, the state Islamic orthodoxy provides 
conservative integrated Islamic schools room for political dissent against the government as 
long as the opposition takes place within the discursive space delimited by the state’s 
conservative Islamic values.          





Overview of state functionalization of national education in Indonesia and Malaysia 
from the late 1800s to the present  
 
Functionalization of the national education in general and Islamic education in particular 
entails two interrelated integral aspects: standardization and nationalization. Standardization 
refers to the streamlining and homogenizing of national education based on a single standard 
set by the central government. The standard typically requires schools to adhere to a common 
curriculum, teach students to pass compulsory national exams, use mandated textbooks, 
employ teachers who are certified by the ministry, among others. Nationalization of education 
involves attempts by the state to build more national public schools and incorporate more 
privately run schools into the national education system. Normatively speaking, by clustering 
as many schools as possible within the national education system and enforcing a single 
standard of education on these schools, the state can be more effective in propagating its 
values among the population at large. These values, which can be religious and/or 
nationalistic, can serve as one of the means for the state to maintain its legitimacy and prolong 
its rule. Of course in reality, not every state has the capacity to standardize and nationalize 
education and schools in the country due to the tensions between state institutions dealing 
with national and Islamic education as well as strong influences from various groups within 
the society, which will be amply demonstrated later in this chapter.  
The standardization of Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia traces its genesis to the 
advent of modern madrasah education in the early 1900s. Traditional Islamic education, as 
described in Chapter 1, does not employ a common standard among its schools; rather, the 
head of each school set his/her own standard. Modern madrasah education largely follows the 
Western model of modern education, which implements a standard curriculum, divides 
students into various levels of competency, and introduces mandatory exams as an evaluative 
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means. Authoritative body such as school boards, state religious departments and the ministry 
professionally manage and staff the schools by training and certifying the teachers, appointing 
school principals, and introducing entrance exam to select students for admission. The 
standardization and professionalization of the Islamic schools led to the heads of these 
schools assuming a bureaucratic role that deviates far from the more spiritual role played by 
the heads of traditional Islamic schools such as kiyai in Indonesia and tok guru in Malaysia. It 
is a distinction that still holds today. During the late colonial era in Indonesia and Malaysia 
(late 1800s to mid-1950s), the purpose of standardized education was to staff the lower rungs 
of the colonial bureaucracy and the booming commercial sectors with educated labor. The 
expanded career opportunities provided traditional Islamic schools in Indonesia and Malaysia 
the impetus to reform their curricula and pedagogical methods since now the Islamic school 
graduates could potentially explore employment options outside the religious realm. 
Standardization and modernization of education signaled the beginning of the slow demise of 
traditional Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia. Traditional Islamic schools, in 
essence, had to reform their modus operandi or fade into irrelevancy and most did the 
former.1 
What standardization of education accomplished from the early 1900s on was to reduce long-
standing heterogeneity of educational practices in the Netherlands East Indies (formerly 
Indonesia) and British Malaya. The opening up and diversification of the colonial economy 
provided new job opportunities in public and private sectors, which required applicants to be 
trained in specific trade skills or in possession of a certain qualification.2 Production and 
																																																								
1 Even though there are still thousands of traditional pesantren in Indonesia and scores of pondok in 
Malaysia that are not part of the national education system, most of them had converted to People’s 
Religious School (Sekolah Agama Rakyat, SAR) in the case of pondok in Malaysia, and incorporate 
madrasah education as part of the traditional Islamic education in the case of pesantren in Indonesia, 
part of the effort to modernize their curriculum since the early 1900s. 
2 By 1938 the British colonial administration employed 1,742 Malays in Federated Malay States in 
low-level administrative works from the total of 4,938 employees. William Roff, The Origins of 	
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export of commodities such as rubber, tin, sugar and tobacco shot up exponentially from the 
mid-1800s to 1930s.3 In the post-independence years, the need for an educated workforce 
motivated the state to establish the national educational system and determine what values 
should be instilled in the national curriculum. The post-colonial states in Indonesia and 
Malaysia realized early on that not only could standardization, which was part of the national 
education system, produce an educated workforce of a consistent quality but also serve, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, as a powerful means to inculcate its ideals in the students. In the 
context of Islamic education, the state’s ability to implement and enforce its own version of 
orthodoxy through the national curriculum is especially useful when Islamic principles form 
the basis of the state’s legitimacy. In theory, the state can win the minds of the Muslim 
populace if it is able to monopolize the Islamic values these Muslims imbibe at a young age at 
school. Thus, it is imperative for us to look in detail into the attempts by states in Indonesia 
and Malaysia to nationalize and standardize the education system in various epochs from the 
late 1800s to the present, in particular the objectives and values associated with these 
attempts. 
The standardization and nationalization of education in the early post-independence years of 
Indonesia and Malaysia also took on the task of promoting national integration (forging a 
sense of nationhood had of course not been a concern of colonial educational policies). 
																																																																																																																																																																													
Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 120. Meanwhile in the Netherlands 
East Indies, the job opportunity was decidedly smaller for the natives to join the Dutch colonial 
administration. For instance, in 1928 the total of Clerkship (K.A.) diploma holders in the Netherlands 
East Indies numbered at 6,559 while the average annual number of job vacancies in the lower rung of 
the colonial bureaucracy were 447. J.S Furnivall, Educational Progress in Southeast Asia (New York, 
NY: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), p. 77. 
3 In the Netherlands East Indies, the export value for sugar and tobacco went up from 32,299,000 
guilden and 3,654,000 guilden in 1870 to 254,274,000 guilden and 58,647,000 guilden in 1930, 
respectively. The export for rubber also saw a meteoric rise from 15,800 tons in 1915 to 153,500 tons 
in 1930. J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1944), pp. 207, 337. In British Malaya, the production of tin went up from 6,500 
long tons in 1850 to 77,000 long tons in 1937. Likewise, the export of rubber rose dramatically from 
33,000 tons in 1913 to 232,000 tons in 1927. K.G. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya 
(Singapore: University of London Press, 1964), pp. 188-89, 203. 
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Education became one of the ways for the young post-colonial governments to not only 
produce a well-trained workforce to help develop the country but also to develop a new 
national identity. The state had to draw up new educational policies in order to achieve the 
two aforementioned objectives. This chapter will demonstrate that the efficacy and reach of 
the post-colonial states in Indonesia and Malaysia can be seen by their ability and success in 
formulating and implementing educational policies, which comprise both standardization and 
nationalization, that are compatible with their (ever changing) ideas and visions of what the 
national identity should be. 
The chapter starts with an overview of the organizational structure and functions of the state 
institutions and types of Islamic schools that comprise the Islamic education system in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. It then continues with a discussion of educational policies during the 
late colonial period (late 1800s to 1950s) when the Dutch and the British tried to introduce 
and implement standardized mass education in the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya, 
respectively. In the post-colonial era, mass education became inextricably enmeshed with the 
nationalism project as the states in Indonesia and Malaysia tried to forge new national 
identities and inculcate their standardized values in the population through their national 
education systems. The national education system became a political battleground as various 
groups contended for their ideological views to be heard, , in turn, affecting the nature of the 
state institutions dealing with national education, and Islamic education in particular. In the 
end, as the chapter argues, the state in Malaysia has been more effective in minimizing the 
influences from the social forces, thus allowing it to assert more control over national 





INDONESIA: NATIONALIZATION WITH LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Present day institutional structure of national education in Indonesia 
The present institutional structure that manages national education in Indonesia remains 
relatively unchanged from its inception during the early post-independence years. Educational 
dualism that separates general and Islamic education into two overlapping bureaucratic 
spheres characterizes the national education system. Since the passing of the 1999 
decentralization laws, the matters of national education, which used to be solely under the 
purview of the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC), have been largely devolved to the 
provincial and district governments while Islamic education firmly remains under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). The decentralized bureaucracy of 
the Reformasi era management of national and Islamic education further accentuates the pre-
existing institutional rift between MOEC and MORA, which will be discussed at length in 
this chapter.      
The management, oversight and funding of national education in Indonesia, Islamic education 
in particular, are enmeshed in the complex lattice-work of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture (MOEC), the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), the Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MOHA), the provincial and district governments. MOHA’s role is not central to the overall 
picture of national education; nonetheless, the ministry does have the ability to affect the 
viability and effectiveness of local educational initiatives when MOHA’s annual “guidance” 
on sectoral priorities for district (kabupaten) budget sometimes comes into conflict with the 
kabupaten’s own local concerns and priorities.4 For the most part, MOEC and MORA are the 
major actors from the central government in regard to the national education in the country. 
MOEC is charged with the overall implementation of the national curriculum while MORA is 																																																								
4 Study of the Legal Framework for the Basic Education Sector, Decentralized Basic Education 1: 
Management and Governance, USAID DBE 1 Special Report, 2nd Edition, September 2009, p. 14. 
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responsible for the religious education dimension of the national curriculum, which MORA 
theoretically must adapt to the objectives and ideals established by MOEC. The supervision of 
schools and implementation of educational policies at the local level are carried out by the 
local offices of MOEC (called Dinas Pendidikan) and MORA (called Kanwil Agama). In 
present-day decentralization, Dinas Pendidikan are part of the autonomous local governments 
while Kanwil Agama remains subsumed under the authority of MORA.5 As such, Dinas 
Pendidikan are funded through provincial and district budgets while Kanwil Agama receives 
their financial support directly from the central government. Both MOEC and MORA also 
provide direct per capita financial assistance to the schools in the form of School Operational 
Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS).6 In short, the relationship between MORA 
and its local offices is a direct vertical hierarchy while the relationship between MOEC and its 
local offices is diverted through the provincial and kabupaten/kota governments. 
Figure 2.1: Management of national education in Indonesia 
 																																																								
5 According to Article 7(2) of the Government Regulation 38/2007 regarding the Division of 
Governance Administration between the Central Government, Provincial Government and 
District/City Government (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 38 Tahun 2007 tentang Pembagian 
Pengurusan Pemerintahan antara Pemerintah, Pemerintahan Daerah Provinsi, dan Pemerintahan 
Daerah Kabupaten/Kota).  
6 Funding for Dinas Pendidikan comes from national budget transfers to the regions in the form of 




















There are three types of Islamic schools in Indonesia: madrasah, pesantren, and sekolah Islam 
(literally Islamic schools). By design, all schools that are part of the national education system 
have to follow the national curriculum established by MOEC. Traditional Islamic schools 
such pesantren salafiyah and madrasah diniyah do not follow the national curriculum and, 
therefore, are solely registered under MORA. The management and supervision of the Islamic 
schools are divided between MOEC and MORA. Madrasah and pesantren are registered with 
MORA under their respective directorates while sekolah Islam are supervised by MOEC 
through the General Directorates for Primary and Secondary Education. In the case of Sekolah 
Islam Terpadu (SIT), the focus of Chapter 5, their integrated curriculum, which combines 
Islamic precepts and general education, must also be vetted and approved by MORA even 
though the schools are registered under MOEC. Overall, most Islamic schools come directly 
under the jurisdiction of MORA since madrasah and pesantren make up an overwhelming 
majority of Islamic schools in the country.  
Figure 2.2: Management and supervision of Islamic schools in Indonesia 
 
Islamic education in the late colonial period (1880-1945) 
In the pre-independence period, the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies adopted a basically 
laissez- faire approach to educating the native population. By 1940, there were 88,223 










schools (grades 7-9) and 1,786 students in high schools.7 The low numbers of Indonesian 
students were due to the limited resources of the colonial state and its decision to follow the 
“Islamic policy” proposed by the well-known Dutch Islamologist, C. Snouck Hurgronje. One 
aspect of Snouck’s proposition was to leave alone local cultural practices, which also included 
Islamic education, while keeping political Islam in check.8 One of the main goals was to 
deploy traditional elites as a countervailing force against the increasing influence of reformist 
Islam.9 The shallowness of Dutch language education also reflected this “non-interference” 
policy, which delegated the responsibility of educating the population to the local Muslim 
community and Christian missions.10 However, fearing political mobilization by Islamic 
schoolteachers, the Dutch colonial administration did try to assert control over Islamic 
education by enacting the 1905 Guru (Teachers) Ordinance whereby every Islamic 
schoolteacher had to apply for official permission from the district office before they could 
start teaching. Vigorous opposition from Islamic schoolteachers ultimately led to its 
																																																								
7 In 1940, only 240 native Indonesians graduated from high school due to high school education being 
primarily reserved for the European population. George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1952), p. 31. 
8 W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change (The Hague & 
Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1956), p. 295. Nevertheless, the Dutch implemented a different Islamic 
policy in the Christian-majority eastern Indonesia, where it repressed the socio-cultural aspects of 
Islam and encouraged the growth of Christianity through the missionaries. Chapter 4 contains more 
discussion of this historical legacy. 
9 Harry Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague & Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), 
p. 25; Daniel Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1972), p. 10; M.B. Hooker, Adat Law in Modern Indonesia. (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1978), p. 97. 
10 In 1942, there were 1,871 pesantrens with 139,415 students in Java and Madura. Dhofier, The 
Pesantren Tradition, p. 20. Muhammadiyah-run private madrasah, on the other hand, numbered at 
1,774 schools across Indonesia by 1938. Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia, 1900-1942 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980), p. 95. In West Sumatra alone, there were 300 Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah 
or PERTI-run private madrasah with 45,000 students in 1928. Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren, 
Madrasah: Pendidikan Islam Dalam Kurun Moderen (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986), pp. 64-65. By 1890 
there were about 150 Christian mission schools in the island of Java alone. Furnivall, Netherlands 
India, p. 381. In the sparsely populated Christian-dominated Nusa Tenggara Timur, there were 247 
Catholic schools with 33,522 students and 572 teachers by mid-1941. There were also 69 Protestant 
schools with about 6,000 students at this time. Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink, eds., A 
History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), p. 240. 
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replacement by the 1925 Guru Ordinance.11 The 1925 Guru Ordinance, which still required 
Islamic schoolteachers to inform the district office, only lasted for a few years before it was 
suspended due to strident opposition from teachers.12 Various ordinances also mandated that 
curriculum in the Dutch public schools for the natives remained secular and free from 
religious instruction, which led to the schools’ deep unpopularity among the Muslim 
community.13 The result was a Dutch education system that did not reach deep into society, 
and thus had limited capacity as a form of social control. Another side effect of this approach 
was the preservation of various types of Islamic and non-Islamic schools that were relatively 
independent from state control. After Indonesia achieved her independence in 1945, the first 
post-colonial government inherited this limited institutional capacity to manage the education 
system, coupled with the relatively independent nature of private schools. The legacies of this 
situation can still be seen in the manner that the Indonesian state manages and controls 
Islamic education and schools today. 
 
 																																																								
11 Essentially there were no discernible differences between the 1905 and 1925 Guru Ordinances. The 
1905 Guru Ordinance was only applicable to Java and Madura islands and the 1925 Guru Ordinance 
merely expanded the existing statute to the Outer Islands, namely Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. 
While the 1905 Guru Ordinance required Islamic schoolteachers to apply for a license from “native 
chiefs” before they could start teaching, the 1925 Guru Ordinance mandated that Islamic 
schoolteachers to possess a “letter of registration” from the district office in order to teach. The 1925 
Guru Ordinance also stipulated that teachers kept complete data of their students and curricula. Taufik 
Abdullah, Schools and Politics: The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra, 1927-1933 (Singapore: 
Equinox Publishing, 1971), pp. 130-132.  
12 Some of the high-ranking Dutch administrators including Charles van der Plas, an adviser in the 
Office of Native Affairs and later served as the Governor of East Java during the revolutionary period 
(1945-1949), deemed the 1925 Guru Ordinance to be ineffective in curbing political activism among 
Islamic schoolteachers especially when there was already a slew of existing laws that specifically dealt 
with political opposition among the natives. Ibid., pp. 130-141.  
13 The ordinances stipulated that religious instruction could only be given outside of school hours. 
Haidar Putra Daulay, Dinamika Pendidikan Islam di Asia Tenggara (Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 2009), p. 
16. In comparison, the British initially implemented similar policy in Malaya but ultimately included 
religious (Islamic) instruction in the curriculum by the late 19th century as a way to attract more Malay 
students to Malay vernacular schools.   
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Islamic education and the ideologically divided Guided Democracy era (1950-1966) 
The effort to formulate and implement a systematic national education that reflects the ideals 
and aspirations of the newly independent Indonesian nation did not take place until 1950, 
when the first post-independence government was formed. At the time, the literacy rate 
among the population was at a dismal 5 percent.14 Hence, when the 1950 Law on Education 
(Undang-Undang Nomor 4/1950) was enacted, its two major foci were cultivating national 
identity and democratizing access to education for everyone, in accordance with Article 31(1) 
of the 1945 Constitution that ensures every citizen’s right to an education. Article 4 of the 
1950 Law on Education stated that educational policies and pedagogical system had to be 
compatible with the foundational beliefs of the nation as exemplified by the 1945 
Constitution, the national ideology Pancasila, and the national culture. Article 10 of the same 
law made it compulsory for children from eight years of age to attend school for a minimum 
of six years as a solution to the acute problem of illiteracy.15 Despite its expressed intent of 
using education to forge a national identity and foster social cohesion, Articles 13 and 14 of 
the 1950 Law on Education also provided for the right of private schools (sekolah partikulir) 
such as Islamic and mission schools to operate with relative autonomy. Article 20 of the law 
also gave students the right to decide whether to attend religious instruction at school and that 
the subject would have no bearing on the student’s class promotion, much to the dismay of 
Muslim leaders who wanted the subject to be compulsory.16 It was not until after 1960 that 
																																																								
14 Wajib Belajar Pendidikan Dasar, 1945-2007 (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Nasional, 2007), p. 
2. 
15 As mentioned previously, in 1950 literacy rate among the general Indonesian population was at a 5 
percent. By 1961 the literacy rate shot up to 46.7 percent for children under 10 years old and even 
higher for male teenagers (ages 10 to 19) at more than 76 percent. Moh. Suardi, Ideologi Politik 
Pendidikan Kontemporer (Yogyakarta: Deepublish, 2015), p. 94. 
16 The law also stipulated that religious education in government public schools started from Class 4 in 
primary schools for 2 hours per week and madrasah had to provide a minimum of six hours per week 
of religious instruction in order to receive a certification from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
Lambert Kelabora, “Religious Instruction Policy in Indonesia.” Asian Survey 16:3 (March 1976), pp. 
237-242; Sejarah Pendidikan Islam dan Organisasi Ditjen Pendidikan Islam: 	
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religious instruction was made compulsory in some parts of Indonesia, largely due to the 
heightened conflict between the military and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia, PKI) during the final years of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy era.  
The final years of the Guided Democracy era saw Islamic education being used as a pawn in 
the ideological and political struggle between the military and the PKI. In a 1959 speech at 
Padjajaran University in Bandung, President Sukarno expounded on the role of national 
education in propagating the nation’s values, namely repudiation of liberal democracy, 
promotion of national unity and cultural nationalism, and protection from western 
decadence.17 The essence of the speech formed the ideals and aims of the Guided Democracy 
era, enshrined in an official political manifesto called Manipol/USDEK.18 Despite the 
speech’s emphasis on the development of a common Indonesian national identity, the Guided 
Democracy era was a period that was rife with political and ideological turbulence as various 
social forces jockeyed for power. The main competition was between the military and the 
PKI. In the early 1960s, in return for support from Muslim leaders, the military agreed to 
support compulsory religious instruction especially in predominantly Muslim areas.19 The 
contentious struggle to make religious instruction a compulsory subject flared when the PKI-
dominated Ministry of Education came up with a new educational philosophy called 
Pancawardhana, which noticeably excluded reference to the One-ness of God (Tuhan yang 
Maha Esa), the first principle of Pancasila. Muslim leaders were predictably upset about this 
																																																																																																																																																																													
http://pendis.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=artikel&id2=sejarahpendis#.VnbTZfFw-Rs (accessed on 20 
December 2015). 
17 Lee Kam Hing, Education and Politics in Indonesia, 1945-1965 (Kuala Lumpur: University Malaya 
Press, 1995), p. 165. 
18 Manipol/USDEK is an acronym for Manifesto Politik / Undang-undang 1945, Sosialisme Indonesia, 
Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Kepribadian Indonesia (Political Manifesto / 1945 
Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy and Indonesian Character). 
It comprised the Guided Democracy’s broad guidelines for state policies (Garis-garis Besar Haluan 
Negara, GBHN), deeply imbued with the spirit of Indonesian brand of socialism. Roeslan Abdulgani, 
Pendjelasan Manipol dan Usdek (Jakarta: Teragung, 1961).  
19 Lee, Education and Politics, p. 262. 
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change, and with the help of the military and leaders from other faiths, managed to pressure 
the government to incorporate religious subject into the 1964 curriculum.20  
Another issue that cropped up during the final years of the Guided Democracy era was the 
“single-roof education system” (sistem pendidikan satu atap). Sistem pendidikan satu atap 
essentially means that only a single ministry should be in charge of all educational affairs in 
the country including Islamic education, which falls under the jurisdiction of Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (MORA). The contest for sistem pendidikan satu atap began when the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) intended to absorb all madrasah into its orbit, 
which was included in the Eight Year Development Plan (1961-1969) proposed to the 
parliament. After a relentless opposition, major Islamic groups managed to defeat the 
proposal and madrasah remained under the aegis of MORA.21 The defeat of the sistem 
pendidikan satu atap proposal simply put the issue on the back burner, from which it would 
come up time and again in the ensuing decades, as illustrated in the next section.    
In short, the state of Islamic education during the Guided Democracy era was in a flux and the 
prevailing perception at the time was that Islamic schools such as pesantren and madrasah 
were academically inferior to government public schools. There were 13,849 madrasah in 
1954 and 30,368 pesantren with 1,392,159 students in 1955, and most of these Islamic 
schools had incorporated, to a varying degree, some general education subjects in their effort 
to modernize their individual curriculum.22 Nevertheless, there was no uniform standard and 
																																																								
20 Muslim parents and guardians had a choice whether to allow their children to attend the Islamic 
education (Pendidikan Agama Islam) class, which meant the subject was not compulsory. If the 
Muslim parents opted not to, then the students can attend character education (Pendidikan Budi 
Pekerti) class instead. Edi Susanto, “Pendidikan Agama Dalam Sistem Pendidikan di Indonesia 
(Survei Historis Era Pemerintahan Soekarno).” Tadrîs 4:1 (2009), pp. 47, 53. 
21 Mujiburrahman, “Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New Order.” Ph.D 
diss., University of Utrecht, 2006, p. 224. 
22 The economic hardship at the time forced many pesantren to focus instead on vocational study such 
as agriculture as the main component of the general (non-religious) education. Azyumardi Azra, 
Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru (Jakarta: Logos, 2002), p. 102-	
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academic qualification for Islamic education system, which meant that graduates of pesantren 
and madrasah would find it impossible to pursue their tertiary studies in non-Islamic higher 
institutions of learning. A worsening economy during this time, evidenced by severe recession 
and hyperinflation, added to the woes faced by Islamic school graduates.23 Incorporating 
religious subject in the curriculum and making its learning mandatory in government public 
schools also became highly contentious, a clear reflection of the society-wide ideological 
divide between the secular and religious socio-political groups at the time. Ever since the 
excision of the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) during the promulgation of the constitution 
(UUD 1945), many Muslim groups felt the need to preserve the relevance of Islam in post-
independence Indonesia. Advocating for an official recognition and equal status for Islamic 
education within the national education system was one of the ways to assert the importance 
of the Islamic way of life in society.24 The ushering in of the New Order era in 1966 with its 
staunchly anti-communist and developmentalist ideology initially seemed more amenable to 
the vitality and growth of Islamic education but later proved to be not as friendly, as we shall 
see in the next section.     
Tug-of-war on the direction of Islamic education during the New Order era (1966-1998) 
By 1966, at the beginning of Suharto’s New Order era, the frequency of religious subject was 
increased from twice to four times a week and its status was elevated to one of the six basic 																																																																																																																																																																													
103; H. Abdul Kodir, Sejarah Pendidikan Islam: Dari Masa Rasulullah hingga Reformasi di 
Indonesia (Bandung: Pustaka Setia, 2015), p. 217. 
23 Unemployment rate in the early 1960s hovered at a decent 5.5 percent but it was the high costs of 
living that sapped the people’s purchasing power. The national hyperinflation rate shot up from around 
100 percent in late 1961 to 500 percent by 1965. In Jakarta for instance, the cost of living index rose 
sharply from the average of 281 in the third quarter of 1961 to 711 by the fourth quarter of 1962. Basu 
Sharma, Aspects of Industrial Relations in ASEAN (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), p. 36; Shafiq Dhanani, 
Iyanatul Islam and Anis Chowdhury, The Indonesian Labour Market: Changes and challenges 
(Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 6; and J.A.C. Mackie, Problems of the Indonesian 
Inflation (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009), p. 57. 
24 The highly contested “seven words” of Piagam Jakarta stipulate that all Muslims should observe the 
Islamic law (dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk2-nya).  R.E. Ellison, 
“Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy of 1945.” Indonesia 88 (October 2009): pp. 112-
118. 
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subjects designed to develop the spirit of Pancasila.25 Nonetheless, the euphoria felt by the 
Muslim leaders that Islamic education had finally been given its due recognition by the state 
proved to be short-lived. During the 1973 parliamentary session discussing the Broad 
Guidelines for State Policies (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN), the regime’s party, 
Golkar, proposed to abolish religious education classes in public schools but dropped the 
proposal due to vociferous opposition from the Islamic party, United Development Party 
(Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP).26 In 1975, three ministries closely involved with 
national education came up with a joint declaration, Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB) Tiga 
Menteri 1975, which laid out, among other things, the reduction of religious instruction hours 
in public schools and a new standardized ratio of 70 percent regular instruction and 30 percent 
religious instruction in madrasah.27 Its critics saw the decision as diluting the content of 
religious instruction and an attempt to convert madrasah into non-religious public schools; in 
effect, secularizing the madrasah.28 To this day, the ratio remains the standard used by the 
government to incorporate many private madrasah and pesantren into the national education 
system and to allow Islamic school graduates to continue their tertiary studies in non-religious 
higher learning institutions. 
The early architects of the New Order regime were secularists and staunch Pancasilaists, 
which explained the regime’s attempts to minimize the role of Islam in policymaking, 
including educational policies, at least before the late 1980s. Prominent New Order figures 
																																																								
25 Religion assumed a newfound importance during the New Order era since it was seen as the 
antithesis to the supposedly atheistic communism, which by now had been completely vanquished. 
The parliament issued the decree TAP MPRS XXVII/1966 that officially designated religious 
instruction to be compulsory from primary schools to the universities. Haidar Putra Daulay, 
Pendidikan Islam dalam Sistem Pendidikan Nasional di Indonesia (Jakarta: Kencana, 2002), pp. 42-
43; Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, p. 229; Kelabora, Religious Instruction Policy, pp. 246-247. 
26 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, pp. 229-230. 
27 R. Murray Thomas, “The Islamic Revival and Indonesian Education.” Asian Survey 28:9 
(September 1988), p. 903; Daulay, Pendidikan Islam, pp. 56-58. 
28 Azra, Pendidikan Islam, p. 152. 
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such as Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardani along with their pro-regime think tank Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) were known for their aversion against inclusion 
of Islam in politics and governance. In a 1980 speech to open a new mosque, Ali Murtopo 
made it clear that “for as long as humans still think Islam as a political element, the world will 
not be at peace.”29 CSIS also clearly articulated characteristics of the New Order regime, one 
of which was that religion should be privatized and not part of state institution; therefore, the 
state should not be in the business of managing religion.30 The secular background of these 
New Order figures also influenced MOEC’s policymaking orientation, which often set it on a 
collision course with MORA. For example, Daoed Joesoef, Minister of Education and Culture 
from 1978 to 1983, was one of the founding members of CSIS.31 Daoed Joesoef was well 
known for his attempt to abolish the month-long school holiday during Ramadan and severely 
curb student activism on campus through the Normalization of Campus Life/Student 
Coordinating Body (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, 
NKK/BKK) policy. In short, the dominance of secular values, which characterized the first 
half of the New Order era, resulted in an uneasy relationship between MORA and MOEC.  
The New Order regime also proposed other educational measures that were seen as anti-
Islamic by the Muslim leaders. For instance, in the 1973 Broad Guidelines for State Policies 
(GBHN), Golkar proposed to replace the Islamic education class with the more religiously 
inclusive Pancasila Moral Education (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, PMP). The parliament 
																																																								
29 Original excerpt: “Selama manusia-manusia itu masih berpikir Islam sebagai elemen politik, selama 
itu dunia tidak akan aman.” Agama Bukan Untuk Dipolitikkan, Pidato Sambutan Menpen Ali 
Moertopo pada Peresmian Mesjid Nurul Iman Tanggal 11 Juli 1980 di Merdeka Barat 7, Jakarta, 
Departemen Penerangan RI, 1980, p. 7.  
30 Original excerpt: “Agama dalam Republik Indonesia adalah lembaga swasta dan bukan lembaga 
negara maka dari itu tidak diatur, diurus atau diselenggarakan oleh negara.” Harry Tjan Silalahi, 
Konsensus Politik Nasional Orde Baru: Ortodoksi dan Aktualisasinya (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1990), p. 9. 
31 Harry Tjan Silalahi, Nalar dan naluri: 70 tahun Daoed Joesoef (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1996). 
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approved the formulation of PMP and its implementation in schools across the country.32 
PMP drew strident protests from many Muslim leaders since it relativized the supremacy of 
Islam as the one true religion by saying that all religions lead to the same truth via different 
means.33 The regime remained unmoved, so much so that it designated PMP as a compulsory 
subject in Article 39 of the 1989 Law on National Education (Undang-Undang Nomor 2 
Tahun 1989 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional).34 In short, the advocates for Islamic 
education who thought that they had found a sympathetic regime at the onset of the New 
Order era that could help to elevate and fortify the status of Islamic education within the 
national education system were in for a huge disappointment. The first half of the New Order 
era saw a regime that was adamant in its belief in religious syncretism and pluralism and not 
in the promotion of Islamic superiority over other religious beliefs. It was not until the late 
1980s when the regime started to flirt with Islamic discourse to counter the challenge to its 
legitimacy and become more amenable to the demands of the advocates of Islamic education, 
which will be discussed later in this section.  
The secular-religious dynamics seen in the previously mentioned examples were also found in 
the long-standing feud between the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and the Ministry 
of Education and Culture (MOEC) over the management of Islamic education in the country. 
The turf battle between MORA and MOEC for the control of Islamic education takes shape in 
the form of the “single roof education system” (sistem pendidikan satu atap), mentioned 																																																								
32 In 1978 the parliament passed a law, Ketetapan MPR No. II/MPR/1978, that listed 36 traits an 
Indonesian citizen should embody in a Pancasila democracy (New Order era), collectively known as 
Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (P4), which formed the basis of PMP curriculum. 
Samsuri, “Transformasi Gagasan Masyarakat Kewargaan (Civil Society) Melalui Reformasi 
Pendidikan Kewarganegaraan di Indonesia.” Ph.D diss., Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, 2010, pp. 
137-150. 
33 Adian Husaini, Penyesatan Opini: Sebuah Rekayasa Mengubah Citra (Jakarta: Gema Insani, 2002), 
p. 34; Fikrul Hanif Sufyan, Sang Penjaga Tauhid: Studi Protes Terhadap Tirani Kekuasaan 1982-
1985 (Yogyakarta: Deepublish, 2014), pp. 43-44. 
34 In the end, religious education was also made compulsory as a compromise. Undang-Undang 
tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional dan Peraturan Pelaksanaannya (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 1991), p. 
16.  
	 76 
briefly in the previous section. Under this concept, the ideals and aims of national education 
can presumably be achieved if a single bureaucracy, in this case MOEC, is responsible for its 
management. In 1972, President Suharto revived the effort to subsume madrasah under the 
authority of MOEC by issuing Presidential Decree no. 34/1972 that stated madrasah had to be 
administered by MOEC. Again the effort failed due to protests from Islamic groups.35 In the 
late 1970s, the idea of sistem pendidikan satu atap was brought up again, this time tucked 
inside the draft law to revamp the national education system. As expected, Islamic groups 
were up in arms against this inclusion, and after a protracted struggle managed to omit the 
single roof education clause from the 1988 draft law on national education, which later 
became the 1989 Law on National Education System (Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 1989 
tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional).36  
The drastic shift between the 1988 draft law on national education and the resultant 1989 Law 
on National Education System was a clear indicator of the growing influence of Islamic 
groups in the New Order regime as Suharto tried to enlist their support as a countervailing 
force against his political opponents. When the regime first introduced the 1988 draft law on 
national education, major Islamic groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, MUI 
and the Joint Efforts for the Renewal of Islamic Education (Gabungan Usaha Pembaharuan 
Pendidikan Islam, GUPPI) bitterly opposed the draft law as it was perceived to be hostile to 
Islamic interests. The previously mentioned sistem pendidikan satu atap was not the only 
controversial aspect of the 1988 draft law. The 1988 draft law also attempted to make 
religious instruction optional in non-religious public schools, restrict the freedom to establish 
private educational institutions (of which the majority of madrasah and pesantren were part), 
and penalize private schools that failed to provide adequate facilities to their students (a 																																																								
35 Moch. Nur Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 
Contemporary Indonesia, 1966-2004. Ph.D diss., University of Tilberg, 2006, p. 142. 
36 Ibid., pp. 143-44. 
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sizeable number of madrasah and pesantren were severely under-resourced).37 The most 
controversial part of the 1988 draft law, however, was the clarification (penjelasan) for 
Article 28(2) that stated, “Teachers of religious education have to share the same faith as the 
religion and the students they teach.”38 The resultant 1989 Law on National Education System 
ended up not including these proposals while retaining Article 28(2), which can be credited to 
the strong lobbying efforts by Islamic groups, including the state-affiliated “corporatist” 
bodies such as MUI and the Golkar-affiliated GUPPI, and the eagerness of Suharto to court 
the support of these Islamic groups in order to shore up his political standing against an 
emerging challenge from a nationalist faction of the military.39 The 1989 law, in fact, 
achieved the opposite of what its drafters and supporters originally intended.40 It reaffirmed 
MORA’s sole authority in managing Islamic education and so was the obligation to teach 
religious education in non-religious public schools. Also for the first time, Islamic education 
system was recognized as a sub-system of the national educational system, which placed 
Islamic schools on an equal standing with other types of national schools.41 In short, from the 
late 1980s onward, Islamic education in Indonesia began to grow more strongly and gain 
more national prominence as it tries to shed the perception of being the provider of subpar and 
outdated education.        
																																																								
37 Abd. Rachman Assegaf, “Tarik Menarik RUU Sisdiknas 1988-2003 (Isu Pendidikan Agama).” 
Kependidikan Islam 1:1 (February – July 2003), pp. 73-76. 
38 Original excerpt: “Tenaga pengajar pendidikan agama harus beragama sesuai dengan agama yang 
diajar dan agama peserta didik yang bersangkutan.” The PDI fraction of the parliament, 
representatives of Christian education and secularists were bitterly opposed to the inclusion of this 
particular sub-article since it imposed an undue burden on Christian schools to provide non-Christian 
religious education for their non-Christian students. An opponent of the sub-article from Majlis Luhur 
Taman Siswa remarked: “Kalau masuk warung sate, jangan pesan soto, karena bukan warung soto” [If 
one goes to a sate stall, don’t order soto since it’s not a soto stall]. Lukman Harun, Muhammadiyah 
dan Undang-Undang Pendidikan (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1990), pp. 72-88. 
39 Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam, pp. 144-146. 
40 Among the supporters of the 1988 draft law were known secularist and abangan (practitioners of 
Javanese mysticism or kedjawen) such as former ministers of education and culture Daoed Joesoef, 
Nugroho Notosusanto, and Fuad Hassan. Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, pp. 223-225.   
41 Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam, p. 146. 
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In sum, the elevation of Islamic education’s status during the New Order era despite the 
regime’s initial aversion toward the educational needs of Muslims can be chalked up to two 
main factors: the country’s need for a skilled and educated workforce; and the cozy 
relationship between the regime and major Islamic groups in the second half of the New 
Order era (from the late 1980s to 1998). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Indonesia’s 
unemployment rate stood at a low 2 to 3 percent while the economic growth rate maintained 
an impressive average of 8 percent, which necessitated an increase in the labor supply.42 
Therefore, the regime’s efforts to streamline the curriculum of Islamic education, namely 
through the issuance of SKB Tiga Menteri 1975, and raise its status to equal that of other 
schools in the national education system fit comfortably within the regime’s developmentalist 
ideology. Nonetheless, advocates of Islamic education during the first half of the New Order 
era had to face challenges from the secularists and abangan within the regime, particularly 
those within MOEC, who wished to wrest control and management of Islamic education away 
from MORA and incorporate Islamic education into an all-encompassing sistem pendidikan 
satu atap. The dalliance between major Islamic groups and Suharto in the second half of the 
New Order era helped the advocates of Islamic education to fortify their political position and 
successfully fend off challenges from the secularists and the abangan. Ever since the 
enactment of the 1989 Law on National Education System, which officially confirmed the 
importance of Islamic schools within the national education system, advocates of Islamic 
education did not face any serious challenges until the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 
and the passing of the decentralization laws in 1999.     
 
 																																																								
42 Dhanani, Islam and Chowdhury, The Indonesian Labour Market, p. 53; H.W. Dick, “The Rise of a 
Middle Class and the Changing Concept of Equity in Indonesia: An Interpretation.” Indonesia 39 
(April 1985), p. 88.  
	 79 
Decentralization and 2003 law on national education 
One defining characteristic of the New Order regime was its strong tendency to centralize 
control over all aspects of governance. Even so, despite the centralizing nature of the New 
Order regime, there had been plans to decentralize the management of national education 
since the mid-1980s. These plans failed because of the lack of agreement on proper standards 
and on how much autonomy should be exercised by the local educational offices and schools. 
The first real attempt to decentralize education occurred in 1994 when MOEC introduced and 
implemented a policy of Local Content Curriculum (Kurikulum Muatan Lokal).43 This policy 
allowed schools within the national education system and their teachers to adapt the national 
curriculum to the particular cultural tradition of the local area, by using local examples to 
illustrate general points in compulsory subjects. There were several reasons for MOEC to 
pursue this policy: delegating more autonomy to the localities as part of an experiment to 
improve educational performance; reducing the percentage of student exiting the system by 
providing vocational training; creating tighter links between curricula and local conditions; 
increasing community involvement in schools; and improving instructional process.44 The 
Local Content Curriculum policy did not achieve its objectives, however. In particular, it did 
not empower local educational authorities since local educational authorities and schools 
perceived the policy as too broad and were afraid of making a wrong interpretation when 
implementing the policy. The local educational actors did not know how to deal with the 
newfound autonomy since they used to simply carry out directives unquestioningly from the 
MOEC, which, in turn, were also lax in encouraging the local educational actors to act 
autonomously.45 Nevertheless, the Local Content Curriculum policy signaled the willingness 																																																								
43 Christopher Bjork, Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools, and Central Bureaucracy (New York 
and London: Routledge, 2005), p. 26. 
44 Ibid., pp. 30-37. 
45 Christopher Bjork, “Decentralisation in Education, Institutional Culture and Teacher Autonomy in 
Indonesia.” International Review of Education 50:3 (July 2004), pp. 251-254.  
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of the New Order regime to deviate from its normally centralizing means of governance for 
the sake of improving academic performance among the schools in the national education 
system. The policy remains part of the national education as the country transitioned into the 
post-authoritarian era in 1998.  
The political openness of the Reformasi era (1998 to present) provided the advocates of 
Islamic education an opportunity to push for a bigger role of Islamic education within the 
national education system. In the early 2000s, religious education again became a focus 
during the debates to draft a new law on national education, as had occurred before the 
passing of the 1989 Law on National Education System. Buoyed by the political freedom 
afforded by the new era of openness, many major Islamic groups such as MUI, Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Muhammadiyah and al-Irshad lobbied for a more substantive role of religion in 
national education in the face of stiff opposition from secular and non-Muslim groups.46 The 
struggle took shape in the form of the 2002 draft law (Rencana Undang-Undang Sistem 
Pendidikan Nasional). Article 12(1) of the draft law, which mandated schools to provide 
religious education according to the students’ religious beliefs, particularly became a highly 
controversial point especially among secularists who wanted to limit the influence of state-
sanctioned religion in the national education and Christian missionary schools that would 
need to provide non-Christian teachers to teach non-Christian religious subject to the very few 
non-Christian students who attended these schools.47 Ultimately the parliament passed the 
2003 Law on National Education System (Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2003 tentang 
Sistem Pendidikan Nasional), which retained much of the 2002 draft law, including the hotly 
contested Article 12(1). Also according to the 2003 law, religious education remained 
mandatory from primary to tertiary levels and even though the required number of instruction 																																																								
46 “UU Sisdiknas & Perjuangan MUI,” Mimbar Ulama, July 2003, pp. 8-10. 
47 Benny Susetyo, Politik Pendidikan Penguasa (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2005), pp. 41-86; Ichwan, 
Official Reform of Islam, pp. 271-273. 
	 81 
time per week did not change (2 hours), the law gave the schools wide latitude to organize co-
curricular religious activities to augment the classroom teaching. These activities included 
pesantren kilat (short-term pesantren), communal prayers in the schoolyards, animal 
sacrifices during Idul Adha, observance of Islamic religious holidays, and establishment of 
Islamic studies forums.48 The mandatory requirement to provide religious instruction to 
students by teachers who share the same faith (Article 12(1) of the 2003 law) rattled many 
Christian missionary schools since it increased their financial burden to educate the 
sometimes very few Muslim students in their schools. This issue remains contentious until the 
present day when Islamic groups such as MUI claim that Christian schools are neglecting 
Islamic instruction for their Muslim students as a form of discrimination and a subtle effort at 
Christianization.49 In all, the enactment of the 2003 Law on National Education System 
marked the high point in the political viability of the advocates of Islamic education in 
Indonesia, which has gone from strength to strength since the second half of the New Order 
era. By making it mandatory even in Christian missionary schools, Islamic education has 
become an inextricable part of the national curriculum. Islamic schools now have assumed an 
equal status alongside other schools in the national education system.        
The 1999 decentralization laws also provided local educational authorities with broad 
autonomy to manage educational affairs in their local areas. This shift was reflected in the 
introduction of the new national curricula in 2004 and 2006. In the 2004 national curriculum, 
MOEC came up with a general guideline and competency standard for all subjects except 
Islamic Knowledge (Pengetahuan Agama Islam, PAI), which remains under the jurisdiction 
of MORA. Local educational actors were required to arrange the syllabus, technical 
guidelines and lesson plans according to their specific needs. The curriculum was based on 																																																								
48 Ichwan, Official Reform of Islam, pp. 274-280. 
49 Interview with Amany Lubis, former Deputy Secretary General, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), 3 
January 2014. 
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the principle of “unity in policy, diversity in implementation” (kesatuan dalam kebijakan, 
keberagaman dalam pelaksanaan).50 The introduction of the 2006 curriculum subsequently 
perfected (menyempurnakan) the 2004 curriculum, which laid out a much clearer and detailed 
national education standard in accordance with the 2005 Government Regulation on National 
Education Standard (Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 19 Tahun 2005 tentang Standar Nasional 
Pendidikan). It also spelled out the division of responsibilities between MOEC and local 
educational actors, now lumped under the generic term “satuan pendidikan” or education 
units.51 More recently, the 2013 national curriculum has replaced the 2006 national 
curriculum. It stresses character and moral development of students by privileging religious 
and citizenship education at the primary school level at the expense of science and 
mathematics. The push for moral and civic emphases in the 2013 curriculum stemmed from 
the panic following a string of violent acts among school-age children.52 The implementation 
of the 2013 curriculum was finally halted in December 2014 after teachers and other 
educational stakeholders leveled criticism at its haphazard introduction, increased teaching 
burden, poor training and socialization of the teachers, and delays with textbook printing and 
distribution. 53 There were also concerns that Indonesians would be less competitive globally 
since moral and civic lessons would replace English and information technology lessons in 
the 2013 curriculum for primary school students.54 Nevertheless, the heavy focus on morality 
lessons in the 2013 curriculum is a testament to the influence of Islamic education advocates 
																																																								
50 Herry Widyastono, Pengembangan Kurikulum di Era Otonomi Daerah: Dari Kurikulum 2004, 
2006, ke Kurikulum 2013 (Jakarta: Bumi Aksara, 2014), pp. 61-65. 
51 Ibid., p. 88. 
52 “Basmi tawuran, jam pelajaran agama akan ditambah,” Merdeka.com, 30 December 2013 (accessed 
on 30 December 2015). 
53 “Kurikulum 2013 Dibatalkan, Balik ke Kurikulum 2006,” Tempo, 5 December 2014 (accessed on 8 
May 2015). Madrasah, on the other hand, decided to continue implementing the 2013 curriculum as its 
moral orientation is seen to be compatible with Islamic education in general. “Kemenag: Kurikulum 
2013 Cocok Buat Madrasah,” Republika, 17 December 2014 (accessed on 8 May 2015).  
54 “Mata Pelajaran Bahasa Inggris, Penjaskes, dan TIK di SD Dihapus,” Kompas, 10 December 2013 
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who see inculcation of religious values in students as a panacea to combat social ills currently 
afflicting young people. Chapter 5 contains a more detailed discussion of the 2013 
curriculum.  
The devolution of power provided local governments with leeway to use their own resources 
to fund local education. While local financial autonomy is a boon for non-religious public 
schools in resource-rich areas, since they no longer have to compete with other schools for a 
piece of the meager national budget for education, Islamic schools in general have not fared 
as well. Religious affairs remain within the ambit of the central government, which means 
Islamic education is still managed by MORA.55 The jurisdictional separation between national 
and Islamic educations vis-à-vis the decentralization policy means that the local governments 
can refuse to provide funding for Islamic schools since they see it as the responsibility of the 
central government (MORA). To make matters worse, since 95 percent of Islamic schools are 
privately owned, funding priority would be given to state-owned madrasah.56 While Islamic 
schools in areas with strong Islamic traditions such as East and West Java, South Kalimantan, 
Aceh and West Sumatra do well in the decentralization era, the same cannot be said for 																																																								
55 One reason offered by Kamaruddin Amin, the Director General of Islamic Education at MORA, is 
that centralized control of Islamic education allows for a single national standard of inclusive, 
moderate and tolerant version Islam to form the basis of the Islamic education (Pendidikan Agama 
Islam) curriculum. According to him, there is no guarantee these moderate Islamic values can be 
protected once Islamic education becomes decentralized. 
http://www.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=berita&id=233013 (accessed on 25 December 2015).    
56 MORA’s fiscal year 2012 allocation for Islamic education was Rp 30.27 triliun (USD 2.2 billion), 
constituting almost 80 percent of its total budget. Out of this amount, Rp 4.1 triliun (USD 301 million) 
was earmarked for School Operational Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS), per capita 
funding channeled directly to public and private Islamic schools. Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (Islamic 
primary schools) receive Rp 800,000 per student per year, Madrasah Tsanawiyah (Islamic junior high 
schools) receive Rp 1,000,000 per student per year, and Madrasah Aliyah (Islamic senior high 
schools) receive Rp 1,200,000 per student per year. In 2012, there were 3,200,459 Madrasah 
Ibtidaiyah students, 2,745,022 Madrasah Tsanawiyah students, and 1,059,814 Madrasah Aliyah 
students. Nota Keuangan dan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, Tahun Anggaran 2012, 
Republik Indonesia, pp. 150, 220; Petunjuk Teknis Pelaksanaan Bantuan Operasional Sekolah 
Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Madrasah Tsanawiyah (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, 
Kementerian Agama RI, 2015), p. 2; Petunjuk Teknis Pelaksanaan Bantuan Operasional Sekolah 
Madrasah Aliyah Pondok Pesantren Salafiyah (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam, 
Kementerian Agama RI, 2015), p. 2; Madrasah @ Indonesia (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan 
Islam, Kementerian Agama RI, 2015), p. 14. 
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Islamic schools in areas where Muslims are not the majority, particularly in the eastern parts 
of Indonesia (see Chapter 4 for detailed discussion on this issue). In 2002 MORA prepared a 
draft regulation, Rancangan Peraturan Pemerintah (RPP) tentang Pelimpahan Urusan 
Madrasah, supported by the president, that sought to address the issue of funding imbalance 
between religious and government public schools by making madrasah equivalent to non-
religious public schools in terms of quality of education, teaching force and infrastructure 
while also relegating most of madrasah’s management and decision-making process to the 
local levels.57 MORA hoped by elevating the quality and standard of madrasah through the 
draft regulation it would be attractive enough for the local governments to pick up most of the 
tab in funding madrasah in their areas since the prevailing perception was that madrasah 
provided inferior standard of education compared to government public schools. 
Unfortunately, nothing has changed when it comes to local government funding of madrasah 
despite the strong support for the local funding aspect of the draft regulation to be included in 
the 2003 Law on National Education System.58 In the end, the draft regulation simply 
disappeared and the responsibility of funding madrasah still remains to this day exclusively 
with MORA.59 Meanwhile, funding for Islamic schools from local governments in areas with 
weak traditions of Islamic learning often comes in the form of Social Assistance (Bantuan 
Sosial, Bansos), which is irregular and not guaranteed.60 A 2011 ruling by the Constitutional 
Court somewhat changed this funding dynamics when it decided that local governments’ 																																																								
57 “Perlu Peraturan Pemerintah tentang Desentralisasi Madrasah,” Kompas, 26 November 2002 
(accessed on 8 May 2015). 
58 “Desentralisasi Madrasah Perlu Terangkum dalam Revisi UU Sisdiknas,” Kompas, 30 November 
2002 (accessed on 23 December 2015). 
59 MORA suggested that alternatively a small slice of the central government’s contribution to the 
local governments in the form of General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU) and Special 
Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK) be used to fund madrasah, as a way to circumvent the 
legal barrier of using decentralized funding for vertical organizations (non-decentralized government 
agencies). http://www.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=berita&id=233013 (accessed on 25 December 2015).  
60 Personal communication with Wayan Darmawan, Head of the Regional Agency for Planning and 
Development (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda) in Nusa Tenggara Timur 
(NTT), 4 November 2014. More discussion on this issue can be found in Chapter 4. 
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refusal to fund madrasah in their areas was unconstitutional since it violated the right of all 
citizens to receive nine years of basic government-funded education enshrined in Article 
31(2) of the 1945 Constitution.61 Despite the mandate from the court ruling that favors 
madrasah funding by the local governments, the dispute between various national institutions 
(MORA and MOEC) and local governments when it comes to funding Islamic schools 
continues (see more discussion on this topic in Chapter 4).       
One obvious downside of being relatively autonomous and private is that a lot of madrasah 
and pesantren are not financially secure. Private madrasah and pesantren are highly 
dependent on students’ tuition fees as their main source of income. In addition, most 
pesantren engage in economic activities such as farming, fishery and livestock rearing to 
supplement their income. As mentioned before, most madrasah and pesantren are also eligible 
to receive financial assistance from MORA in the form of BOS but the complexity of 
satisfying the funding requirements results in a delay, which leads to many schools not 
receiving any money for many months.62 Hence, as discussed before, some advocates of 
Islamic education tried to lobby for the decentralization of the management and oversight of 
madrasah as a way to force local governments to provide funding for madrasah.63 In general, 
the financial situation for madrasah and pesantren is not as stable as other schools in the 
national education system due to their autonomous and private status coupled with 
jurisdictional conflict between MORA and MOEC.   																																																								
61 Article 55(4) of the 2003 Law on National Education System states that “community-based 
educational institutions can receive technical assistance, funding subsidy, and other resources in a just 
and equal manner from the central government and/or local governments” (lembaga pendidikan 
berbasis masyarakat dapat memperoleh bantuan teknis, subsidi dana, dan sumber daya lain secara 
adil dan merata dari Pemerintah dan/atau Pemerintah Daerah). The contentious word in the article 
was “can” (dapat), which was interpreted as giving the local governments a legal escape from not 
funding private educational institutions. “Bantuan Pendidikan Berbasis Masyarakat Bersifat Wajib,” 
Hukum Online, 29 September 2011 (accessed on 8 May 2015). 
62 “Menanti Cairnya Dana BOS Madrasah,” Republika, 2 September 2015 (accessed on 30 December 
2015). 
63 “Komisi VIII DPR Ingin Madrasah Dikelola Desentralisasi,” Republika, 4 December 2012 
(accessed on 30 December 2015). 
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Another way for financially fledgling private madrasah to overcome their fiscal troubles is to 
convert into state-owned madrasah. This move provides private madrasah with a steady flow 
of guaranteed funding from MORA, which ensures their financial stability. In 2014 the 
Minister of Religious Affairs issued a directive, Peraturan Menteri Agama Nomor 14 Tahun 
2014 tentang Pendirian Madrasah yang Diselenggarakan oleh Pemerintah dan Penegerian 
Madrasah yang Diselenggarakan oleh Masyarakat, that lays out strict criteria that private 
madrasah have to satisfy in order to become state-owned (dinegerikan). One of them is 
Article 7(1), which requires a private madrasah to surrender all its assets to MORA before it 
can become a state-owned institution.64 This requirement presents a conundrum for private 
madrasah that cherish their autonomy, since the management and ownership of the schools 
will be fully transferred to MORA. Despite the prospect of losing independence, as of mid-
2014, around 500 madrasah had applied to become state-owned since the issuance of the new 
regulation.65 This figure, of course, is a mere drop in a bucket since there are 72,669 private 
madrasah in Indonesia from pre-school to senior high school levels.66 The funding quandary 
concerning Islamic education also brings back the aforementioned hot-button issue of 
pendidikan satu atap that first came into being in the late 1950s, in which its advocates argues 
that Islamic education will be better funded and managed if MOEC takes full control over it.67 
MORA, functioning as expected, does not find this idea at all attractive as the ministry would 
lose its monopoly in determining the nature and direction of Islamic education in the country 
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and risking marginalization in the field of education.68 As a result, Islamic education remains 
mired in jurisdictional overlap between MORA, MOEC and the local governments in the 
post-authoritarian era.                 
MALAYSIA: CENTRALIZATION OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Figure 2.3: Organizational structure of national educational bureaucracy 
 
Overview of state institutions that administer Islamic education 
Most Islamic schools in Malaysia are part of the national education system. Only a few dozen 
traditional pondok choose to remain independent of the official control by offering 
exclusively religious education. There are three authorities that manage and supervise the 
various types of Islamic schools in Malaysia: the Ministry of Education (Kementerian 
Pendidikan), the State Religious Council (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri, MAIN), and 
Department of Islamic Development (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam, JAKIM). There is an 
occasional overlap of jurisdiction and responsibilities between these three authorities, even 
causing intra-institutional frictions at times, but the overall relationship is smooth with a 
heavy tilt toward the Ministry of Education and JAKIM.   																																																								
68 Interview with Halfian Lubis, Head of Sub-Directorate, Directorate of Islamic Education, Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, 14 January 2014. MUI is also adamantly against the transfer of Islamic education 
to MOEC for fear of secularization. Interview with Amany Lubis, former Deputy Secretary General, 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 3 January 2014.   
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Article 3 of the constitution, which provides each state the full authority to manage Islamic 
affairs within its borders, produces a two-tiered administration for Islamic education in 
Malaysia: national and state. At the national level, the Islamic Education Division (Bahagian 
Pendidikan Islam, BPI) of the Ministry of Education is in charge of all national religious 
secondary schools (Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Agama, SMKA), the curriculum of the 
Islamic studies subject in all schools within the national educational system, and the 
certification of Islamic studies teachers. BPI also co-manages the Government-Assisted 
Religious Schools (Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan, SABK) with the state Islamic council. 
The ministry and the state Islamic council divide between them the management of the 
aforementioned SAR and State Religious Schools (Sekolah Agama Negeri, SAN). The 
ministry supervises the implementation of the national curriculum in these schools while the 
state Islamic council sets the curriculum for all Islamic subjects. Schools such as pondok, 
which are not part of the national educational system, fall under the aegis of the state Islamic 
council. SAR also come under the Advisory Agency for the Streamlining of Islamic 
Education and Islamic Studies (Lembaga Penasihat Penyelarasan Pelajaran dan Pendidikan 
Agama Islam, LEPAI), a sub-division under the Department of Islamic Development 
(Jabatan Kemajuan Islam, JAKIM), which strives to harmonize the varying standards and 
qualities of Islamic education and schools between all the states in Malaysia.  

































At the local level, the federal bureaucracy that oversees and manages national education, 
including Islamic education, mimics the organizational structure found at the national level. 
This means that for every department, sector and unit in the Ministry of Education, there are 
corresponding departments, sectors and units in each state and district. Theoretically, this 
allows for seamless flow of information and better coordination between levels of 
government. In reality, the organizational efficiency is highly dependent on geographic 
location. Geographically remote district offices such as the ones in Sabah and Sarawak are 
typically hard to reach due to bad infrastructure and forbidding landscape, which can 
sometimes complicate the attempt of the ministry to implement uniformity across all levels of 
governance. However, in general, the interaction and cooperation between levels of 
governance in the national educational system is smooth and the ministry does try to engage 
with officers from the state and district levels as much as possible by occasionally flying them 
to Putrajaya or Kuala Lumpur for briefings, seminars, and workshops.69 
Educational policies during the late colonial years in British Malaya (late 1800s to 1957) 
As briefly mentioned in the Indonesian section of the chapter, the British’s educational 
policies in Malaya were initially similar to the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies. But 
unlike the Dutch, which largely ignored the importance of Islamic education in the lives of its 
Muslim subjects, the British did accommodate Islamic education in the curriculum for 
national Malay vernacular schools in the late 1800s as a way to increase student enrollment 
(more on this later). While Islamic schools such as pondok and madrasah have always been an 
integral part of the educational practices in Malaysia, Islamic education did not figure 
prominently in the national education until the late 1970s when the wave of Islamic 
resurgence started to hit the country and the federal government began to pay more attention 
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to Islamic schools in the country. Since the late colonial period (the late 1800s to 1957), one 
of the main emphases of the national education system has been the implementation of a 
common language as a thread that can unify the Malaysian multi-ethnic society and forge a 
new national identity, which still continues until today. Another reason for such heavy 
emphasis on educational language policy especially during the early independence years is the 
strong correlation between the rise of ethno-religious politics and the growing importance of 
Islamic schools in the national education system in the late 1970s, underlined by the 
ascendancy of the Malay language in the national education system. As such, the discussion 
of the nationalization and standardization of education in Malaysia in this chapter will 
disproportionately focus on the language debate in the national education system, namely 
whether to use Malay, English or other vernacular languages as the medium language in 
schools.     
Before the Second World War, the British colonial administration mainly adopted a laissez- 
faire approach when it came to educating its colonial subjects in Malaya. Its educational 
policies encouraged private enterprises and communities to set up their own schools and 
curricula. As such, most schools during the pre-independence period were vernacular in 
nature, which the Malays, Chinese and Indian communities built to serve their respective 
communities. There were two reasons for this decentralized approach. The first was the 
paternalistic tendency of the British to preserve native customs and protect them from the so-
called corrupting foreign influences. The second reason was the colonial state’s limited 
resources for more comprehensive educational programs. The British and various missionary 
organizations also set up English-medium schools in the urban areas to serve the 
cosmopolitan population and provide an educated workforce for the colonial administration.70 
Thus, this educational legacy of school system segregated by vernacular education has largely 																																																								
70 Francis Wong Hoy Kee and Ee Tiang Hong, Education in Malaysia (Hong Kong: Heinemann 
Educational Books, 1975), p. 9. 
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remained until the present day though all the English-medium national schools were 
converted to Malay-medium schools in the 1970s (will be discussed in detail later in the 
chapter). 
When it came to providing Islamic religious instruction in Malay vernacular schools, the 
British initially implemented a policy similar to the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, 
which was not to allow any religious instruction at all during the school hours. But unlike the 
Dutch, the British later realized that the only way to entice Malay parents into sending their 
kids to the Malay vernacular schools was to include Islamic religious instruction in the 
curriculum, which was introduced in the late 19th century. The policy proved to be successful 
as average school attendance in Malay vernacular schools rose exponentially from 13,350 in 
1896 to 37,866 pupils in 1924.71 The first three decades of the 1900s also saw the 
establishment and growth of modern Islamic education in the form of madrasah. Many 
Muslim reformers who came back from the Middle East such as Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi and 
Syeikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin established their own madrasah as a way to modernize 
the Islamic education system in British Malaya, which had been hitherto dominated by the 
traditional pondok system. The first few decades of the 20th century also saw the increasing 
bureaucratization of Islam by the sultanates in the form of State Islamic Council (Majlis 
Agama Islam Negeri). The Kelantanese sultanate was the first to establish its own State 
Islamic Council, Majlis Agama Islam Kelantan (MAIK), in 1915. One of MAIK’s early 
undertakings was to build more madrasah in order to bring Islamic education in the state up to 
date with the socio-economic demands of the time by including subjects such as English, 
mathematics, and science (more details in Chapter 3). Other states soon followed suit in 
establishing their own State Islamic Councils as a means to formalize and deepen the reach of 																																																								
71 J. Stewart Nagle, Educational Needs of the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States. Ph.D 
diss., John Hopkins University, 1928, pp. 56-57; Rex Stevenson, Cultivators and Administrators: 
British Educational Policy towards the Malays 1875-1907 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 
1975), pp. 78-79.    
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the sultan’s religious authority. Modernizing Islamic education through building more 
madrasah and overhauling the curriculum became one of the State Islamic Council’s main 
priorities.72 
In the immediate years following the Second World War, the British realized that the 
momentum for self-determination was unstoppable among the Malayan population. They thus 
promoted policies they thought would help with nation building and ethnic integration. The 
common thrust of these policies was the emphasis on language as the social glue, specifically 
the use of bilingual education – Malay and English – to foster inter-ethnic harmony and a 
sense of nationalism. The Cheeseman Plan in 1946 proposed to expand the instruction of 
English language as a way to bridge the gap between all vernacular schools – Malay, Chinese 
and Tamil – but it was ultimately aborted due to resistance from the major ethnic 
communities that saw mother-tongue education as an integral part of preserving their cultural 
traditions.73 The British administration then established the Central Advisory Committee on 
Education (CACE), which came up with the Holgate Report in 1950 that proposed replacing 
all vernacular schools with a single bilingual education that consisted of English-medium 
schools with mandatory Malay language classes and Malay-medium schools with mandatory 
English language classes; Mandarin and Tamil would be elective subjects in these schools. 
Both the Malay and non-Malay communities strongly opposed the plan, which resulted in its 
abandonment.74 CACE then appointed the Barnes Committee, which produced a report in 
1951 that recommended mandatory bilingual (English and Malay) in the national primary 																																																								
72 Unlike in Indonesia, hardly anything comprehensive has been written on the history of Islamic 
education in Malaysia during the colonial era. Most works that I found were detailed ethnographic 
study of a particular madrasah or pondok or on Islamic education in a particular state or area of the 
state. Therefore, it is not known exactly how many madrasah and pondok existed during this time 
throughout the British Malaya. On the other hand, there are a lot more information on Malay 
vernacular schools since the British did keep meticulous record on them.   
73 Tham Seong Chee, “Issue in Malaysian Education: Past, Present, and Future.” Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 10:2 (September 1979), pp. 324-25. 
74 Tan Yao Sua and R. Santhiram, Educational Issues in Multiethnic Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: 
Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2014), pp. 10-14. 
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schools; national secondary schools were exempted as a compromise to placate the opposing 
Malay and non-Malay communities. Despite vehement resistance from both the Malays and 
non-Malays, the British colonial government formally adopted the recommendations from the 
Barnes Report, which became the underpinnings of the 1952 Education Ordinance.75 From 
this point, standardization and nationalization of the national educational system began in 
earnest.                   
Educational policies in the early years of independence 
In 1955, the first post-colonial government in Malaysia (known as Malaya at the time) wasted 
no time in establishing a committee to conduct an in-depth study of the state of education in 
the country. The committee produced the Razak Report in 1956 that later turned into the 1957 
Education Ordinance. The main recommendation of the Razak Report was the mandatory use 
of Malay language as the medium of instruction in the national educational system. The 1957 
Education Ordinance, however, dropped this recommendation in the face of strident protests 
from Chinese educationists. In its place, the new law proposed a common-content syllabus 
while allowing vernacular schools to maintain their mother-tongue language as the medium of 
instruction. The new law also set up local educational authorities and effectively decentralized 
the oversight of local educational affairs to local councils, which were democratically elected 
until 1965 when local government elections were suspended during the confrontation with 
Indonesia.76 The 1957 Education Ordinance and its progenitor, the 1956 Razak Report, 
displayed early on the contrast between the centralizing tendency of a Malay-dominated state 
and its inability to fully implement all its centralizing recommendations in the education 
sphere, namely the mandatory use of Malay language in national primary schools. The slight 
departure of the 1957 Education Ordinance from the 1956 Razak Report was to placate the 																																																								
75 Ibid., pp. 14-18. 
76 Local council elections are still abolished until today. For section on local education authorities, see: 
Report of the Education Committee 1956 (Kuala Lumpur: B.T. Fudge, 1956), p. 6.  
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demands of Chinese educationists wanting to maintain the character of their mother-tongue 
education. One researcher notes  
[i]nstitutional pluralism [diversity of types of schools] has permitted the Alliance [the 
coalition government at the time] its luxury of ambiguity as it tries to work out the 
shape of its long-range goal.77  
The young post-colonial state also did not possess the administrative capacity to expand its 
bureaucratic reach down to the local level; hence the delegation of educational authority to the 
local councils. All this was about to change rather drastically from the 1960s.  
The 1960 Rahman Report and the resultant 1961 Education Act exerted the efforts for 
nationalization and standardization more forcefully by implementing the Malay- and English-
medium secondary schools and imposing mandatory national exams in both languages that 
were vital to students’ class promotion (vernacular education was still allowed unchanged at 
the primary school level). The Chinese educationists, as in the earlier ordinance, were bitterly 
opposed to this new educational law, but this time the government did not budge. It took a 
hardline approach to the extent of trying to revoke the citizenship of Lim Lian Geok, one of 
the most vocal critics of the new law.78 The implementation of the act meant that vernacular 
secondary schools, namely Chinese and Tamil schools, were forced to change their medium 
of instruction to Malay or English if they wanted to remain in the national educational system 
and continue to receive financial assistance from the government. Non-Malay vernacular 
schools were mainly supported by their respective ethnic communities in their local areas and 
therefore varied in their financial viability. The prospect of losing state funding proved to be 
too much for many of the cash-strapped schools; in the end, 55 out of 71 Chinese secondary 
schools opted to remain in the national educational system and become National-Type 																																																								
77 Cynthia Enloe, Multi-Ethnic Politics: The Case of Malaysia (Berkeley: Research Monograph No. 2, 
University of California, 1970), p. 45. 
78 Tan and Santhiram, Educational Issues in Multiethnic Malaysia, p. 25. 
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Chinese Secondary Schools. There was hardly any resistance from the mainly rural Tamil 
schools since they were already in a woeful financial condition and in no position to oppose 
the act. The government at this time possessed three assets, which allowed it the means to 
adopt a more muscular approach in implementing the new educational policies: economic 
resources (a colonial legacy that centralizes income distribution and makes states dependent 
on federal government for funding), control of the examination system, and the luxury of 
ambiguity.79 Financial solvency, in particular, turned out to be the deciding factor whether a 
school chose to cede control over to the government or remained independent, which will be 
illustrated in greater detail in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.80 
Centralization forms the main thrust of the national education system in post-independence 
Malaysia but it has not always been that way. Initially, the 1957 Education Ordinance 
stipulated that education on the local level was to be managed and funded by municipal 
governments. From this time there was a form of decentralization in educational management 
due to the lack of bureaucratic capacity by the federal government and its supposed sensitivity 
to particular local educational needs. The government did an about-face in the early 1960s 
when it decided to centralize control of local educational affairs and abolish the wide latitude 
hitherto enjoyed by the local authorities. Accordingly, the 1960 Rahman Report and the 1961 
Education Act wrested the control away from the municipal government. The federal 																																																								
79 Ambiguity here refers to the indeterminate shape of what Malaysian idea of nationhood should be, 
which characterized how national educational policies were formulated at this time. The government 
used the ambiguous national identity to find compromises with every stakeholder in the educational 
arena since there were no concrete official ideals to “unite” all ethnic groups in Malaysia, besides the 
universal implementation of Malay and English languages as media of educational instruction, with 
English to be eventually phased out to make way for the sole dominance of Malay language. It was not 
until the early 1970s when the Malaysian national identity came to be dominated by Malay/Islamic 
ideals. Indonesia, on the other hand, is blessed with a rather clear national identity with Bahasa 
Indonesia and the ideals of Pancasila firmly at its core, around which educational policies can be 
formulated and implemented. Enloe, Multi-Ethnic Politics, pp. 58-67. See also R.S. Milne, “National 
Ideology and Nation-Building in Malaysia.” Asian Survey 10:7 (July 1970), pp. 563-573. 
80 At the time of the law’s implementation, there were 122 English-medium, 29 Chinese-medium and 
2 Tamil-medium independent schools operating outside the national educational system. See Chapter 
VIII, Paragraph 165 of Report of the Education Review Committee 1960 (Kuala Lumpur: B.T. Fudge, 
1960), p. 30. 
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government gave as its reasons the inability of local education authorities to raise sufficient 
funds for their schools, the need to streamline all levels and types of education, and political 
meddling by the local educational authorities that did not share common ideals and objectives 
as the federal government.81 The 1961 Education Act authorized the establishment of 
federally controlled state educational offices in every state in the country to act as the agent of 
the Ministry of the Education at the local level. The state educational offices had effectively 
replaced the pre-existing local educational authorities, and would only be answerable to the 
ministry, not the state government or local municipal administration. The Ministry of 
Education allowed the teachers to make recommendations to modify the curriculum based on 
the particularities of local conditions, but such changes had to be approved by the ministry.82 
The stage was thus set for a deeper penetration of the federal government into the education 
system as it took away the local autonomy in managing educational affairs and consolidated 
its control via the Ministry of Education and its state educational offices. 
In short, the indeterminate shape of the newly independent Malaysian national identity and 
the increasing efforts of the federal government to centralize control of the education system 
came to characterize the direction of national educational policies in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Non-Malay vernacular schools had to contend with the efforts of the federal government to 
implement an exclusively bilingual education system (English and Malay) at the expense of 
Mandarin and Tamil languages, against which the non-Malay vernacular schools managed to 
resist to a certain extent due to the negotiating flexibility afforded by the ambiguity of the 
national identity at this time.83 The 1960s also saw the federal government taking away the 
local autonomy in managing educational affairs by setting up its own local educational offices 																																																								
81 Ibid., Chapter XI, Paragraphs 197-219, pp. 35-37.  
82 Report of the Committee on Curriculum Planning and Development (Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian 
Pelajaran Malaysia, 1967), p. 4. 
83 For detailed account of the national language policy debates in the 1950s and 1960s, see Margaret 
Roff, “The Politics of Language in Malaya.” Asian Survey 7:5 (May 1967), pp. 316-328. 
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in every state in the country. The centralizing tendency of the federal government in 
educational matters remains unchanged in the ensuing decades while the ambiguity of 
national identity finally gave way to the dominance of Malay/Islamic ideals from the early 
1970s onward.        
Islamic education in early years of independence (1950s – 1960s) 
Before 1915 Islamic schools in British Malaya were privately owned and managed by 
individual religious teachers (typically known as to’ guru) or the local communities. There 
was no overseeing authority either on the state or national level that supervised and funded 
these schools, just like the case in Indonesia. But unlike in Indonesia, where most pesantren 
and madrasah have always remained private and relatively autonomous from the control of a 
central authority, the Islamic education in Malaysia became enmeshed in the bureaucratic 
centralizing trend that originated with the establishment of the first State Religious Council 
(Majlis Agama Islam Negeri, MAIN) in Kelantan in 1915. From the 1950s until late 1970s, 
the federal government, while acknowledging the need to improve the poor conditions of 
Islamic schools around the country, gave very little assistance until Islamic discourse came to 
dominate the public space in the late 1970s. It was then that the federal government started to 
take an active role in the management and supervision of Islamic schools in Malaysia.    
Since the early 1900s, Islamic schools had been under the jurisdiction of MAIN, accorded by 
the sultan’s authority over the Malay and Islamic matters in his state. MAIN and community 
governing boards managed the pondok, madrasah and People’s Religious Schools (Sekolah 
Agama Rakyat, SAR), which were in the same leaky financial boat as the vernacular schools 
as illustrated by a 1956 report submitted by the Committee to Consider Financial Aids to 
	 98 
Non-Government Islamic Religious Schools.84 The resultant 1957 Education Ordinance, 
however, did not incorporate the report’s recommendation to improve the financial situation 
of Islamic schools in the country. While Section 49 of the 1957 Education Ordinance 
mandated that any public schools in the national education system that had more than fifteen 
Muslim students had to provide at least two hours of Islamic knowledge instruction, the 
implementation and funding of this directive became entangled in the messy division of 
responsibilities between the state and federal governments since neither authority wanted to 
bear the full costs of providing Islamic education in national public schools. The 1960 
Rahman Talib Report sought to clarify this jurisdictional muddle by recommending that the 
state religious authority should supply religious teachers in government-assisted schools 
while the state and central authorities would share the cost for providing such instruction.85 
Nonetheless, both the 1956 and 1960 Reports and their attendant Acts did not directly address 
the state of affairs of private Islamic schools, which, for the most part, were in a sorry 
condition. As mentioned above, many traditional Islamic schools have modernized their 
curriculum since the early 1900s in order to keep up with the changes and demands of the 
modern world. Unfortunately, not many of these Islamic schools had the financial 
wherewithal to undertake this endeavor sufficiently, which would have required hiring new 
teachers, providing new learning facilities and replacing outdated textbooks, as exemplified 
by the aforementioned 1956 report. On August 1956, a national congress of SAR came out 
with specific demands for support from the federal government. The congress asked for $50 
per student per year, textbook subsidies, assistance for teachers’ training, supply of 
university-educated teachers, and scholarships for SAR students to study in the Islamic 																																																								
84 According to the report, by 1956, there were 368 non-government Islamic religious schools along 
with 35,093 students and 1,174 teachers spread across eleven states in the peninsular Malaysia. Most 
of these schools had poor infrastructure, unqualified teachers, and haphazardly designed curricula that 
mainly focused on religious subjects. Hashim, Educational Dualism, pp. 36-39. 
85 Exception is made for Islamic studies teachers in residential secondary schools for Malays, where 
the Ministry would provide the teachers. Ibid., Chapter XVI, paragraphs 283-297, pp. 47-48.  
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universities abroad. In return, the schools agreed to place their management under the control 
of the Ministry of Education.86 Even some state religious authorities asked for the government 
to assume control of SAR, which were under their jurisdiction, due to the lack of funding for 
maintaining basic school infrastructures and hiring competent teachers.87 It was not the 
priority of the government at this time to increase its support for Islamic education beyond 
what was proposed in the 1956 Razak Report and the 1960 Rahman Talib Report, since Islam 
as a political tool was not yet central to its legitimacy and regime maintenance.88 Moreover, 
private Islamic schools especially SAR were largely the stronghold of the Islamic opposition 
political party, PAS, which added another reason for the non-support from the federal 
government (more discussion on this issue in Chapter 3).89 The “secular” stance of the federal 
government was about to change as the wave of Islamic revivalism hit the Malaysian shores 
in the late 1970s. 
In all, the first three decades following independence saw the federal government not properly 
addressing the plight of Islamic education despite the 1956 report that acknowledged the 
problems and pleas for financial help from various Islamic schools and state religious 
authorities. Furthermore, the fact that Islamic schools were largely under the jurisdiction of 																																																								
86 Laporan Mesyuarat, Kongres Sekolah-Sekolah Agama Rakyat SaMalaya di Dewan Sekolah Al-
Ulum, Batu 20, Bagan Datoh, Perak, 23 dan 24 Ogos 1956, National Archive of Malaysia, Kuala 
Lumpur.  
87 The state religious authority in Pahang asked for a federal government takeover of SAR under its 
management. It lamented that some SAR teachers did not receive salaries for three months and that 
most of SAR teachers were not qualified, which, in turn, resulted in poor instruction and high rate of 
exam failure among the SAR students. Kertas Meshuarat Jawatan Kuasa Ugama dan Kebajikan 
Masharakat, Bil. 26/65, National Archive of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.  
88 Wan Abdul Rahman Wan Abdul Latiff and Kamaruzzaman Yusoff, “Kontroversi Sekolah Agama 
Rakyat (SAR): Globalisasi, Sekularisasi dan Pendemokrasian Pendidikan” (paper presented at the 4th 
International Malaysian Studies Conference, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 3-5 August, 
2004), p. 11.  
89 One example of the close relationship between PAS and SAR at this time was evident in a letter 
dated 16 March, 1965 from Ustaz Zulkarnain Hj. Ahmad, the Secretary General of the Association of 
Teachers of People’s Madrasah (Persatuan Guru-Guru Madrasah Raa’yat) in the state of Perak, to 
Ustaz Hj. Hassan Adli, the then Deputy President of PAS. The letter entailed the former’s refusal of 
the latter’s offer to appoint him as the head of a new Islamic college in northern Perak. National 
Archive of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.    
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MAIN and some schools were known to be the hotbed for Islamic opposition against the 
federal government added to the reluctance of the federal government to support the Islamic 
schools. The federal government’s reticent attitude toward Islamic education was about to 
change in the late 1970s as Islamic discourse became more prominent in the public space and 
posed a serious threat to the federal government’s legitimacy to rule.    
The dominance of Malay/Islamic views in the national education system (1970s to present) 
Due to the aforementioned ambiguous approach in shaping the new national identity, the 
government’s educational policies before 1970 did not explicitly represent the interests of a 
single ethnic group. This ambiguity allowed the government the flexibility in appeasing the 
demands of non-Malay education advocates, namely the Chinese educationists. The 
ambiguity was also the result of the contradictory purposes of educational policies. On the 
one hand, the government expected the educational policies to act as an agent of integration 
that could somehow unite the multicultural Malaysian society on common ideals; on the other 
hand, these very same policies were also supposed to improve the socio-economic conditions 
of the majority Malay population, who were mainly poor and rural at the time.90 This dynamic 
was soon to change from the early 1970s as the government adopted more Malay/Islam-
centric educational policies. This policy change came as result of two reasons: the May 13, 
1969 racial riots and the Islamic revivalism that started in the late 1970s. 
There are many versions of the May 13, 1969 race riots, but the event involved clashes 
between Malays and Chinese, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries, along with 
serious property damage.91 At the root of the May 13, 1969 race riots was the economic 
																																																								
90 John Bock, “Education and Nation-Building in Malaysia: A Study of Institutional Effect in Thirty-
Four Secondary Schools.” Ph.D diss., Stanford University, 1971, p. 155. 
91 For the official version of the event, refer to The May 13 Tragedy: A Report (Kuala Lumpur: 
National Operations Council, 1969). For an alternative account, refer to Kua Kia Soong, May 13: 
Declassified Documents on The Malaysian Riots of 1969 (Kuala Lumpur: Suaram, 2007). 
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disparity between the poor rural Malays and the more economically dominant Chinese, which 
quickly became the rallying cry for United Malay National Organisation or UMNO, the 
Malay political party that dominated the ruling coalition at the time. The aftermath of the race 
riots saw the creation of the New Economic Policy (Dasar Ekonomi Baru) or NEP, which was 
an affirmative action program aiming to benefit the Bumiputera (sons of the soil), the 
majority of whom were Malays. NEP was part of the UMNO-led government’s aggressive 
push for the elevation of the Malay status in all aspects of life even at the expense of other 
non-Bumiputra groups. The government founded the National University of Malaysia 
(Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, UKM) in 1970 as the first institution of higher learning 
that uses Malay language as its sole medium of instruction. The government also took more 
concerted and determined efforts to establish the supremacy of the Malay language in national 
education. The post-1970 national educational policies reflected the reification of Malay 
identity, as evidenced by the sharp rise of Malay-empowerment rhetoric in the political 
discourse following the 1969 racial riots. Mandatory implementation of the Malay language 
was one of these policies that acted as a means to exert a Malay-dominated national identity. 
The Minister of Education, Abdul Rahman Ya’akob announced in 1970 that as of 1978 all 
standardized national examinations would be held in the Malay language.92 The ministry even 
imported teachers from Indonesia to fill in the vacancies needed to teach Malay in all subjects 
except English.93 There was a regional aspiration as well that the Malay language could play a 
larger economic and technical role between Malaysia and Indonesia. Hussein Onn, who 
succeeded Abdul Rahman Ya’akob as Minister of Education, stated that 
Working in close cooperation with Indonesia in regard to common spelling, scientific 
and technical terms etc., the National Language will be spoken and used in a region 
																																																								
92 Bock, Education and Nation-Building in Malaysia, p. 184. 
93 Ibid., p. 184. 
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consisting of over 100 million people. We have no doubt whatsoever the National 
Language is virile and viable.94              
The ascendancy of Malay identity politics from the 1970s onward gave rise to the concept of 
Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy), which, among other things, required non-Malays to 
conform to the Malay/Islam-centric notion of Malaysian nationhood.95 The government 
formulated the National Cultural Policy (Dasar Kebudayaan Kebangsaan) in 1971, and put 
Malay culture and Islam firmly at the heart of the government’s idea of “Malaysian culture.”96 
By the 1970s, the Malayanization policy that from the onset of independence had set out to 
wean the civil service of British expatriates and increase the recruitment of Malayans of all 
ethnicities gave way to “Malay”ization policy that favored the recruitment of Malays over 
other ethnic groups.97 The percentage of Malays in managerial and professional positions 
within the civil service rose dramatically from 14.1 percent in 1957 to 67.8 percent by late 
1999.98 This trend was also abetted by the increased enrollment of Malay students in public 
universities as a result of NEP. In 1970, Malay students constituted 40.2 percent of all 
tertiary-level students enrolled in public institutions. By 1995, the number had jumped to 61.6 
percent. The figure for non-Malays plummeted from 56.2 percent in 1970 to 38.4 percent in 
																																																								
94 Speech given at a seminar for Members of Parliament and State Legislative Assemblies hosted by 
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Institute of Language and Literature) on 18 February 1971. Education in 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia, 1971), p. 12. 
95 The term Ketuanan Melayu was coined by Abdullah Ahmad, a former UMNO Member of 
Parliament, in a speech at Institute of International Affairs, Singapore on 30 August, 1986. “Sorry 
attempt to rehabilitate Ketuanan Melayu,” Malaysiakini, 9 February 2011 (accessed on 15 March, 
2015).  
96 Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia: http://pmr.penerangan.gov.my/index.php/maklumat-kenegaraan/238-dasar-
kebudayaan-kebangsaan.html (accessed on 16 March 2015). 
97 In 1957, Europeans made up 82.6 percent of the direct-entry Senior Malayan Civil Service posts 
with no Malayans holding these senior posts. By 1967, the trend was completely reversed with 30.3 
percent Malayans and no Europeans holding these senior posts. The Malayan Administrative Service 
(46.7 percent) and the State Civil Services (22.9 percent) made up the rest of bureaucratic staffs. 
Shafruddin, The Federal Factor, pp. 164-174. 
98 Khoo Boo Teik, “Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector: Malaysian 
Experiences,” United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Democracy, Governance 
and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 20 (December 2005), pp. 18-19. 
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1995.99 The government’s Malay-centric educational policies also resulted in a mass exodus 
of Chinese students into National-Type Chinese primary schools when the government began 
to convert all English-medium primary schools to Malay-medium primary schools in the early 
1970s. By 2011, Chinese students comprised only 3 percent of all students enrolled in the 
Malay-medium national primary schools and 22 percent in the national Malay-medium 
secondary schools.100 When it comes to ethnic composition of the teaching staff in national 
primary and secondary schools, in 2011 Bumiputera (most of whom are Malays) made up 81 
percent while only 14 percent and 5 percent were Chinese and Indians, respectively.101 In 
short, the decades following the 1969 racial riots saw an overwhelming representation of 
Malays in the national schools (as opposed to Chinese and Tamil schools, which are classified 
as National-Type schools) and the government agencies that oversee these schools, which, in 
turn, produced Malay/Islam-centric educational policies and environment in the schools. In 
short, catalyzed by the May 13, 1969 race riots, the 1970s became the decade in which Malay 
political elites within UMNO began to assert their dominance vis-à-vis other ethnic groups 
via the Ketuanan Melayu rhetoric and practices such as favorable recruitment of Malays in the 
civil service, implementation of Bahasa Malaysia as the sole medium language in schools, 
and the preferential admission for Malay students in public universities. This pervasive 
“Malay”ized climate in the government and national schools proved to be conducive to the 
widespread growth of Islamic piety that took place during the Islamic resurgence period from 
the late 1970s onward. 
 																																																								
99 Ibid., p. 21. 
100 Similarly, Indian students also constituted a dismal 1 percent of overall enrolled Malay-medium 
primary school students and 7 percent of the Malay-medium secondary school students. Ironically, 
there are now more Malay students in National-Type Chinese primary schools (9 percent) than 
Chinese students in Malay-medium national primary schools (3 percent). Preliminary Report: 
Malaysia Education Blueprint 2013-2025 (Putrajaya: Ministry of Education, 2012), p. 95. 
101 Ibid., p. 96. 
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The Islamization of a Malay-centric national educational system (late 1970s to present)  
The increasing Malay dominance in the civil service and the national school system, which 
began in the early 1970s, prepared a fertile socio-political environment for the Islamic 
revivalism that hit Malaysia in the late 1970s. The main reason was the official notion of the 
Malay identity. Article 160 of the Malaysian constitution defines Malay people as “a person 
who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, and conforms to 
Malay custom.” The conflation of ethnicity (Malay) with religion (Islam), while having 
always been present in the constitution since it first came into force in 1957, did not gain 
serious political saliency until the late 1970s when Islam became more prominent in public 
discourse. The 1979 Iranian revolution further galvanized Islamic activists seeking political 
change, which also included the former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. The 
challenge from the Islamic activists became real enough that the government decided to take 
it seriously by mainly coopting the Islamic activist leaders, including Anwar Ibrahim (more 
discussion on this topic in Chapter 5).102 The government issued a special committee report in 
1979, chaired by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, which proposed that 
national exam for Islamic education be made compulsory for all Muslim students, candidates 
for Islamic education teachers to be chosen based on the federal government’s guideline, and 
there should be at least one religious officer in every state who would oversee the 
implementation of religious education in schools.103 In the 1982 UMNO general assembly, 
																																																								
102 The Malaysian government’s responses to the threat posed by Islamic revivalism at this time 
consisted of four methods: making largely symbolic religious concessions to the Islamic activists such 
as building more mosques; coopting leaders of major dakwah organizations and promoting its own 
official dakwah activities; increasing control over Islamic affairs and education; and repressing 
Islamic groups that could not be coopted and which the government considered “deviants.” Simon 
Barraclough, “Managing the Challenges of Islamic Revival in Malaysia: A Regime Perspective.” 
Asian Survey 23:8 (August 1983), p. 967. See also Mohamad Abu Bakar, “Islamic Revivalism and the 
Political Process in Malaysia.” Asian Survey 21:10 (October 1981), pp. 1050-1055. 
103 Laporan Jawatankuasa Kabinet Mengkaji Dasar Pelaksanaan Pelajaran (7hb November, 1979) 
(Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1979), pp. 71, 177-178. 
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soon after becoming the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad articulated the 
urgency of UMNO in responding to the Islamic revivalism in the Malay society: 
Today we face the biggest struggle – the struggle to change the attitude of the Malays 
in line with the requirement of Islam in this modern age…UMNO’s task now is to 
enhance Islamic practices and ensure that the Malay community truly adheres to 
Islamic teachings…Naturally this cause is far bigger than the previous struggles of 
UMNO. Of course it is not easy to succeed. But UMNO must pursue it, whatever the 
obstacles, for this is our real cause.104 
 By the early 1980s, the federal government had also started to actively provide funding for 
SAR, which it had largely ignored before.105 With the permeation of Islamic values in all 
parts of the government, facilitated by the previously discussed “Malay”ization of the civil 
service, the 1985 Policy on the Inculcation of Islamic Values in Administration (Dasar 
Penerapan Nilai-Nilai Islam Dalam Pentadbiran)106 and the increasing religious piety within 
the Malay society in general, Islamic values came to dominate the Malay-centric policies of 
the government. The centrality of Malay/Islamic worldview in educational policies 
manifested itself in the form of the National Education Philosophy (Falsafah Pendidikan 
Kebangsaan) in 1988 and the 1989 Integrated Curriculum for Secondary Schools (Kurikulum 
Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah, KBSM). While the influence of Malay/Islamic-centric views 
in educational policies have been apparent since the 1970s, the formulation of the National 
Education Policy and KBSM marked the first time these views were made official by the 
																																																								
104 Quoted in Diane Mauzy and R.S. Milne, “The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline 
Through Islam.” Pacific Affairs 56:4 (Winter 1983-1984), p. 644. 
105 In 1983, 680 SAR with 105,292 students received RM3,868,035 from the federal government. In 
1984 the allocation increased to RM3,924,165 for 697 SAR with 105,950 students. Taklimat, 
Bahagian Pendidikan Islam kepada Y.B. Datuk Abdullah bin Hj. Ahmad Badawi, Menteri Pelajaran 
Malaysia, 23 Ogos, 1984, National Archive of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.  
106 The 1985 Dasar Penerapan Nilai-Nilai Islam Dalam Pentadbiran was an official government 
policy that aimed to make Malay civil servants better Muslims with the belief that a devout Muslim is 
also a productive and honest worker. Garis Panduan Bagi Mengadakan Ceramah Penerapan Nilai-
Nilai Islam Dalam Perkhidmatan Awam: Pekeliling Am Bil. 2 Tahun 2001 (Putrajaya: Jabatan Perdana 
Menteri, 2001), p. iii.   
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UMNO-dominated government that strived to burnish its Islamic credential. Religious values 
(read: Islam) as defined and promoted by the federal government now formed the crux of the 
national curriculum (refer to Chapter 1). No longer were religious values divorced from 
general subjects as the Ministry of Education saw the seamless integration between the two as 
the most effective way to shape the character of young Muslim students.107 The Ministry of 
Education stated in 1992 under the heading “Penekanan Nilai-Nilai Murni” (Emphasis on 
Virtuous Values) that 
Inculcation of virtuous values is carried out in total through all KBSM subjects. This 
approach is known as values transcending curriculum.108 
KBSM stood in stark contrast to previous national curricula due to the explicit role of 
religious values in its content and preferred pedagogy in an effort to keep the curriculum in 
line with religiously imbued Falsafah Pendidikan Negara. While the Ministry of Education 
defined nilai-nilai murni (virtuous values) as universal in character and as not contradicting 
religion, culture and norms of the Malaysian society, the implementation of these values in 
the curriculum indicated a hegemonic presence of Malay/Islamic values in schools that 
alienates other belief systems.109 The former director of Centre for Curriculum Development 
at the Ministry of Education, Wan Mohd. Zahid Mohd. Nordin, stated that 
																																																								
107 Falsafah Pendidikan Kebangsaan: http://www.moe.gov.my/v/falsafah-pendidikan-kebangsaan (accessed 
on 6 January, 2016). 
108 The original Malay excerpt: “Penyerapan nilai-nilai murni dilakukan dengan menyeluruh melalui 
semua mata pelajaran KBSM. Pendekatan ini dikenali sebagai nilai-nilai merentas kurikulum.” Buku 
Penerangan Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah (Kuala Lumpur: Pusat Perkembangan 
Kurikulum, Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 1992), p. 6. 
109 The original Malay excerpt: “Nilai-nilai murni bersifat sarwajagat dan tidak bercanggah dengan 
agama, budaya dan norma masyarakat Malaysia.” Ibid., p. 10. 
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Even though the moral values proposed in the education on the primary and secondary 
levels embody universal values, these values have to be acknowledged as Islamic 
values that are not ‘new’ or relative.110  
The Ministry of Education’s current curriculum guideline (Huraian Sukatan Pelajaran) for 
the subject of history at the senior high school level (Form 4) reveals that 50 percent of the 
content are Islamically-oriented, despite the non-religious nature of the subject.111 There are 
also reported incidences of Malay/Islamic domination in national schools, which include a 
Muslim school principal forcing non-Muslim students to participate in Islamic prayer during 
school assembly, a Muslim teacher asking a non-Muslim student to not drink water in class 
during Ramadan and drink his own urine in the toilet instead, and a Malay school principal 
who gave racist speech while addressing a multiracial student body.112 The Education Act of 
1996, which repealed the Education Act of 1961, further entrenched the superior position of 
Malay/Islamic-centric views in the national education system. The main difference between 
the Education Acts of 1996 and 1961 was that the former reduced the minimum number of 
																																																								
110 The original Malay excerpt: “Walaupun nilai-nilai moral yang disarankan dalam pendidikan di 
peringkat rendah dan menengah merupakan nilai-nilai universal tetapi ianya tetap diakui sebagai nilai-
nilai Islam yang bukan bersifat ‘baharu’ atau relatif.” Paper entitled Perancangan Kurikulum 
Pendidikan Islam dalam Falsafah Pendidikan Negara (Planning of Islamic Education Curriculum in 
the National Educational Philosophy) was presented at the 1990 Bengkel Pendidikan Islam Malaysia 
[Workshop on Islamic Education in Malaysia], Kolej Agama Sultan Zainal Abidin, Kuala Terengganu, 
Terengganu, p. 5.  
111 The Islamically-oriented content includes discussions on the spread of Islamic civilization in the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia, and the golden era of the Melaka sultanate in the 15th century. The 
rest of the syllabus sweepingly covers the history of western civilization and the pre-Islamic 
civilizations of Southeast Asia, which curiously omitted any reference to Hindu-Buddhist Malay 
kingdoms in the peninsular. Huraian Sukatan Pelajaran Sejarah Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah 
Menengah, Tingkatan 4 (Putrajaya: Pusat Perkembangan Kurikulum, Kementerian Pendidikan 
Malaysia, 2015), pp. 28-50. 
112 These reports are just the tip of the iceberg since there are many other discrimination cases in 
schools that went unreported. “Lagi gejala ‘rasis’ di sekolah,” Malaysiakini, 27 September, 2010 
(accessed on 16 March 2015); “Jabatan pendidikan Kedah diarah siasat dakwaan pelajar disuruh 
minum air kencing,” The Malaysian Insider, 22 June 2015 (accessed on 21 January 2016); “School 
abused power by luring minor into Islam, Sabah MP claims,” Malay Mail Online, 8 February 2015 
(accessed on 5 April 2015); “Masing: Attempts to convert students to Islam must stop,” Borneo Post, 
28 March 2015 (accessed 5 April 2015); “Report: Malaysia’s mission schools facing Islamisation with 
alleged conversions,” Malay Mail Online, 12 February, 2016 (accessed on 15 February, 2016).  
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Muslim students for whom mandatory provision of Islamic studies by the schools was 
required from fifteen to five.113 This was a blatant attempt to force National-Type Chinese 
schools to provide Islamic studies instruction to the small number of Muslim students who 
attended those schools and represented an added burden on schools that were already severely 
under-funded.114 The non-Malay vernacular schools now have to hire Muslim teachers to 
teach the subject, most likely from their own pocket.115 On the other hand, in 1997, the 
Ministry of Education increased the budget allocation for the teaching of Islamic Studies and 
Moral Studies subjects in government schools by 41.6 percent, namely to ramp up dakwah 
(Islamic propagation) activities among the students.116 In short, it is clear from the examples 
given that there have been active efforts by the government since the early 1970s to shape the 
national identity in the Malay/Islamic mold due to the May 13, 1969 race riots and the Islamic 
resurgence in the late 1970s; educational policies are simply one of the means to achieve that 
end.         
Enforcing standardization (1970s to present day) 
As mentioned before, standardization goes hand in hand with nationalization of the education 
system. In order for the federal government to effectively shape the society to conform to its 
objectives via the national education system, it needs to formulate standardized curriculum 
and educational policies that it can implement without major alterations as the curriculum and 																																																								
113 Chapter 10, Paragraph 50 of the Education Act of 1996 (550 Act). The Act also states that no 
funding will be given to the teaching of other religions besides Islam though schools are allowed to 
have it on their own (Paragraph 51) and financial assistance can be given to private Islamic schools 
that are not under the control of the Ministry of Education (Paragraph 52). 
114 National-Type school (Sekolah Jenis Kebangsaan) is an official designation for Chinese and Indian 
vernacular schools that are part of the national education system. 
115 Under the Ninth Malaysian Plan (2006-2010), Chinese and Tamil National-Type schools were each 
allocated 3.6 percent and 1.34 percent funding respectively despite constituting 21.12 percent and 
3.124 percent of the total student population respectively. Tan and Santhiram, Educational Issues in 
Multiethnic Malaysia, p. 67.  
116 Pembangunan Pendidikan 2001-2010: Perancangan Bersepadu Penjana Kecemerlangan 
Pendidikan (Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 2001), p. 6-6. 
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policies trickle down to the local level. While this thesis argues that the state in Malaysia is 
generally strong and cohesive in its educational objectives, as evidenced by the state’s 
relentless centralizing efforts and attempts to control the political discourse through the 
national education since the 1970s, the state is still vulnerable to pressures from various social 
groups that can result in alterations to its standardized curriculum and educational policies. 
The cohesiveness of the Malaysian state can be readily observed in the local educational 
offices where the federalized institutional mindset prevails despite the pride in strong regional 
identity. It is at the ministerial level where the state cohesion can be heavily influenced by the 
political dynamics in the public sphere. The example shown in this section – the policy 
implementation of Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English (Pengajaran 
dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris, PPSMI) – illustrates the 
occasional weakness of the Malaysian state to external pressures from the society, which can 
put a damper on the state’s efforts to formulate and implement a uniformly agreed standard 
for national curriculum.  
Despite the increasing centralization tendency of the federal government since the early 
1970s, there is a gap between what the Ministry of Education envisions and the practical 
reality on the ground when it comes to implementation and enforcement of national 
educational policies. The highly centralized, top-down nature of national policy-making in 
Malaysia formulates one-size-fits-all policies and hands them down from the cloistered 
citadel of Putrajaya to be implemented by state educational offices at the local level. While 
there is a fair amount of local adaption of national education policies at the local level as we 
shall see in the case studies chapters, the institutional ideology in the form of a federalized 
mindset is still very strong and ubiquitous among the local agents of the ministry, who 
generally believe in the nobility and sincerity of their national mission to improve local 
education in their areas. A federalized institutional mindset means that the views of the state 
education officers are generally in accordance with the objectives of the ministry despite these 
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officers being typically locals, especially in states with historically strong regional pride and 
tradition such as Kelantan and Sarawak, both of which make up the case studies in this 
research (Chapters 3 and 4). In other words, these local officers believe that the national 
mission bequeathed upon them by the ministry usually supersedes any unique attributes of the 
local culture and tradition in their areas. More detailed explanation of the federalized 
institutional mindset among the state education officers are illustrated in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The institutional identity of the Ministry of Education, on the other hand, changes more 
readily at the national level depending on the political exigencies of the time. This is largely 
due to the fact that key policymakers are generally politicians and political appointees, whose 
careers are reliant on their ability to satisfy the demands of their core constituencies or, in the 
case of political appointees, their political patrons. Institutional ideological shift can occur as 
a response to electoral results or pressure from the civil society groups. One example of 
institutional ideological shift in the Ministry of Education since the 1970s is the policy 
implementation of Teaching and Learning Science and Mathematics in English (Pengajaran 
dan Pembelajaran Sains dan Matematik dalam Bahasa Inggeris, PPSMI). The policy shift in 
the PPSMI issue illustrates how institutional ideology can respond to pressure from society 
despite the Ministry of Education’s overwhelming centralizing tendency.  
The formulation and implementation of PPSMI represent a major shift in the Ministry of 
Education’s language policy regarding the national curriculum. As mentioned before, the 
government’s educational policies have become increasingly Malay/Islamic-centric since the 
early 1970s. One of the main pillars of this Malay/Islamic institutional ideology is the 
implementation of Malay language as the sole medium of instruction in all national schools, 
which the government managed to achieve by the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the all-Malay 
language policy went through an abrupt shift in 2002 when the then Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamad, introduced the PPSMI policy for national primary and secondary schools. This 
policy’s purported primary concern was to increase the global competitiveness of Malaysian 
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students in scientific and technical fields, with English proficiency the key to achieve that 
objective. There was also a general concern among employers that the level of English 
proficiency among Malaysian students had deteriorated significantly ever since the 
implementation of Malay-only national curriculum and exams. PPSMI enjoyed several years 
of nation-wide implementation before the former Minister of Education and Deputy Prime 
Minister, Muhyiddin Yassin abolished it in 2009 and replaced it with a compromised version 
called Upholding The Malay Language and Strengthening The English Language 
(Memartabatkan Bahasa Malaysia dan Memperkukuhkan Bahasa Inggeris, MBMMBI).117 
The ministry argued that it was necessary to abolish PPSMI due to the low English 
proficiency of teachers and students and the lack of evidence that learning science and 
mathematics in English would improve Malaysia’s global competitiveness.118 The PPSMI 
issue elicits strong reactions that divide the Malaysian society along ethnic and class lines: 
non-Malays and urban educated Malays support the policy, while Malay nationalists and rural 
Malays oppose it.119 In the aftermath of the 2008 election, when the UMNO-led government 
saw its parliamentary advantage reduced to a simple majority for the first time since 
independence, it decided to abolish PPSMI as a move to entice the rural Malay voters back to 
the government’s camp.120 PPSMI remains a contentious issue until now with the former 
																																																								
117 Ministry of Education, Frequently Asked Questions: http://www.moe.gov.my/en/soalan-lazim-
view?id=150&cat=28&keyword=&page=1& (accessed on 20 March 2015). 
118 “Why PPSMI is abolished?” The Star, 5 October 2011 (accessed on 20 March 2015). 
119 The fault line can be clearly seen in the headlines of mainstream newspapers in Malaysia: English-
language newspapers such as The Star and The New Straits Times, which readership mainly 
comprises non-Malays and urban Malay professionals, were in support of PPSMI while Malay-
language newspapers such as Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian were calling for PPSMI’s abolition. 
Asiah Abu Samah, “The Development of English Language Policy in Malaysia: The New Policy on 
Science and Mathematics in the Medium of English.” Ph.D diss., University of Sussex, 2008, pp. 92-
93.  
120 The then Deputy Minister of Education, Wee Ka Siong, denied that the policy repeal was in any 
way related to the results of the 2008 election: “No return to English, says Wee,” The Malaysian 
Insider, 18 January 2011 (accessed on 21 March 2015). 
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Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, calling for its reinstatement while Muhyiddin Yassin 
vowing to protect the Malay language and forge ahead with the new policy.121  
In the context of institutional ideological shift, the PPSMI policy and its subsequent reversal 
signifies the reactions of the key policymakers, namely the politicians and their political 
appointees in the Ministry of Education, to the apparent changes in the society since the 
1970s. The 1971 New Economic Policy had created a large educated and upwardly mobile 
middle-class population, especially among the Malays, who demanded the partial 
reintroduction of English in the national curriculum to improve global competitiveness.122 
This emerging Malay middle-class group, along with the non-Malays who were already 
disgruntled at the increasing dominance of Malay language in the national education since the 
early 1970s, created a tremendous pressure that resulted in the ideological shift within the 
Ministry of Education. The institutional ideology of the Ministry of Education again swung 
back to supporting the supremacy of Malay language in the national curriculum in the 
aftermath of the 2008 general elections, namely for UMNO to shore up support from the rural 
Malays to compensate for the loss of votes from the urban Malays, who overwhelmingly 
voted for the opposition.123 In short, while the institutional ideology in the state educational 
offices remains consistently pro-federal government regardless of the strong influence from 
the local culture and politics, the institutional ideology within the Ministry of Education can 
																																																								
121 “Dr M: Bring back PPSMI or get left behind,” The Star, 2 October 2014 (accessed 21 March 2015); 
“Kerajaan janji perkasa bahasa Melayu,” Utusan Malaysia, 12 November 2014 (accessed 21 March 
2015).  
122 The significant decrease in the percentage of population living in poverty from 49.3 percent in 1970 
to 6.1 percent in 1997 corresponded to the rising percentage of middle-class population during the 
same period. Similarly, gross monthly income grew from RM264 in 1970 to RM2,606 in 1997. Jomo 
Kwame Sundaram and Wee Chong Hui, Malaysia @ 50: Economic, Development, Distribution, 
Disparities (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2014), pp. 68-70. 
123 The results of the 2008 General Elections denied the incumbent coalition Barisan Nasional its 
customary two-third majority of the parliamentary seats, which it had continuously received since 
1969, in large part contributed by the loss of many Malay urban and semi-urban seats to the opposition 
coalition. An Analysis of Malaysia’s 12th General Election (Kuala Lumpur: Asian Strategy & 
Leadership Institute, 2012), p. 2. 
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readily change, though rarely, as the government reacts to socio-political dynamics that can 
threaten its hold on power. The ability of the state in Malaysia to detect the changes in society 
and react accordingly contributes to its resiliency and hegemonic reach when it comes to 
national education, as exemplified by the PPSMI policy battle.      
Conclusion 
Both post-colonial governments of Indonesia and Malaysia have undertaken serious efforts 
since the 1950s to standardize and nationalize education, including Islamic education, as a 
way to inculcate the idea of nationhood among the population and to create an educated 
workforce that is able to satisfy the country’s development needs. Standardization and 
nationalization of the education system also signify the extent to which the two governments 
are able to centralize its authority. In present-day Indonesia, two defining aspects characterize 
its national education, which also includes Islamic education: the rift between the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (MOEC) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) especially on 
the questions of “single roof education system” and madrasah funding; and local autonomy. 
At the heart of it is the cultural and ideological clash between MOEC and MORA that hinders 
efforts by the state to increase centralization of Islamic education, even during the highly 
centralized New Order era (1966-1998). The 1999 decentralization laws further accentuated 
and made formal the institutional chasm between the two ministries by devolving matters of 
national education to the local level while still retaining Islamic education within the ambit of 
the non-decentralized MORA. Meanwhile in Malaysia, national education in the post-
independence era, including the management of Islamic education, is characterized by the 
increasing centralization of the Malay-Muslim dominated federal government especially from 
the early 1970s onward. The heightened presence of Malay/Islamic rhetoric since the early 
1970s helped to establish more ideologically coherent state institutions that did not operate at 
cross-purpose (at both national and local levels), which contributed to the efficacy of the state 
in Malaysia in centralizing the national and Islamic education. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Two Verandahs of Mecca: Islamic education in Aceh and Kelantan 
 
The province of Aceh in Indonesia and the state of Kelantan in Malaysia share a particularly 
strong Islamic identity and a long tradition of Islamic education. Both places are known as 
Serambi Mekah (Verandah of Mecca) due to their Islamic character and the important role 
both places play in the Southeast Asian region as major centers of Islamic learning. 
Traditional Islamic schools in Aceh are known as dayah, which are akin to pesantren in Java 
and surau in West Sumatra. In Kelantan, traditional Islamic schools are known as pondok. 
Both dayah and pondok are very similar in the sense that they are boarding schools 
established by local ulama, and are predominantly rural, self-sufficient, and heavily focused 
on the study of old Islamic manuscripts (kitab). The major difference between dayah and 
pondok is that currently the dayah system is thriving within the province of Aceh, especially 
since the beginning of the 2000s after the passing of the decentralization laws and the law to 
recognize the special status of Aceh, while the pondok system in Kelantan is fast fading into 
obscurity, dwarfed by the dominance of the modern Islamic school system in the state, which 
is mainly under the control of the federal government. This chapter argues that despite the two 
areas’ shared legacy of Islamic learning, Aceh has been able to preserve the uniqueness of its 
Islamic educational tradition while Islamic education in Kelantan is slowly being 
“federalized” by the government in Putrajaya. 
I posit that the localization and federalization of Islamic education in Aceh and Kelantan, 
respectively, is due to three factors that link directly to the core arguments of this thesis: the 
ideological makeup of state institutions that oversee Islamic education; patterns of 
Islamization in the society; and control of resources by the central government.  
Both Aceh and Kelantan share similar historical legacies. Both were governed by a series of 
similar socio-political forces – sultans, local chieftains, ulama and colonial administrations – 
	 115 
which began to modernize Islamic education in these two areas from the early 1900s. 
However, the socio-political dynamics that led to the modernization of Islamic education in 
these two areas also set them on different institutional paths. While institutions that oversee 
Islamic education in Aceh became more localized over the years especially after 2005 when 
the province gained the special autonomy status, their counterparts in Kelantan became 
increasingly federalized from the late 1970s as the Ministry of Education absorbed more local 
Islamic schools into its jurisdiction.  
Ministry officials at the educational office in Kelantan, who are locals, believe that the best 
way to improve the conditions of Islamic education at the local level is through the federal 
government. This points to what I term “federalized institutional mindset”: the local staff of 
the ministry possess strong regional pride in their unique local culture and traditions, but 
believe they need substantial assistance from the federal government in order to maintain and 
develop the state’s Islamic education. In contrast, in Aceh, post-2005 special autonomy status 
only serves to strengthen the already pervasive localized institutional mindset by empowering 
local state educational offices, including the officers of the provincial office of Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (Kantor Wilayah Agama Aceh), and to shape Islamic education in Aceh 
according to the objectives of syariat Islam in the province. 
The wave of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s affected states in Indonesia and Malaysia in 
markedly different ways. The New Order regime in Indonesia did not face an existential 
threat to its legitimacy similar to that posed by highly mobilized Islamic socio-political forces 
toward its counterpart in Malaysia. As such, the New Order regime did not feel the need to 
shape the Islamic discourse in its favor via the Islamic education system, which resulted in the 
preservation of Aceh’s unique Islamic learning tradition. Unlike the Darul Islam rebellion in 
the 1950s, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) did not instrumentalize 
Islam as a rallying cry in its opposition against the Indonesian government; hence, there was 
	 116 
little need to shape local Islamic discourse to favor its struggle.1 In Malaysia, however, the 
engagement between the UMNO-led regime and the politically galvanized Islamic opposition, 
led by Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS), which has governed 
Kelantan since 1959, resulted in the federal government’s relentless attempts to gain control 
of Islamic schools in Kelantan.2  
The localized institutional identity found in Aceh since independence was preserved during 
the highly centralized New Order era (1966-1998). The New Order regime in fact encouraged 
socio-cultural expressions of Islamic religiosity, which was further strengthened by the 
newfound autonomy since 2005. The increasing role played by Islam in every facet of the 
Acehnese society since the province assumed special autonomy status has helped the 
development of local Islamic education, especially the dayah education system. Meanwhile, 
Islamic education in Kelantan has always been a site of contestation between the UMNO-
controlled federal government and the PAS-controlled state government, with the federal 
government trying to subdue Islamic opposition by controlling Islamic education in the state. 
Taking control of Islamic schools, especially the People’s Islamic schools (Sekolah Agama 
Rakyat) in Kelantan, has been one of the ways in which UMNO tried to win the hearts and 
minds of a constituency that has historically opposed the federal government on religious 
grounds.  
At present, decentralization of governance affects Islamic education in Indonesia and 
Malaysia in different ways. In Indonesia, Islamic education falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) and the Minister of Religious Affairs as stated in 
																																																								
1 Edward Aspinall, Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia (Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press, 2009), pp. 193-219. 
2 UMNO managed to take advantage of the leadership crisis in the Kelantan’s state legislature when 
the state of emergency was declared and PAS was expelled from Barisan Nasional. UMNO 
subsequently took over the reins of the state government in a fresh election in 1978. Harold Crouch, 
Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 106. 
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Article 3(2) of the Government Regulation 55/2007 (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 55/2007). 
Such control makes it very difficult for Islamic schools to receive funding from the Ministry 
of Education and Culture, the functions of which have been decentralized to the local level 
since 1999. On the other hand, Article 3 of the Malaysian constitution specifies the right of 
every state to administer its own Islamic affairs, which includes Islamic education. In 
practice, the federal government often overrides the states’ constitutionally provided 
autonomy in administering Islamic education by virtue of financial superiority.   
The main tool used by the federal government to increase its control over Islamic education in 
Kelantan has been distribution of resources. Islamic schools that are opposed to the federal 
government’s control have to choose between shutting down due to financial problems or 
receiving assistance from the federal government and moderating their resistance. In Aceh, on 
the other hand, the special autonomy status has accorded the provincial government much 
more control over its own resources, and local Islamic education has benefitted handsomely 
from this arrangement. Special agency such as Dayah Education Development Agency 
(Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Dayah, BPPD) was established so that dayah education could 
be developed with Aceh’s own resources outside of the jurisdictions of both the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture. 
By applying the conceptual tools established by writings on institutionalism such as critical 
juncture, positive feedback and institutional complexity, I will attempt to trace the formative 
trajectory of institutional identity and why different institutional identities have managed to 
take root in these two places. I will also apply Joel Migdal’s approach of state-society 
relations to put in perspective the inter-institutional interactions between different levels of 
governance (Migdal’s “pressure points”). Therefore, by connecting the pre-independence 
socio-political dynamics with post-independence center-periphery relations, I will explain 
why Islamic education in Aceh manages to maintain its local character while the federal 
	 118 
government has been slowly taking control of Islamic education in Kelantan especially since 
the late 1970s. 
The first half of this chapter starts with a historical background of Islamic education in Aceh, 
followed by a socio-political analysis that explains how Islamic education in the province has 
developed a localized identity since the early 1900s. The section on Aceh ends by showing 
how the localized Islamic educational identity engaged with the central government in 
Jakarta, and how this local identity was later bolstered by Aceh’s post-2005 special autonomy 
status. The second half of the chapter looks at the historical background of Islamic education 
in Kelantan, followed by an analysis of socio-political root causes that have shaped the 
characteristics of Islamic education in the state since the early 1900s. The section on Kelantan 
closes with a discussion of the increasing hegemony of the federal government on present-day 
Islamic education in Kelantan by looking at how various local Islamic educational actors such 
as officers in the state educational office, Yayasan Islam Kelantan, and school principals 
perceive the pervasive role of federal government in the state’s Islamic educational affairs.       
ACEH: LOCALIZATION OF ISLAMIC EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Ulama and Raja cannot be far or separated, for if the Ulama and Raja are separated the 
kingdom will be ruined.3 
 
History of Islamic education in Aceh 
The history of Islamic education in Aceh is divided into four epochs: the Islamic sultanate era 
(pre-1873), the Dutch-Aceh war (1873-1903), the Dutch and Japanese occupation (1903-
1945), and the post-independence era (1945 – present day).4 The traditional Islamic schools in 
Aceh are known as dayah. The word dayah is thought to derive from the Arabic word 																																																								
3 Original words: Ulama dengan Raja tidak boleh jauh atau cerai, sebab jikalau cerai Ulama dengan 
Raja niscaya binasalah negeri. Qanun Meukata Alam (author, publisher and year unknown), p. 30. 
4 M. Hasbi Amiruddin, “The Response of Ulama Dayah to the Modernization of the Islamic Law in 
Aceh.” M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1994, p. 5. 
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zawiyah, which literally means corner.5 A dayah is established by an ulama, known in Aceh 
as Teungku, and typically consists of a space for learning and a living quarter to 
accommodate students from all across the territory and sometimes, beyond. It is said that the 
first dayah in Aceh was founded by a nobleman cum ulama named Teungku Cik Cot Kala 
(Muhammad Amin) of the old Kingdom of Perlak in the tenth century.6 The curriculum varies 
from one dayah to another, depending on the perceived expertise of its Teungku. During the 
golden age of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636) subjects such as philosophy, politics, 
history, health and agriculture were reputedly taught by forty-four syeikh (another term for 
Teungku), in addition to the normal fare of Islamic subjects such as Arabic language, tafsir 
(Quranic exegesis), tauhid (the doctrine of one-ness of God), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and 
others.7 The level of education in the traditional dayah was roughly equivalent to the present-
day senior high school. It was preceded by meunasah (primary level) and rangkang (junior 
high school level). There were also Dayah Teungku Chik that served as the training centers 
for future Teungku Chik (major ulama).8 Aceh was a well-known center for Islamic learning 
in the region during this time (pre-1873) and produced scholars such as Hamzah Fansuri, 
Syamsuddin Sumatrani, Nuruddin ar-Raniry and Abdurrauf Singkili (Tengku Syiahkuala). 
Thriving dayah education was part and parcel of this vibrant intellectual environment. 
The Dutch-Aceh war lasted for thirty years, from 1873 to 1903, and swiftly destroyed most of 
the achievements and progress made by the dayah in the preceding few hundred years. Many 
																																																								
5 The corner in educational context originally refers to the corner of Mesjid Madinah (Medina 
Mosque), where Prophet Muhammad delivered his teachings during the early years of Islam. Later on, 
zawiyah came to be known as the religious center of tassawuf (Islamic mysticism) adherents and other 
spiritual seekers. M. Hasbi Amiruddin, “Dayah: Lembaga Pendidikan Tertua Masyarakat Aceh” in 
T.H. Thalhas and Choirul Fuad Yusuf, eds., Pendidikan & Syariat Islam di Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam (Jakarta: Gelora Pase, 1997), p. 15.  
6 Dayah Cot Kala is also thought to be the first Islamic learning center in Southeast Asia. A. Hasjmy. 
Bunga Rampai Revolusi Dari Tanah Aceh (Jakarta: Penerbit Bulan Bintang, 1978), pp. 55-56. 
7 Amiruddin, Dayah, p. 23.  
8 Hasjmy, Bunga Rampai Revolusi, pp. 66-68. 
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ulama died fighting in what they believed to be a holy war (Prang Sabil) against the Dutch 
infidels; and with their demise the dayah they led also ended up in ruin. Dayah, like their 
Javanese counterpart pesantren, are dependent on the ulama’s influence and leadership. Once 
the ulama died, the school was likely to disintegrate; if there was no designated successor, the 
school would be divided up among several heirs.9 The war gave rise to a chaotic socio-
political situation, with power struggles intensifying among the traditional elites and security 
conditions worsening for everyone, especially the common folk. Traveling far from one’s 
gampong to study in a dayah was no longer safe; people armed themselves to the teeth just to 
go to the market.10 Mahmud Yunus, a prominent reformist ulama and a historian of Islamic 
education in Indonesia, refers to the resistance against the invading Dutch forces as masa 
kemunduran (an age of reversal).11 Politically, the Dutch struck deals with various uleebalang 
called korte verklaringen (short contracts) as a way to secure more territory and divide the 
traditional elites from the ulama.12 The sultanate was finally abolished in 1903. The effect of 
the war effectively left only two influential socio-political groups standing amidst the dust 
and rubbles: the traditional elite represented by the uleebalang and the religious elite 
represented by the ulama.  
When the war ended around 1904 and conditions in Aceh began to stabilize, the few 
remaining ulama started to re-establish dayah to replace the ones lost during the conflict. 
Nevertheless, they met numerous obstacles thrown up by the Dutch colonial administration, 
																																																								
9 Karel Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Pendidikan Islam dalam kurun moderen (Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 1986), p. 116. 
10 Allegedly, according to the people who lived through this tumultuous time, just going to the market 
alone one had to bring bedil (gun) and tombak (spear), and carry two or three kelewang (a type of 
sword) and rencong (Acehnese dagger) on one’s waist. Mahmud Yunus, Sejarah Pendidikan Islam di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: PT Mahmud Yunus Wadzurriyah, 2008), p. 192. 
11 Ibid, pp. 191-193. 
12 Ismail Yakub, “Gambaran Pendidikan di Aceh Sesudah Perang Aceh-Belanda Sampai Sekarang” in 
Ismail Suny, ed. Bunga Rampai Tentang Aceh (Jakarta: Penerbit Bhratara Karya Aksara, 1980), p. 
328. 
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particularly the requirement to have a legal permit to build a school, limits on what could be 
taught in classrooms, close supervision of Islamic teachers, and a provision for an explanation 
letter for every out-of-the-area student who would then have to report to the authorities every 
three months.13 During the early 1900s, the colonial government built Dutch schools in Aceh 
as a means to train civil servants to staff the bureaucracy and assist in governance, which 
mainly catered to the sons of uleebalang and the wealthy due to their prohibitive fees and 
discriminatory policies against non-elite natives. The colonial administration also built 
people’s schools (sekolah rakyat) in various districts to provide rudimentary education for the 
village folks. These public schools were unpopular with the Acehnese who viewed them with 
deep suspicion; various ulama exhorted that it was haram for parents to send their children to 
these schools.14 Despite the resistance from the populace, by 1936 there were 321 public 
schools across Aceh with 33,553 students (9,871 of them were females).15  
Meanwhile, the problem with dayah education at this time was that dayah only offered 
religious subjects. Many traditional ulama considered learning general subjects such as 
science, mathematics, geography and other non-Islamic knowledge to be haram, as was 
attending public schools built by the Dutch. Reformist ulama, who became active in Aceh in 
the early 1900s, on the other hand, believed that the only way for Muslims to progress and to 
resist the colonial power was to seriously revamp the Islamic education system by 
modernizing its pedagogy and infrastructure, and most importantly, by incorporating general 																																																								
13 Hasjmy, Bunga Rampai Revolusi, pp. 88-92; Ismuha, “Ulama Aceh dalam perspektif sejarah” in 
Taufik Abdullah, ed. Agama dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: CV Rajawali, 1983), p. 55. 
14 During this time, the fee for madrasah was about 0.25 guilden per month, while the fee for the 
Dutch schools was at least 2.50 guilden. There was no set fee for attending a dayah since it was based 
on donation and the students’ ability to pay, either monetarily or in-kind. M. Isa Sulaiman. Sejarah 
Aceh: Sebuah Gugatan Terhadap Tradisi (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1997), p. 41. Also see 
Yakub, Gambaran Pendidikan di Aceh, pp. 328-333.  
15 The major reason for the high number of students in public schools despite the resistance from the 
populace was that the colonial government in Aceh ordered the uleebalang to force parents to send 
their children to the public schools under the threat of fines or forced labor (corvée). Sejarah 
Pendidikan Daerah Istimewa Aceh (Jakarta: Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan, 
Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1984), pp. 40-45. 
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subjects into its curriculum. This new mood was part of a broader trend already happening in 
other areas of the Netherlands East Indies that involved the spread of reformist Islamic ideas 
brought by Muhammadiyah activists from Java and West Sumatra. In fact, some of the 
reformist ulama in Aceh in the 1930s and 1940s were graduates of the Muhammadiyah-
influenced Thawalib schools in West Sumatra.16 These ulama came back to Aceh and along 
with other like-minded religious leaders and uleebalang started the madrasah system that 
incorporated both Islamic and general subjects. Nonetheless, Dutch colonial authorities only 
allowed Arabic (reading and writing), Tauhid (one-ness of God) and Fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) to be taught in madrasah, which meant that religious content in a madrasah 
curriculum was inferior to that found in dayah.17   
A member of the Acehnese royal family, Tuanku Raja Keumala, opened the first madrasah in 
Aceh, Al Khairiyah, in 1916 in Kutaraja. The growth of madrasah, in conjunction with the 
rising influence of the reformist ulama, really accelerated in the late 1920s and into the World 
War II years. Several reformist Islamic foundations came into existence, such as Madrasah 
Perguruan Islam in Seulimun, Jamiah Al-Islam Wal Irsyad Al-Arabia in Lhokseumawe, and 
Al-Muslim in Mantang Glumpang Dua, which subsequently established madrasahs in their 
local areas. By 1936 there were almost one hundred madrasahs throughout Aceh.18 While 
there was tension between the traditionalist and reformist ulama, similar to other parts of the 
Netherlands East Indies, the conflict did not yet take a violent form.19 Both forms of Islamic 																																																								
16 Yakub, Gambaran Pendidikan di Aceh, p. 335; Yunus, Sejarah Pendidikan Islam, p. 197. 
17 In order to burnish the religious content in their curriculum, madrasah in Aceh went so far as to 
rename general subjects in Arabic. For example, Geography was renamed Al-Joghrafiyah, General 
History as At-Tarikh Al’am, Dutch language as Al Lughah Al Hulandiyah, English language as Al 
Lughah Al Injeliziyah, and Mathematics as Ilmu Hisab. Ismuha, Ulama Aceh, p. 23; Baihaqi, “Ulama 
dan Madrasah Aceh” in Taufik Abdullah, ed. Agama dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: CV Rajawali, 
1983), p. 167.  
18 Sejarah Pendidikan Daerah Istimewa Aceh, pp. 58-65. 
19 Public debates were held by several uleebalang in their districts between the traditionalist and 
reformist ulama with the intention to ameliorate the ill feeling harboured by the two groups and the 
hope that both would somehow come to an understanding. The typical result of these public debates 	
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education, dayah and madrasah, managed to co-exist rather peacefully despite their 
theological differences. These differences were finally resolved in a meeting (musyawarah) 
convened in Banda Aceh in October 1936 that comprised both groups of ulama and reform-
minded uleebalang. The musyawarah discussed and debated three major theological issues: 1) 
Can Muslims learn knowledge such as science and other bases of modern progress? 2) Can 
Islamic schools incorporate these subjects in their curricula? 3) Can female students learn 
from male teachers in a safe and controlled environment? By the end of the meeting all parties 
unanimously agreed that Muslims could learn non-religious subjects, Islamic schools should 
be allowed to teach these subjects, and that there was no proscription in Islam that prevented 
girls from learning from male teachers.20 The result of the musyawarah led to the rapid the 
growth of madrasah education in the 1930s and 1940s.   
The effort to modernize Islamic education in Aceh took another monumental step on 5 May, 
1939 when a group of reformist ulama including Daud Beureueh, Nur Al-Ibrahimi, and Ismail 
Yakub formed Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA), or All-Aceh Association of Ulama. 
PUSA’s founding objectives were three-fold: to spread, uphold and defend Islam; to resolve 
differences between the ulama concerning Islamic laws; and to improve and streamline 
Islamic education in Aceh.21 The new uniform curriculum proposed by PUSA – in this case, 
for junior and senior high school – consisted of fourteen Islamic subjects and ten general 
subjects, with the weekly hours broken down into roughly seventy percent for the former and 
thirty percent for the latter.22 The Normal Islam Instituut, a modern tertiary institution, was 																																																																																																																																																																													
was that the two groups of ulama simply agreed to disagree without resolving their theological 
differences. Sulaiman, Sejarah Aceh, pp. 66-69.  
20 Hasjmy, Bunga Rampai Revolusi, pp. 93-95; Yakub, Gambaran Pendidikan di Aceh, pp. 349-351. 
21 Yunus, Sejarah Pendidikan Aceh, pp. 195-196. 
22 An interesting aspect of this new curriculum was its national orientation that included subjects of 
Bahasa Indonesia (two hours per week for all five levels) and Indonesian History (one hour per week 
for levels 4 and 5). Amiruddin and Wildan, “Pelaksanaan Pendidikan di Kabupaten Bireuen: Tinjauan 
Historis terhadap Al Muslim Peusangan” in T.H. Thalhas and Choirul Fuad Yusuf, eds., Pendidikan & 
Syariat Islam di Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Jakarta: Gelora Pase, 1997), p. 33. 
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established in December 1939 in Bireuen to absorb madrasah graduates and supply teachers 
for the newly revamped and modern Islamic education system. The Japanese occupation from 
1942 to 1945 saw heightened fervency in PUSA’s activity and its growing influence as most 
of its leaders collaborated with the Japanese military government and began to prepare against 
the return of the Dutch. The Japanese military government formed an Islamic Council for 
Assisting Prosperity in Greater East Asia (Majlis Agama Islam Untuk Bantuan Kemakmuran 
Asia Timur Raya, Maibkatra) in Kutaraja in 1943, which was subsequently dominated by the 
ulama from PUSA. Maibkatra served as a central hub to funnel resources, namely financial 
assistance, to Islamic schools and mosques.23 By the end of 1946, there were almost two 
hundred madrasahs across Aceh serving the needs of tens of thousands of students.24  
The years immediately following Indonesia’s independence on 17 August, 1945 were a time 
when PUSA further entrenched its dominance over the Acehnese society: first, by almost 
wiping out its political rival, the uleebalang, in a violent social revolution;25 and second, by 
building on the nascent Islamic bureaucracy previously established by the Japanese military 
government. The Islamic court (Mahkamah Agama), also known as Syukyo Hooin, which 
functioned as the agency that managed all Islamic affairs during the Japanese occupation 
period, was re-named after independence as Office of Religion (Pejabat Agama) with Islamic 
Education (Pendidikan Agama) as one of its divisions.26 In 1946, one of the first acts of the 
Pejabat Agama was to take over 180 private madrasah along with about 36,000 of their 
students and fold them into the public school system. These madrasah were subsequently re-																																																								
23 Sulaiman, Sejarah Aceh, pp. 93-113. 
24 Hasjmy, Bunga Rampai Revolusi, p. 106. The Japanese military administration kept the Dutch 
public school structure intact while at the same forced all private schools, namely dayah, to become 
public. Sejarah Revolusi Kemerdekaan Daerah Istimewa Aceh (Jakarta: Proyek Inventarisasi dan 
Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1983), pp. 24-30. 
25 Anthony Reid. The Blood of the People: The Revolution and the end of traditional rule in Northern 
Sumatra (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 185-217; Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, The 
Republican Revolt: A Study of the Acehnese Rebellion (Singapore: ISEAS, 1985), pp. 23-26. 
26 Ismuha, Ulama Aceh, p. 91. 
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named Sekolah Rendah Islam (SRI) for Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (primary schools), Sekolah 
Menengah Islam (SMI) for Madrasah Tsanawiyah (junior high schools), and Sekolah 
Menengah Islam Atas (SMIA) for Madrasah Aliyah (senior high schools).27 Meanwhile, by 
1952, there were 445 non-religious public schools (primary and secondary levels) with 90,644 
students, far outnumbering madrasah and dayah in the province.28 It was not known if Pejabat 
Agama tried to inject more Islamic content in the curriculum for non-religious public schools 
since Law no. 4/1950 on National Education System made religious education non-
compulsory. Nonetheless, the early years of independence saw the provincial government in 
Aceh beginning to put its localized stamp on Islamic education in the province.    
Between the years 1950 to 1956, the province of Aceh was merged into the province of North 
Sumatra, a move which resulted in the Darul Islam rebellion against the central government 
in 1953. The Darul Islam rebellion was a reaction against the increased centralization of the 
Sukarno’s regime that sapped away Aceh’s autonomy including in the field of education, 
which will be discussed in the next section. The failure of the central government to pass the 
Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta), which obligated syariah all Muslims in the country to 
abide by syariah laws, and the central government’s efforts to hamper Aceh’s aspiration to 
implement Islamic laws in the province, also played a significant role in sparking the Darul 
Islam rebellion.29 The military governor of Aceh during this time, Daud Beureueh, lamented 
“Acehnese are disappointed to see the behavior of the leaders in central government who 
obstruct the implementation of Islamic teachings in the life of the society and the nation.”30 At 
																																																								
27 Sejarah Pendidikan Daerah Istimewa Aceh, p. 180; Hasjmy, Bunga Rampai Revolusi, pp. 106-108. 
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the end of the conflict, in May 1959, Aceh was given the status of Special Province through a 
decree by the central government that allowed it broad autonomy in the areas of religious 
affairs, education, and local customs.31  
During Suharto’s New Order period (1966 to 1998), local reformers who wanted to use the 
autonomy provided by the Special Province status to strengthen Islamic education in Aceh 
had to contend with the centralizing tendency of the regime in Jakarta, which had a 
development-focused agenda. Law No. 5/1974 on the Principles of Regional Government 
Administration formally consolidated the central government’s control over the provinces, 
which included centralized appointment of governors and bupati. Attempts by Islamic 
education advocates in Aceh to subvert a central ruling banning the wearing of jilbab (head-
covering) in schools were rebuffed by MOEC.32 Meanwhile, dayah education did not remain 
static though the dayahs’ willingness to incorporate general subjects into their traditional 
curriculum came much later than the madrasah. Traditionalist ulama who hitherto had 
organized themselves under Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamijah (PERTI), or Movement for 
Islamic Education, a rival organization to the reformist PUSA, had decided to modernize the 
dayah curriculum in the 1970s. In 1974, major leaders of PERTI in Aceh Besar formed the 
Educational Institute for Integrated Dayah Inshafuddin (Lembaga Pendidikan Dayah Terpadu 
Inshafuddin) to facilitate the modernization of dayah education in Aceh, which two years later 
was managed by the newly created Foundation for Inshafuddin Development (Yayasan 
Pembina Inshafuddin).33 By 1994, the number of dayah in Aceh almost doubled from 243 in 
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Publishing, 2010), p. 56. See also Hardi, Daerah Istimewa Aceh, pp. 181-183. 
33 Dayah that incorporate general subjects in their curriculum are called Dayah Inshafuddin, while 
traditional dayah are called Dayah Salafiyah. For a brief organizational history of Dayah Inshafuddin, 
refer to: http://dayahinshafuddin.wordpress.com/organisasi/sejarah/ (accessed on 3 July, 2014). 
	 127 
1975 to 470 with 77,500 students and 2,000 teachers.34 In short, Islamic education in Aceh – 
madrasah and dayah systems –was rapidly becoming modernized under the New Order to 
keep up with the developmentalist objectives of the regime.   
The post-authoritarian period (1998 to the present) saw a deepening of local control of Islamic 
education in Aceh. First, came the enactment of the decentralization laws in 1999, which 
devolved educational matters to the levels of province and district. The national legislature 
also passed the 1999 Law on Special Administration of the Special Province of Aceh 
(Undang-Undang Nomor 4/1999 tentang Penyelanggaraan Keistimewaan Propinsi Daerah 
Istimewa Aceh) that affirmed Aceh’s autonomy in administering its own educational affairs 
(Article 3). The 2006 Law on Governance of Aceh (Undang-undang No 11/2006 tentang 
Pemerintahan Aceh) and Qanun Aceh No 5/2008 on the Administration of Education 
(Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan) further clarified and broadened Aceh’s autonomy by 
specifying that the functions of provincial and district governments in administering matters 
of education to be in line with local customs and Islamic values. The provincial government 
of Aceh also streamlined the curriculum for dayah in 2010 by passing the Governor’s 
Regulation Number 47/2010 (Peraturan Gubernur Aceh Nomor 47/2010), which centralized 
the management and supervision of dayah under the authority of Dayah Education 
Development Agency (Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Dayah, BPPD).  
The Islamic education system in present-day Aceh is built upon a web of interrelated and 
overlapping jurisdiction and authority of various national, provincial and district agencies. 
The provincial office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kanwil Agama) and the Local 
Offices for Education (Dinas Pendidikan) represent national educational interests. Kanwil 
Agama is in charge of the administration of madrasah curriculum and the teaching of Islamic 
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Studies (Pendidikan Agama Islam) in national public schools (sekolah negeri), while Dinas 
Pendidikan deals with the management of general education in all schools that belong to the 
national education system. The Article 16 of Qanun No 5/2008 also endowed Dinas 
Pendidikan offices at the district (kabupaten) and city (kota) levels with autonomous 
privileges such as setting their own strategic plans and implementing the provincial and 
national educational standards as long as they do not contradict the provincial and national 
objectives. On the provincial level, there is the Dayah Education Development Agency 
(Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Dayah, BPPD) that manages the affairs of all the dayahs in 
the province, which includes implementing detailed standards and guidelines for traditional 
dayah curriculum and providing financial assistance for dayah infrastructure and teachers’ 
training. Before BPPD was established in 2008, the management of dayah was placed under 
the aegis of Dinas Pendidikan. Aceh’s Council of Education (Majelis Pendidikan Daerah, 
MPD) was established as part of the provincial government’s Syariah Agency (Dinas Syariat 
Islam), the overarching purpose of which is to imbue every aspect of Acehnese life with the 
spirit of Islam. There is also the role of the Ulama Council (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Ulama, MPU), through its education commission, to ensure a homogenized interpretation of 
major theological issues in Islamic education in Aceh. In sum, the overall picture of Islamic 
education in present-day Aceh shows it to be thriving and firmly ensconced within the highly 





Table 3.1: Number of schools (public and private) in Aceh as of 201535 
 Number of schools Number of students 
Madrasah Ibtidaiyah 1,086 100,099 
Madrasah Tsanawiyah 391 82,977 
Madrasah Aliyah 261 42,846 
Dayah 944 142,600 
General public schools 5,113 1,150,000 
Total 7,795 1,518,522 
 
The socio-political roots of present-day Islamic education in Aceh 
Dutch colonial rule in Aceh had much to do with how today’s Islamic education system in 
Aceh came to be. In fact, the late colonial period (late 1800s to 1945) was a pivotal time that 
set up the ulama group for their eventual dominance of state institutions and the reification of 
local Islamic identity in the post-independence years. Colony-wide, when it came to handling 
the threat of political Islam, the Dutch policy in the Netherlands East Indies was to play off 
the Islamic groups and the traditional elites against each other, and Aceh was no exception. 
This strategy was the brainchild of a prominent Dutch Islamologist, C. Snouck Hurgronje. Its 
main thrust was to cultivate closer relationship with the traditional elites while isolating 
influential religious leaders from the society.36 The traditional elites were seen as more 
amenable to the Dutch way of thinking and thus recruited into the colonial bureaucracy to 
exercise indirect rule over the population. Snouck saw the deadly potential of Islam being 
instrumentalized to organize political resistance against colonial rule and therefore advised 
the colonial government to aim at the weakening of ties between religious leaders and the 
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36 Eric Morris, “Islam and Politics in Aceh: A Study of Center-Periphery Relations in Indonesia.” 
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people while at the same time empowering the traditional elites.37 In the case of Aceh, this 
meant supporting the uleebalang, who were the local traditional elites, and pitting them 
against the emasculated ulama. 
Despite the sharp fragmentation within the Acehnese society during the war against the 
Dutch, major social groups such as the sultanate, uleebalang, ulama and the villagers shared a 
view that Islam was an integral part of their social identity, though how they perceived the 
role of Islam in their lives varied from one another.38 The Dutch invading army forced out the 
sultanate when it took over Kutaraja in 1874, which effectively left two socio-political 
groups, the uleebalang and the ulama, to compete for influence over the population. While 
there was a clear divide-and-rule policy from the Dutch, there was no similarly concrete effort 
to manage Islamic affairs in Aceh other than to outsource them to the uleebalang, who were 
now part of colonial indirect rule. The assumption, put forth by Snouck, was that Islam and 
custom (adat) were inseparable inasmuch as the ignorant villagers could not tell the 
difference between them, and the uleebalang as the traditional elites with authority over adat 
were therefore well positioned to be the sole authority for religion and customs.39  
Snouck’s analysis was of course off the mark as many villagers did not see most uleebalang 
as legitimate traditional authorities, much less as religious authorities; they would not have 
been able to reign supreme without their heavily-armed retainers.40 Ulama, on the other hand, 
encouraged the villagers, mainly men, to envision themselves as part of a social group that 
was much larger and less confining than their limited gampong milieu. Ulama did not 
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necessarily wield strong influence in the particular locality where they resided but what they 
lacked in traditional authority was more than made up by what they could offer in abundance: 
the attractive possibility to escape the confining traditional norms and the chance to become 
part of the much larger and more egalitarian Muslim ummah. In the words of James Siegel: 
The meudagang [to study in a dayah] took the students out of one cultural world, the 
village, where men were linked as kinsmen, and left them in another, the school, 
where men acted as Muslims and not kinsmen. The experience of two radically 
different cultural worlds, which were not linked by the normal expectations of the life 
cycle, led the ulama to stress that man’s nature could be the basis of unity between 
men even when sociological distinctions separated them. In the absence of cultural 
bonds between men, the ulama formulated ideas out of their own experience which 
could tie men together. Islamic ideas provided an idiom by which unity despite social 
distinction could be expressed.41 
It was this idea of universalism in Islam that allowed the ulama to break the already weak 
feudal bond between the villagers and the uleebalang and further entrench their own authority 
in the hitherto atomized Acehnese society. 
The transcendental Islamic identity first engendered by the meudagang ritual was further 
reinforced by the thirty-year war against the Dutch. Dayah ulama, led by Tengku Cik di Tiro, 
put an indelible Islamic stamp on the struggle, by casting it as a holy war (Prang Sabil). The 
Dutch, and by extension, most of the uleebalang, were seen as infidels (Acehnese: kaphé) by 
the resisting forces.42 While there were some uleebalang who cooperated with the ulama in 
the resistance movement, most decided early on to surrender or collaborate with the Dutch as 
a means to increase their influence and wealth. It was during this tumultuous period that 
Aceh’s red-hot Islamic identity was forged and strengthened. Islam was not only used as a 
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rallying war cry but also was seen as the basis upon which a new Acehnese society must be 
built and developed. The process of “othering” took place as those who were deemed to be 
not fitting into this definition of “Acehnese Muslim” were ostracized. 
The ulama were concerned not only with resisting the invaders but also with 
Islamizing society. These two endeavors were indissolubly linked. In both of them, the 
main rivals were the uleebalang, whom the ulama castigated not only for collaborating 
with the Dutch but also for their impiety.43 
The effort to preserve and improve Islamic education in Aceh was therefore inextricably 
linked to the Islamization of society in general. Further intensifying this religious bifurcation 
of Acehnese identity was that most uleebalang chose to support the modern secular schools 
built by the Dutch while the ulama retreated into their dayah and madrasah. Some uleebalang 
did join up with the reformist ulama to improve Islamic education but the dividing line in the 
educational sphere was clearly demarcated between the three contending groups.44 The sharp 
difference in educational outlook that saw the uleebalang favoring the secular education 
promoted by the Dutch ultimately signified the complete domination of Islamic education by 
the ulama, giving them unfettered rein to shape it to their liking. Islamic education, and writ 
large, Islamic identity, during the post Dutch-Aceh war years were firmly under the control of 
the ulama and effectively decoupled from their ties to the traditional elites, namely the 
uleebalang and the vanquished sultanate. As noted before, the Dutch did try to intervene in 
the madrasah curriculum by limiting its religious content, but the attempt did not have any 
negative impact on the public’s perception of madrasah’s Islamic identity. 
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In the 1930s and 1940s, the Dutch schools, as previously mentioned, were exclusively limited 
to the sons of uleebalang for the purpose of training staff for the colonial bureaucracy, while 
the more numerous and rudimentary Sekolah Rakyat were built for the Acehnese in general, 
with attendance being made compulsory through the threat of fines and forced labor.45 
Nevertheless, Islamic schools – dayah and madrasah – remained highly popular with the 
people especially in light of the reinforced Islamic identity. The role of education as one of 
the core components of the new Acehnese Islamic identity was best exemplified in the three 
main objectives of PUSA’s first meeting in May 1939: 1) uniting to uphold and defend Islam; 
2) unifying religious differences and explaining religious laws to the public; and 3) 
developing a plan to improve Islamic education in all Islamic schools in Aceh.46 The target of 
this reform was solely directed at private madrasah with the intention of streamlining their 
curriculum, improving their infrastructure, creating a higher institution of learning to absorb 
madrasah graduates and a teachers’ training college (Normal Islam Instituut) to train 
madrasah teachers in modern pedagogy, and also providing graduates with career 
opportunities on a par with their Dutch school counterparts. 
What were the factors that explain the success of the reformist ulama in pursuing their 
agenda, namely modernizing Islamic education in Aceh, and overcoming opposition from 
traditionalist ulama and the uleebalang? The major reformist ulama who founded PUSA such 
as Teungku Daud Beureueh, Teungku Abdul Rahman Meunasah Meucap and Teungku Ismail 
Yakub were home-grown and highly attuned to local sensibilities when spreading their ideas; 
in addition, they were well-connected with each other geographically and through their past 
studies, which allowed them an organizing advantage.47 Traditionalist ulama, who owned and 
ran many of the dayah, resisted the educational reforms put forth by PUSA. During the post 																																																								
45 Sejarah Pendidikan Daerah Istimewa Aceh, pp. 40-45. 
46 Yakub, Gambaran Pendidikan di Aceh, p. 354. 
47 Ismuha, Ulama Aceh, pp. 55-65. 
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Dutch-Aceh war years, traditionalist ulamas started to rebuild many of the dayah that were 
destroyed by the conflict but were not able to bring the dayah system back to its old glory.48 
The growing influence of the reformist ulama and the expansion of madrasah system with its 
modern pedagogy had been chipping away at the traditionalist ulama’ religious authority and 
the dwindling popularity of dayah under their control. In any case, the Islamic reform 
movement had to bear a clear Aceh imprint in order to succeed as evidenced by the failure of 
the reformist Muhammadiyah to gain a foothold in Aceh.49  
Arguably, there are two reasons why the traditionalist ulama were ineffective in resisting the 
growing influence of the reformist ulama in the 1930s and 1940s. First, though the 
traditionalist ulama did manage to organize themselves in a counter-movement, namely the 
Association for Islamic Education (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, PERTI), which was 
established in the early 1940s, it was geographically limited to their strongholds in south and 
west coast of Aceh; moreover, its major players mostly originated in West Sumatra and were 
therefore perceived as interlopers.50 Second, there was no deep customary link between the 
traditionalist ulama and the uleebalang, who might have offered support in facing the 
reformist challenge. The reinforced Islamic identity that stemmed from the Prang Sabil 
period and the colonial divide-and-rule policy effectively ensured the place of the uleebalang 
on the opposite side of the religious divide. The uleebalang were never seen as the defender 
of Islam even before the arrival of the Dutch, and colonial rule had only made them lesser 
Muslims in the eyes of the ulama, both traditionalists and reformists.  Also, as mentioned 																																																								
48 Sejarah Pendidikan Daerah Istimewa Aceh, pp. 20-23. 
49 The reformist movement was locally developed, as opposed to being imposed from the outside, 
which was instrumental in its success. Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh, pp. 77-78. See also 
Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, Pemberontakan Kaum Republik: Kasus Darul Islam Aceh (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Utama Grafiti, 1990), p. 20.  
50 Michael Feener, Shari’a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in 
Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 34, 75; Steenbrink, 
Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah, p. 63; Alfian, The Ulama in Acehnese Society: A Preliminary 
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before, most uleebalang had thrown their support behind secular education offered by the 
Dutch while the few religiously-inclined ones decided to join forces with the reformist ulama 
instead to reform Islamic education.51 By the 1940s, an alliance, even one of convenience, 
between the traditionalist ulama and the uleebalang was not possible.  
The challenge from the uleebalang took the form of a political struggle during the years 
preceding World War II. Though they were officially empowered by the Dutch, most of the 
uleebalang ruled over people who did not see them as the sole native authority. It was the 
ulama who enjoyed the support and trust of the population, particularly due to their high 
status as learned Islamic scholars and community leaders. During this time, reformist ulama 
traveled the region, going from one gampong to another, to disseminate their ideas through 
public preaching (tabligh); these fora were also used to refute theological beliefs long held by 
traditionalist ulama.52 The speaking tours were not only about popularizing new religious 
ideas; more importantly, they were the means to further sow the seeds of the Acehnese 
Islamic consciousness in society at large, which stood in stark contrast to the status quo 
practiced by the Dutch and the uleebalang.  
The political threat posed by the reformist ulama, however, did not go unnoticed by the 
uleebalang who resorted to legal means to suppress the influence of the reformist ulama, 
particularly by issuing official bans against them speaking and teaching in their territory 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s.53 Some uleebalang also accused their counterparts who 
supported the reformist ulama of using PUSA to re-establish the sultanate, so much so as 
																																																								
51 Teuku Chik M. Johan Alamsyah, the uleebalang in Sigli, was chosen as the “protector” of the 
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mocking PUSA as Persatuan Untuk Sulthanat Aceh (Association for Acehnese Sultanate).54 
Ultimately, the unequal rivalry between the uleebalang and the reformist ulama simply 
pointed to the glaring weakness of uleebalang as a group: their divisiveness, petty squabbles, 
and inability to organize among themselves against a common threat.55 By the mid-1940s, it 
was apparent that the two incongruent normative conceptions of an Acehnese society that had 
developed in the preceding decades – one based on Islam as represented by PUSA and the 
other on adat, promoted by the Dutch and of which the overarching symbol was the 
uleebalang – were no longer able to co-exist. The Japanese interregnum threw the two 
opposing worldviews into an even sharper relief as PUSA leaders collaborated with the 
Japanese military administration to further entrench their influence while most uleebalang, 
now politically out of favor, still supported the Dutch and harbored hope for their eventual 
return. The conflict finally reached its bloody apogee in the violent Revolusi Sosial in 1946 
when most of the uleebalang were wiped out. The resultant power vacuum from the purge 
allowed PUSA to consolidate its control of Aceh and govern uncontested for a time.56  
Aceh-nization of Islamic education in the post-independence years          
In explaining the nature of post-independence Islamic education in Aceh, there is a clear 
linkage between the previously mentioned historical socio-political dynamics and the post-
1949 relations between the province and the central government in Jakarta. The late colonial 
period (late 1800s to 1945) became a pivotal period that precipitated the formation of 
localized Acehnese Islamic identity that has persisted until today. This localized Islamic 
identity would remain intact in the post-independence years as Aceh engaged in the struggle 
against a central government that was bent on tightening its grip over its territory. The post-
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independence period can be divided into three eras: the Parliamentary and Guided Democracy 
era (pre-1966), the New Order era (1966 to 1998), and the Reformasi era (1998 to present 
time). While these three eras offer starkly different modes of governance, the Acehnese 
Islamic identity that was molded in the pre-independence years remains relatively unchanged 
and in fact has been fortified as time goes by; only the strategies employed by local Acehnese 
actors to engage the central government have varied depending on the era. It is through this 
lens that the chapter will analyze how Islamic education in Aceh has managed to maintain its 
local character in the past 100 years. 
As the only socio-political group that retained significant social influence in the early years of 
the independence, the ulama, specifically the PUSA-affiliated reformist ulama, were in an 
unchallenged position to further revamp and develop the Islamic educational system. 
Madrasah graduates who dominated the newly established provincial government, especially 
the Pejabat Agama and its Board of Religious Education (Lembaga Pendidikan Agama), also 
supported the growth of Islamic education at this time. Private madrasah were made public in 
1947 and re-designated as Islamic Primary Schools (Sekolah Rendah Islam, SRI) and Islamic 
Secondary Schools (Sekolah Menengah Islam, SMI). The provincial government channeled 
more subsidies to SRI and the Normal Instituut Islam (by this time known as Sekolah Guru 
Islam) and converted madrasah teachers into public employees.57 The entire cycle in which 
ulama-dominated state institutions established an Islamic education system that produced 
graduates who would later populate the ranks of these state institutions, created a positive 
feedback mechanism that over time further reinforced the localized institutional identity. 
Nonetheless, despite the dominance of reformist ulama in the post-independence years, the 
reality was that they did not have the broad autonomy to fully implement their Islamic 
reforms. Aceh was subsumed under the “national project” of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy 
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that allowed very little regional expression. The increasing dominance of Sukarno’s regime 
resulted in discontent among major islands outside of Java and ultimately led to regional 
rebellions in the late 1950s.58 
Increased centralization by Sukarno’s regime had several impacts on Islamic education in 
Aceh. The central government stopped subsidies for some SMI in mid-1951 and SRI in 
January 1952 in order to force the closure of these religious schools and divert their students 
to government public schools. The central government also built more schools in the 
neighboring province of North Sumatra, including in the regency (kabupaten) of Tapanuli 
Utara, which had less than half of the population of the whole province of Aceh.59 Reformist 
ulama claimed that the central government was trying to weaken and secularize Aceh’s proud 
tradition of Islamic learning by closing down Islamic schools in the province, building more 
non-religious public schools in the neighboring province and forcing Acehnese parents to 
send their children to these out-of-province schools, so much so the central government was 
willing to provide scholarships for the students.60 Aceh’s inability to administer its own 
education system during this time was part of the province’s loss of autonomy in all aspects 
of local governance, which created enough tensions with the central government that in the 
end they sparked the Darul Islam revolt in 1953.    
At the end of the Darul Islam revolt in 1959, as already noted, Aceh was given the status of 
Special Province (Daerah Istimewa), allowing it greater autonomy to experiment with and 
reform the local educational system. The reality, of course, was not clear-cut. The New Order 																																																								
58 Traditionalist ulama did not support the rebellion and called it religiously unlawful since it created 
disaster for the people and country. Yusny Saby, Islam and Social Change: The Role of Ulama in 
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regime that came to power in 1966 implemented a development (pembangunan) ideology that 
had a significant effect on Islamic education in Aceh. In place of the vanquished uleebalang, 
the new competing local elites were the technocrats and the bureaucrats, whose sole purpose 
was to carry out the development prerogatives of the central government in Jakarta.61 In the 
education arena, they were the non-local staff of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the 
Ministry of Education and Culture, employed to promote national education with a heavy 
emphasis on economic development. They saw Islamic education as a hindrance to the 
developmental aims of the regime. The reformist ulama, who were still very much in control 
of Islamic education in Aceh, were alarmed by what they deemed as secularization of the 
education system by the central government, which they thought could possibly lead to the 
demise of Islamic education itself, such as abolishing school holidays during Ramadan and 
making the Islamic Studies subject in public schools non-compulsory. The comparison cannot 
be starker: in the early 1970s, the Islamic (read: madrasah) education had 32 percent religious 
subjects in its curriculum while the national education had only 8 percent.62 The New Order 
regime also placed higher emphasis on supporting government public schools than religious 
schools as part of its overall developmentalist agenda in Aceh at this time. In 1983, 68.8 
percent of primary level students in Aceh were in the non-religious school system while 29.7 
percent were enrolled in religious schools.63 The reformist ulama certainly did not see the 
technocrats and bureaucrats of the regime as being friendly to their educational objectives, 
namely supporting the madrasah system and combining general and religious subjects into 
one. 
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The issue of dualism in education has always been a major debating point in Muslim-majority 
societies, Aceh included. The reformist ulama tried to take advantage of the autonomy 
provided by the Daerah Istimewa status in the early 1960s to integrate the religious and 
secular streams of primary education, Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Negeri (MIN) and Sekolah Dasar 
(SD) respectively. They were joined in this effort by academics from the State Islamic 
Institute (IAIN) Ar-Raniry and the Education faculty of the Universitas Syiah Kuala. Both the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and Ministry of Education and Culture, however, ignored the 
proposal since they deemed it to be non-contributive to the regime’s developmentalist 
agenda.64 Even so, the effort to integrate religious and secular primary education was a 
synthesis of Islamic principles and the Acehnese identity growing out of the Daerah Istimewa 
status that set the course for the future shape of Islamic education in Aceh.65 It was not only 
the reformist ulama who sought educational changes at this time; dayah education was also 
going through its own modernization – a few decades after modernist ulama had established 
their own educational institutions in Aceh. Again, academics from IAIN Ar-Raniry 
collaborated with the traditionalist ulama to revamp dayah curriculum and pedagogy. The 
first modern dayah, Dayah Moderen Tgk. Cik Panté Kulu, was established in 1968 in Banda 
Aceh and was opened by President Suharto himself, which signified the flexibility of the 
dayah system in adapting to the development objectives of the New Order regime.66 Slowly 
the distinct character of Islamic education in Aceh began to take hold in the province in the 
midst of a highly centralizing New Order era. In 1987, Darwis Soelaiman, the head of the 
Faculty of Education at Universitas Syiah Kuala in Banda Aceh, published a booklet entitled 
Kearah Perbaikan Mutu dan Pembaharuan Pendidikan di Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh – 																																																								
64 Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, p. 55. 
65 While the academics from IAIN Ar-Raniry who participated in this educational reform effort were 
graduates of madrasah, which explains their support for the reformist ulama, their counterparts from 
Universitas Syiah Kuala were mainly graduates of secular public schools. This does illustrate the 
particularity of Acehnese identity that sees no difference in their obligations as both Muslims and 
Acehnese. Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh, pp. 280-281.  
66 Feener, Shari’a and Social Engineering, pp. 73-81. 
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Sebuah Model (Toward the Improvement of Quality and Reform of Education in the Province 
of Aceh – A Model) that, among its recommendations, urged stronger emphasis on Acehnese 
culture and Islam in the national curriculum implemented in Aceh, in an effort to preserve the 
uniqueness of Acehnese identity.67 It was not certain if the MOEC took heed of the proposal 
but it was endorsed by the then Governor, Ibrahim Hasan. Nevertheless, there was a real 
struggle in Aceh during the New Order era to maintain its local educational identity in the 
face of a centralizing, development-oriented push from the central government.    
One result of the Special Province status in 1959 was the Aceh-nization of the provincial 
administration, including the territorial military structure.68 The practice continued even 
during the New Order period. Though Suharto’s installed outsiders, typically military 
commanders, as local administrators throughout the archipelago, Aceh was the exception. 
This anomaly allowed Islamic education in Aceh to preserve its uniqueness such as the dayah 
system, despite the pressure from Jakarta to conform. By the 1970s, many ulama and other 
religious functionaries, upon realizing the futility of oppositional tactics to advance their 
agenda, decided to join the provincial offices of the national ministries instead, namely the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture.69 Meanwhile, the 
regime recognized early on the resiliency of Acehnese local Islamic identity and the 
importance of coopting the support from local ulama by helping to establish the Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Ulama Daerah Istimewa Aceh (MPU) in December 1965, a good decade 
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before the establishment of MUI in 1975.70 The local ulama thought they could help to shape 
MPU policies to preserve aspects that were integral to Acehnese identity such as its dayah 
system, Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Negeri (MIN), religious judiciary, Ulama Council (Majelis 
Ulama), State Islamic Institute (IAIN), and even the Ministry of Religious Affairs itself, 
which they saw as being threatened by the more secular Ministry of Education and Culture.71 
In short, similar to Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah in 
other provinces, both the traditionalist and reformist ulama in Aceh adopted an 
accommodationist approach in dealing with the coercive authority of the New Order regime 
by working with and within institutions that did not share their values and goals. In the long 
run, this ploy helped to shape the identity of these provincial offices of the ministries and their 
district and sub-district branches to become less national-oriented and more Acehnese.72 
When it came to Aceh, the approach adopted by the New Order regime was somewhat 
schizophrenic. On the one hand, the central government in Jakarta was hegemonic and 
uniform in enforcing its developmentalist agenda; on the other hand, the regime did actively 
promote the uniqueness of Aceh’s culture and history. In the words of Edward Aspinall: 
[t]his “special territory” (daerah istimewa) status was accompanied by an energetic 
process of cultural production that did much to normalize and valorize Acehnese 
identity. At the same time, the Indonesian state became more authoritarian and 
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centralized, meaning that the promise of special treatment was never realized in 
practice, despite being constantly celebrated.73   
While the autonomous benefits of having a special status might not be realized at this time, 
the incorporation of local ulama into formal national institutions, the hiring of local staff and 
the vigorous Acehnese cultural production by the central government helped to create a 
distinct institutional identity that became more prominent and independent in the Reformasi 
years. Institutional identity can be formed through the reproduction of institutional culture. In 
the case of Aceh, this involved the gradual inculcation and reinforcement of its local Islamic 
identity by the Acehnese-staffed national institutions that would ultimately take precedence 
over the formerly irreligious developmentalist values of the central government. The 
institutional strength of the ulama, especially in maintaining the socio-political influence of 
the madrasahs and dayah, was evident in the electoral wins of the Islamic political parties, 
Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Parmusi) and United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) in Aceh in the 1971 and 1977 legislative 
elections, respectively. It did speak to the strength of the local institutional identity that 
managed to defy the New Order electoral juggernaut in the form of the Golkar party.74 The 
organization of traditionalist ulama, PERTI, joined PPP in 1973, which explained PPP’s 
stellar electoral performance in dayah-intensive areas. On the other hand, ulama who joined 
Golkar in the 1970s found their popularity significantly dwindled due to the public’s 
perception of them being corrupted and greedy.75 The appointment of Ibrahim Hasan as the 
governor in 1986 changed Golkar’s political fortune in Aceh. Ibrahim Hasan was a highly 
popular local personality and once appointed, he started to channel money into dayah 																																																								
73 Aspinall, Islam and Nation, p. 8. 
74 PPP won in most sub-regencies (kecamatan) with high student enrollment in madrasah, as were 
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especially those located in PPP strongholds, as a means to win electoral favors from the 
ulama.76 By the time he left office in 1993, Golkar had managed to hold the majority of seats 
in Aceh’s provincial assembly.77 In short, this example illustrates the vitality of the Islamic 
educational institutions in Aceh despite being at cross-purpose with the aims of an omnipotent 
central government, a feat that would not have been possible without the active participation 
of local ulama in the national institutions and their efforts to transform these institutions’ 
culture and identity from within.78 
High institutional complexity within and between state institutions that oversaw Islamic 
education during the New Order era also played a crucial role in sustaining Aceh’s localized 
Islamic identity despite the regime’s centralizing tendency. As amply demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, the tension between MORA and MOEC over the issues of single-roof education 
and abolition of religious subject in public schools, resulted in the inability of the New Order 
regime to exert more control over Islamic education in the country. The institutional 
fragmentation allowed advocates for Islamic education in Aceh to withstand any attempt by 
the central government to secularize Islamic education in the province.79 In the first half of the 
New Order era, MORA was preoccupied with what it saw as MOEC’s attempts to secularize 
Islamic education. Major Islamic groups such as MUI, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, 
GUPPI and MPU in Aceh rallied around MORA to defend Islamic education from MOEC 																																																								
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and the threat of secularization.80 As detailed in Chapter 2, these push-pull dynamics between 
Islamic organizations and the New Order regime’s inability to act cohesively, as well as 
institutional fragmentations that characterized the debate over Islamic education in Indonesia 
before 1989, in a way helped Aceh to preserve its own localized Islamic education.  
Islamic education in Aceh in the Reformasi era           
The end of the New Order regime signaled the sudden loosening of the tight control from 
Jakarta and a stronger centrifugal pull from the periphery for more real autonomy. This 
change resulted in the passing of Laws 22 and 25 in 1999 that devolved control of several 
areas of governance to the provincial and district levels, education being one of them. The 
parliament subsequently passed Law 44/1999 on Special Administration of the Special 
Province of Aceh (Undang-Undang Nomor 44 Tahun 1999 tentang Penyelenggaraan 
Keistimewaan Propinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh), the main focus of which was to affirm 
Aceh’s autonomy in four special administrative aspects as laid out under Article 3: religious 
life, customary life, education, and the role of ulama in the province’s policy-making process. 
The parliament again passed Law 18/2001 on Special Autonomy for the Special Province of 
Aceh as the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 
2001 tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Daerah Istimewa Aceh sebagai Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) that strengthened Aceh’s authority in the overall 
implementation of the special autonomy framework (Article 3(1)). The effect of these 
decentralization laws on Aceh was further reinforced with the 2006 Law on Governance of 																																																								
80 A letter from Majelis Ulama-Ulama Daerah Istimewa Aceh to Pimpinan Komisi Pembaharuan 
Pendidikan, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, dated 9 February 1979, showed support for the 
government’s attempt to renew the national education system as long as MORA remained fully in 
charge of Islamic education and schools. No. 420/101, Badan Arsip dan Perpustakaan Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Banda Aceh. Nationally, ulama from major Islamic organizations met up 
with Minister of Religious Affairs, Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, to air their grievances against 
MOEC’s attempts to secularize Islamic education and demand reassurance from the President that he 
would not support such attempts. Notulen Pertemuan dengan Menteri Agama Tanggal 8 Mei 1979 
tentang Jaminan Presiden, Badan Arsip dan Perpustakaan Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 
Banda Aceh.     
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Aceh (Undang-undang No 11/2006 tentang Pemerintahan Aceh) that essentially confirmed 
Aceh’s rights to establish a form of governance that suited its particular Islamic culture and 
tradition. The newly empowered provincial government subsequently passed a provincial law, 
Qanun Aceh No 5/2008 on the Administration of Education (Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan), 
to align its education system with its Islamic values.81 The provincial government transferred 
the management of dayah, which used to be under the aegis of Dinas Pendidikan, the 
provincial office of the Ministry of Education and Culture, to the newly created Badan 
Pembangunan Pendidikan Dayah (BPPD) in 2008. As a result of these decentralizing efforts, 
the particular Acehnese Islamic identity that was patiently being developed and sustained 
within the educational arena during the repressive years of the New Order regime now came 
into full bloom.  
One major conundrum that hobbles decentralization of Islamic education in Indonesia is the 
fact that matters of religion still remain within the authority of the central government, in this 
case the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This not only means that there are a lot of overlapping 
of jurisdictions between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education and 
Culture but also between the ministries and the provincial and district governments. Some of 
the main issues are funding of schools and training of teachers.82 While Aceh is not spared 
																																																								
81 The general explanation on the intent of the qanun states that “The life of an Acehnese society is 
based on Islamic principles and the uniqueness of a religious life, custom, education and the role of 
ulamas in determining the policy that provides the main inspiration in the administration of education, 
not just in the context of national education system but also in the implementation of the [said] special 
characteristics [translation mine]: Qanun Aceh Nomor 5/2008 Tentang Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan 
(Banda Aceh: Dinas Pendidikan Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, 2008), p. 39.    
82 The widening gap between the two ministries was such that the Ministry of Home Affairs even 
issued a circular (903/2429/SJ) on September 2005, which prohibited local governments from funding 
‘vertical’ institutions, namely those that fall under the jurisdiction of the central government. After a 
protest from the madrasah community this directive was revised a year later to include an exemption 
for madrasahs but other legal obstacles still remained. One such example is the Article 39 of the Law 
33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Regions, which states that 
discretionary grants that local governments received from the central government, Special Allocation 
Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus), cannot be used to fund madrasahs. Risti Permani, “Educational 
Challenges with Special Reference to Islamic Schooling,” in Chris Manning and Sudarno Sumarto, 	
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from this jurisdictional wrangling, its Special Province status has afforded it broad leeway to 
deal with this problem, as well as the autonomy to interpret the decentralization laws in 
accordance with its Islamic identity. The creation of BPPD was the perfect example of the 
provincial government’s use of its autonomy to empower its dayah learning tradition, seen as 
an integral part of the Acehnese identity.83 Since the formation of BPPD in 2008, the dayah 
system has flourished into about 944 schools (traditional and modern) with 142,600 students 
across the province with an annual budget of USD 2.77 million in 2015.84 Even in the office 
of Kanwil Agama, the orientation of which is supposedly directed toward Jakarta, the 
prevalent institutional sentiment is thick with localized Islamic hue. One official I talked to 
mentioned, “Our foremost objective here [in Kanwil Agama Provinsi Aceh] is to ensure that 
the Islamic education in the province is in-line with the objectives and spirit of syariat Islam 
in Aceh.”85 In short, when it comes to managing Islamic education, Aceh has finally managed 
to realize its long overdue autonomy, not least due to decades of identity cultivation within 
the state institutions in the province. 
Implementation and enforcement of MORA’s orthodox values at the local level   
While it looks like Aceh has been exercising its special autonomy privileges in the Islamic 
education arena relatively independently of the central government, particularly in the matters 
of administration and oversight, this does raise the question whether there is any incongruity 																																																																																																																																																																													
eds., Employment, Living Standards and Poverty in Contemporary Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 2011), p. 186.     
83 The motivation for creating BPPD was not only to strengthen the dayah system, which was seen as 
an integral part of the Acehnese Islamic identity, but also to spur economic development and to 
establish more dayah along the border with North Sumatra as a bulwark against deviant Islamic sects 
and Christian missionary encroachment. Feener, Shari’a and Social Engineering, p. 77fn.   
84 There is also an effort to revamp the present jurisdictional arrangement to transfer the control of 
Junior Islamic High School (Madrasah Tsanawiyah) and Senior Islamic High School (Madrasah 
Aliyah), which are now under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, to BPPD, which 
should come into effect some time in 2015. Interview with Bustami Usman, Kepala BPPD, 5 February 
2014.   
85 Interview with Taharuddin Muhammad, Kepala Seksi Kurikulum dan Evaluasi, Bidang Madrasah, 
Kantor Wilayah Agama Provinsi Aceh, 4 February 2014. 
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in the substance and spirit of the Islamic education promoted by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and the one practised and taught locally; in other words, do we see evidence for 
competing interpretations of Islamic tenets in Aceh. This question is especially pertinent in 
light of Aceh’s strong localized Islamic identity, as explained in the previous section. In the 
context of center-periphery relations, what kind of efforts has the central government made to 
enforce its version of orthodoxy on Aceh, if there are such efforts, and what actions have 
Acehnese actors taken to protect and promote their own version of orthodoxy, if they do think 
themselves as being imposed upon by the central government? These questions, of course, 
have to be seen within the context of Aceh’s broad autonomy as a Special Province and 
whether the attempt by the central government to impose its own Islamic orthodoxy managed 
to affect the way Islamic education is administered in the province, be it in terms of 
curriculum, school tests, school oversight or teachers’ training, among others.   
One particular point of theology poses the utmost concern to the advocates of Islamic 
education is the basic beliefs of the faith (aqidah). Defining and therefore sorting out which 
interpretation of the aqidah should be permissible and which is not has long been a priority 
for those in power since Islamic education offers the perfect vehicle to disseminate and 
inculcate ideas of orthodoxy in the impressionable minds of the young students. Ulama in 
Aceh have always been preoccupied with regulating aqidah since colonial times. Despite the 
differences between the traditionalist and reformist ulama in modernizing Islamic education 
in Aceh, as far as aqidah is concerned, there was a consensus that only Ahlus Sunnah Wal 
Jamaah (ASWJ) was to be accepted and enforced. One example is in the 1940s when 
Teungku Daud Beureueh, along with other prominent ulama in Aceh, crushed a “deviant” 
Islamic sect in Pidie by using both hard methods (demolishing the sect’s congregation place) 
and soft methods (an intensive public education campaign).86 The trend continued during the 
																																																								
86 Yakub, Gambaran Pendidikan di Aceh, pp. 344-345. 
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New Order era when the leading ulama in Aceh, as represented by Majelis Ulama Daerah 
Istimewa Aceh, not only defended and promoted the ASWJ orthodoxy but also strived to 
reconcile it with the objectives of the regime.87 Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Majelis Ulama 
Daerah Istimewa Aceh also collaborated closely to stamp out “deviant” Islamic sects and to 
defend Islam against the purported Christianization efforts by churches, missionary groups, 
and Christians within the New Order regime.88 The Reformasi era saw no discernible 
diversion from the well-established norms with regard to aqidah; in fact, the Islamic 
orthodoxy in Aceh has been promoted even more vigorously as part of Aceh’s autonomous 
syariah-based governance. The Deliberating Council of Ulama (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Ulama, MPU), the successor to the Majelis Ulama Daerah Istimewa Aceh, is a formal partner 
of the current Aceh government and the sole arbiter of local orthodoxy, having the authority 
to issue legally binding rulings (fatwas) and even defy orders from the MUI leadership in 
Jakarta, though this has never really happened since they always find an agreement in any 
thorny issue.89 Throughout its post-independence history, when it comes to the matters of 
aqidah, Aceh has always been able to maintain its version of Islamic orthodoxy, but at the 
same time remained flexible enough to reconcile differences with the development-focused 
New Order regime. Since 2005, the special autonomy status has accorded Islamic orthodoxy 
in Aceh more prominence; it has also given the provincial government more coercive legal 																																																								
87 In response to a letter of inquiry from an ulama in Aceh Timur about a line in the 1978 Broad 
Guidelines of State Policy (Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) that states “Kepercayaan 
terhadap Tuhan yang Maha Esa tidak merupakan Agama” (Belief in the One-ness of God does not 
constitute a Religion), Majelis Ulama Daerah Istimewa Aceh wrote that the phrase was still in line 
with the constitution (UUD 1945) and it would not lead to the formation of a new religion that was 
exclusive of the belief in the One-ness of God (my translation). Majelis Ulama Daerah Istimewa 
Aceh’s letter to Teungku Abdul Aziz, 23 May 1979, Badan Arsip dan Perpustakaan Provinsi 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Banda Aceh.  
88 Among the alleged Christianization efforts found in the education arena include sending for 
Christian teachers from East Indonesia and assigning them to public schools, stocking up public 
libraries with Christian books, providing scholarship for students to study in Catholic schools, and 
rejecting a Muslim teacher to teach Islamic education subject at a Catholic school in Sukabumi, West 
Java. Majelis Ulama Indonesia’s letter to all MUI chapters in Indonesia, No. A-422/MUI/IV/1979, 20 
April 1979, Badan Arsip dan Perpustakaan Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Banda Aceh.   
89 Interview with Teungku Lem Faisal, Wakil Ketua MPU, 8 February 2014. 
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powers to protect the Acehnese values.90 In short, Aceh’s broad autonomy in managing its 
own local Islamic identity, including the Islamic education system, is integral to the 
province’s ability to preserve and implement its conservative Islamic ideals despite running 
counter to the more moderate ones promoted by MORA as reflected in the Pengetahuan 
Agama Islam (PAI) curriculum.  
Schools, as the ground zero for public education, serve as an ideal place to disseminate and 
enforce ideas of orthodoxy at the level of society. The process takes the forms of streamlined 
curriculum, mandatory subject testing, and teachers’ training. Schools in Aceh mainly fall 
under two jurisdictional authorities and they overlap each other: madrasahs are under the 
aegis of Ministry of Religious Affairs by way of its provincial office (Kanwil Agama) while 
dayah are being administered by BPPD; since many dayah also incorporate madrasah system 
as part of their modern curriculum, they are also partly under the supervision of Kanwil 
Agama. From my interviews with officials at the Kanwil Agama, I received the impression 
that the Kanwil Agama has a broad autonomy to interpret and implement national objectives 
according to Aceh’s particular local context. In other words, despite the Kanwil Agama in 
Aceh being part of the non-decentralized “vertical” state institutions, it acts in an almost 
similar fashion as other decentralized “horizontal” institutions such as Dinas Pendidikan, that 
is strongly Acehnese in orientation. According to a principal of a modern dayah in Banda 
Aceh, his school is supervised in strict coordination with Kanwil Agama; all of its activities 
must be pre-approved and attendance in a monthly meeting is mandatory.91 Nevertheless, the 
school is allowed to develop (mengembangkan) the mandated curriculum according to its 
values; it goes without saying that those values must not contradict the ones propagated by the 
																																																								
90 MPU issued a fatwa in 2011 that lists out thirteen points of what constitutes as a deviant belief 
(ajaran sesat) and adhering to the teachings that are non-compatible with ASWJ is one. “MPU Aceh 
tetapkan 13 kriteria ajaran sesat,” Tribun News, 13 March 2011 (accessed on 6 August, 2014). 
91 Interview with Kesuma Nirwana, Kepala Sekolah Madrasah Aliyah of Dayah Moderen Darul Ulum, 
Banda Aceh, 10 February 2014.  
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local orthodoxy. The schools also have qualified leeway to make up their own Islamic 
education (Pendidikan Agama Islam) subject test as part of the National Standard School 
Testing (Ujian Sekolah Berstandar Nasional), typically done in a group of school teachers 
(Kelompok Kerja Guru, KKG) convened at the kabupaten level using the general guideline 
(kisi-kisi) provided by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.92 Both Kanwil Agama and BPPD 
administer teachers’ training programs, not just to provide teachers for madrasahs and dayah, 
but also Pendidikan Agama Islam teachers in non-religious public schools (sekolah negeri). 
These trained teachers are also sent to the rural parts of Aceh especially along the border with 
North Sumatra to partly serve as a “fort” (benteng) against Christian proselytizing efforts and 
“deviant” Islamic sects, namely obscure tariqat (Islamic mysticism) groups.93  
As a whole, the schools do have some space for interpreting the curriculum and they do 
exercise that privilege on a regular basis but ultimately, when it comes to the crucial matter of 
aqidah, the schools generally conform to the prevailing local orthodoxy. On rare occasions, 
there would be teachers who were disciplined by BPPD and Kanwil Agama for allegedly 
promoting “deviant” ideas, but the hegemony of orthodoxy is such that the only real worry 
among Islamic educationists in Aceh now is the threat of Christian proselytization in 
schools.94 As we can see, values promoted and enforced by local Islamic education authorities 
in Aceh are far more conservative than those propagated by MORA. However, the pluralist 
approach of the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia allows various religious interpretations 																																																								
92 Interview with H. Saifuddin, Kepala Bidang Pendidikan Agama Islam, Kantor Wilayah Agama 
Provinsi Aceh, 4 February 2014. 
93 Ibid. 
94 The process of disciplining a teacher accused of “deviant” teaching is quite long and rigorous. 
Typically acting on parents’ or community’s complaints, BPPD or Kanwil Agama would report the so-
called offender to MPU. MPU would then form a fact-finding team and cooperate with the intelligence 
agency to gather information. After collecting enough documented evidence, MPU would convene a 
deliberation team (tim perumus) that consists of its own ulama and technical experts from outside. The 
alleged offender would be called for questioning by tim perumus. Only after that MPU would issue a 
fatwa stating that the teaching is haram and the teacher should be disciplined and rehabilitated. The 
teacher would still be able to keep his/her job as long as he/she agrees to be reformed. Interview with 
Teungku Lem Faisal, Wakil Ketua MPU, 8 February 2014.  
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to co-exist, including the more conservative form of Islam currently being practiced in Aceh. 
Aceh’s special autonomy status and localized state institutions only serve to reinforce this 
privilege and further weaken MORA’s hold over Islamic education in the province.   
By historical quirks and the dynamics of center-periphery relations, the province of Aceh has 
managed to preserve and invigorate its Islamic education, which this chapter argues is an 
integral part of its localized Islamic identity. Thus the present-day vigor in Islamic education 
in the province does not merely stem from the full realization of local autonomy since 1999; 
there are much deeper historical roots that led to the current flourishing of Islamic schools and 
their facilities and the overall strengthening of the Islamic education curriculum. Both the 
madrasahs and dayah, imbued with the localized Islamic identity, will remain central to the 
Acehnese social life for years to come.                    
KELANTAN: FEDERALIZATION OF THE STATE’S ISLAMIC EDUCATION SYSTEM 
In dividing territories of governance amongst themselves [the British] and the Malay rulers, 
however, religious and racial identity, not previously a major part of Malay elite legitimacy 
or discourse, became the center of the Malay elite domain, and the key to their survival.95 
 
History of Islamic education in Kelantan 
Pondok or traditional Islamic schools provided the earliest form of education to the 
predominantly rural Malay-Muslim population in Kelantan. Very scant records about the 
origin and early years of pondok are available but it is said that the form of pondok we know 
now can be traced to northern Sumatra, namely Aceh, and the ethnic Malay kingdom of 
Patani in southern Thailand. Haji Abdul Samad Abdullah reputedly established the first 
pondok in Kelantan circa early 1800s in Pulai Chondong, about 28 kilometers from the capital 																																																								
95 Iza Hussin, “The Pursuit of Perak Regalia: Islam, Law, and the Politics of Authority in the Colonial 
State,” Law and Social Inquiry 32, no. 3 (Summer 2007), p. 770. 
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Kota Bharu.96 The term pondok originates from the Arabic word funduq, meaning “temporary 
residence.” In Malay, the word pondok means “hut,” which refers to the type of structures that 
make up the school.97  
Essentially, traditional pondok in Kelantan share similar characteristics with dayah in Aceh, 
or for that matter, pesantren in Java and surau in West Sumatra. These schools are built by a 
local ulama (colloquially known as to’ guru) on a wakaf (donated) land to provide boarding 
for students who come from all over the state and beyond. The longevity of a pondok is highly 
dependent on the skills and charisma of the founding guru; the curriculum consists of 
studying and memorizing old kitab (religious books); they are economically self-sustaining 
and do not charge a fixed fee (“payment” is made via money donation, in-kind contribution or 
providing labor for the pondok’s economic activities). A remarkable aspect of pondok is that 
they not only cater to young people but also to old folks who prefer to spend the remaining 
years of their lives in religious learning and surrounded by a highly pious environment.98 The 
type and length of learning differs from one pondok to another; students tend to study in 
several pondok – one after another – based on the perceived expertise of the pondok’s ulama. 
Traditional pondok education was the only educational option for the homogenously Malay 
society in Kelantan until the entrenchment of British governance in the state and the 
establishment of Kelantan’s Council of Religion and Custom (Majlis Agama dan Istiadat 
Kelantan) in December 1915. 
The signing of the Pangkor Treaty in 1874 with the sultan of Perak (a state on the west coast 
of peninsular Malaysia) set the precedent for the British colonialists’ later agreements with 																																																								
96 Abdul Halim Ahmad, “Pendidikan Islam di Kelantan” in Khoo Kay Kim, ed. Beberapa Aspek 
Warisan Kelantan (Kota Bharu: Perbadanan Muzium Negeri Kelantan, 1982), p. 8. 
97 William Roff, Studies on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: National University of 
Singapore Press, 2009), p. 118; see also Robert Winzeler, “The Social Organization of Islam in 
Kelantan” in William Roff, ed. Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 266fn.  
98 Robert Winzeler, The Social Organization of Islam in Kelantan, p. 267. 
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other sultanates in British Malaya. One point of the treaty was the prerogative given to the 
sultan to manage the affairs of Islam and Malay customs in his kingdom. This latitude, 
combined with the bureaucratization of Kelantanese kingdom’s governing affairs spurred on 
by increased penetration of the British colonial administration into the Malay hinterlands, 
resulted in the creation of the aforementioned Council of Religion and Customs of Kelantan 
(known from now on as Majlis Agama), the first of its kind in British Malaya. Unlike PUSA 
in Aceh, which was dominated by reformist ulama who were bitterly at odds with the 
traditional elites, Majlis Agama was formed by traditionalist ulama who were aligned to the 
traditional ruling elites in Kelantan, namely the royal family. Despite their differences, Majlis 
Agama also believed in reforming (read: modernizing) Islamic education in the kingdom of 
Kelantan, similar to the objective of PUSA in Aceh. On August 1917, Majlis Agama 
established its own modern Islamic school in Kelantan, Madrasah Muhammadiah, which 
offered three streams of education: Malay, Arabic, and English.99 The main objective of the 
school was to provide educated Malays to staff the expanding colonial bureaucracy in the 
state. Many graduates of Madrasah Muhammadiah later furthered their studies in English-
medium schools such as Penang Free School and the Malay College of Kuala Kangsar. By 
1918, Majlis Agama had expanded its educational program by taking over several pondok in 
Pasir Mas, Pasir Putih, and Kampung Kutan.100     
There were also many independent madrasahs that operated outside the Majlis Agama’s 
control in the early 1900s. One such madrasah was Al-Khairiyyiah in Kota Bharu, the first of 
its kind in Kelantan, which was established in 1906. The previously mentioned 
bureaucratization of Islamic affairs led to a proliferation of madrasah and pondok from 1915 
																																																								
99 Khoo Kay Kim, Malay Society: Transformation and Democratisation (Subang Jaya, Selangor: 
Pelanduk Publications, 1991), p. 135. 
100 Nik Ahmad Kamil, the son of Haji Nik Mahmud Ismail, the founder of Majlis Agama, was a 
graduate of Madrasah Muhammadiah who later completed his law studies in England. Khoo, Malay 
Society, pp. 135-136.  
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onwards that, in turn, provided the necessary workforce to man this bureaucracy, from imam 
in a village mosque to the mufti of the state. Unfortunately, the popularity of these 
independent Islamic schools during the early 1900s proved to be their eventual downfall as 
the state government and Majlis Agama coopted this success by building schools of their own 
called Sekolah Agama Kerajaan, thus injecting more competition into the Islamic education 
arena in the state. These Sekolah Agama Kerajaan were flushed with resources from Majlis 
Agama, as opposed to many of the independent Islamic schools that were typically small, 
rural and supported by limited revenue base.101 Adding to the competition was the growth of 
national public schools since the early 1900s, which included mandatory Islamic subjects as 
part of their curriculum (more detail in Chapter 2). Many Muslim parents did not feel 
obligated to send their kids to Islamic schools anymore as religious education could now be 
attained in national public schools, which offered more educational and career options to the 
students after they graduated.102  
The wave of Islamization that first hit Malaysia in the late 1970s, which saw a marked 
increase of religiosity in the national bureaucracy and the society at large, also prompted 
further attempts by the federal government to absorb more independent Islamic schools into 
its sphere of influence. Many People’s Islamic Schools (Sekolah Agama Rakyat, SAR), 
successor to the traditional pondok, were taken over by the ministry and renamed Sekolah 
Agama Bantuan Kerajaan (SABK). The first SAR in Kelantan taken over by the ministry was 
Naim Lil Banat in 1977; it was converted into a national religious high school (Sekolah 
																																																								
101 Majlis Agama now assumed the responsibility of collecting and dispensing zakat (personal wealth 
tax), thus taking away the pondok’s main source of income. Majlis Agama also began to issue licenses 
(tauliah) to all religious teachers, thus eroding their academic freedom and basis of authority. Hashim, 
Educational Dualism, pp. 28-29. 
102 The decline of pondok education could be chalked up to the students’ need to obtain school 
certificates for government jobs, which only madrasah and Malay vernacular schools could offer, and 
the fact that many to’ guru who founded these pondok joined PAS when the party was established in 
1951. Wan Yahya Wan Ahmad, “Traditional Islamic Education and Its Modern Development in 
Kelantan,” MA thesis, University of Kent, 1982, pp. 63-67. 
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Menengah Kebangsaan Agama, SMKA) as part of the ministry’s effort to incorporate 
independent schools into the national system.103 The federal government has so far only 
managed to acquire and convert twenty SAR to SABK in the state of Kelantan as part of the 
2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Ministry of Education and 
Kelantan Islamic Foundation (Yayasan Islam Kelantan, YIK).104 Despite the prerogatives 
provided by the constitution to the states in administering Islamic affairs, which also include 
Islamic education, the current practice shows intensive involvement by the federal 
government to dictate the nature of Islamic education at the state level especially in places 
like Kelantan, where small, mainly rural private Islamic schools (SAR and traditional pondok) 
form the main support for the Islamic opposition party, PAS, which will be elaborated later in 
this chapter. 
Currently, Islamic schools in Kelantan generally fall under two overlapping jurisdictions: the 
Ministry of Education (MOE) via the State Education Agency (Jabatan Pelajaran Negeri, 
JPN) and YIK, which is an arm of the state government (but not part of the Majlis Agama). 
National religious high schools (Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Agama, SMKA) are under 
total control of the MOE, and while the MOE administers SABK, their curriculum comes 
from YIK; SAR and state religious schools (Sekolah Agama Negeri, SAN), on the other hand, 
operates under the authority of the state government via YIK. There is also a small section 																																																								
103 Overall, 11 SAR were taken over by the ministry in 1977 and converted to SMKA. To date there 
are 55 SMKA across Malaysia, in contrast to 195 SABK. While both types of schools are managed 
and funded by the ministry, their main difference lies in the curriculum: SABK uses curriculum from 
the state’s religious council (Majlis Agama Negeri) or in the case of Kelantan, Kelantan Islamic 
Foundation (Yayasan Islam Kelantan), and SMKA uses the national curriculum set by the ministry. 
SABK is a relatively new program, introduced by the ministry in 2005 in order to quell political 
opposition from the PAS-dominated SAR. SABK receives a semblance of autonomy by retaining its 
land and building ownership. Quick Facts 2013: Malaysian Educational Statistics, Educational 
Planning and Research Division, Ministry of Education; Pengenalan: SABK dan SMKA. 
http://www.moe.gov.my/v/sabk-smka (accessed on 11 July, 2014); Taklimat Isu Sekolah Agama Rakyat 
(SAR) 2003, Urusetia SAR, Sektor Pendidikan Islam dan Moral, Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Kelantan, 
p. 15.   
104 “20 SAR kini Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan,” Utusan Malaysia, 13 August 2008 (accessed on 
11 July, 2014). 
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within the Islamic Development Agency of Malaysia (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, 
JAKIM) called the Advisory Board for Streamlining Islamic Learning and Education 
(Lembaga Penasihat Penyelarasan Pelajaran dan Pendidikan Agama Islam, LEPAI) that 
tries to coordinate and implement a standard curriculum for all SAR and SAN in Malaysia, 
which technically should come into effect in 2015.105  
Table 3.2: Total number of Islamic schools, students and teachers in Kelantan in 2013106 






Pondok 47 320 26 
Sekolah Agama Rakyat 42 11559 893 
Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan 22 3938 490 
Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Agama 6 4920 423 
Total 117 20,737 1,832 
     
The socio-political roots of present-day Islamic education in Kelantan 
The first critical juncture that provided the impetus to shape the character of Islamic education 
in Kelantan took place in the late colonial period (the late 1800s to 1957), a result of 
interactions between major socio-political groups in the kingdom. Similar to pre-colonial 
Aceh, the kingdom of Kelantan also consisted of the royal family that ruled from the capital 
city Kota Bharu, various local chieftains that reigned over their fiefdoms across the kingdom, 																																																								
105 Since Islamic affairs is a matter that falls under the state jurisdiction, the implementation of 
national curriculum for SAR and SAN by LEPAI has to be agreed upon unanimously by the sultans 
and traditional figureheads in all the states. So far Kelantan is the only state that refuses to adopt this 
proposed national curriculum due to the claim that its curriculum is religiously superior. Interview 
with Azizan Muhammad, Chief Assistant Director, Islamic Education Branch of JAKIM, 21 March, 
2014.  
106 Data KAFA, Sekolah Agama dan Masjid (Putrajaya: Bahagian Kemajuan Islam, Jabatan Kemajuan 
Islam Malaysia [JAKIM], 2013), pp. 14-30; the number for SAR was obtained through a personal 
interview with Noor Aisyah Ibrahim, Assistant Director of LEPAI, JAKIM, 9 September 2014. 
Comparatively, there is one Islamic school for every 1,811 Muslims in Aceh and one Islamic school 
for every 13,965 Muslims in Kelantan, which indicates an overwhelming dominance of non-religious 
government schools in Kelantan (592 schools and 315,652 students as of 2015). Aceh Dalam Angka 
2015 (Banda Aceh: Badan Pusat Statistik Provinsi Aceh, 2015), p. 102; Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri 
Kelantan: http://jpnkelantan.moe.gov.my/v1/ (accessed on 19 April, 2016).  
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and a fractured religious class represented by the ulama and local imams. Also akin to the 
more autonomous uleebalang in Aceh, the local chieftains in Kelantan were relatively 
independent of the sultan, though the sultan did have a strategic and geographical advantage. 
Kota Bharu, which sits at the mouth of Kelantan River, a point of entry along the China – 
India trade route, controlled the commercial flow and the sultan promptly used this as 
leverage against the landlocked chieftains in the hinterlands.107 The signing of the Pangkor 
Treaty between the kingdom of Perak (on the west coast) and the British in 1874 marked a 
pivotal point in the wayMalay and Islamic affairs were administered, the first critical juncture 
with a legacy that still resonates to this day as a result of the bureaucratization of Malay and 
Islamic affairs in every state in Malaysia. Clause 6 of the treaty sets forth the appointment of a 
British adviser and assistant adviser to give instruction and guidance in all matters of 
administration other than those touching on Islam and Malay customs.108 This particular 
article was incorporated in the British’s subsequent treaties with other Malay rulers, which 
primarily served as a face-saving gesture for the sultans in accepting the humiliation of 
colonial subjugation. The sultans, who hitherto were already well established as the symbolic 
fusion of Islam and Malay traditions, at least ritualistically, moved into the new colonial role 
with ease.109 In 1909, the British signed a treaty with the kingdom of Siam, which had 
suzerainty over Kelantan and other parts of northern Malaya, to concede the northern Malay 
																																																								
107 Shahril Talib, History of Kelantan: 1890-1940 (Kuala Lumpur: The Malaysian Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 1995), pp. 8-12. 
108 The original English wordings were “The Sultan of Perak shall receive and name a suitable house 
for a residence for the officer who is under the British Government called the Resident of Perak and is 
accredited to the Sultan’s Court. The Sultan shall consult with him first on all matters and 
administration in the State of Perak except that he, the Resident, may not intervene in matters of the 
Mohammedan religion and Malay customs.” J.M. Gullick, Rulers and Residents: Influence and Power 
in the Malay States, 1870-1920 (Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 31.     
109 Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems, xiii – xix. For more historical details on the fusion of Malay 
traditionalism and British colonial bureaucracy, albeit not so much on the religious aspect, see Donna 
Amoroso, Traditionalism and the Ascendancy of the Malay Ruling Class in Colonial Malaya 
(Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2014), pp. 65-98.  
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kingdoms to Britain’s control. Like other sultans in British Malaya, the sultan of Kelantan 
was retained as the head of Malay and Islamic affairs within his kingdom.  
The Pangkor treaty formalized the sultan’s authority over matters of Malay customs and 
Islam, expanding his reach into Malay society especially in the hinterlands. This was done in 
tandem with the British rulers’ efforts to intensify their colonial footprint, namely through 
increased bureaucratization.  In other words, the sultans were allowed a share in the colonial 
state-making endeavors by the British in an obviously reciprocal relationship: the sultans 
looked to the British for help in preserving the status quo ante and in further entrenching their 
privileged position while the British used the sultans’ traditional authority as a means of 
indirect rule and social control. The treaty had allowed  
[t]he preservation and reinforcement of the traditional bases of authority and social 
organization implicit in this [non-interference] policy, together with greatly improved 
means of communication and centralization and backed by the effective sanctions now 
open to British-supported sultans, combined to produce an authoritarian form of 
religious administration much beyond anything known to the peninsula before. The 
rulers and traditional elite, much of whose real power to influence the destiny of their 
states had been stripped from them by the circumstances of British rule, not 
unnaturally turned to the only fields now left to them, religion and custom, to express 
what remained.110  
Administrative modernization efforts undertook by the British in Kelantan following the 1909 
Anglo-Siam Treaty entailed setting up district offices across the state, mostly as an efficient 
means to collect taxes. Local chieftains who used to reign unimpeded now found their 
																																																								
110 William Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1967), p. 72. See also Iza Hussin, “The Pursuit of Perak Regalia: Islam, Law, and the Politics of 
Authority in the Colonial State,” Law and Social Inquiry 32:3 (Summer 2007), p. 782. 
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traditional fiefdoms being replaced by the generic sounding “districts” and their own 
influence being subsumed by “district officers,” typically non-local agents of the colonial 
administration.111 This “forward movement” by the British naturally raised the ire of the local 
chieftains, which culminated in the failed rebellion by To’ Janggut (literally “Old Long 
Beard”) in 1915, suppressed by both the sultan’s army and British forces. One important 
result that came out of the British efforts to modernize the administration of Kelantan was to 
bring law and order to the kingdom and quell opposition to the royal family; this, in turn, 
helped the sultan to strengthen his grip on power especially after the establishment of Majlis 
Agama in 1915. In short, “by cooperating with the British, Sultan’s authority was secured at 
the expense of the constellation of chiefs that has previously negotiated power in the Malayan 
kingdoms.”112 
Further accelerating the formalization of religious authority in the hands of the sultan was the 
conflict between the traditionalist ulama (Kaum Tua) and the reformist ulama (Kaum Muda) 
in the early 1900s, akin to what was happening in Aceh. Unlike in Aceh, where the reformist 
ulama had the upper hand due to their local origin and political cache amassed during the 
Prang Sabil and extended during the Japanese occupation, their counterparts in Kelantan and 
other parts of British Malaya did not enjoy the same privileges and social acceptance. The 
reformist ulama barely registered any presence in the Malay heartland since most of them 
resided in the urban and highly cosmopolitan Straits Settlements of Penang, Melaka, and 
Singapore. Those who lived in Kelantan were few in number, being based in Kota Bharu and 
large towns, and were generally not much involved in traditionalist-dominated local 																																																								
111 Kelantan was initially divided into five districts and the district officer acted as revenue collector, 
land officer, and a magistrate. In regards to the rebellion, though it was against the “infidel” British 
colonial administration, Islam was not instrumentalized as a rallying cry, unlike during Prang Sabil in 
Aceh. Ibrahim Nik Mahmood, “The To’ Janggut Rebellion of 1915” in William Roff, ed., Kelantan: 
Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 
67-73; Cheah Boon Kheng, To’ Janggut (Old Long Beard): Legends, Histories and Perceptions of the 
1915 Rebellion in Kelantan (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2006), pp. 8-12. 
112 Hussin, The Pursuit of Perak Regalia, p. 781. 
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politics.113 But the tepid blow of reformists’ criticisms at this time was felt nonetheless, 
pointedly directed at both the traditional elites and the traditionalist ulama. This resulted in 
the two traditional groups joining forces to defend the existing status quo. Majlis Agama was 
the entity born out of this alliance, the foremost aim of which was to take advantage of the 
deep penetrative means provided by modern state-making to entrench their position of 
religious and political superiority. It was through Majlis Agama that the religious authority of 
the sultan was fully realized as the council was employed to impose a new orthodoxy and 
quash ideological rivals.114 One famous case in 1937 that perfectly illustrated the way Majlis 
Agama tried to justify its orthodox values through the modern mode of governance was the 
great debate between reformist and traditionalist ulama in Kota Bharu regarding the 
cleanliness of a dog’s saliva. The debate took place on the sultan’s palace compound and was 
attended by about 2,000 people. William Roff noted that in defending the conservative 
position that a dog’s saliva was unclean  
The establishment [Majlis Agama] ulama chose to appeal not simply to their own, 
quite traditional, view of the sharia but to a supposed obligation, validated extra-
Islamically by another form of writ (statute or positive law and its instruments), to 
derive the shari’a in a particular way (solely through the Shafi’i madzhab).115 
																																																								
113 Manning Nash, Peasant Citizens: Politics, Religion, and Modernization in Kelantan, Malaysia 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Program, 1974), pp. 
145-146. In addition to geographic disparity of the reformist ulama, they were also barred from 
disseminating their ideas by the traditionalist ulama through legal means such as selective issuance of 
preaching permit, ban on reformist materials from entering the state, and severe penalties for printing 
or publishing them. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 79-80.		
114 The inclusion of five ulama in the twelve-member State Council of Majlis Agama provided it with 
the necessary Islamic imprimatur, namely in preserving the interests of the traditional elites. William 
Roff, “The Origin and Early Years of the Majlis Ugama” in William Roff, ed., Kelantan: Religion, 
Society and Politics in a Malay State (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 134. Similar 
dynamics also took place in the northern state of Kedah that precipitated the establishment of its own 
Majlis Agama in 1948. Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, “From Saints to Bureaucrats: A Study of the 
Development of Islam in the State of Kedah, Malaysia.” Ph.D diss., Cornell University, 1985, pp. 119-
160.  
115 William Roff, “When Cometh the Law? Dog Saliva in Kelantan, 1937” in Wiliam Roff, ed. Studies 
on Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2009), p. 
263. The debate was sparked by the controversy regarding the sultan’s decision to keep a pet 	
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In short, as a tool for consolidating power by the traditional Kelantanese elites, it was highly 
imperative for Majlis Agama to ensure that there could be no challenge to its religious 
interpretation of Islamic precepts lest its control over the Muslim society be weakened; hence, 
the reliance on positive laws, written legal notices, official certifications and other forms of 
bureaucratic means to establish and enforce a single truth (in this case, exclusively within the 
Shafi’i school of thought).   
Majlis Agama in many respects paralleled the British bureaucratic administration, and the 
British colonial state’s non-interference policy in Islam and Malay customs provided Majlis 
Agama with the independence to expand its reach further into Kelantanese society. Before the 
British intervention, highly autonomous imams were in charge of administering Islamic 
affairs at the local level. Imams held complete authority over their parishes (mukim), which, 
in addition to usual religious responsibilities, also included conflict mediation, land 
surveying, and poll-tax collection. The colonial bureaucracy began to replace the imams with 
its own officers to take over the secular tasks, relegating the authority of the imams to merely 
the religious sphere. Even in their sacral duties, the imams were no longer independent; rapid 
administrative expansion by Majlis Agama had absorbed the imams into its fold. Majlis 
Agama forced the previously independent imams to formally register with the council, closely 
supervised their activities, and more importantly, obligated them to surrender three-fifth of 
wealth tax (zakat) and seven-eighth of head tax (fitrah) collected in their parishes, which 
hitherto had been their only funding sources. Adding insult to injury, this new submissive role 
																																																																																																																																																																													
Dalmatian in the palace’s compound. The “pro-dog” side of the debate was represented by reformist 
ulama from Singapore while the “anti-dog” side was represented by ulama associated with Majlis 
Agama. The “pro-dog” side argued that talfiq, mixed ruling from various madzhab (school of 
thoughts), should be applied in this particular issue. The “anti-dog” side, on the other hand, contended 
that Kelantan was exclusively following the Shafi’i school of thought (taqlid) as enshrined in the 
state’s various legal documents, which meant that other interpretation should not be allowed in this 
case. In the end, both sides agreed to disagree and the issue was referred to the Fatwa Committee of 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo, which ruled in favor of the “pro-dog” side. Ibid., pp. 249-263.    
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of the imams came largely unpaid by Majlis Agama.116 The bureaucratic over-reaching by 
Majlis Agama created widespread resentment among the predominantly rural imam, which, in 
turn, set the course for an oppositional politics that has persisted until the present day by 
driving the rural religious functionaries into the arms of the Islamic party PAS. The Majlis 
Agama, as noted by William Roff, is 
[a]n indigenous agent of directed social change, utilizing the institutions of Islam, 
wedded to Western bureaucratic forms, to further what appears to have been genuinely 
perceived by its progenitors as the interests of the state as a whole despite the 
undoubted fact that, on the one hand, it was the peasantry alone who provided the 
financial basis of its power, and on the other that it was relatively small group among 
the ‘new men’ [Western educated Malay elites] who were to benefit most from the 
processes set in train.117  
In addition to the imams, there were also local ulama, called To’ Guru, who founded and 
taught in many pondok across the state. Ideologically, there was no discernible difference 
between the vast majority of ulama pondok and the religious authorities that occupied Majlis 
Agama; both were traditionalists. The major difference was in the political sphere where the 
ulama pondok saw Majlis Agama as a tool used by the elites to protect their own wealth and 
interests, and not as a vehicle to establish true Islamic supremacy in the state. Party politics 
that started in the early 1950s further sharpened this divide as many high officials of Majlis 
Agama became affiliated with the then-secular Malay political party UMNO through the 
aforementioned ‘new men,’ who the ulama accused of serving the interests of the elites in 
Kuala Lumpur and collaborating with the Chinese and Indian infidels at the expense of 
																																																								
116 Clive Kessler, Islam and Politics in a Malay State: Kelantan, 1838-1969 (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 195-207.  
117 Many of these ‘new men’ were sent to the UK by Majlis Agama to further their studies, typically in 
law, and joined the colonial bureaucracy after they finished. Many of these Malay elites later formed 
the Malay nationalist party UMNO in 1946. Roff, The Origin and Early Years, p. 215. 
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establishing an Islamic state in Malaysia; consequently, ulama pondok, along with other local 
religious functionaries such as imam and lebai, flocked to the PAS in droves.118    
As mentioned in the previous pages, integral to Majlis Agama’s bureaucratic expansion in the 
first few decades of its establishment was the modernization of Islamic education by building 
more madrasah or converting dilapidated pondok into madrasah. By 1952 there were 14 
Majlis Agama madrasah that provided education in both general and Islamic subjects, an 
increase from 4 madrasahs in 1918.119 In addition, there were also vernacular Malay schools 
established by the British, which incorporated Islamic subjects in their curriculum. Growing 
options for Islamic education, albeit in varying degrees of intensity and comprehensiveness, 
resulted in stiff competition among the schools. Islamic education at this time not only 
fulfilled one’s spiritual needs but also acted as the means to obtain a career in the expanding 
Majlis Agama’s bureaucracy, not just in Kelantan but in other states as well. The competition 
forced many pondok to transform their curriculum, which they were later re-designated as 
Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR). SAR then had to be registered with Majlis Agama under a 
program called Schools under the Purview of MAIK (Sekolah-sekolah di Bawah Naungan 
MAIK), which required a uniform curriculum and the teachers to be certified by Majlis 
Agama.120 These homogenization efforts were indeed part of the overall objective of Majlis 
Agama to exert its influence and assumed the self-proclaimed role of singular religious 
authority in the state of Kelantan. The period between 1915 and 1950s witnessed the rapid 
bureaucratic expansion of Majlis Agama and the modernization of Islamic education in 
Kelantan, which resulted in an apparent urban-rural divide. In the post-independence years, 																																																								
118 Nash, Peasant Citizens, pp. 105-108. 
119 Arba’iyah Mohd Noor, “Perkembangan Pendidikan Islam di Kelantan,” Jurnal Malaysia Dari Segi 
Sejarah, no. 36 (2008), p. 76. In 1919, Majlis Agama had proposed to transfer all Malay vernacular 
schools in Kelantan under its management, which would have significantly increased the total number 
of its schools, but the proposal was rejected by the British colonial administration in Singapore due to 
financial considerations. Roff, The Origin and Early Years, p. 211.  
120 Noor, Perkembangan Pendidikan Islam, p. 79.  
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the political gulf between the religious and traditional elites in Kota Bharu and the local 
ulama pondok became more palpable and contentious as electoral politics was added to the 
mix with Majlis Agama right at the center of it.            
Federalization of Islamic education in Kelantan from 1950s to present 
The presently fraught relationship between the federal government and the state government 
of Kelantan can be traced back to the first post-independence election in 1959. At this time, 
PAS captured the state government in the face of a sweeping nationwide victory by the 
UMNO-led National Alliance. The PAS victory was a testament to its deep support within the 
overwhelmingly rural population of Kelantan. As stated above, PAS’s core constituency in 
Kelantan consisted of local religious functionaries such as ulama pondok, imam, and lebai; 
UMNO, a political vehicle for the Malay elites, was not able to reach beyond the backing of 
those who had benefited handsomely from the pre-independence status quo, namely the 
aristocrats, English-educated civil servants, and wealthy landowners. Prior to the election, 
UMNO had tried to penetrate into the rural heartland where PAS drew its political succor by 
enlisting the help of Majlis Agama. Majlis Agama, with its deep-reaching bureaucracy and 
helmed by local Malay elites who were also UMNO partisans, used its formal authority to 
restrict the influence of PAS by using a carrot-and-stick approach. On the one hand, Majlis 
Agama publicly claimed that only UMNO could bring development to the rural areas by 
building new stone-and-cement mosques and madrasah while attempting to persuade people 
that UMNO was as Islamic as PAS; on the other hand, since the early 1960s, Majlis Agama 
also prohibited its imam from talking about politics during Friday sermons (khutbah Jumaat) 
since most of them were PAS supporters. Majlis Agama, in the words of Clive Kessler, was 
“an explicit instrument of the old elite’s bid, back in Kuala Lumpur and in UMNO garb, to 
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reassert its control over the state.”121 The problem with employing Majlis Agama to extend 
UMNO’s electoral reach in the heartlands of Kelantan was that Majlis Agama’s influence was 
only limited to bureaucratic control. It simply did not have much sway in influencing the 
political allegiance of the mostly pro-PAS rural religious functionaries as reflected in the 
continued electoral dominance of PAS. To further muddy the situation, federal grants 
promised by Majlis Agama were contingent on its ability to deliver the Kelantan state 
government to UMNO.122 Because PAS remained in control of the state until 1978, there was 
no money forthcoming, severely affecting the financial solvency of many Islamic schools that 
were dependent on Majlis Agama.123 The gradual decline of Majlis Agama schools finally 
reached its nadir in 1974 when control of the schools was surrendered to its rival institution in 
the state government.      
Since Islamic affairs are strictly the prerogative of the state with the sultan as its head, any 
attempt by the federal government to impose its will would have to be done with tact, lest it 
would be seen as usurping the power of the sultan. Majlis Agama was the ideal local 
institution for UMNO to manipulate in order to garner support without being perceived as 
interfering since Majlis Agama was an institution under the jurisdiction of the sultanate. The 
sultan, on the other hand, can be quite fickle in his political identification as his legitimacy 
mostly rests with how well he deals with local court intrigue, not on approval from the federal 
government. This center-periphery dynamic has driven the nature of Majlis Agama and by 																																																								
121 Kessler, Islam and Politics, pp. 293-297.  
122 The then Deputy Prime Minister, Abdul Razak Hussein, promised RM500 million special 
development allocation for Kelantan during the 1969 campaign, contingent on PAS’s loss. Since PAS 
won the election, Kelantan did not see a single cent of the promised development fund. James Chin, 
“Politics of federal intervention in Malaysia, with reference to Sarawak, Sabah and Kelantan,” The 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 35:2 (1997), p. 108. 
123 Based on interviews with officers at the national economic planning agency such as the Economic 
Planning Unit (EPU) at the Prime Minister’s Office there was a marked difference in development 
support from the federal government to Kelantan before and after UMNO took over the state 
government in 1978. Nik Mahmood Nik Ibrahim, “Some Constraints of a Federal System of 
Government on the Development Performance of a Component State: The Case of Malaysia with 
Special Reference to the State of Kelantan.” Ph.D diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1984, pp. 108-112. 
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extension, Islamic education, in the post-independence years. PAS’s electoral victory in the 
state election in 1959 forced the sultan to use his influence in Majlis Agama to gain favor 
from the new PAS state government and to develop support against pretenders to the throne 
by burnishing his religious image and thus increasing his popularity among the population. To 
achieve these goals, the sultan packed the Majlis Agama with PAS’s partisans, who later 
gained control of the institution and promptly used it as a source of patronage, mainly 
expanding its bureaucracy to allow more Islamic school graduates to be hired; and hence, 
further increasing PAS’s support among the rural population, where most of these schools 
were located.124 On the downside, being a PAS-controlled institution meant that no federal 
funding was flowing into Majlis Agama’s coffers; as a result, there was no funding for many 
of the Islamic schools under its purview.125  
Ever since the 1950s, the decision of the UMNO-led federal government to use a proxy 
institution to advance its political interests in Kelantan, especially in the state’s Islamic 
affairs, was not so much out of respect for Kelantan’s constitutional rights and the federal 
system in general but mainly due to the saliency of Islam as a determinant in the federal 
government’s political legitimacy. UMNO simply did not want to be perceived by the largely 
religiously conservative Malay population in Kelantan as hostile to the interests of Islam. The 
UMNO-led federal government, however, did try to financially starve the Islamic schools 
under Majlis Agama before 1978 with hopes that the ulama would become desperate enough 
to defect from PAS, which did not materialize. In 1976, financial woes finally forced Majlis 
Agama to cede control of Islamic schools under its purview to the Islamic Foundation of 
Kelantan (Yayasan Islam Kelantan, YIK), which was established by the PAS-controlled state 
government in 1974 (under the old name of Department of Islamic Schools or Jabatan 																																																								
124 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
125 A poor rural-based state like Kelantan did not want to increase its tax receipts in order to 
compensate for the loss of funding from the federal government since the state government was 
heavily dependent on rural votes for winning the election. Shafruddin, The Federal Factor, p. 61.  
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Sekolah-Sekolah Agama, JASA).126 Now the battleground for control of Islamic schools in the 
state, which included Sekolah Agama Negeri (State Islamic Schools), Sekolah Agama Rakyat 
(People’s Islamic Schools), and pondok, had effectively shifted from Majlis Agama to YIK, 
which was packed with PAS partisans.     
When UMNO managed to take control of the Kelantan state government in 1978, however, it 
started to funnel subsidies and allowances to Islamic schools and their teachers through YIK 
in a blatant attempt to gain their support. The financial remunerations were of course 
dependent on the level of support the UMNO state government received from each pondok; it 
goes without saying that the more fervent a pondok was in showing support for UMNO, the 
more money it received.127 The abysmal result of this patronage strategy was clearly evident 
in the 1990 election when PAS re-took the reins of state government. This election also 
witnessed the ascendancy of the ulama leadership within the party, led by the newly elected 
Chief Minister, Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat.128 The sultan was once again involved in the 
political feud as UMNO accused him of “playing politics” and supporting the opposition 
coalition that won the election.129 The failure of UMNO to employ YIK as a source of 
																																																								
126 The institution was originally named Foundation of Islamic Education of Kelantan (Yayasan 
Pelajaran Islam Negeri Kelantan, YPINK) and was renamed Yayasan Islam Kelantan in 1983. The 
history of Yayasan Islam Kelantan’s establishment can be found at: 
http://www.yik.edu.my/v2/latarbelakang/sejarah-penubuhan-yik (accessed on 11 July 2014). 
127 Mohamad Abu Bakar, “Pondok, Pilihanraya dan Pemerintahan di Kelantan,” in Nik Safiah Karim 
and Wan Abdul Kadir Yusuf, eds., Kelantan Dalam Perspektif Sosio-Budaya: Satu Kumpulan Esei 
(Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Pengajian Melayu Universiti Malaya, 1985), pp. 330-333.  
128 In 1991, as a retaliation against the victorious PAS in the Kelantan’s state election, the federal 
government redirected development allocations under the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995), 
previously earmarked for the Kelantan state government, to a newly created state-based federal agency 
called State Development Office. The federal government also slashed the development allocation for 
Kelantan during the midterm review of the Sixth Malaysia Plan. Francis Loh, Restructuring Federal-
State Relations in Malaysia: From Centralised to Cooperative Federalism?” The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs 99:407 (2010), p. 135.  
129 The coalition was called Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah and it consisted of PAS, Semangat 46, and 
Berjasa (the latter two were off-shoots from UMNO but now defunct). Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, a 
Kelantanese aristocrat, led Semangat 46. Previously, Tengku Razaleigh narrowly lost to the Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad in the highly controversial 1987 UMNO’s presidency election. He 
subsequently left UMNO and founded Semangat 46. Inclusion of Tengku Razaleigh might have 	
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patronage to win the hearts and minds of PAS partisans among the rural religious 
functionaries could be attributed to the deep ideological commitment of these religious 
functionaries to PAS’s political ideals and its promise of establishing a true Islamic state in 
Kelantan.  
The socio-political landscape of Malaysia changed quite drastically after the late 1970s, 
which, in turn, altered the way the federal government dealt with the PAS-controlled state 
government especially when it came to Islamic education. The Islamic revivalism that hit 
Malaysia in the late 1970s propelled Islamic narratives to the forefront of public discourse as 
the Malay-Muslim society became more religious. The onset of Islamic revivalism provided 
the critical juncture that reshaped the strategies used by the federal government to gain an 
upper hand in Kelantanese politics. To be perceived as un-Islamic would have delivered a 
death knell to UMNO’s political legitimacy; hence, the federal government had a proactive 
approach to riding the Islamization wave.130 Even when it came to Islamic education in 
Kelantan, letting it wither through financial starvation would now not have been a viable 
option as in the past, lest UMNO would be seen as anti-Islam. Plus, there were many teachers 
appointed by the Ministry of Education who were teaching in YIK’s schools, and it would 
have seemed unwise to sacrifice these teachers at the altar of political retribution.131 The PAS-
led state government, however, did take a measure of precaution to guard against potential 
federal government’s backlash by allocating a sizeable RM16.2 million (USD 4 million) to 
YIK in 1990, which by 1999 was significantly increased to RM32.5 million (USD 8 
																																																																																																																																																																													
explained why the sultan was supportive of the coalition. After Semangat 46 disbanded in 1996, 
Tengku Razaleigh rejoined UMNO. Lotfi Ismail, Serambi Mekah Di Bawah Pimpinan Ulama: 
Bahagian 2 (Kota Bharu, Kelantan: Walijah Publications, 1991), p. 29.  
130 Employment of Islamic discourse as a political tool by UMNO is still alive and well to this day. 
“Use politics to fight for Islam, Zahid tells UMNO members,” Malaysiakini, 8 December 2015 
(accessed on 8 December 2015). 
131 When PAS took over the state government in 1990 there were 179 Ministry of Education teachers 
teaching in 90 YIK’s schools across the state. Lotfi Ismail, Serambi Mekah Di Bawah Pimpinan 
Ulama: Bahagian 4 (Kota Bharu, Kelantan: Walijah Publications, 1991), p. 130. 
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million).132 However, despite the state government in Kelantan being controlled by PAS, the 
federal government kept channeling money and various resources to Islamic schools in the 
state, mainly through the Ministry of Education’s state education department (Jabatan 
Pelajaran Negeri) and even YIK.  
Federal grants kept flowing unimpeded into the state’s Islamic education sector until the early 
2000s when the federal government charged some SAR with being hotbeds of Islamic 
radicalism and subversive activities, and thus suspended their funding. The former Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad proclaimed, "SAR teachers have deviated from the real purpose 
of education and taught students to hate the government and other Muslims."133 In March 
2003 the then Education Minister Musa Mohamad announced in the Parliament that 
government funding for SAR nationwide, which at the time numbered 268 schools with 
74,453 students and 4,429 teachers, would be diverted to national Islamic schools due to their 
dismal academic performance and anti-government activities, which resulted in the transfer of 
almost 15,000 SAR students and 2,000 teachers to other schools.134 By suspending the 
funding for SAR, the federal government risked being perceived as hostile to Islamic 
interests, which it had been trying to avoid since the late 1970s. As a compromise, the federal 
																																																								
132 Riduan Mohamad Nor, Sumbangan PAS dalam Bidang Pendidikan di Malaysia (1951-2004) 
(Kuala Lumpur: Jundi Resources, 2013), p. 121. In 2013 the budget allocation for YIK further 
ballooned to RM83 million (USD 20.3 million). “RM83 juta akan dibelanjakan YIK tahun 2013,” 
Sinar Harian (edisi Kelantan), 6 March 2013. 
133 “SAR advocates not swayed by Mahathir’s assurance,” Malaysiakini, 14 February 2003 (accessed 2 
August 2012). 
134 “Jalan terbaik bagi SAR,” Utusan Malaysia, 24 November 2003. It is not stated how many SAR in 
Kelantan were affected by the suspension of federal grant but in 2008 YIK agreed to a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the Ministry of Education to convert 20 SAR in Kelantan into Government 
Assisted Islamic Schools (Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan, SABK) with five more waiting for 
approval. 
	 171 
government decided to resume funding for SAR in 2004 in return for SAR’sregistration with 
the Ministry of Education.135  
More recently, the federal government announced in November 2011 a RM35.6 million (USD 
8.6 million) in financial assistance for religious schools (including 22 SAR) in the state of 
Kelantan. In his speech the then Education Minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, stated that “this 
financial assistance proves that the federal government does not play favorite when it comes 
to elevating the standard of national education.”136 The Ministry of Education (MOE) was 
well aware of the importance of funding SAR despite its tendency to sympathize with PAS. In 
an internal circular, the MOE stated two reasons for the continuation of funding: first, SARs’ 
command widespread bipartisan appeal in the Parliament and MOE would be subjected to 
intense questioning by members of Parliament if SARs’ funding was suspended; and second, 
it is more politically beneficial for the federal government to cultivate and strengthen its 
relationship with SAR, rather than severing the ties.137 In short, it was clear that the federal 
government saw Islam as an integral component of its legitimacy, which thus leavened its 
approach when it came to dealing with the politically recalcitrant Islamic schools in Kelantan, 
namely SAR.138 At the same time, despite its obvious disdain for federal government, YIK 
still acquiesces to offer of financial assistance from MOE as evidenced by its willingness to 
cede partial control of 25 SAR, which was quite intriguing in light of its previously 
																																																								
135 Azizi Umar et al., “The History of the Institutionalization of People’s Religious Schools in 
Malaysian National Education Policy,” Advances in Natural and Applied Sciences 6:7 (2012), pp. 
1047-1048. 
136 “79 sekolah agama terima RM35.6 juta,” Utusan Malaysia, 24 November 2011. 
137 “Bantuan kewangan SAR,” MOE Internal Memo, KP.R (JAPIM) 011/2 Jld 5(18), October 2011, 
National Archive of Malaysia. 
138 There are parallels between SAR and pondok in Kelantan and southern Thailand in terms of the 
centrality of Islamic education in both areas’ oppositional identity against the central governments in 
Putrajaya and Bangkok, respectively. Joseph Liow, Islam, Education and Reform in Southern 
Thailand: Tradition and Transformation (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009). 
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mentioned healthy budget.139 When it comes to Islamic affairs in Malaysia, there is a delicate 
dance between the federal government’s proclivity to dominate and the state’s need to be 
autonomous, where one is cautious not to step on the other’s toes. 
The federalized institutional identity of Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Kelantan      
The last aspect of center-periphery relations is institutional identity. Here I investigate what 
prevalent sentiment is held by the staff of the state educational department of the MOE in 
Kota Bharu and YIK, and projected outward toward the federal government or directed 
inward toward the local Kelantanese identity? Since PAS’s win in the first state election in 
1959, Kelantanese identity has been framed as uniquely Islamic, in contrast to the rest of the 
country and especially to the supposedly secular federal government in Kuala Lumpur. In the 
eyes of mostly rural PAS supporters, a vote for PAS means supporting the preservation of 
village culture that is steeped in traditional Islamic values and defending it against the threat 
of elite interests and corrupting non-local influence, in this case represented by UMNO. Since 
the late 1970s, however, when Islamic discourse has dominated the public sphere, the framing 
of Kelantanese identity has shifted to one of religious credibility: who is more Islamic? Both 
PAS and UMNO jostle to become the sole representative of the interests and aspirations of 
the Malay-Muslim community, and it is this dynamic that animates the institutional identity 
of the two aforementioned state institutions. Similar to Aceh, almost all civil servants in 
Kelantan, in the state education office and YIK, are local Kelantanese. Going through the 
																																																								
139 YIK’s burgeoning budget is also puzzling since it fails to pay overdue payroll deductions from its 
teachers to relevant agencies. This financial mismanagement, despite the RM85 million (USD19.9 
million) federal funding for YIK’s administrative expenses in 2015, prompted an UMNO state 
legislator to call for the ministry’s takeover of the rest of Islamic schools managed by YIK. “Kelantan 
akui tidak bayar caruman, potongan gaji guru YIK RM14.6 juta,” The Malaysian Insider, 2 November 
2015 (accessed on 2 November 2015).   
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profiles of top level officers in Kelantan’s state education department bears out the fact that 
most senior officials have spent their entire careers in Kelantan.140  
The MOE and Kelantan state education department share the objective of improving and 
developing the Islamic education in Kelantan by drawing on the resources of the federal 
government. I term the institutional behavior of the Kelantan state education department as 
the federalized institutional identity. In other words, there is low degree of institutional 
complexity or rivalry when it comes to the relationship between MOE and the Kelantan state 
education department. As one of the officials at the state education department sums it up, 
“We are not at all political here. All we care about is the well-being of Islamic education in 
Kelantan, and the best way to help is through the federal government, which has all the 
resources at its disposal.”141 Meanwhile in YIK, where one expects a more prominent display 
of anti-federal defiance, the oppositional tendency seems to be more subdued amidst a 
decidedly robust Kelantanese identity. There has been occasional bickering between YIK and 
the federal government but the relationship is generally cordial and cooperative.142 One YIK 
official relates to me that for the most part the interaction between YIK and MOE is of equal 
partners but MOE does act unilaterally sometimes such as posting its own teachers to YIK’s 
schools without consulting YIK even though the appointment should be made jointly.143 In 
contrast to Aceh, where Acehnese identity, which is clearly demarcated from the central 
government, permeates every nook and cranny of local and central institutions, the picture in 
Kelantan is blurrier. While there is a strong Kelantanese identity in both local and federal 																																																								
140 For example, the director and the deputy director of JPN have spent their whole teaching and 
administrative careers in Kelantan. Profil Korporat Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Kelantan: 
http://jpnkelantan.moe.gov.my/v1/index.php/gerbang-korporat-4/profil (accessed on 12 August 2014). 
141 Interview with Amran Mamat, Deputy Director of Sektor Pendidikan Islam, Jabatan Pendidikan 
Negeri Kelantan, 30 July 2013. 
142 One relatively recent spat was regarding federal subsidies for students in three Islamic schools in 
Kelantan. “YIK nafi tidak beri kerjasama,” Utusan Malaysia, 2 February 2012. 
143 Interview with Che Zainah Abdul Lah, Deputy Director of Academic, Yayasan Islam Kelantan, 30 
July 2013. 
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institutions and a widely shared belief in the utmost importance of protecting it, the boundary 
and relationship between the two levels are more permeable and negotiable, with the power 
balance tilting in favor of the federal government by virtue of its superior resources as 
demonstrated by the assistance given by MOE to many Islamic schools in the state and YIK.   
Oppositional sentiment is perceptibly more pronounced at the school level, however, as 
evidenced by the history of the SAR jealously guarding their autonomy and being suspicious 
of the federal government. Even an official of the MOE’s state educational department 
admitted that it is extremely difficult to dispel SARs’ distrust of the federal government 
despite the department’s many efforts to provide financial, teachers’ training, and other forms 
of assistance.144 One SABK principal, whose school is considered troublesome by the state 
education department due to its connection with PAS, related to me that while his school has 
been treated fairly by the department and was given the freedom to use its own pedagogical 
system, he was still wary of the real agenda of the federal government. According to him, 
when the federal government cracked down on SAR in the early 2000s, MOE announced that 
SAR teachers would be unconditionally accepted as federal employees but they were told 
later that their absorption into the ministry was completely dependent on them supporting the 
ruling coalition to win the 2004 election.145 Despite the suspiciousness and strong anti-federal 
sentiment in some Islamic schools, especially SAR, the schools’ dire financial condition 
unfortunately necessitates them acquiescing to the dictates of the federal government in return 
for assistance.  
																																																								
144 This only applies to SAR that have been converted to SABK, which then fall under the supervision 
of MOE. Interview with Amran Mamat, Deputy Director of Sektor Pendidikan Islam, Jabatan 
Pendidikan Negeri Kelantan, 30 July 2013. 
145 The principal personally refused to be absorbed by MOE when his school came under the 
jurisdiction of MOE in 2008 even though the remunerative package was much more attractive. He, 
along with eleven other SAR principals (out of twenty), chose to remain with YIK, despite the lower 
pay and narrow career option. He calls this his own jihad fisabilillah (religious struggle). Interview 
with Tajudin Mahmood, Principal of SABK al-Fitrah, Tanah Merah, 31 July 2013. 
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Near total conformity to conservative interpretation promoted by the state Islamic orthodoxy 
also contributed a great deal to the low degree of institutional complexity in the interactions 
between MOE, state education department, and the schools. Theologically speaking, there is 
no fundamental difference between the version promoted by the ministry and the one 
espoused by the schools, or even those that are deemed to be pro-PAS. The differences come 
to a head only when political disagreements are seen and interpreted in a black-and-white 
religious context. For instance, the principal of the aforementioned school is a staunch PAS 
supporter but he does not believe in “outright political indoctrination” in the classrooms. He 
said that  
Our [PAS version of the] truth (kebenaran) is of course more superior and the way we 
incorporate and demonstrate that truth in our classroom teaching is by making it self-
evident to the students without resorting to political indoctrination. It is much more 
effective this way because the students would feel genuinely in their hearts that we 
hold the ultimate truth (kebenaran mutlak).146  
In the fierce competition to “out-Islamize” each other in order to gain religious credibility to 
govern, both UMNO and PAS have propelled the Islamic public discourse into an 
increasingly conservative pitch. JAKIM has a close working relationship with state religious 
authorities including Kelantan, which it meets regularly to streamline views on Islamic-
related issues at the national and state levels.147 JAKIM also provides sizeable financial 
assistance to Majlis Agama in Kelantan despite the state government being in control of the 
opposition party PAS.148 High ideological congruity between the federal and state 
governments and the schools leads to low degree of overall institutional complexity, which, in 
																																																								
146 Ibid. 
147 Persidangan Ketua Jabatan/Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Seluruh Malaysia (PKJ) Kali Ke-97: 
http://www.islam.gov.my/node/51923 (accessed on 19 February 2016). 
148 “JAKIM salur RM63.17 juta kepada Kelantan,” Utusan Malaysia, 12 May 2015 (accessed on 19 
February 2016).  
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turn, has allowed the federal government to gradually increase its control over Islamic schools 
in Kelantan.    
 It is obvious that there is an existential struggle within the schools, which pits their quest to 
remain autonomous against their desire to find the solutions to their financial woes. SAR are 
typically the option for less well-off families looking to send their children for a 
comprehensive Islamic education above and beyond what is offered by the national schools; 
hence, SAR are not able to charge sufficiently high school fees to cover their own 
administrative expenses. Herein lies the conundrum as financial solvency equals autonomy, 
and for as long as this remains an issue, SAR will always be financially dependent on the 
federal government.  
The pondok system, while remains an integral part of the Islamic identity of Kelantan, is only 
tangential to our discussion of Islamic education in the state, namely because pondok are not 
part of the national education system and are therefore not subjected to uniform standard 
imposed on other types of schools in the state. YIK oversees the pondok system in Kelantan 
but the informal nature of pondok education means that each pondok has the freedom to create 
its own curriculum and to follow its own pedagogical methods. Nevertheless, despite the 
dwindling popularity of pondok education, as evidenced by the figures shown earlier, the 
UMNO-led federal government does not ignore pondok’s history as a pocket of resistance 
against its rule, especially in Kelantan. The federal government has made efforts to subdue 
pondok’s resistance, namely through financial assistance.149 In short, the fading significance 
of pondok education in Kelantan over the years, in comparison to other types of schools, can 
be attributed to the demands of Kelantanese parents who want a modern Islamic education to 
help secure a better future for their children, rather than a result of the federal government’s 
attempt to quash political opposition to its rule.      																																																								
149 “RM25j disalur kepada pondok tahfiz,” Sinar Harian, 23 March 2016 (accessed on 7 April 2016).  
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Conclusion 
Both Aceh and Kelantan are known for being the Verandah of Mecca (Serambi Mekah) for a 
good reason: both have illustrious Islamic traditions that are inherent to their identities. 
Islamic education has long formed a major component of this identity, which means that 
changing the nature of Islamic education is tantamount to changing the unique identity that 
both places have so assiduously ascribed to themselves. As this chapter has demonstrated, the 
current nature of Islamic education in Aceh and Kelantan is indissolubly intertwined with the 
historical dynamics between major socio-political groups and the oft-contentious center-
periphery relations in the post-independence era.  
The sociopolitical events that occurred in both places during the late colonial period (the late 
1800s to independence) helped local institutions overseeing Islamic education in Aceh and 
Kelantan to develop a particular institutional identity. In the case of Aceh, the reformist ulama 
shaped the local institutional identity from the ground up, while in Kelantan there was a top-
down approach brought on by the increased bureaucratization of Islamic affairs in the state 
from the early 1900s. As such, while both institutional identities claim to be fiercely 
localized, the institutional identity found in Aceh is much more resilient, since it represents 
the interests and aspirations of the Acehnese society in general. In Kelantan, however, Majlis 
Agama was first established as a means to preserve and perpetuate the ruling privilege of the 
traditional elites via expansion of the modern bureaucracy, which came into conflict with the 
pre-existing rural Malay cultural norms. In other words, Kelantan’s localized institutional 
identity was based on shaky ground and needed to be propped up by outside influence, be it 
the British or the UMNO-led federal government. 
The critical juncture that occurred in the late 1970s at the onset of the Islamic resurgence 
influenced Islamic education in Aceh and Kelantan differently. This global phenomenon did 
not have much political impact on Indonesia but in Malaysia Islamic social forces became 
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galvanized, which forced the federal government to coopt the Islamized public discourse in 
order to maintain its legitimacy. In the case of Kelantan, the federal government started to 
play a more direct role in the state’s Islamic education system by absorbing many SAR and 
SAN into the MOE’s jurisdiction as a way to keep the Islamic opposition in check since these 
schools were known to be strongholds of PAS. In Indonesia, on the other hand, the highly 
centralizing New Order regime (1966-1998) in fact helped to preserve the localized 
institutional identity by actively promoting Aceh’s unique tradition and history. In contrast to 
Kelantan, where many ulama joined PAS to oppose the federal government, most of the 
ulama in Aceh decided to cooperate with the central government in their quest to preserve 
Aceh’s local Islamic learning traditions.   
Therefore, the contemporary independence and revival enjoyed by Islamic schools in Aceh, 
especially the dayah system, is not merely a product of the series of decentralization laws 
passed since 1999; it is a manifestation of hopes and aspirations that have been simmering 
under the surface since the late colonial years. Islamic education in Kelantan, on the other 
hand, is still thriving but its functions are slowly being taken over by the federal government 
in Putrajaya. The changes seen in the nature of Islamic education in Kelantan over the years 
also speak to the fact that it is class, and not religion, that shapes the oppositional dimension 
of the Kelantanese Islamic identity as the PAS-led Islamic opposition distinguishes its rural 
bucolic self from elite predation of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya.  
In sum, both Aceh and Kelantan have presently succeeded in protecting the Islamic education 
that is core to their local Islamic identity, but they have done so by taking very different paths. 
The adaptability of the religious elites in Aceh, especially during the New Order era and the 
GAM insurrections, contributes to the preservation of local control of Islamic education in the 
province. On the contrary, the oppositional stance taken by most ulama in Kelantan ends up 
inviting more federal intrusion into the Islamic education in the state. As such, the differences 
lie to the extent each place has managed to resist the centralizing attempt from the central 
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government, which ultimately leads to localized institutional identity in Aceh and federalized 
institutional identity in Kelantan.									
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Image of Tolerance: Islamic Education in Nusa Tenggara Timur and Sarawak 
 
This chapter deals specifically with how Islamic education survives and persists in a milieu 
where Muslims are the minority. The two case studies are Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), a 
province in the eastern part of Indonesia, and Sarawak, a state in Malaysian Borneo. The 
population of NTT, based on 2012 statistics, comprises 9.5 percent Muslims and 90 percent 
Christians.1 The 2010 Malaysian census shows that the Muslim community in Sarawak 
constitutes slightly less than 30 percent of a total state population that is predominantly 
Christian and animists.2 Because of the dominance of national and missionary schools in these 
places, Islamic schools do not play a big role in shaping the Islamic identity of the local 
Muslim community and acting as the ground for political mobilization.3  
In this chapter, I analyse the nature of present-day Islamic education in both places from a 
historical perspective, looking at both the pre- and post-independence eras through the prism 
of centre-periphery relations. My analysis will also look at the existence of long-standing 
traditions of Islamic education in both areas, interactions between the major socio-political 
groups over time, colonial policies and intra-group rivalry. The focus of this chapter then is to 
see how the Islamic schools in NTT and Sarawak have managed to persevere since the 
colonial era until the present day. By focusing on these factors I argue that the overall 
																																																								
1 Total population of NTT in 2013 was 4,953,967. Badan Pusat Statistik, Provinsi Nusa Tenggara 
Timur: http://ntt.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/18 (accessed on 1 September, 2014).   
2 The Muslims in Sarawak are mainly represented by three major communities: Malay, Melanau, and 
Kedayan. The 2010 decennial census only provides specific categories for Malay (568,113) and 
Melanau (123,410) while lumping the much smaller Kedayan under the category “Other Bumiputera.” 
The total population of Sarawak according to the 2010 census was 2,471,140. Sarawak: Facts and 
Figures 2011 (State Planning Unit, Chief Minister’s Department: Kuching, 2011), p. 12.   
3 Currently, there is one Islamic school for every 1,783 Muslims in the NTT, compared to one Islamic 
school for every 32,232 Muslims in Sarawak. The huge disparity between NTT and Sarawak points to 
the overwhelming dominance of non-religious public schools in Sarawak, in addition to the state’s 
lack of long-standing Islamic learning tradition. 
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conditions of Islamic schools found in these two areas are shaped by similar forces of inter- 
and intra-group dynamics and centre-periphery relations with one glaring difference: the 
influence of the Muslim minority in local politics. In NTT, Muslims are marginal in the 
province’s politics while in Sarawak they have managed to play a leading role by getting the 
backing of the federal government in Putrajaya. It is this power differential that explains why 
Islamic schools in NTT have withered while those in Sarawak have prospered. 
When it comes to patterns of Islamization, NTT and Sarawak are distinct from Muslim-
majority areas of Indonesia and Malaysia. Historically, Islamic influence was not as strong 
and widespread in NTT and Sarawak as in other parts of Indonesia and Malaysia. Major 
Indonesian Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah were barely 
present in NTT during the colonial period. In Sarawak, there was no sultan to act as the 
traditional symbol of Islam as in in the peninsular Malaysia. The wave of Islamic resurgence 
in the late 1970s also did not have serious political effect on Sarawak as it did in the 
peninsula. The localized character of Islamization in NTT and Sarawak helps to explain why 
Islamic education in these two areas takes the shape it does now. 
The patterns of Islamization in turn determine types of responses from the state, and in this 
case, the degree in which the central government distributes resources plays a pivotal role in 
shaping the political strength of the Muslim minority relative to the Christian majority in NTT 
and Sarawak. Since the central government in Jakarta does not rely on Islamic discourse to 
prop up its legitimacy, it does not feel a strong political need to allocate resources to the 
Muslim minority in NTT. Meanwhile, the decentralization laws of 1999 make it difficult for 
cash-strapped Islamic schools in NTT to ask for assistance from the local government in order 
to supplement the meagre allocation they receive from the central government. In contrast, the 
UMNO-led federal government in Putrajaya desperately needs the support of the Malay-
Muslim community in Sarawak for its political survival. Therefore, the federal government 
has lavished resources on Sarawak through the state’s Malay-Muslim political leaders. This 
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funding, in turn, helps to strengthen the Muslim community’s political position vis-à-vis the 
majority Christian community. 
In NTT, the bodies that oversee Islamic education such as Kanwil Agama have assumed a 
localized institutional identity. In other words, the local state institutions behave in a manner 
consistent with the local culture and traditions, which might be incongruent with the 
institutional norms of their ministries in the central government. This is due to two factors: 
First is the central government’s lack of financial resources, which prevents it from exerting 
more oversight over its provincial offices in NTT, a problem that is further compounded by 
the sheer geographic distance between Jakarta and NTT. The second factor is the pervasive 
influence of the local culture that also shapes the institutional identity of Kanwil Agama, 
helped by the weak influence of the central government. It’s the opposite situation for 
Sarawak where a federalized institutional mindset pervades the state institutions that oversee 
Islamic education, such as the State Education Department (Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri, JPN) 
and the Islamic Council of Sarawak (Majlis Islam Sarawak, MIS). This mindset places a high 
importance in the role of federal government in developing Islamic education in the state 
despite Sarawak’s purported autonomy. This particular institutional behaviour can be 
explained by the local state institutions’ dependence on the federal government for resources 
and the vital role of Sarawak as a vote bank that ensures the unbroken electoral dominance of 
the Barisan Nasional-led federal government.  
The chapter is divided into two parts: one on NTT and the other on Sarawak. Each part has 
similar organization. It starts with the history of Islamic education from the late colonial 
period (late 1800s) until the present day. This discussion is followed by a discussion of the 
socio-political dynamics between Muslims and Christians in the pre-independence period. 
The same discussion continues into the post-independence period when party politics became 
part of the inter-communal dynamics. The analysis then moves to the issue of center-
periphery relations and how they affect Islamic education in these two areas. Finally, each 
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section looks at how effectively the policies of the respective national ministries are 
implemented at the local level.    
NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR 
The inhabitants of Coupang consist of Malays, Chinese, and Dutch, besides the natives, so 
that there are many strange and complicated mixtures among the population. There is one 
resident English merchant, and whalers as well as Australian ships often come here for stores 
and water. The native Timorese preponderate, and a very little examination serves to show 
that they have nothing in common with Malays, but are much more closely allied to the true 
Papuans of the Aru Islands and New Guinea.4 
 
The history of Islamic education in Nusa Tenggara Timur (late 1800s to present)                 
The above quotation from the famous British naturalist, Sir Alfred Russel Wallace, illustrates 
the social diversity of eastern Indonesia when he arrived in Kupang in 1857. This diversity 
continues until today, with Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, animists, and other faiths co-
existing relatively peacefully in the territory.  
Islam first spread to Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) sometime in the 17th century, much later 
than in the western part of present-day Indonesia. As in many other parts of maritime 
Southeast Asia, Islamic missionary work in NTT was carried out mainly by Muslim traders, 
in this case from the neighbouring island of Sulawesi. They were later joined in the 19th 
century by Yemeni traders who married local women and made NTT their permanent 
residence. Political exiles from Java and Sumatra, sent away to NTT by the Dutch as a 
punishment, also helped spread Islam in the region.5 Despite the gradual spread of Muslims in 
NTT, especially in the 19th century, Catholic and Protestant Christian communities were 
already well-established under Dutch and Portuguese sponsorship. As a result, Muslim 
communities settled along the coast, engaging in trade and fishing.  																																																								
4 Alfred Russel Wallace, The Malay Archipelago, Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1869), Chapter XIII. 
5 Munanjar Widiyatmika, Sejarah Agama Islam di NTT (Jakarta: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-
Indonesia, 1995), p. 53. 
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For centuries, Islamic education in NTT remained informal and was confined to the mosques 
and the homes of local ulama. It was not until 1910 that the first modern Islamic school 
(madrasah) was established on the island of Alor at the initiative of local nobles.6 The Dutch 
soon shut down the school as they perceived it to be a potential hub for political mobilization. 
Dutch policy in Java and Sumatra in the early 1900s allowed Islamic organizational activities 
to prosper but no such policy was applied in NTT. In 1925, a few Muslim leaders in Kupang 
tried to establish a local chapter of Muhammadiyah, the modernist Islamic organization, but 
were rebuffed by the Dutch.7 The Dutch were resistant to Islamic organization in NTT 
because they wanted to prevent the mainly Muslim political exiles from Java and Sumatra 
from using Islam to organize resistance and because they aimed to create and foster loyal 
Christian enclaves.8 The failure of Islam to gain a strong foothold in NTT was due not only to 
its late arrival in the region but also to Dutch policy, which contributed significantly to the 
weak political position of NTT Muslims, a situation that persists to the present day (and 
which will be explained in detail in a later section). 
The first madrasah that did not get closed down by the Dutch authorities was Madrasah Al-
Chairiyah, which was built in Kupang in 1935. Alor re-established the aforementioned banned 
madrasah in 1938, which was later followed by another madrasah in the neighbouring 
western island of Solor in 1942. Nonetheless, the number of madrasah in NTT paled in 
																																																								
6 Ibid., p.88. 
7 Ibid., p. 100. 
8 Gerry van Klinken, The Making of Middle Indonesia: Middle Classes in Kupang Town, 1930s-1980s 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), pp. 143-144. See also Syarifuddin Gomang, “The people of Alor and 
their alliances in Eastern Indonesia: a study in political sociology.” MA thesis, University of 
Wollogong, 1993, pp. 113-117.  
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comparison to the number of Christian missionary schools. For many Muslim students the 
only schooling option available in their areas were the Christian mission schools.9  
The growth of Islamic education in NTT only took off during the New Order era (1966 to 
1998) when the central government’s transmigration program was relocating significant 
numbers of mainly Muslim people from the densely-populated islands of Java and Madura to 
less-populated regions of the country. The number of migrants into NTT increased 
tremendously from 10,218 people in 1971 to 106,053 in 2000.10 The regime, spurred by its 
developmentalist policies, was also expanding its bureaucracy by opening up offices in the far 
reaches of the country and staffing them with mostly non-locals, many of whom were 
Muslims.11 The influx of Muslims into NTT had naturally created a demand for Islamic 
education, which saw the sharp rise in numbers of Islamic schools. In 1993, there were 128 
madrasah in the province with 12,992 students.12 Presently, every district (kabupaten) has at 
least one madrasah to serve the growing Muslim population in the province. As in other parts 
of Indonesia, most madrasah in NTT were private.13  
																																																								
9 Educational report in the early 20th century shows that the student body of some Catholic missionary 
schools in Ende and Nangapanda were all Muslims. Widiyatmika, Sejarah Agama Islam di NTT, p. 
101.  
10 Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, Dampak Politik Migrasi: Perbandingan Orde Baru dan Pasca Orde-Baru: 
http://www.bkkbn.go.id/materi/Documents/DITDAMDUK,%20Seminar%20Exekutif/Dampak%20Politik%20M
igrasi%20Final.pdf (accessed on 26 April, 2016). 
11 In 1984, the Ministry of Religious Affairs finally opened up a small office, Kantor Urusan Agama 
(KUA), in sub-district (kecamatan) Amarasi, about 50km outside of the provincial capital Kupang, to 
cater to the religious needs of the small Muslim minority there, which comprised civil servants, 
community health centres (puskesmas) staffs and traders, mainly from South Sulawesi, Alor, and Java. 
Laporan Penelitian Konfigurasi dan Transformasi Kehidupan Beragama Menjelang Tinggal Landas 
Pembangunan Nasional di Kecamatan Amarasi Kabupaten Kupang Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur 
(Badan Penelitian dan Perkembangan Agama, Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia: Jakarta, 1991), 
pp. 99-104, 206.  
12 The number of madrasah comprises all formal levels from primary (Ibtidaiyah) to senior high school 
(Aliyah). Widiyatmika, Sejarah Agama Islam di NTT, p. 102. 
13 It is quite an achievement since in some places in NTT Islam did not even make its way until well 
into the 1950s. Laporan Penelitian Konfigurasi, p. 221. 
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Table 4.1: Number of Islamic schools and students in NTT in 201214 
 Total schools Total students 
Madrasah Swasta (private) 192 23,050 
Madrasah Negeri (state) 49 13,644 
Pondok Pesantren 23 2,158 
Total 264 38,852 
 
Currently, despite the increased number of Islamic schools especially madrasah in NTT, most 
of these schools were in poor shape and woefully under-funded. State madrasah (madrasah 
negeri) receive the bulk of their funding from the Ministry of Religious Affairs while private 
madrasah (madrasah swasta) and Islamic boarding schools (pondok pesantren) largely 
depend on school fees and donations. Moreover, many of the private madrasah are in remote 
areas where they serve the educational needs of the small and often impecunious Muslim 
communities there; hence, they are typically very rudimentary, lacking many basic facilities, 
and not having enough qualified teachers to teach general subjects such as science or 
mathematics.  
The decentralization laws of 1999 worsened the already precarious financial situation of these 
madrasah. These laws greatly enriched district governments but these local governments often 
refused to provide funding to madrasah since they see Islamic education as being part of 
religious affairs, which is one of the policy areas that still remains under the ambit of the 
central government in Jakarta (see Chapter 2 for more details). As a result, poorly equipped 
schools with dilapidated infrastructure and serious shortages of certified teachers are the 
norm. Many Islamic schools, sometimes in cooperation with the provincial office of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kanwil Agama), have managed to find creative ways to deal 																																																								
14 Buku Statistik Pendidikan Islam Tahun Pengajaran 2011-2012, Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal 
Pendidikan Islam, Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia: 
http://pendis.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=artikel&id2=bukustat20112012#.VhQJ7aTGYy5  (accessed on 4 
October, 2014).  
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with the problems, even to the extent of bucking directives from the ministry, as we will see 
later in the chapter. In the context of the argument made in this chapter, it is important to note 
that the politically weak status of the Muslim minority in NTT forces them to seek ways 
outside official channels (i.e. local governments) to sustain Islamic education in the province, 
especially given that the support from the central government is less than robust. 
Christian-Muslim socio-political dynamics in the NTT in the late colonial era 
The province we now know as NTT had yet to come into existence during the colonial period. 
Administered by a Dutch Resident, Assistant Resident, and native elites, who formed the 
pamong praja bureaucracy, it was known as the Timor residency, with Kupang as its 
capital.15 When it came to dealing with Islamic influence, as mentioned above, Dutch policy 
differed between the western part of the Indies, namely Java and Sumatra, and the eastern 
part, which included Timor. In Java and Sumatra, Dutch Islamic policy was guided by the 
ideas of C. Snouck Hurgronje, the well-known Dutch Islamologist. The thrust of this policy 
was to promote the religious practice of Islam while drastically curtailing its political 
tendencies.16 Furthermore, the Dutch administration did not allow Christian missions to 
establish schools in Java, forcing them to the Outer Islands, including Timor.17  
In contrast, Dutch policy in east Indonesia took on a wholly different tack. Here, due to the 
significant number of Christian adherents, both Catholics and Protestants, the Dutch 
administration instead promoted Christianity as a bulwark against the encroaching influence 
of Islam in the region. This was a three-pronged strategy: first, the Dutch colonial 																																																								
15 Sejarah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur: 
http://nttprov.go.id/ntt/sejarah-provinsi-nusa-tenggara-timur/ (accessed on 7 March, 2015). 
16 Harry Benda, “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in 
Indonesia.” The Journal of Modern History 30:4 (December 1958), pp. 338-347.   
17 The ban was lifted in 1851 but the construction of mission schools was still very limited due to 
pressure from the local Islamic kingdoms and the Dutch’s reluctance to inflame the sensitivity of the 
Muslim majority population. J.S. Furnivall, Educational Progress in Southeast Asia (New York: 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), pp. 16-18. 
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administration completely surrendered responsibility to educate locals to the Catholic and 
Protestant missionary organizations; second, the colonial administration radically restructured 
local societies by constructing roads and demolishing traditional villages, while urging the 
native population to live in new villages in small families as a form of social control; and 
third, the colonial administration enlarged local political structures by creating new 
administrative districts and appointed Catholic or Protestant tribal chiefs to govern them.18 
Furthermore, until the end of the colonial era in 1949, the Dutch colonial government 
financed all church activities in the Timor residency including the missionary schools.19 The 
limited presence of Islam along with the vigorous promotion of Christianity by the Dutch 
authorities allowed Christianity to prosper in all aspects of life in the eastern part of the 
Netherlands East Indies. 
By mid-1941, there were 247 Catholic schools with 33,522 pupils and 572 teachers in the 
Timor residency, alongside 87 Catholic priests. In the island of Sumba alone, there were 69 
Protestant schools and about 6,000 students. A similar situation was also taking place in other 
major islands in the Timor residency.20 Graduates of the missionary schools went on to 
populate the ranks of the enlarged bureaucracy as the Dutch carved out Muslim enclaves to 
make way for new (Christian) districts. Sons of pagan native rulers were also sent to the 
missionary schools with the hope that they would convert and later rule over their territories 
as Christian chiefs.  
The Muslims in the Timor residency in the early 1900s were isolated from the socio-political 
changes that were happening elsewhere in the region. Their access to education was very 																																																								
18 Jan Sihar Aritonang and Karel Steenbrink, eds., A History of Christianity in Indonesia (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2008), p. 239. 
19 Subsidies from the Dutch colonial government to missionary schools steadily increased from 
497,863 Dutch florins in 1875 to 892,819 in 1916. Alfian. Muhammadiyah: The Political Behavior of 
a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University 
Press, 1989), p.143. Also see Aritonang and Steenbrink, A History of Christianity in Indonesia, p. 138. 
20 Aritonang and Steenbrink, A History of Christianity in Indonesia, p. 240. 
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limited and most Muslim parents refused to send their children to the missionary schools lest 
they be converted to Christianity. Religiously-neutral government schools were scarce and 
could only be found in urban areas like Kupang. Madrasah education did not provide 
adequate educational qualifications for Muslim students to pursue a career in the bureaucracy, 
a problem that was compounded by the schools’ poor quality. Poor education would have 
effectively barred Muslims from joining the bureaucracy, even without the Dutch preference 
for Christians. The result was that the newly established Christian intelligentsia thoroughly 
dominated the socio-political arena in the Timor residency, forming a nascent bureaucratic 
elite class who would later dominate local politics in the post-independence era.21  
Christian-Muslim socio-political dynamics in NTT in the post-independence era 
The Christian intelligentsia was the beneficiary of the extensive schools established by the 
missionaries. Their educational qualifications allowed them to enter careers in the colonial 
bureaucracy, in which they remain embedded until well after the independence. During the 
immediate years following Indonesia’s independence (1945-1950), the Timor residency 
became part of the State of East Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Timur, NIT), a federal state of 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS) that was 
under de facto control of the Dutch with Makassar as its capital.22 The NIT kept the pre-
independence governing structure intact, which meant that there was no radical change to the 
bureaucratic and political dominance of the Christian intelligentsia. However, many of the 
Christian intelligentsia were also nationalists and wanted to dissolve NIT into the Indonesian 
																																																								
21 Jacqueline Vel, “Reading Politics from a Book of Donations: The Moral Economy of the Political 
Class in Sumba,” in Gerry van Klinken and Joshua Barker, eds., State of Authority: The State in 
Society in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2009), p. 123. 
22 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Koesalah Soebagyo Toer and Ediati Kamil, Kronik Revolusi Indonesia, 
Jilid II (1946) (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 1999), pp. 559-564. Opponents of NIT 
mocked NIT’s pro-Dutch orientation by calling it Negara Ikut Tuan (a state that followed its master). 
M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200 (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 276. 
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republic, which ultimately led to NIT’s demise in 1950.23 Sukarno dissolved RIS on 17 
August, 1950 and turned Indonesia into a unitary state. Some parts of the now defunct NIT 
made up the Lesser Sunda province (Provinsi Sunda Kecil) that comprised Bali, Nusa 
Tenggara Barat (NTB), and Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT).24 It was not until 1959 that NTT 
finally became a province in its own right. 
When a series of regional rebellions broke out in the Outer Islands in the late 1950s, this new 
bureaucratic ruling class in NTT was sucked in along with those in the neighbouring Sulawesi 
and Maluku. As a way of appeasement, the central government in Jakarta issued Presidential 
Decree no. 69/1958, which created NTT as a new province in 1959, largely delineated along 
religious lines.25 The new province was overwhelmingly dominated by the Christian faith. 
Muslims, while constituting about 10 percent of the population, were mainly located at the 
western end of this collection of 566 islands, closer to the neighbouring province of NTB.26 
The seat of power, the capital Kupang, was at the eastern end of the province, and in 2014 
comprises 98 percent Christians and only 1.5 percent Muslims.27 In short, the establishment 
of NTT resulted in a much smaller and thus politically weak Muslim population that was 
separated from the Muslim-majority province of NTB. 
																																																								
23 Predictably, pro-Dutch Christians in eastern Indonesia were opposed to the dissolution of NIT, 
which then sparked a rebellion in South Maluku islands to establish the Republic of South Maluku 
(Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS). Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, p. 285. 
24 Sejarah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur, Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur: 
http://nttprov.go.id/ntt/sejarah-provinsi-nusa-tenggara-timur/ (accessed on 7 March, 2015). 
25 In the eastern part of Indonesia, the provincial delineation was along religious lines: Islam for Nusa 
Tenggara Barat (NTB), Hindu for Bali, and Catholic and Protestant for NTT. van Klinken, The 
Making of Middle Indonesia, pp. 192-193. 
26 According to the 2010 census, main urban areas in the western part of NTT such as Ende consisted 
of 26 percent Muslims while in Manggarai Barat it was 19.2 percent. Data Sensus Penduduk 2010, 
Badan Pusat Statistik Republik Indonesia: http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php (accessed on 1 Sept, 2014). 
27 Badan Pusat Statistik: Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur: http://ntt.bps.go.id/ (accessed on 1 Sept, 
2014). 
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While Christians dominated the bureaucracy in NTT during the New Order period (1966-
1998), at this time the highly centralizing regime was firmly in control of the local political 
situation. The central government placed its own appointees in leadership positions at the 
local levels of governance. The regime typically appointed people who were not drawn from 
the local elites to these positions, while appeasing the local elites with non-political positions 
such as adat (traditional) leaders or as heads of state-sanctioned farmers’ groups and religious 
associations.28 Similar to the New Order’s self-contradictory policy toward Aceh as seen in 
Chapter 3, the regime tried to exploit the unique local traditions of NTT such as its ethnic 
diversity and inter-religious tolerance to promote its own notion of national identity based on 
unity in diversity, while at the same time tightening its control over the province.29 
Anthropologist Rita Smith Kipp noted that: 
The Indonesian government [New Order regime] attempts both to control ethnicity 
and to use it. That it requires control goes without saying: ethnic and regional 
secession recurrently threaten modern states; short of that, ethnic animosities can flare 
into violence, destroying lives and property. On the other hand, indigenous cultures 
provide a repository of traditions and symbols that leaders can use to forge national 
identity and foster a sense of community.30 
The highly centralized New Order regime, with its tentacles reaching deep into the society, 
ensured that local aspirations for political autonomy were never realized. However, the 
regime’s active promotion of local traditions, cultures and history cultivated an invigorated 
localized identity that permeated the locally staffed state institutions in NTT. This localized 
identity persists until the present day, as we shall see below. 
																																																								
28 Y. Argo Twikromo, “The Local Elite and the Appropriation of Modernity: A Case of East Sumba, 
Indonesia.” Ph.D diss., Radboud University Nijmegen, 2008, p. 13. 
29 Rita Smith Kipp, Dissociated Identities: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in an Indonesian Society 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 110-114. 
30 Ibid., p. 105. 
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During the New Order period, the rate of transmigration shot up as NTT became incorporated 
into the regime’s overall development program.31 These transmigrants were engaged in the 
agricultural sector as small landholders planting rice, cassava, and other cash crops. In noting 
the poor socio-economic background of the transmigrants, Heinz Arndt wrote: 
It must be remembered that most of the transmigrants are not average Javanese. The 
majority are recruited from among the landless and poorest. To them, even an average 
migrant’s standard of living, including a piece of land of their own, represents a big 
improvement.32 
While the influx of Muslim transmigrants from Java and Madura during the New Order era 
did increase the size of the Muslim population in NTT, they were too geographically 
dispersed to be organized politically.33 The population of NTT grew from 2,737,166 in 1980 
to 4,953,967 in 2013.34 The arrival of impoverished Muslims from Java and Madura did not 
have any discernible effect on the political strength of the Muslim community in NTT. 
Increase in the number of Muslims did not translate into an organizational movement that 
could be used to bargain with the more dominant Catholic and Protestant communities, 
because these transmigrants were isolated in rural parts of the province and too preoccupied 
eking out a living. In remote areas where there were sizeable transmigrant populations, the 																																																								
31 The New Order regime’s five-year development plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, 
Repelita) showed a remarkable increase of transmigration in a fifteen-year period. Repelita I (1969-
1974) enlisted 45,133 families but the number went up exponentially to 81,000 families in Repelita II 
(1974-1979) and 535,474 families in Repelita III (1979-1984). Dietrich Kebschull, Transmigration in 
Indonesia: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation, Expectations and Experiences (Hamburg: Verlag 
Weltarchiv GmbH, 1986), pp. 50-51.    
32 Heinz Arndt, “Transmigration: Achievements, Problems, Prospects.” Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies 19:3 (1988), p. 56. 
33 According to the Ministry of Workforce and Transmigration, the number of Transmigration 
Settlement Unit (Unit Permukiman Transmigrasi, UPT) in NTT in 2014 is 12 settlements (mukim) 
with 1,301 families. Moreover, these mukim are dispersed among the many islands in NTT. 
Comparatively, the number of transmigrants in NTT is less than other provinces such as West 
Kalimantan (19 settlements, 4,250 families), Central Sulawesi (21 settlements, 4,055 families), and 
South Sumatra (13 settlements, 3,090 families).  http://www.depnakertrans.go.id/pusdatin.html,9,542,ptrans 
(accessed on 21 October 2014).            
34 Badan Pusat Statistik, Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur: http://ntt.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/18 
(accessed on 1 September, 2014). 
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Ministry of Religious Affairs built madrasah and set up kecamatan-based Office of Islamic 
Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA) to serve the religious needs of these communities. But 
with respect to political organization, no such activity was known to take place in areas 
outside of the major towns. 
Meanwhile, in urban areas such as the provincial capital Kupang, Muslim communities were 
more visible, as evidenced by the number of mosques and vibrant commercial activities. 
Many of these urban Muslims were West Sumatran, Bugis and Makassarese migrants who 
were predominantly traders. The concentration of Muslims in the economic sector happened 
by default since they were shut out of the Christian-dominated politics and bureaucracy – the 
situation was akin to the experience of the Chinese in Java. The historical grip of Christians 
on the provincial bureaucracy, providing a steady stream of income and pensions explains 
why middle class Christians were less inclined to get involved in commerce. There was also 
social prestige in being a civil servant.35 Thus, the main religious communities each had their 
own sphere of influence, but tensions between them later came to a violent head in the months 
following the fall of Suharto in May 1998. 
The Reformasi period: The Kupang incident 
The fall of Suharto’s New Order regime on 21 May, 1998 signalled a new era of political 
openness in Indonesia. The new democratic space provided opportunities for local elites in 
NTT to finally realize their political ambitions that had been hitherto suppressed by the New 
Order regime’s system of direct appointment of local leaders. The passing of Law no. 32/2004 
on Regional Governance heightened political competitiveness among local elites by allowing 
direct elections for heads of local governments (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah, Pilkada). Political 
competition in NTT largely takes place between Catholic and Protestant candidates 																																																								
35 Sylvia Tidey, “Performing the State: Everyday Practices, Corruption and Reciprocity in Middle 
Indonesian Civil Service.” Ph.D diss., University of Amsterdam, 2012, pp. 63-64.  
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representing the two biggest religious communities in the province. Amidst the electoral 
tussles between these two religiously dominant communities the political weakness of the 
Muslim community is laid bare, as exemplified by the so-called Kupang incident in late 1998.      
The incident was a communal conflict between Muslims and Christians that broke out in 
Kupang on 30 November 1998 and lasted for three days. It started on a day of mourning when 
the whole city was closed down as an act of solidarity with the victims of the so-called 
Ketapang incident in Jakarta that had happened a week earlier, in which several Christians 
had been killed.36 Some people spread the news that a Catholic church, Gereja Katedral 
Kristus Radja, had been burned down by a group of Muslims, which then sparked retaliatory 
action by the Christian crowds. They burned and destroyed several mosques and many 
Muslim-owned shops and thousands of Muslims had to seek refuge in the compound of the 
provincial police headquarters.37 Since independence, there had not been previously any inter-
religious conflict in NTT, and there has been none since then. NTT has always prided itself as 
the example par excellence of harmony and tolerance among diverse ethnic and religious 
groups.38  
While the severity of the Kupang incident pales in comparison to the more violent and bloody 
communal conflicts in Poso, Ambon and other places, it is worth looking at why the conflict 
																																																								
36 The conflict took place in Jalan Ketapang, which is located in West Jakarta. It started on 21 
November 1998 when one of the Ambonese enforcers from a gambling den in the neighbourhood beat 
up a local Muslim kid. The altercation quickly escalated into a communal riot between the Christian 
Ambonese and the local Muslims, which in the end resulted in 16 deaths, along with 16 churches, 3 
mosques and one school destroyed. 159 Ambonese preman (gangsters) were also deported back to 
Ambon in the aftermath. Jan Aritonang, Sejarah Perjumpaan Kristen dan Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
BPK Gunung Mulia, 2004), pp. 533-535.    
37 For more details about the chronology of events and supposed reasons for the Kupang communal 
riot, see: Riza Sihbudi and Moch. Nurhasim, eds., Kerusuhan Sosial di Indonesia: Studi Kasus 
Kupang, Mataram, dan Sambas (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2001), pp. 42-100. 
38 Jamie Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2008); John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in 
Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Dave McRae, A Few Poorly Organized Men: 
Interreligious Violence in Poso, Indonesia (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 
	 195 
erupted. According to one study, two inter-related underlying factors led to the conflict: 
economic and political factors, with Islam being at the centre of them.39 As mentioned above, 
the Muslims dominate the commercial sphere in Kupang. The market-oriented development 
strategy pursued by the New Order regime in the decades leading to the conflict solidified the 
economic position of the Muslims in Kupang. The Muslim community’s prosperity, 
according to the study, could be measured by the increase in the number of mosques, with 
construction funding mostly comes from private donations.40 The wealth of the Muslims 
created resentment among those who were less successful, which conflict actors exploited.  
The political dimension of the conflict, meanwhile, revolved around the power struggle 
between the Protestants and the Catholics. For the first time in NTT post-independence 
history, a Protestant, Piet Alexander Tallo, had been chosen to be the governor in 1997, much 
to the chagrin of the Catholics, who had long held the post. While Protestants constituted a 
majority in Kupang (about 55 percent), Catholics formed the majority in the province. The 
appointment of governors had never given rise to open conflict during the New Order era 
since the military took up all the important political positions in the province and the regime 
was more than willing to use force to maintain order. The loss of the governorship in 1997, 
however, meant the drying up of one of the major patronage sources for the Catholic 
community, many of whom depended on the provincial bureaucracy for their livelihood.41 In 
																																																								
39 Sihbudi and Nurhasim, eds., Kerusuhan Sosial, pp. 42-100. 
40 By November 2000 (two years after the conflict), there were 32 mosques in the city of Kupang, 
compared to 96 Protestant and 16 Catholic churches. The study states that proportionallyspeaking the 
number of mosques is high for the Muslim population size, which is the third largest (about 18 
percent) especially when it eclipses the number of Catholic churches that serve Catholics, who make 
up 27 percent of the city population. Ibid., pp. 43, 63.  
41 Ibid., pp. 89-94. 
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her study of the local bureaucracy in Kupang, Sylvia Tidey estimates that almost half of the 
city’s population relied on the civil service in one form or another.42  
Thus, one possible explanation offered by Sihbudi and Nurhasim for the Kupang incident is 
that it was a ploy by disaffected parties who had lost their source of patronage in the 
governor’s office to try to sabotage the new administration and showcase the ineptitude of the 
governor by fomenting chaos and lawlessness. The provocateurs easily stirred up hostility 
against the Muslims through the long simmering resentment of their economic success.43 The 
Kupang incident is relevant to this study because it shows the weak political position of the 
Muslims in NTT that led to them being targeted by the two feuding Christian groups. The 
Kupang incident was the bloody and extreme culmination of this deeply lopsided political 
dynamics, but less violent and more mundane examples abound in daily affairs, and some will 
be explored in subsequent sections.  
Centre-periphery relations in the Reformasi era 
NTT is one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. Its economic output is predominantly 
derived from the agricultural and fishery sectors. The NTT government is highly dependent 
on the central government, with about 84 percent of its income coming from Jakarta in the 
form of the Equilibrium Fund (Dana Perimbangan), which consists of Revenue Sharing Fund 
(Dana Bagi Hasil), General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum), and Special Allocation 
Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus).  
																																																								
42 She groups these people in a category called “political class,” which includes bureaucrats, 
businessmen, and family members of the bureaucrats. Tidey, Performing the State, p. 40. 
43 Tapes that contained an inflammatory speech by Theo Syafei, a Christian Bugis who was a former 
major general in the military and a PDI-P stalwart, were circulated among the Christians in Kupang 
before the conflict and was pinpointed as a catalyst that ratcheted up the tension. In the speech he was 
allegedly heard making derogatory comments about Islam, the Quran, the then President, B.J. Habibie, 
and the possible Muslim takeover of the political power in Christian-majority areas. “Madu dan Racun 
di Tangan Theo,” Tempo, 15 July 2002 (accessed on 17 October 2014).     
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Table 4.2: Income for NTT in 2012 (in USD)44 
Provincial Original Income (Pendapatan Asli Daerah) 72 million 
Equilibrium Fund (Dana Perimbangan)  824.5 million 
Other Legal Incomes (Lain-lain Pendapatan Yang Sah)  80.5 million 
Total Income 977 million 
 
In the decentralization era, the bulk of the budget allocated to the Islamic education sector 
come from the central government.45 As mentioned in Chapter 2, there was a directive from 
the Ministry of Home Affairs on September 2005, circular (903/2429/SJ), that prohibited 
local governments from funding ‘vertical institutions,’ namely those that fall under the 
jurisdiction of the central government. This directive particularly hit the cash-strapped 
madrasah, and after widespread protests the instruction was later amended to exclude 
madrasah but with the stipulation that additional local funding must not come from the 
Special Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Khusus), which is typically used to fund education, 
among others.46 The Ministry of Home Affairs reaffirmed the directive when it issued the 
Ministerial Regulation 39/2012 (Permendagri Nomor 39 Tahun 2012), which listed the 
criteria to be used by local governments in funding ‘vertical institutions.’ The order came 
under heavy criticism especially from officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, who were 
hoping that local governments could pick up part of the tab for funding madrasah in their 
																																																								
44 NTT’s total budget for the fiscal year 2012 was Rp1.335,183 miliar (USD1.02 billion), which 
resulted in deficit spending. Tinjauan Ekonomi dan Keuangan Daerah: Provinsi Nusa Tenggara 
Timur. (Jakarta: Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia, 2012), pp. 31-32. 
45 Ministry of Religious Affairs’ funding for madrasah is channelled through School Operational 
Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah, BOS), which is based on the number of students enrolled 
in the madrasah and their level. The figures of 2015 are as follow: for Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (primary 
school), it is Rp800,000 per student per year; for Madrasah Tsanawiyah (junior high school), it is 
Rp1,000,000 per student per year; and for Madrasah Aliyah it is Rp1,200,000 per student per year. 
Bidang Pendidikan Islam, Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Agama NTT: http://www.pendisntt.com/berita-
144-juknis-bos-pada-madrasah-ta2015.html (accessed on 12 January, 2015).  
46 Risti Permani, “Educational Challenges with Special Reference to Islamic Schooling,” in Chris 
Manning and Sudarno Sumarto, eds., Employment, Living Standards and Poverty in Contemporary 
Indonesia (ISEAS Publishing: Singapore, 2011), p. 186. 
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provinces.47 The Home Affairs Minister later backtracked and issued circular 503/961/SJ on 
28 December 2012 to clarify the “misunderstanding.” He stated that there was no restriction 
per se for local governments to fund Islamic schools; only that the funding need not be 
mandatory and continuous.48  
The Minister’s pronouncement meant that – after a period of uncertainty – local governments 
now have the full discretion to fund religious schools in their areas. In this context, areas with 
a strong Islamic presence and politics, such as Aceh and West Java, have chosen to lavish 
funds on madrasah (see Chapter 3 for the case of Aceh). In NTT, where Christianity 
permeates every aspect of public space, local governments also channel funds to Christian 
schools. Catholic and Protestant groups assiduously lobby the local governments to fund their 
activities, including their schools. The major Protestant church in the province, Gereja 
Masehi Injili Timur (GMIT), set up a foundation called Economic Foundation (Yayasan 
Perekonomian) specifically for the purpose of lobbying local governments. GMIT also 
established the Christian Education Foundation (Yayasan Pendidikan Kristen, Yapenkris) as 
an advocate for its network of schools. In 1976, GMIT-run schools in NTT numbered at 445 
and increased to 548 schools by 2012.49 There are also more ministry-appointed teachers 
(Pegawai Negeri Sipil, PNS) working at GMIT schools, compared to teachers hired directly 
by Yapenkris, indicating a heavy reliance of GMIT schools on the Dinas Pendidikan NTT for 
support.50 Moreover, there is much overlapping between members of the political 																																																								
47 “Kementerian Agama Protes Larangan Hibah APBD Untuk Madrasah,” Tempo, 6 January 2013 
(accessed on 24 October 2014). 
48 “Mendagri: Tak Ada Larangan Madrasah Dapat Dana APBD,” Republika, 7 January 2013 (accessed 
on 24 October 2014). 
49 Frank Cooley, Memperkenalkan Gereja Masihi Injili Timor, Benih Yang Tumbuh XI (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Penelitian dan Studi Dewan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia, 1976), p. 241. See also Melky 
Manafe, Eksistensi SD GMIT di Rote Ndao.” MA thesis, Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana, 2013.   
50 In 2010 there were 2,450 PNS teachers teaching at GMIT schools, compared to 461 Yapenkris 
teachers. “Penarikan Guru PNS dari Sekolah Swasta agar Ditangguhkan,” Suara Pembaruan, 23 
December 2010 (accessed on 28 April 2016). See also Melky Manafe and Bambang Ismanto, 
“Eksistensi SD GMIT di Rote Ndao.” Satya Widya 29:2 (December 2013), p. 69. 
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establishment (including the bureaucracy) and the church, which further blurs the line 
between the sacred and the profane. The symbiosis represents what Frank Cooley, a church 
historian, calls “the forged bond between religion, politics and government in NTT.”51  
The dominance of Christian groups means that there is barely any money left for Islamic 
schools in NTT.52 Islamic schools in urban areas such as Kupang, Manggarai and Ende fare 
better than their counterparts in the countryside since the Muslim communities in major towns 
are better off and able to make financial contributions to schooling themselves. But the 
overall state of Islamic education in NTT is bleak and would have been worse without 
community support. The head of the NTT chapter of Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia, MUI) claimed that:  
We Muslims cannot rely on the local government for assistance because they will not 
give us anything. The central government, too, ignores us. We only look to our own 
community for support.53 
While the political weakness of the Muslim community in NTT can be partially chalked up to 
its lack of numbers relative to the Catholics and Protestants, absence of support from the 
central government also plays a major role. Firstly, there is no coherent policy from the 
central government when it comes to buttressing the position of Islam in the country 
especially in non-Muslim majority areas. The central government in Jakarta does not rely on 
political instrumentalization of Islam as a means to strengthen the state legitimacy, unlike its 																																																								
51 Cooley, Memperkenalkan Gereja Masihi, p. 348. 
52 For fiscal year 2012, the total Bansos (social assistance) allocation for education in the NTT’s 
provincial budget was Rp22,580,480,000 (USD 1.8 million) though it was not stated how much of this 
funding went to madrasah. Laporan Keuangan 2012 (Pejabat Pengelola Keuangan Daerah, Pemerintah 
Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Timur). According to the Head of Planning at the Regional Agency for 
Planning and Development (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah, Bappeda), Wayan 
Darmawan, the funding for madrasah is outside the jurisdiction of the provincial government, so 
therefore there is no allocation for it in the provincial budget (APBD). But he also mentioned that 
some madrasah do occasionally receive Bansos funding from the provincial government in the form of 
project grants. Personal communication, 3 November 2014.  
53 Interview with Abdul Kadir Makarim, head of the NTT chapter of MUI, Kupang, 10 April 2014. 
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counterpart in Malaysia, and does not need to formulate a coherent official policy to further 
enhance its Islamic credentials. The aforementioned conflicting policies between the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Affairs regarding local government funding of 
madrasah is a good example of the incoherence of the central government. Despite being the 
patron of Islamic education, the budget of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is stretched too 
thinly to adequately fund the tens of thousands of Islamic schools that are scattered across the 
country. One official at the Ministry of Religious Affairs relates that: 
I wish we [ministry officials] could do more to help the financially struggling 
madrasah but we are just not able to. Our budget is not sufficient and most local 
governments do not want to help out because they see it as our responsibility.54 
As a result, the situation of the politically weak Muslim community in NTT remains 
unchanged, as it is stuck between the hegemonic rule of the Christians and the inability of the 
central government to help. Ties between the Christian political class, the churches and 
Christian group such as GMIT create a positive feedback mechanism that helps to perpetuate 
lopsidedness in communal resource distribution and power allocation.  
One example that clearly illustrates the skewed power relations between Christians and 
Muslims came in the aftermath of the 2007 mayoral election in Kupang. The winner, Dan 
Adoe, a Protestant backed by a coalition that also included Islamic parties, promised to 
appoint a Muslim to the position of Regional Secretary – a Catholic person already took up 
the position of deputy mayor. Instead of making good on this promise, Adoe left the position 
unfilled for years for fear of angering his Christian supporters.55 The fact that the newly 
elected mayor was able to ignore his coalition partners’ price for supporting his candidacy 
attests to the deeply skewed balance of power in the province.  																																																								
54 Interview with Imam Tolhah, Kepala Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pendidikan Agama, 
Kementerian Agama Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, 19 December 2012. 
55 Tidey, Performing the State, p. 120. 
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More mundane everyday examples of this unequal power relation abound. One official at the 
Kanwil Agama NTT lamented that: 
It is common that official functions here are held during Muslim prayer times, for 
example on a Friday afternoon or in the evening during Maghrib prayer. Attendance is 
usually mandatory for civil servants, even for us Muslims. We then have to make up 
the prayer later, so we can attend these events. It is not ideal and quite insensitive to 
our needs, but what can we do?56  
 But as we can see in the following section, social adaptability and creativity in problem 
solving have helped the Muslims in NTT to deal with this bleak sense of powerlessness.                
Policy implementation at the local level 
Similar to other parts of Indonesia, Islamic education in NTT falls under the jurisdiction of 
the provincial office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), better known as the 
Kantor Wilayah Agama (Kanwil Agama). Geographic disparity certainly plays an important 
role in shaping the relationship between Kanwil Agama NTT and MORA in Jakarta. The two 
places are separated by 1,900km. Supervisory visits from the ministry are infrequent, and 
MORA mostly leaves the Kanwil Agama NTT to its own devices.  
Ironically, the lack of funding from the ministry has a positive effect on the way Islamic 
education is managed in NTT. Most Islamic schools in NTT, as we can glean from the 
preceding section, are resource-poor and struggle to stay afloat. One major issue the schools 
have in common is a lack of qualified and certified teachers. According to an official at 
Kanwil Agama NTT, the ministry in Jakarta specifically disallows non-Muslims from 
teaching in madrasah but this directive disadvantages the schools in NTT since there is a 
																																																								
56 Interview with Husen Anwar, Ketua Bidang Pendidikan Agama Islam, Kanwil Agama NTT, 
Kupang, 7 April 2014. 
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serious shortage of Muslim teachers in the province.57 At the same time, there are qualified 
Christian teachers who are willing to teach in the madrasah. This is the conundrum faced by 
the Kanwil Agama NTT and the madrasah. In the absence of strict supervision from the 
ministry, Kanwil Agama NTT decided to defy the directive and occasionally allowed 
Christian teachers to teach in madrasah. One Catholic teacher was even promoted as assistant 
principal of a madrasah in Mangarai.58  
Another reason for recruiting Christian teachers, according to the Kanwil Agama NTT, is 
cultural. Muslim teachers from outside of NTT, especially Java and Sumatra, might not be 
familiar with the unique NTT culture that values tolerance and diversity. Christian teachers 
might not share the same faith as their students, but at least they are natives of NTT and 
typically come from the local area where the madrasah is located and are often connected to 
students by kinship ties. Therefore, they have a much deeper understanding of the culture of 
the madrasah, which is coloured and shaped by local traditions.59 For the Kanwil Agama 
official, this flexibility is the ultimate expression of what NTT stands for, even if this 
approach contradicts the one-size-fits-all policy that is passed down from the ministry in 
Jakarta.  
Joel Migdal’s “state in society” framework helps explain why such intransigence occurs at the 
lower rungs of the hierarchy of the state. It will be recalled that the state, according to Migdal, 
projects an image of a coherent whole, but in practice it is comprised of various components 																																																								
57 Ibid. Legally there is no explicit prohibition against recruiting non-Muslim teachers to teach in 
madrasah. Article 29 of the Central Government Regulation Number 19/2005 Concerning National 
Education Standard (Pasal 29, Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 19/2005 Tentang Standar Pendidikan 
Nasional) clearly states three qualifying criteria for hiring teachers: 1) minimum academic 
qualification 2) tertiary educational background in education or relevant discipline 3) teaching 
certificate for the intended school level. Undang-undang Sisdiknas, UU RI Nomor 20 Tahun 2003 dan 
Undang-undang Guru dan Dosen, UU RI Nomor 14 Tahun 2005 (Jakarta: Asa Mandiri, 2009), p. 113.  
58 Another example, a pastor was confirmed as a permanent teacher in a pesantren in Ende. Interview 




that might be working at cross-purposes with the overall prerogatives of the higher officials. 
Agents of the state in the field are much closer to the society than the policymakers in the 
capital; hence, their actions are typically shaped or at least partially influenced by the culture 
and norms of their immediate surroundings, which sometimes lead the state’s local agents to 
pursue their own agendas that contravene those they are asked to implement.60 The action of 
the Kanwil Agama NTT is an example of this phenomenon. These local officials are what 
Migdal terms “implementors,” who work at the state’s “dispersed field offices.” Their main 
responsibility is to carry out orders from their superiors in the “central office.”61 But given the 
distance from the capital, and their proximity to the local community, the implementors are 
often caught between the state’s totalizing mission and the particularities and demands of the 
local community. More often than not, they also come from the local area themselves and 
share its values and sentiments. It is no wonder then that they decide to cast their lot in with 
the local community they serve, instead of the state institution they work for.  
Of course, this is not true in every case. Locally recruited staff of the local office of the 
ministry can also shift into the opposition mode and become staunch cheerleaders and 
executors of central government policies while paying scant attention to the influence of local 
culture. The Sarawak case in the second half of this chapter will further demonstrate this 
institutional behaviour, which I term “federalized institutional identity.” In the case of NTT, 
the officials of the Kanwil Agama assume a “localized institutional identity,” in which they 
direct their institutional orientation locally, instead of toward the MORA in Jakarta. 
The lowest rung in Migdal’s “state in society” is what he calls the “trenches.” In the context 
of this research, the trenches are the schools where the educational policies of the state are 
finally realized and enforced. The schools are mostly in contact with the state educational 																																																								
60 Joel Migdal. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform Each Other and 
Constitute One Another (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 15-16.	
61 Ibid., pp. 117-124. 
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office in the province, the so-called “implementors,” and not the national ministry.62 The 
principal of one madrasah in Kupang explained that while the school did follow the national 
curriculum – which was mandatory – it did have wide latitude to adapt the curriculum to the 
local culture and the school’s own norms and values. He also added that “local application” 
(penerapan lokal) of the school curriculum happens in the classrooms, typically by the 
teachers’ own initiative. For instance, teachers can apply examples from NTT’s traditions of 
inter-communal tolerance when explaining the concept of pluralism found in the Pengetahuan 
Agama Islam curriculum.63 It is for this reason that the school preferred teachers from NTT, 
rather than from Java, since local teachers are more understanding of NTT’s unique culture of 
religious harmony and tolerance.64  
On the other hand, as previously mentioned, the weak tradition of Islamic learning in the 
province allows the central government to play a deeper role in developing the province’s 
Islamic education by providing technical assistance. One example is the final exam questions 
used for the National Standard Madrasah Exam (Ujian Akhir Madrasah Berstandar 
Nasional), which in NTT are solely prepared and provided by MORA in Jakarta.65 In some 
areas of Indonesia where Islamic education has long been part of the local tradition, the 
ministry allows Islamic educators, typically a group of teachers from several schools on a 
district (kabupaten) level organized in a Teachers’ Working Group (Kelompok Kerja Guru, 
KKG), to formulate their own exam questions based on the guidelines (kisi-kisi) supplied by 
the ministry. In NTT’s case, there is no such Islamic educational legacy; therefore, the 
																																																								
62 Interestingly, supervisory visits to madrasah are carried out by officials of Christian schools, and 
vice versa. It is called cross supervision (pengawasan silang), which seems to be quite a common 
practice in NTT. Interview with Ahmad Betan, principal of Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) Kupang, 
8 April 2014. 
63 Interview with Husen Anwar, Ketua Bidang Pendidikan Agama Islam, Kanwil Agama NTT, 
Kupang, 7 April 2014. 
64 Interview with Ahmad Betan, principal of Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) Kupang, 8 April 2014. 
65 Ibid. 
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schools are dependent on the ministry for guidance and instructions. The dependence on 
technical assistance from the MORA is in fact beneficial to the schools due to the dearth of 
locally grown Islamic educators and the weak tradition of Islamic learning in the province.  
In sum, there are opposing dynamics at work when it comes to how the schools in NTT deal 
with the ministry. On the one hand, the schools have discretion to interpret and adapt the 
national curriculum to the particular aspects of their local culture. On the other hand, the lack 
of Islamic educational legacy in the province means that there is a shallow pool of resources 
for the schools to draw upon and thus forcing the schools to turn to the ministry for technical 
assistance such as formulating the content of the curriculum and developing assessment and 
academic achievement standards. It is this dichotomy that characterises the nature of Islamic 
schools in NTT. 
The localized institutional identity found in state institutions overseeing Islamic education in 
NTT is also the result of high institutional complexity. As demonstrated earlier, there are two 
inter-related aspects that explain this high institutional complexity: the post-1999 
jurisdictional wrangling between MORA and the Dinas Pendidikan (decentralized provincial 
department of MOEC) over the funding of madrasah; and the weak supervision of MORA 
over Kanwil Agama NTT and the madrasah in the province. The reluctance of Dinas 
Pendidikan NTT to provide regular funding for madrasah means that madrasah in NTT are 
completely dependent on MORA and local Muslim communities for assistance. But as 
mentioned before, MORA operates on an overstretched budget, having to support and oversee 
tens of thousands of madrasah across the country, and therefore is unable to allocate 
significant resources to madrasah in NTT. This dearth of funding from MORA forces Kanwil 
Agama NTT and the madrasah to become self-reliant and find creative solutions to their 
problems, which contributes to the localized institutional identity found in the province. 
MORA’s resource shortage, coupled with the geographic distance between NTT and Jakarta, 
also means that supervisory visits from Jakarta are rare, which weakens the central 
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government’s influence over Kanwil Agama NTT and the madrasah while at the same time 
strengthening their localized identity.  
SARAWAK 
From what has been stated respecting their religion, it will be easily seen that the intolerant 
bigotry of the western Mahometan is entirely unknown to these people; and I am strongly 
inclined to believe that a rigid Turk, being set down in their country, would scarcely allow 
that they had a chance of safely skating over the narrow bridge into the paradise of the 
Prophet.66 
 
Islamic education in Sarawak in the late colonial period 
This above comment, made by a British colonial administrator and naturalist based in 
Sarawak during the time of the first White Rajah, James Brooke, is a typical, if rather 
colourful, early characterization of the open and tolerant nature of Islamic practice in 
Sarawak. This openness, which has long been seen as the unique characteristic of Sarawak’s 
Islamic practice, is largely a product of the great ethnic diversity in the territory. High social 
fluidity between the local ethnic groups in Sarawak requires a degree of flexibility from 
individuals when practicing their faith, which sets the Muslims in Sarawak apart from their 
counterparts in the peninsula, a key point we will visit later in this chapter. 
Sarawak was under the suzerainty of the Brunei sultanate until 1841 when the Sultan of 
Brunei gave it to James Brooke, the so-called “White Rajah,” in exchange for pacifying local 
rebellions. Unlike in peninsular Malaysia, where the sultan is the symbol of Islam and Malay 
culture in his kingdom, no such cultural tradition existed in Sarawak, even before the arrival 
of James Brooke. The Sultan of Brunei was far removed from the Muslim communities in 
Sarawak, which were ruled by local lords appointed by the sultan called pengiran.  These 
local lords, while being Muslims, were not seen as religious leaders or symbols, and their 
																																																								
66 Hugh Low, Sarawak; Its Inhabitants and Productions: Being Notes during a Residence in That 
Country with His Excellency Mr. Brooke (London: Richard Bentley, 1848), p. 126. 
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authority was mainly derived from controlling trade flows along the rivers, not unlike the 
uleebalang in Aceh. The major difference with Aceh is that there was no distinct and 
independent ulama group in Sarawak. In the mid-1800s, Islamic education in Sarawak was 
informally conducted at the mosques, surau (small praying spaces) and the houses of local 
Islamic figures; no traditional Islamic schools like the pondok system in peninsular Malaysia 
or the dayah in Aceh existed.67  
On the other hand, quite a number of Christian missionary schools came into being in the 
early 1800s and proliferated during the White Rajah’s reign.68 The Malay communities 
perceived the growth of Christian missionary schools as a threat and decided to establish their 
own schools. They built the first Malay vernacular school, Sekolah Kampung Jawa, in 
Kuching in 1883. The curriculum in this school was a mix of Islamic instruction and general 
subjects such as English, mathematics, geography, reading, and history. The school proved to 
be so popular that the Malay communities built another school in Kuching, Sekolah Kampung 
Gersik, in 1893.69 The Brooke government also established an obscure educational institution 
called The School for the Study of Mohamedan Theology in Sibu in 1899, which offered 
subjects such as reading and writing in both Roman and Arabic scripts, Quranic exegesis 
(tafsir), and mathematics, among others.70  
A local Indian Muslim community ultimately built a formal Islamic school in Kuching in 
1917, which was spearheaded by a local ulama named Datuk Hakim Imam Abang Haji 																																																								
67 Sabihah Osman, “Malay-Muslim Political Participation in Sarawak and Sabah 1841-1951.” Ph.D 
diss., University of Hull, 1983, pp. 59-60. 
68 Sarawak was under the sovereign rule of the Brooke family (James, Charles and Vyner) from 1841 
to 1941 before it was finally designated as a British Crown Colony. 
69 Wan Kamal Mujani and Noranizah Yusuf, “Islam dan Missionari di Sarawak: Kesan terhadap 
Pendidikan pada Zaman Crown Colony, 1841-1941,” Sosiohumanika 3:2 (2010), p. 236. 
70 Not much else is known about this school or what has become of its fate. Muda @ Ismail Abd 
Rahman and Farah Salwani Ismail, “Peranan Ulama Sarawak dalam Perkembangan Pendidikan Islam 
di Sarawak,” in Farid Mad Zain and Izziah Suryani Mat Resad, eds., Prosiding Nadwah Ulama 
Nusantara II Sumbangan Ulama dan Tokoh Agama Borneo: Ulama Penggerak Pembangunan 
Masyarakat (Bangi: Fakulti Pengajian Islam Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2003), p. 527. 
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Murshidi. It was eponymously called Madrasah al-Mursyidiah, but later changed its name to 
Madrasah al-Islamiyyah. Since Sarawak did not have a tradition of Islamic learning, the 
newly formed madrasah adopted its curriculum from the renowned Madrasah al-Junaid in 
Singapore. The madrasah’s modest objective was to provide local Muslim students with a 
proper foundation of Islamic learning before they went off to peninsular Malaysia, Singapore 
or the Middle East for further education. Despite its limitations, Madrasah al-Islamiyyah has 
managed to produce several prominent Muslim figures in Sarawak such as the former state 
mufti Datuk Abdul Kadir, Ustaz Anis Abot and Ustaz Awang Pon. Its importance is such that 
it still exists until today and is managed by a school board, unlike other Islamic schools that 
fall under the combined jurisdiction of Majlis Islam Sarawak and the Ministry of Education.71 
Islamic education in Sarawak in the post-colonial period 
The management of Islamic education system in Sarawak differs from that in peninsular 
Malaysia due to the facts that Muslims are a minority in the state and that the state lacks a 
formal Islamic learning tradition. As a result, Sarawak has always been dependent on the 
federal government in Kuala Lumpur, and later Putrajaya, for funding to sustain its Islamic 
education system.  
Among the main issues encountered by Islamic schools in Sarawak are a lack of qualified 
Islamic studies teachers, especially from the local population, poor infrastructure and learning 
materials, lukewarm support from the community in general, and inadequate financial support 
from the state government, including the Sarawak Islamic Council (Majlis Islam Sarawak, 
																																																								
71 Suffian Mansor, “Cabaran Perkembangan Islam di Sarawak Zaman Pemerintahan Keluarga Brooke: 
Satu Kajian Umum,” in Farid Mad Zain and Izziah Suryani Mat Resad, eds., Prosiding Nadwah 
Ulama Nusantara II Sumbangan Ulama dan Tokoh Agama Borneo: Ulama Penggerak Pembangunan 
Masyarakat (Bangi: Fakulti Pengajian Islam Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2003), p. 560. 
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MIS).72 MIS is the state religious authority, similar to the ones found in every state in 
Malaysia (see Chapter 3 for discussion on the Islamic Council of Kelantan or Majlis Agama 
Islam Kelantan). The root of most of these problems is money, and MIS does not have 
enough of it since the small Muslim population in the state means small revenue collection 
from zakat (wealth tax) and fitrah (head tax), hence less support to the financially-fledgling 
Islamic schools in the state. Shortage of Islamic studies teachers requires MIS to recruit 
teachers from the peninsula, which further adds to its financial burden. Ultimately in August 
2011, MIS decided to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of 
Education and enlist all of its schools (ten in total) in the Government Assisted Islamic 
Schools (Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan, SABK), a federal program that entailed dual-
management of Islamic schools in the state. MIS still holds authority over the management of 
school infrastructure and land-holding, but the curriculum, teacher recruitment and training 
and financial management fall completely under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. 
Table 4.3: Islamic schools in Sarawak in 201473 
Types of Islamic school Number of schools 
MIS schools under SABK  10 
National Islamic School (Sekolah Kebangsaan Agama) 3 
Private Islamic Schools 2 
Sekolah Agama Rakyat (half-time) 8 
Total number of schools 23 
 
The two private Islamic schools follow the national school curriculum, in combination with 
their own specific Islamic curriculum. Meanwhile, Sekolah Agama Rakyat offer purely 
Islamic education in the afternoon as a complement for students who go to national schools in 
the morning and as a way for them to strengthen their Islamic knowledge. The supervision of 																																																								
72 Abang Haji Atei Abang Medaan, “Matlamat dan Masa Depan Sekolah-sekolah Agama Islam di 
Sarawak,” in Ismail Rahman, ed., Pendidikan Islam di Malaysia (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1992), pp. 86-87.  
73 Biro Perkhidmatan Pendidikan Majlis Islam Sarawak: http://bppmis.com/?page_id=1121 (accessed on 
8 September, 2014).  
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these schools comes from MIS but the council barely provides any financial support as these 
schools are for the most part self-funded through student fees and community support.  
For all intents and purposes, therefore, de facto authority to manage and supervise Islamic 
education in Sarawak rests in the Ministry of Education in Putrajaya. There is no pre-existing 
local Islamic education system outside of MIS to compete for influence with the federal 
government. The State Education Office (Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri, JPN) in Sarawak 
represents the Ministry of Education and the Islamic Education Sector (Sektor Pendidikan 
Islam, SPI) within the JPN oversees Islamic education in the state, which means that JPN is 
effectively in control of Islamic schools in Sarawak.  
Malay-Muslim politics in Sarawak during the late colonial period (late 1800s to 1960s) 
One aspect of early British colonization in Malaya was the expansion of the bureaucracy as a 
way to streamline colonial administration and extend its reach into the population. Even 
though Sarawak was not officially part of the Crown Colony until 1941, the “White Rajah” 
who reigned supreme there, James Brooke, introduced a similar state-making policy. Like the 
British residency system in the peninsula that enlisted the service of local elites, notably the 
royal families, to indirectly rule the various Malay kingdoms, Brooke also embarked on a co-
optation strategy in Sarawak when he took control in 1841. In his case, he preferred to recruit 
the politically weak Malay chiefs and remove the Bruneian nobles and the Arab Sharif from 
Sarawak, whom he saw as potent challenges to his authority.74 This policy marked the 
political ascendancy of the local Malay-Muslim community.  
The Brooke administration employed the local Malay-Muslim leaders to help rule but the 
scope of their authority was circumscribed; for example, they were no longer allowed to 																																																								
74 Naimah Talib, Administrators and Their Service: The Sarawak Administrative Service under the 
Brooke Rajahs and British Colonial Rule (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 
7. 
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collect taxes for their own personal benefit. Customary positions such as Datu Patinggi 
(premier lord), Datu Bandar (lord mayor) and Datu Temenggung (commander-in-chief) were 
repurposed to fit with the bureaucratic objectives of colonial rule. Brooke also created two 
more customary positions: Datu Hakim (head of Malay judges) and Datu Imam (head of 
Islamic affairs).75 In short, the bureaucratization of colonial rule in Sarawak was not 
accompanied by the expansion of Malay traditional authority through bureaucratization of 
Malay and Islamic affairs as seen in the case of Kelantan in Chapter 3. 
Another shared characteristic between the Brooke administration and its counterparts in the 
peninsula was their minimal interference in Malay and Islamic affairs. The only exception 
was the creation of the position of Datu Imam, which Brooke exploited to rally the Malay 
community to his side while alienating the more powerful Bruneian nobles and Arab Sharif. 
This move effectively split the local Muslim community, and with the assistance of British 
naval power, the Brooke administration ultimately crushed all local opposition. 
Unlike the sultanates in the peninsula, which parlayed their symbolic religious authority into 
an official function with coercive powers that came with colonial bureaucratic expansion (see 
Chapter 3), no such dynamics arose in Sarawak. This was due to two inter-related reasons. 
First, there was no sultan-like figure, even on a symbolic level, who was perceived as the 
head of Islamic affairs in the state. The creation of a Datu Imam did not change this fact, as 
the Datu’s function was merely to advise the White Rajah on matters related to Islam. 
Second, due to the absence of traditional Islamic authority, Islam figured very little as a 
means of attaining political legitimacy in Sarawak. The establishment and expansion of an 
Islamic bureaucracy in the form of the State Islamic Council (Majlis Agama Islam Negeri), 
such as what occurred in the peninsula, was not replicated in Sarawak. The Sarawak Islamic 
																																																								
75 Sharif are local nobility of Arab descent who claimed to have a direct lineage to Prophet 
Muhammad through his grandson, Hasan. Osman, Malay-Muslim Political Participation, pp. 29-30. 
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Council (Majlis Islam Sarawak, MIS) only came into existence in May 1955. It was 
established by the British colonial administration when it took over Sarawak from the Brooke 
family in 1946.  
In this context, political contestation within the Malay-Muslim community in Sarawak simply 
took on a different shape than what had transpired in the peninsula during the pre-
independence period. In the peninsula, conservative traditional elites instrumentalized Islam 
to gain a stake in the colonial order. In Sarawak, political contestation within the Malay-
Muslim communities took the form of class struggle between the traditional Malay elites and 
the rising Malay intelligentsia, a product of the Malay vernacular education.  
In what ways did political dynamics within the Malay-Muslim community affect the nature of 
education among the Malay-Muslims in Sarawak during the colonial period? As mentioned 
above, James Brooke and his successor, Charles and Vyner, preferred to staff the state 
bureaucracy with local Malays, a ploy to split the local Muslim communities and isolate the 
supporters of the Sultan of Brunei. In the first few decades of the White Rajah’s reign, Brooke 
did not expend much effort in developing an organized educational system that could produce 
educated human capital, despite the incorporation of Malays into the colonial bureaucracy. 
His main focus at this time was to quell uprisings, expand territory and cultivate support from 
the inland Dayak tribes. In this latter regard, the Malay elites were useful because many of 
them had gained their diplomatic skills through their long experience of river trading.  
It was only in the late 1800s and early 1900s that native education in Sarawak became more 
formalized. This happened as the kingdom finally stabilized and needed more employees for 
low-level clerical positions. Pioneering Malay schools such as Sekolah Kampung Jawa and 
Sekolah Kampung Gersik came into in Kuching, and were soon followed by similar schools in 
other urban areas in Sarawak. In 1903, Charles Brooke, the successor to James Brooke, 
created the National College, also known as Government Lay School, for the sole purpose of 
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training native Sarawakians, mainly Malay, Iban and Chinese, for clerical positions in the 
colonial government.76 In 1931, the Malay section of the National College merged with 
Sekolah Kampung Jawa and became Madrasah Melayu, popularly known as the Malay 
College, styled after the elite Malay College of Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) in the state of 
Perak.77 Unlike MCKK, however, Madrasah Melayu did not exclusively cater to the 
traditional Malay elites but all Malays regardless of their class and socio-economic 
background. This policy ultimately led to the creation of a new Malay intelligentsia, whose 
political presence would become apparent in the post-World War II years when many of the 
new Malay intellectuals argued for independence during the so-called “cessation debate” in 
Sarawak.78  
At the same time, in the early decades of the 20th century, Islamic education still remained 
largely informal and unsystematic, mainly due to colonial policy that encouraged the growth 
of Malay vernacular schools and the preference of Muslim parents to send their children to 
the government schools given the better job prospects of graduates, especially in the colonial 
administration. As mentioned above, the Muslim community established the first modern 
Islamic school, Madrasah Mursyidiah (later known as Madrasah al-Islamiyyah), in 1917 but 
its objective was to prepare students to further their religious studies in the peninsula and 
elsewhere in the region, not for employment in the colonial government. Other formal Islamic 
schools did not exist at this time. Meanwhile, the Islamic education (Pendidikan Agama 																																																								
76 The classes at the National College were ethnically segregated with each major ethnic group – 
Malay, Iban and Chinese – was taught in its own native language. Malay students would attend 
religious classes in the morning at Sekolah Kampung Jawa and Sekolah Kampung Gersik before going 
to the National College at 9:30am. Osman, Malay-Muslim Political Participation, 70-71; Sanib Said, 
Malay Politics in Sarawak, 1946-1966: The Search for Unity and Political Ascendancy (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 24. 
77 English was used as a medium of instruction and students were selected from the Kuching area by 
the more meritocratic entrance exam. Vernon Porritt, British Colonial Rule in Sarawak, 1946 – 1963 
(Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 310. 
78 The cessation debate sharply divided the Malay-Muslim community into two camps. The traditional 
elites wanted Sarawak to be ceded into the British Empire while the new Malay intelligentsia agitated 
for independence. Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak, p. 25. 
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Islam) subject was largely absent from the Malay vernacular schools in Sarawak until the 
federal government made it mandatory in 1976.79 Majlis Islam Sarawak waited three decades 
after its inception in 1955 before it started to build its own network of Islamic schools, 
starting in Kuching and gradually in major population centres in Sarawak. By 2011 it had 
established ten schools (eight secondary and two primary). The Majlis Agama Islam 
Kelantan, described in Chapter 3, pursued bureaucratic expansion and the growth of modern 
Islamic education system to help traditional elites to entrench their interests and suppress 
politico-religious rivals. The Majlis Islam Sarawak engaged in no such manoeuvre. Unlike in 
Kelantan, jockeying for power within the Malay-Muslim community in Sarawak occurred in 
the Malay vernacular school system. The weak tradition of Islamic learning, and the fact that 
Islam was not suited for political mobilization meant that the Islamic education system in the 
territory was largely disconnected from political contestations. 
The post-World War II years saw the rising influence of the Malay intelligentsia in Sarawak. 
This intelligentsia was the product of the expanding Malay vernacular school system. Despite 
their educational qualifications, they were largely shut out of the upper ranks of the colonial 
bureaucracy, which remained the sole preserve of the traditional elites (perabangan).80 Many 
of these non-elite, educated Malays took up teaching positions in Malay vernacular schools 
across the state. The friction between them and the perabangan began to intensify in 1946 
when the Brooke dynasty abruptly ended. This collapse resulted in a raging debate and even 
violent struggle between the cessionist faction, led mostly by the perabangan, who favoured 
Sarawak to be folded into the British Empire and the anti-cessionist group that was 																																																								
79 The Education Act of 1961 made Islamic education subject mandatory in schools that have fifteen or 
more Muslim students. The requirement was not implemented until much later despite guaranteed 
funding from the federal government due to severe shortage of qualified local teachers and the 
unwillingness of many teachers from the peninsular to work in Malaysian Borneo. Zainal Abidin 
Abdul Kadir, “Pendidikan Islam di Sabah dan Sarawak: Masalah dan Perlaksanaannya,” in Ismail 
Rahman, ed., Pendidikan Islam di Malaysia (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1992), 
p. 61. 
80 Osman, Malay-Muslim Political Participation, p. 94. 
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predominantly comprised of Malay intellectuals, who wanted Sarawak to declare 
independence.81 The leaders of the anti-cessionist movement were mainly Malay civil 
servants and schoolteachers. They staged major acts of protests against cession, such as a 
mass resignation of 400 civil servants and 87 Malay teachers, which led to the closing of 22 
schools.82 Despite receiving widespread support, the anti-cessionist movement had fizzled out 
by 1951 due to internal fissures and repression by the colonial authorities. The two feuding 
Malay factions managed to come to an uneasy truce in 1952, until the proposal that Sarawak 
should join the federation of Malaysia in 1961 once again put them at loggerheads. 
Class and historical animosity, as opposed to religion, took centre stage in these contentious 
politics. Islam, and by extension the Islamic schools, did not make a mark on the political 
landscape of Sarawak until well after the territory joined the Malaysian federation on 16 
September, 1963. Moreover, even Islam finally became more prominent in Sarawak’s Malay-
Muslim communities in the late 1970s, the effect of Islamization on local politics was 
different than in the peninsula, as we shall see.           
Malay-Muslim politics in post-independence Sarawak 
The incorporation of Sarawak into the Malaysian federation in September 1963 changed the 
nature of Malay politics, and the politics of Sarawak as a whole. The Malays in Sarawak, who 
had hitherto been seen as only distant cousins of the Malays in the peninsula, now found their 
fates more closely intertwined with their peninsular cousins. They began to be drawn into the 
pattern of ethno-religious politics that was played out in the peninsula. To be sure, the multi-
ethnic makeup and more fluid social interactions in Sarawak have not allowed peninsula-style 																																																								
81 Rosli Dhoby, a seventeen-year old teacher of a Malay school in Sibu and a member of the Rukun 
Tigabelas group, a radical off-shoot of the anti-cessionist movement, stabbed to death the newly 
appointed colonial Governor of Sarawak, Sir Duncan Stewart, during a street parade in December 
1949. He, along with three co-conspirators, were arrested and later hung. “Singkap Perjuangan Rosli 
Dhoby,” Utusan Malaysia, 13 January 2013 (accessed on 12 September, 2014).    
82 Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak, pp. 51-52. 
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ethno-religious politics to take root in the state. Nonetheless, Sarawak is still affected by the 
political discourse emanating from the peninsula. Malay leaders in both Sarawak and the 
peninsula find themselves in a symbiotic relationship: Malay leaders in Sarawak depend on 
the might of the federal government to help buttress their authority, especially given their 
minority status in Sarawak; the UMNO-led federal government needs Sarawak for its own 
self-preservation, often relying on Sarawak MPs to form government.83 These mutually-
reinforcing dynamics have benefitted Islamic education in Sarawak, developed years after the 
state became part of the Malaysian federation, and it has prospered as a result.  
By mid-1962 there were five political parties in Sarawak, each representing a major ethnic 
group: the Sarawak Party (Parti Negara Sarawak, PANAS), which was mainly established by 
the conservative cessionist Malay elites; Sarawak Natives Front (Barisan Ra’ayat Jati 
Sarawak, BARJASA), which largely comprised the anti-cessionist Malay intelligentsia; 
Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), which represented the Chinese community; Sarawak 
National Party (SNAP) and Parti Pesaka Sarawak (PESAKA), which was formed by the 
leaders of Iban tribe, the largest ethnic group in the state.   
In the early 1960s, the federal government used the question of Sarawak becoming a member 
in the Federation of Malaysia in its attempt to intervene in the local politics of the state. To do 
so, it employed a style of ethno-politics that was familiar in the peninsula. The federal 
government played up the threat of communism, implying complicity of the Chinese 
community since the membership of Malayan Communist Party was predominantly 
																																																								
83 According to Faisal Hazis, there are five demands from the federal government that have to be met 
by the Malay leaders in Sarawak: safeguarding national interests; maintaining Malay political 
dominance; ensuring BN’s continued dominance in the state and parliamentary elections; transferring 
the rights to the state’s petroleum and gas reserves to the federal government; and providing political 
stability. Faisal Hazis, Domination and Contestation: Muslim Bumiputera Politics in Sarawak 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Studies, 2012), pp. 83-96.   
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Chinese.84 The ploy succeeded in unifying the Malay and Iban parties, with both ethnic 
groups considered as Bumiputera (native sons of the soil), behind the Malaysian federation 
plan while alienating the anti-Malaysian Chinese party SUPP. Sarawak ended up joining the 
federation on 16 September 1963.85  
The second intervention of the federal government into Sarawak’s internal politics happened 
barely three years after the federation agreement was signed in 1963. Sarawak’s first Chief 
Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, a Christian Iban leader from SNAP, decided to adopt a 
Sarawak-first stance against the wish of the centralizing federal government by refusing to 
speed up the use of Malay language in Sarawak and replacing the expatriates in the state 
bureaucracy with locals, among others. The federal government then engineered a 
constitutional crisis in Sarawak that led to the ouster of Stephen Kalong Ningkan in 1966.86 
Another Christian Iban leader from SNAP, Tawi Sli, promptly replaced him and who later 
proved to be more compliant. After the 1969 state election, the state legislature chose a 
Muslim leader from the Malay intelligentsia, Abdul Rahman Ya’kub, as the Chief Minister. 
This marked a watershed moment in Sarawak because it was the first time a member of a 
minority group became the Chief Minister, a political arrangement that has remained 
unbroken until the present day. 
It was clear from the start that the federal government in the peninsula had no intention of 
respecting the autonomy promised to Sarawak in managing its own internal affairs. The two 
aforementioned examples foreshadow the type of relationship we see today between Sarawak 																																																								
84 Said, Malay Politics in Sarawak, p. 88. 
85 SUPP wanted Sarawak to remain independent and therefore rejected the plan to join the Malaysian 
federation in 1963. 
86 The crisis started with a dispute over legislation on land tenure, which would allow land ownership 
for non-natives. The opponents of the legislation sought help from the federal government, which 
subsequently declared a state of emergency in Sarawak in order to oust Stephen Kalong Ningkan. 
Michael Leigh, The Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 
1974), pp. 102-112; James Chin, Politics of federal intervention, with reference to Sabah, Sarawak, 
and Kelantan,” The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 35:2 (1997), p. 101.  
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and the federal government, which overwhelmingly tilts in favour of the federal government 
in Putrajaya.87 The unequal relationship also holds true when it comes to the question of Islam 
and its place in the Malaysian society. Unlike in the peninsula, where Islam is constitutionally 
enshrined as the official religion of the federation, Sarawak is exempted from such a clause by 
Paragraph 15(1) of the 1963 Agreement. Consequently, Sarawak has formal autonomy to 
manage its own religious matters without any interference from the federal government. The 
agreement also explicitly states in Paragraph 15(3) that no federal financial assistance should 
be permitted for Islamic schools or education without the concurrence of the state 
government. The same paragraph also mentions that such financial assistance should instead 
be channelled to social welfare programs in the state.88 Paragraph 17 of the agreement deals 
specifically with education, stating that “[t]he present policy and system of administration of 
education in North Borneo and Sarawak (including their present Ordinances) should be 
undisturbed and remain under the control of the Government of the State until that 
Government otherwise agrees.” It also states that federal requirements regarding religious 
education (as part of the 1961 Education Act) are not applicable to Sarawak.89 The agreement 
makes clear that matters of religion, particularly Islam, and education are integral to Sarawak 
joining the Malaysian federation. This clause was inserted as a way to pre-empt any future 
centralizing attempts by the federal government.90  
																																																								
87 Another example of the federal government asserting its supremacy is when it overturned the ban on 
lottery instituted by the then Chief Minister of Sarawak, Taib Mahmud, in 1992. Taib later on did an 
about-face and supported the federal government’s action by saying that the ban would only drive 
gambling underground and thus worsen the problem. Hazis, The Politics of Islam in Sarawak, p. 211. 
88 Malaysia: Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office [HMSO], 1963), pp. 9-10. 
89 Ibid., p. 12.  
90 The agreement also includes a provision that safeguards Borneo from any amendment to the federal 
constitution that is germane to its interests (Paragraph 30) and the Borneanisation of the public service 
that stipulates a hiring preference of local Borneans over Malaysians from the peninsular (Annex B). 
Ibid., pp. 30, 44-45.  
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Despite the aforementioned delineation of powers stated in the 1963 Agreement, as we can 
see in the following sections of this chapter, the jurisdictional boundary between Sarawak and 
the federal government in practice is not clear-cut. This is partly because of the power 
imbalance that heavily tilts in favour of the federal government, but also because of the 
strength and adaptability of local leaders in Sarawak, particularly those from the Malay-
Muslim communities, who manage to resist the total hegemony of the federal government 
while at the same time using federal support to further entrench their political influence 
locally.  
One key aspect of the political relationship between Sarawak and the federal government is 
the patronage system by which I mean the heavy reliance of Sarawak on the federal 
government’s resources.91 In the case of Sarawak, patronage assumes a more important role 
for Malay-Muslim politicians than for non-Malays as it helps to ensure their political 
dominance despite their minority status. They selectively use largesse from federal 
government such as development projects to cultivate support in various constituencies and to 
ameliorate grievances from the majority Christians. The federal government realized early on 
at the formation of the Malaysian federation that it needed to co-opt local leaders in Sarawak 
in order to quell anti-federalist forces and assert its dominance. Federal leaders learned that 
the most effective way to achieve these objectives was to deploy the government’s vast 
resources as a means to muster political support. Throughout the 1960s, the federal 
government sponsored local Sarawakian leaders, both Muslims and non-Muslims and on all 
levels of state governance, by providing them with overseas travel junkets, funding for minor 
rural projects, and appointments to the boards of federal agencies.92 The practice persists to 
this day as Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak still look to the federal government for approval 																																																								
91 See Hazis, Domination and Contestation; Chin, Politics of federal intervention; and Leigh, The 
Rising Moon. 
92 Leigh, The Rising Moon, pp. 118-123. 
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and support in the form of development funding and other material assistance.93 In return, 
they provide the federal government with the necessary electoral victory to ensure the 
continuing dominance of the National Front (Barisan Nasional) coalition.94   
The dominant position of the Malay-Muslim community in Sarawak, despite its minority 
status, can be attributed to the patronage politics practised by Malay-Muslim “strongmen” 
such as Abdul Rahman Ya’akub and Taib Mahmud, who use their vast resources to establish 
client networks that help to cement their political influence, and fend off challenges from non-
Muslims. Patronage politics in the form of selective distribution of resources not only assists 
the Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak to maintain the support and unity of the Malay-Muslim 
community but also allows them to woo and appease the non-Muslims.95 As a result, the 
Malay-Muslim community in Sarawak has managed to protect and develop its communal 
																																																								
93 Here is one example from the 2016 Sarawak state election of federal government using development 
funding as an electoral ploy. “Zahid pledges RM500k for school if BN wins, says opposition ‘dry 
taps,’” Malaysiakini, 29 April 2016 (accessed on 30 April 2016). 
94 The most recent example is when 49 BN MPs were lured on an agricultural study trip to Taiwan on 
September 2008, to obviate their supposed impending defection to the opposition camp, planned to 
commence on 16 September 2008. The defection would have given the opposition coalition a simple 
majority in the parliament and thus the control of the federal government. Out of the 49 MPs, 12 were 
from Sarawak. Suffice to say the party-jumping ploy orchestrated by the opposition leader Anwar 
Ibrahim failed in the end and BN remained in power still. “49 BN MPs off to Taiwan beginning 
today,” Malaysiakini, 8 September 2008 (accessed on 29 September 2014).   
95 Faisal Hazis uses Joel Migdal’s notion of “strongmen” to describe the rise and longevity of the 
Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak. The rift within the non-Muslim communities especially the 
Dayaks, namely Iban, the largest Dayak group in the state (about 30 percent of the population) also 
contributes to the Malay-Muslim dominance. The notion of Iban unity poses a real threat to the 
political position of the Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak, and it is imperative to co-opt at least one 
Dayak faction as a part of the leading political party, as represented by the PESAKA component of 
Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB). Hazis, Domination and Contestation, pp. 98-99. For factors 
that explain the divisions within the Iban community, see Peter Searle, Politics in Sarawak, 1970-
1976: The Iban Perspective (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 48-66; James Chin, 
“PBDS and Ethnicity in Sarawak Politics,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 26:4 (1996), pp. 512-526; 
and Jayum Jawan, The Iban Factor in Sarawak Politics (Serdang: Penerbit Universiti Pertanian 
Malaysia, 1993). 
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interests by using the resources of both the state government and the federal government, 
despite being heavily outnumbered by the non-Muslims.96  
The viability of Islamic education in Sarawak illustrates the strength of the Malay-Muslim 
community. As previously stated, in the 1963 agreement it was agreed that the federal 
government would not give financial assistance to Islamic schools and Islamic instruction in 
national schools without the concurrence of the state government. With the federal 
government becoming more Islamised in the wake of Islamic revivalism in the late 1970s, and 
the Malay-Muslims in control of the state government in Sarawak from 1969, an Islamic 
agenda assumed an increasing role in the relationship between the federal government and 
state government in Sarawak. This Islamic agenda included funding for Islamic education, 
despite Sarawak’s initial fear that Islamising efforts would disrupt religious tolerance.97 
Nevertheless, the instrumentalization of Islam as a political means assumes a different 
dynamic than what is happening in the peninsula. 
Facets of Islamization: locally moderate, nationally conservative 
Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak and the peninsula employ Islam as a political tool in 
markedly different ways. These differences became visible from the late 1970s onwards as 
Islamic revivalism became deeply embedded in the Malaysian political landscape. While 
Islam as a faith remained essential to Malay identity in both Sarawak and the peninsula, it 																																																								
96 Majlis Islam Sarawak (MIS) headquarters in Kuching, known as Kompleks Islam, cost RM100 
million (USD30.8 million) to build with funding exclusively from Tabung Baitulmal Sarawak, a state 
agency in charge of the collection and management of zakat (wealth tax), wakaf (donated land) and 
sedekah (alms). “Kompleks Islam Sarawak,” Utusan Malaysia, 29 January 2009 (accessed on 30 
September 2014). Meanwhile, the Islamic Department of Sarawak (Jabatan Agama Islam Sarawak, 
JAIS), the secretariat of MIS, receives RM36.5 million (USD11.2 million) in 2014 from the federal 
government. http://www.sarawakiana.net/2014/09/peruntukan-rm365-juta-kepada-jabatan.html (accessed on 
30 September 2014). 
97 In 2014, the Ministry of Education provides RM9.05 million (USD2.8 million) funding for 10 
Government Assisted Islamic Schools (Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan, SABK) and RM310,000 
(USD95,135) for 12 People’s Islamic Schools (Sekolah Agama Rakyat, SAR) in Sarawak. “Baik 
Pulih: RM9.05 juta diberi kepada SABK, RM310,000 diberi kepada SAR,” Borneo Post, 26 
September 2014 (accessed on 30 September 2014).  
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took on a different political significance in these two places. In the peninsula, Islamic political 
discourse began to saturate the public sphere and offer the federal government an alternative 
way to govern and seek political legitimacy. The two major Malay-Muslim parties in the 
peninsula, UMNO and PAS, heatedly engaged with each other within this Islamic political 
paradigm.  
The same dynamics did not take place in Sarawak, even though its Malay-Muslim leaders 
also used Islamic symbolism to strengthen their political influence. Instead, they used Islam 
as a political tool to gain approval from and curry favours with the federal government. This 
involved merely displaying an Islamic façade.98 Islam does not serve as a source of political 
legitimacy for Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak, unlike for their counterparts in the 
peninsula, due to lack of saliency of Islamic discourse.99 In Sarawak, Malay-Muslim leaders 
also used Islam to politically unite the heterogeneous Muslim communities consisting of 
Malays, Melanau, and Kedayan. Islamic identity for the Muslim communities in Sarawak 
transcends their ethnic differences. The need for political unity became more pressing when 
Malay-Muslims took on the political leadership of Sarawak, following the 1969 election. A 
split within the Muslim communities would have allowed the numerically superior non-
Muslim ethnic groups to dominate state politics, as happened earlier in the 1960s when the 
Iban community was in control. Therefore, in the context of the political constellation in 
Sarawak, Islam serves as a distinct identity marker that differentiates the Muslim and non-
																																																								
98 The federal government typically tries to avoid meddling in socio-political affairs in Borneo unless 
if they become a threat to its political existence. For example, the federal government does not engage 
in the Islamization process in Sarawak with the same zeal like it does in the peninsula since it does not 
want to unnecessarily inflame the non-Muslim majority and will continue to do so as long as Sarawak 
remains a reliable vote bank that ensures the continued dominance of an UMNO-led federal 
government. Chin, Politics of federal intervention, p. 116.     
99 Faisal Hazis, “The Politics of Islam in Sarawak” in Faisal Hazis and Stanley Bye Kadam-Kiai, eds. 
Politics and Local Government in Sarawak (Kota Samarahan: Penerbit Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, 
2013), p. 206.  
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Muslim communities when it comes to resource distribution and power arrangements; its 
influence is much less so in the social realm, as we will see in this chapter. 
Despite social fluidity among the various ethnic groups in Sarawak, political representation 
still largely breaks down along ethno-religious lines, with the main fissure separating 
Muslims and non-Muslims.100 The Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak do use Islam to further 
entrench their position within the Malay-Muslim communities but not with the similar 
rhetoric found in the peninsula. They do so primarily by enmeshing Islam in development 
politics such as building mosques and providing financial assistance to Islamic schools and 
organizations. The Islamic revivalism in the past thirty years has served to intensify the 
Islamic identity of the Malay-Muslims in Sarawak, which has, in turn, translate into 
increasing political support for the only Malay-Muslim party, PBB, which won all the seats it 
contested in predominantly Malay-Muslim constituencies.101 Despite the strong ethno-
religious appeal in Malay-Muslim constituencies, as evident by the electoral support for PBB, 
one finds different type of Islamic discourse employed in Sarawak as electoral strategy, 




100 The exception is the Dayak-majority constituencies, where Chinese candidates have been known to 
succeed against Dayak candidates. But the political representation on the whole is still clearly divided 
along ethno-religious line as no non-Muslim candidates ever contest, much less win, in Muslim-
majority constituencies. Jayum Jawan and Victor King, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics in Sarawak 
(Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2004), pp. 48-53. 
101 After the 2013 general election, Sarawak has 31 parliamentary seats and 29 of them belong to BN 
component parties in Sarawak. PBB holds 16 out of the 29 BN parliamentary seats, 8 of which are in 
Muslim-majority districts. The other 8 seats are in Muslim-minority districts, several of which are 
represented by PBB’s non-Muslim MPs, a testament to PBB’s appeal across the religious line through 
the power of patronage. Election Commission of Malaysia: http://www.spr.gov.my (accessed on 7 
March, 2016).  
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Table 4.4: PBB’s Performance in the Parliamentary Elections, 1982-2004102 
 1982 1986 1990 1995 1999 2004 
% of votes won 















Number of seats 




5 out of 
5 
 
5 out of 
5 
 
7 out of 
7 
 
8 out of 
8 
 
7 out of 
7 
 
7 out of 
7 
  
In essence, Malay-Muslim leaders pursue an Islamization strategy in Sarawak not because 
they need political legitimation as a result of a dominant role of Islam in public discourse 
locally. They are not compelled to engage on a theological level about what the normative 
Islamic governance should be, unlike in the peninsula, where the two main Malay-Muslims 
parties, UMNO and PAS, battle each other to claim sole interpretive authority over the place 
of Islam in Malaysian public life. For instance, issues such as the implementation of the 
hudud law and the use of the term Allah by non-Muslims, which find strong resonance among 
the Malay-Muslims in the peninsula, do not acquire similar traction among the Malay-
Muslims in Sarawak.103 As a result, one finds the nature of Islamization of the Malay-Muslim 
societies in Sarawak since the 1970s to be more moderate, in contrast to the more 
conservative dynamics found in the peninsula, which will be explained later in this section.     
Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak pursue local Islamic policies that facilitate the practice of 
Islam in people’s daily lives. It means implementing development projects to build mosques, 
surau (small prayer room or building), and Islamic schools. Furthermore, these “Islamic 
projects” are often timed to coincide with the state or parliamentary elections, a clear 
illustration of their objective as an electoral strategy. The heightened religiosity among 																																																								
102 Hazis, Domination and Contestation, p. 169. 
103 “Adenan: Sarawak BN parties united against hudud,” The Star, 2 April 2015 (accessed on 2 May 
2016). 
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Muslims in Malaysia since the late 1970s was also apparent in Sarawak as reflected in the 
increasing number of “Islamic projects” since the mid-1980s to accommodate the rising 
demand from the Muslim community in the state.  
Table 4.5: “Islamic projects” promised or distributed by the BN leaders during Sarawak 
elections, 1982-2004 (election years in bold)104 
 Number of “Islamic 
projects” 
Total costs of “Islamic projects” (in RM 
millions) 
1982 2 n.a. 
1983 0 0.0 
1986 1 0.06 
1987 6 0.128 
1990 5 5.405 
1991 13 0.94 
1995 14 0.865 
1996 8 7.01 
1999 7 14.57 
2001 8 6.25 
2004 16 2.255 
 
The strategy has so far proven to be successful as demonstrated by PBB’s wins at the polls 
since the early 1980s. Despite using Islam as a means for political survival, the Malay-
Muslim leaders have not transformed the tone and substance of Islamic discourse in the state 
to parallel the high-pitched, deeply acrimonious climate in the peninsula. Faisal Hazis states 
that there are two reasons for this divergent trend: the absence of an influential Islamist 
movement that can challenge Sarawak’s official Islam; and the need for the Malay-Muslim 
strongmen–politicians to allay the fear of the non-Muslims.105  
Turning to the first of these explanations, the absence of an influential Islamic movement that 
can offer a counter-narrative to that presented by the state government has allowed the state’s 
leaders to pursue moderate Islamic-oriented policies. The biggest Islamic organization in 																																																								
104 “Islamic projects” here refer to the construction of mosques, surau and Islamic schools, in addition 
to financial grants to Islamic organizations in the state. Hazis, Domination and Contestation, p. 195. 
105 Ibid., p. 194. 
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Sarawak is Harakah Islamiah (HIKMAH), which was established in April 1969, with the then 
Chief Minister, Abdul Rahman Ya’kub, as its first patron.106 HIKMAH is a dakwah-based 
organization, with the overarching objectives of strengthening the Muslim community in 
Sarawak and reaching out to the non-Muslims (not necessarily to convert them). While 
HIKMAH is registered as a non-governmental organization, it is inextricably linked to the 
state government, so much so that its main office building is located on state-owned land.107 
HIKMAH’s dakwah efforts typically involve cultural approaches such as sports and music, 
paying acute sensitivity to the fluidity of inter-religious norms of Sarawak. In other words, 
HIKMAH’s modus operandi is no different than that practised by the Malay-Muslim leaders 
in the state, which is based on moderation, tolerance, and flexibility.  
Despite its dominance in the Islamic civil society milieu, HIKMAH is still challenged to a 
certain extent by another Islamic organization, namely Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia Negeri 
Sarawak (ABIMNS). ABIMNS is the state chapter of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
(ABIM), an Islamic civil society organization founded in 1972 by Anwar Ibrahim, the former 
Deputy Prime Minister and currently the Opposition leader. ABIMNS is a mirror image of its 
peninsular counterpart, as it promotes a modernist version of Islam that eschews cultural 
influences deemed to be un-Islamic (bid’ah). This strict interpretation of Islam sets ABIMNS 
on a collision path with local Islamic organizations that adopt a more culturally-flexible 
approach, particularly HIKMAH. ABIMNS members claim that HIKMAH’s dakwah through 
cultural and sporting activities is not sanctioned by the Quran. ABIMNS also charges 
HIKMAH with being highly politicized and dominated by self-interested politicians only 																																																								
106 Before August 1994, HIKMAH was known as Angkatan Nahdatul Islam Bersatu (BINA). Juanda 
Jaya, “Organisasi Dakwah Bukan Kerajaan di Sarawak: Sejarah dan Peranan” in Anwar Fakhri Omar, 
Ezad Zaraai Jamsari and Jaffary Awang, eds., Islam di Sarawak dan Sabah (Bangi: Penerbitan 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2003), pp. 89-96.  
107 The land is owned by Lembaga Amanah Masjid Sarawak, a state agency in charge of building and 
maintaining mosques. One example of the closeness of HIKMAH to the state government is when it 
suffered financial woes between 1985 and 1991 after some of its leadership decided to join the 
opposition against the state government. Ibid., p. 92.  
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looking to expand their influence; it is not neutral and therefore unfit to act as a vehicle for 
dakwah.108  
The challenge by ABIMNS has failed to put a dent in HIKMAH’s supremacy as the most 
influential Islamic organization in Sarawak for two reasons: first, the state government 
provides unstinting support to HIKMAH, as already explained; and second, ABIMNS’s main 
strategy of “internal dakwah” (dakwah dalam) emphasizes individual behavioural change 
over political organizing, and so does not constitute a significant threat to HIKMAH. Despite 
its obvious disagreement with HIKMAH’s alleged collusion with the political establishment, 
ABIMNS has never mounted any serious challenge to the state government. ABIMNS 
realizes that a hard line approach toward dakwah, similar to those widely prevalent in the 
peninsula, would not sit well with the more open inter-religious dynamics found in Sarawak. 
Therefore, its programs solely focus on education, such as kindergartens and Quranic schools 
and youths. As such, ABIMNS has had little impact on public Islamic discourse, unlike in the 
peninsula.109 
The second aspect that explains the moderate nature of Islamization efforts in Sarawak is the 
awareness of the Malay-Muslim leaders that they should avoid upsetting the non-Muslim 
majority by making overt displays of religious piety. The fear that Islam could disrupt the 
tolerant multi-ethnic coexistence in Sarawak was evident when Sarawak agreed to join the 
Malaysian federation in 1963. Paragraph 15(1) of the agreement states that Islam should not 
be the official religion of Sarawak as it is in the peninsula.110 As mentioned above, the notion 
of Dayak unity presents a clear threat to the Malay-Muslims’ hold on power, and the Malay-																																																								
108 Ibid., pp. 96-99. 
109 For in-depth analysis of ABIM’s role during the wave of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia, see 
Mohammad Nor Monutty, “Perception of Social Change in Contemporary Malaysia: A Critical 
Analysis of ABIM’s Role and Its Impact Among Muslim Youth.” Ph.D diss., Temple University, 
1990, pp. 155-198. See also Chapter 5 in this thesis.  
110 Malaysia: Report of the Inter-Governmental Committee, pp. 9-10.  
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Muslim leaders try to avoid at all cost providing any pretext that might rally the Dayak tribes 
against them. Since most Dayaks are Christians, any effort to exert a more aggressive form of 
Islamization in Sarawak might have such an effect.111 Accordingly, the prevalent thinking 
among Malay-Muslims in Sarawak is that religious conflict should be avoided whenever 
possible. One official at the Islamic Council of Sarawak (Majlis Islam Sarawak, MIS) said 
that the rigid form of Islam practised in the peninsula was simply not relevant to Sarawak, and 
even if it was implemented it would only cause unnecessary tension with the non-Muslim 
community, which, in turn, would not be good for the Muslim minority in the state.112  
Furthermore, since the political legitimacy of the Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak does not 
depend on them adopting more orthodox views as a way to strengthen their Islamic 
credentials, they are free to pursue a moderate approach when it comes to Islamic-oriented 
policies. Even the Islamic party PAS in the peninsula, the agenda of which includes 
implementation of hudud (Islamic criminal law), chooses to exclusively focus on bread-and-
butter issues such as poverty, corruption and poor infrastructure when it campaigns against 
PBB in Malay-majority areas in Sarawak; hudud and other religiously controversial issues 
such as the use of the term Allah in Malay-language bible are nowhere to be found on its 
campaign platform.113 In short, Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak adopt a moderate approach 
when it comes to the Islamization process. This approach is borne out of political necessity, 
																																																								
111 “Hudud will be ‘last straw’ for Sabah, Sarawak,” Free Malaysia Today, 6 April 2015 (accessed on 
2 May 2016). 
112 Interview with Latif Abdul Karim, Ketua Sektor Pendidikan Islam, Majlis Islam Sarawak, 28 April 
2014. 
113 “PAS launches ‘Untukmu Sarawak’ to woo Sarawakians,” Borneo Post, 27 May 2014 (accessed on 
6 October 2014). 
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lest they incur the wrath of a non-Muslim majority already feeling anxious about the 
encroachment of Malay-Muslim polemics from the peninsula.114  
Federalized institutional identity of SPI-JPNS and MIS 
Unlike other state Islamic councils in Malaysia, which are deeply involved in Islamic 
educational affairs in their states especially in establishing the curriculum and hiring teachers, 
the Islamic Council of Sarawak (MIS) does not have comprehensive control over Islamic 
education in the state. Since a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between 
MIS and the federal government in August 2011, almost all Islamic schools in Sarawak now 
have fallen under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, administered by the ministry’s 
state educational office (Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri Sarawak, JPNS) in Kuching. The 
management and supervision of Islamic education are under the purview of the Islamic 
Education Sector (Sektor Pendidikan Islam, SPI) of JPNS. JPNS, in turn, has 31 district 
offices (Pejabat Pendidikan Daerah, PPD) across the state with 11 PPDs having their own 
“religious supervisor” (penyelia agama) in charge of Islamic educational affairs.115 MIS still 
plays a role in maintaining the school infrastructure and retaining ownership of the land on 
which most of the schools are built, but the administration and supervision of the Islamic 
schools, their curriculum and the hiring of their teachers are now firmly within the authority 
of the federal government. The federalization of Islamic schools in Sarawak raises the 
questions: How autonomous are federal agents of the state (the staffs of JPNS and PPD) in 
implementing the Islamic educational policies from the ministry? To what extent does 
Sarawak’s multi-ethnic culture influence their institutional behaviour? 
																																																								
114 “Sarawak starts feeling the heat of peninsular feud over religion,” Aliran Online, 2 August 2014 
(accessed on 6 October 2014). 
115 Only PPDs with large enough Muslim population receive religious supervisors. 
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A significant majority of the employees of SPI-JPNS and MIS are local Sarawakians. This 
fact is a result of Borneanisation of the civil service, as required by the 1963 agreement. A 
few staff are Malays from the peninsula, but most of them have been residing in Sarawak for 
a long time, mainly because of marriage with locals.116 Despite the overwhelming 
representation of Sarawakians in the state educational office, the prevalent institutional 
sentiment in the office tilts toward the federal government. Local officials mostly emphasize 
the value of having a uniform standard from the federal government and the need for federal 
assistance in order to develop Islamic education in the state. There is little evidence of a local 
institutional identity shaped by the peculiarities of Sarawak’s multicultural dynamics. The 
federalization of local institutional identity seen in Sarawak’s state educational office can be 
explained chiefly by the fact that there has not been a long-standing history of formal Islamic 
education in the state, unlike in Kelantan. This absence allows the federal government to fill 
in the void, namely with a uniform standard and a supply of its own teachers. Furthermore, 
MIS does not engage in oppositional relationship with the federal government when it comes 
to managing Islamic education in the state, in contrast to the dynamics seen in Kelantan 
between the Majlis Agama Islam Kelantan, Yayasan Islam Kelantan, and the federal 
government.  
While the majority of the staff of SPI-JPN are Sarawakians, the collective institutional 
mindset is a mirror image of that in the federal government. One high-ranking official of SPI-
JPNS states that there should not be any difference between the policies formulated by the 
ministry and the way they are implemented and enforced in Sarawak; in other words, local 
culture has no bearing on the interpretation of federal policies in Sarawak.117 When officials 
of SPI-JPNS mix up local culture with Islamic educational policy, they say they do so as part 																																																								
116 Interestingly the director of SPI-JPNS is originally from Perak, a state on the west coast of the 
peninsula. The position was left vacant for almost two years before it was finally filled by a non-
Sarawakian appointee in July 2011.   
117 Interview with Arip Sa’aya, Pengarah SPI-JPNS (the aforementioned personnel), 10 July 2013. 
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of their obligation to carry out the policies of the ministry, not as a sign of tolerance.118 In 
short, the belief in unadulterated implementation of a uniform federal standard by the staff of 
SPI-JPNS is a testament to the pervasive influence of the federal government on the 
institutional mindset of SPI-JPNS.     
The minimal role of MIS also correlates to the increased federalization in the management of 
Islamic education in Sarawak. Currently, MIS is only in charge of maintaining the school 
infrastructure and is allowed to retain the ownership of the land on which the schools are 
built. As mentioned before, MIS lacks the resources and capacity to manage the schools under 
its jurisdiction; hence, they had to be given up to the federal government on August 2011. 
One commonly cited reason for this move is that Sarawak lacked a comprehensive Islamic 
curriculum at the state level due to its weak tradition of formal Islamic education.119 There is 
also a dearth of local teachers capable of teaching Islamic subjects and many have to be 
recruited from the peninsula.120 Since August 2011, the federal government has provided 
curricula for all Islamic subjects, along with the mandatory subject testing, and the hiring and 
placement of teachers. The 2011 MoU nonetheless states that MIS has the authority to assign 
principals to Islamic schools that used to be under its jurisdiction but in practice the decision 
has to be done in consultation with SPI-JPNS. In sum, the weakened function of MIS in 
																																																								
118 Examples given are when the non-Muslim principals at Sekolah Kebangsaan (National Primary 
School) Batu Lintang and Sekolah Jenis Kebangsaan Cina (Chinese-Type National School) Sematan 
decided to host Majlis Khatam Quran (an event to celebrate one’s accomplishment in finishing the 
Quran) in their school. Their act was seen not as an accommodation of the religious needs of the 
Muslim students but as simply following orders from the federal government. Interview with Zaini 
Hasbollah, Ketua Unit Dakwah dan Syiar Islam, SPI-JPNS, 8 July 2013.    
119 Interview with Latif Abdul Karim, Ketua Sektor Pendidikan Islam, Majlis Islam Sarawak, 28 April 
2014. 
120 “Sarawak kekurangan guru Pendidikan Islam: Ahmad,” Borneo Post, 1 August 2014 (accessed on 
22 August 2014). More recently, an appointment of a religious teacher from the peninsular as the 
principal of a predominantly non-Muslim Dayak national public high school (SMK Sungai Paoh) in 
the rural area of Sarikei has caused quite a stir in the state. “Stop appointment of religious teacher to 
Sarawak rural school, Dayaks tell Adenan,” The Malaysian Insider, 7 November 2015 (accessed on 7 
November 2015).  
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managing Islamic education in Sarawak directly contributes to the ability of the federal 
government to exert more influence in the state, namely through SPI-JPNS.  
The present-day dynamics illustrate an overwhelming influence of the federal government on 
Islamic education in Sarawak. In contrast to the case of Kelantan in Chapter 3, where the 
Islamic Foundation of Kelantan (Yayasan Islam Kelantan, YIK) serves as a (largely 
ineffective) foil against the federal juggernaut, MIS is simply incapable or unwilling to play a 
countervailing role. Therefore, based on my interviews with two top officials of SPI-JPNS, it 
is clearly evident that the Islamic education arena in Sarawak is effectively monopolized by 
the federal government, and the dominance the institutional identity of SPI-JPNS that is 
heavily in favour of the federal government with nary a consideration for local particularities. 
In the context of the argument of this thesis, the federalized institutional identity seen in 
Sarawak can be attributed to low institutional complexity between institutions that oversee 
Islamic education in the state. Weak tradition of Islamic learning and dearth of resources 
create an institutional dependency within SPI-JPNS and MIS on the federal government, 
which, in turn, minimizes the friction between the federal government and these Sarawak-
based institutions. Localized institutional identity can be developed in opposition to the 
institutional norms found in the centre, a sign of high institutional complexity, as seen in the 
case of Aceh and NTT, and to a much smaller and futile extent, with YIK in Kelantan. Such 
oppositional dynamics are absent in Sarawak, which has allowed the federal government a 
free rein in managing Islamic education in the state despite the explicit Borneaisation of the 
civil service in Sarawak. 
Implementation and enforcement of orthodox values in schools     
Despite the fact that the officials in charge of Islamic schools are heavily influenced by the 
federal government’s Islamizing agenda, the influence of Sarawak’s more open multicultural 
interaction is obvious at the school level. While the staff and students of Islamic schools are 
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predominantly Malay-Muslims, unlike other types of schools that are more ethnically diverse, 
the schools’ collective ethos is a reflection of the society at large. When it comes to 
implementing the national curriculum, the students’ and teachers’ lived experience plays a 
crucial role in how they interpret and adapt the learning materials in order to make them 
relevant to their lives. Indeed, the principal of one Islamic school says that it is not only 
necessary for the teachers to adapt their pedagogical style and curriculum to the cultural 
reality of Sarawak for the sake of relevancy but the action itself can also be seen as a form of 
dakwah.121 The reason, she explained, was that the teachers and students can better 
comprehend and internalize the teachings of Islam if they do not find them alien and off-
putting.  
Since the national curriculum originates from the peninsula, its cultural references are based 
on the Malay life in the peninsula, which can be starkly different from the Malay-Muslim 
experience in Sarawak. A personal friend, who is a local Sarawak Malay businessman, relates 
that his first experience of living in the peninsula for his university study was “shocking and 
suffocating.”122 This is the point made by the aforementioned principal. An effective dakwah, 
according to her, has to be built on existing culture and should not set out to displace it. Many 
of the Malay-Muslim students in the school come from multi-religious families, which is 
almost unheard of in the peninsula, and the pedagogical approach in the classroom has to take 
that fact into consideration. For example, classroom learning focuses less on differences 
between religions and sects in Islam and more on common ideals such as universal moral 
values and that everyone is equal in the eyes of God. Her remark stands in stark contrast to 
the state Islamic orthodoxy on religious pluralism embodied in the Pendidikan Islam 
curriculum shown in Chapter 1, which it will be recalled, suggests that the Ahlus Sunnah Wal 																																																								
121 Interview with Affida Helmi, principal of Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Agama (SABK) Tun 
Ahmad Zaidi, Kuching, 8 July 2013. 
122 It was a culture shock for him and suffocating in a sense that his peninsular Malay friends were 
constantly telling him how to behave like a “proper Muslim.” Interview in Kuching, 3 July 2013. 
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Jamaah version of Islam as the absolute truth, and therefore superior to other interpretations 
of Islam and non-Islamic religions. In addition, she also says that curriculum development is 
actually part of an official ministry policy called Skills for Thinking Creatively and Critically 
(Kemahiran Berfikir Secara Kreatif dan Kritis, KBKK), which tries to encourage students 
and teachers to expand on the knowledge enclosed in the official curriculum.123 The teachers 
use the pretext of KBKK to mould the national curriculum into a form that is more suitable to 
the local peculiarities of Sarawak. For instance, there is no mention of multi-religious family 
in the national high school curriculum for Pendidikan Islam, which as stated before, is a 
common aspect of communal life in Sarawak. Local teachers, thus, use KBKK policy to 
incorporate discussion on multi-religious family in the Pendidikan Islam subject in order to 
make the subject more relevant to lived experience of the students.    
Therefore, the school’s view that a certain degree of leeway is needed to interpret the 
Pendidikan Islam curriculum is not congruent with the one-size-fits-all policy of the federal 
government demonstrated earlier. This then brings us to the question of enforcement and 
compliance: how do the school and federal government (as represented by the state 
educational office) navigate the apparent ideological differences and manage not to step on 
each other’s toes? Visits of schools by officers from SPI-JPNS take place about two or three 
times a year, and include financial auditing and classroom observation. Visits from ministry 
officials are infrequent due to staff shortages and logistical challenges. According to the 
principal of SMKA (SABK) Tun Ahmad Zaidi, “deviancy” from official directives tends to 
be overlooked by the officers from SPI-JPNS when they observe the classroom. The focus of 
their supervision is mainly on the school’s financial management, teaching competency, and 
																																																								
123 The principal herself comes from a mixed background. She was born to Chinese parents but was 
given up for adoption to a Malay-Muslim couple, who brought her up as a Muslim. She still keeps 
close contact with her biological parents and whenever she visits them, they always make sure that the 
served food is prepared using utensils that are pork-free. She keeps referring to her own background as 
a way to emphasize the importance of adapting the curriculum to the local culture. 
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coverage of materials in the syllabus.124 Actions taken against “deviant” teaching in the 
classrooms typically stem from complaints made by parents or local communities, not from 
these regular supervisory visits.  
There is also a contradiction between the homogenous image of the national curriculum and 
its heterodox implementation at the local level as exemplified by the KBKK policy.125 When 
asked about this, an officer at SPI-JPNS says that adaptation is indeed allowable as long as it 
does not go against the principles of Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah and corrupt the faith (aqidah) 
of the students.126 In short, the federal government does acknowledge the importance of local 
culture in curriculum development but somehow this is not apparent in the attitude of the 
officers of SPI-JPNS. One explanation is that the political dominance of Muslims in Sarawak 
means that the focus of the religious authorities, including SPI-JPNS, is not on guarding the 
faithful against competing interpretations of Islam but to defend them against the threat of 
Christianization, whether perceived or real. 
The fear of Christianization is understandable given that the Malay-Muslim minority is 
surrounded by a Christian majority. Hence, one of the main focuses of SPI-JPNS is to 
neutralize this “threat,” not so much in Islamic schools but more importantly in national 
schools, where the student body is more religiously and ethnically diverse. SPI-JPNS is in 
charge of the subject Islamic Studies (Pendidikan Islam) and the needs of Muslim students in 
																																																								
124 Interview with Affida Helmi, principal of Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Agama (SABK) Tun 
Ahmad Zaidi, Kuching, 8 July 2013. 
125 The Ministry of Education first introduced the KBKK policy in 1994 as an effort to encourage 
critical thinking skills among students and move teachers away from simply being a vessel of 
knowledge to interactive classroom figures that foster innovation and creativity. Rafiei Mustapha, 
Kajian Tentang Kemahiran Berfikir Secara Kritis dan Kreatif (KBKK) Dalam Pengajaran dan 
Pembelajaran Bahasa Melayu Sekolah Menengah (Putrajaya: Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia, 
1998), p. 2.  
126 Interview with Zaini Hasbollah, Ketua Unit Dakwah dan Syiar Islam, SPI-JPNS, 8 July 2013.    
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national schools, which includes protecting their faith against seeping Christianization.127 
According to a SPI-JPNS officer, the Ministry of Education’s target is zero “deviant 
activities” (aktiviti penyelewengan aqidah) according to official guidelines, which specifies, 
among other such activities, the spread of Christian teachings in schools.128  
As well as education, another issue that relates to the Christianization effort is the practice of 
inter-religious marriage among Sarawakians. Inter-religious marriage is common in Sarawak 
even between Muslims and non-Muslims, though the non-Muslim partner has to convert to 
Islam in accordance with Malaysian law.129 Nonetheless, it is also common for new Muslim 
converts to maintain their old non-Islamic lifestyle, and some even revert back to Christianity 
after the marriage falls apart.130 The increased influence of rigid Islam as practised in the 
peninsula in the past three decades has drawn a sharp wedge between the Muslims and non-
Muslims in Sarawak when it comes to the issue of inter-religious marriage. The major 
sticking point in this issue is the requirement to convert to Islam before marriage for non-
Muslim partners and the prohibition on reversion out of Islam (apostasy or murtad) in the 
case of a divorce. The Islamic Development Agency of Malaysia (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam 
Malaysia, JAKIM), the main arbiter of Islamic orthodoxy in the country, has made its 
position clear when it comes to inter-religious marriage. While JAKIM encourages inter-
religious (i.e. inter-ethnic) marriage for variety of reasons, including as a form of dakwah, for 
fostering inter-ethnic harmony and due to the evidence of high IQ among children of mixed 																																																								
127 Examples offered by SPI-JPNS of Christianizing efforts in schools include inviting pastors to lead 
the prayer for Christian students in the school when there’s a concurrent Muslim prayer (typically 
during solat hajat before the national exams), attempts to establish student Bible study groups, and 
principals who allow Malay-language Bibles to be freely placed in classrooms. Ibid. 
128 He also adds that since the state educational department (JPNS) as a whole is dominated by 
Muslims, Christian activities in schools can still be easily contained. Ibid.  
129 Welyne Jeffrey Jehom, “Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnic Relations in Sarawak” in Zawawi Ibrahim, 
ed., Representation, Identity and Multiculturalism in Sarawak (Kuching and Kajang: Dayak Cultural 
Foundation and Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 2008), pp. 98-100. 
130 “Sarawak won’t adopt anti-apostasy law,” The Sun, 14 November 2011 (accessed on 10 October 
2014). 
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marriage, it also stipulates that the non-Muslim partner has to convert to Islam and that 
reversion to their former faith upon divorce cannot be allowed and should be punishable by 
death.131 This official view makes its way into the national curriculum for Pendidikan Islam, a 
mandatory subject for all Muslim students in which they also have to sit a national exam.132 
The effect of this orthodox view has slowly taken root in Sarawak over the years with an 
increasing number of non-Muslims becoming averse to marrying Muslims.133 While the 
present-day inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in Sarawak remain more fluid and far 
less contentious than in the peninsula, the polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims is 
becoming more apparent as the polemics and orthodox views of the peninsula slowly make 
their way across the South China Sea, including through the Pendidikan Islam curriculum.      
Conclusion 
This chapter has compared Islamic education in two Christian-majority areas – Nusa 
Tenggara Timur in Indonesia and Sarawak in Malaysia – analysed through the lens of power 
relations between the minority Muslims and majority Christians. In the context of this thesis, 
it is the differences in power dynamics between the two religious communities, explained by 
factors such as the institutional mindsets of the agencies that oversee Islamic education, 
patterns of Islamization, and control of resources by the central government, that allow the 
																																																								
131 While apostasy is not punishable by death in Malaysia, it is still considered an offence that falls 
under the purview of various states’ syariah legal systems, of which the punishment can range from 
mandatory counselling and rehabilitation to imprisonment and caning. For JAKIM’s view on inter-
religious marriage, see: Tanya Ulama JAKIM: http://apps.islam.gov.my/ka/questions/view/17069/page:38 
(accessed on 9 October 2014). For fatwa on the death penalty for apostasy, see JAKIM’s e-fatwa page: 
http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my/fatwa-negeri/hukum-menolong-orang-yang-hendak-murtad-0 (accessed on 15 
October 2014). See also Mohd Aizam Mas’od, “Apostasy is not human rights,” Bahagian Aqidah, 
JAKIM: http://www.islam.gov.my/sites/default/files/apostasy_is_not_human_rights.pdf (accessed on 15 
October 2014).  
132 Maimon Husin, Apendi Sahi, Zulhazmi Omar and Mohammad Zaini Yahaya, Nexus Tuntas SPM 4-
5: Pendidikan Islam. (Kuala Lumpur: Sasbadi Sdn. Bhd, 2014), p. 47. 
133 Hew Cheng Sim, “Praying Together, Staying Together: Islamisation and Inter-ethnic Marriages in 
Sarawak, Malaysia,” International Journal of Sociology of the Family 36, no. 2 (Autumn 2010): pp. 
208-214. 
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state in Malaysia to exert more influence and control over Islamic education, compared to the 
state in Indonesia.  
This chapter argues that the sad state of Islamic education in NTT is a result of the politically 
weak position of the Muslim community in the province, which officially constitutes about 10 
percent of the total population. As we can see from the comparison with Sarawak in Malaysia, 
where being a minority does not translate into powerlessness, the Muslim community in NTT 
does not have features that could enable it to gain political advantage and resist Christian-
centric policies and values promoted by the provincial government and local society. For one, 
the population of Muslims in NTT is one-third of that in Sarawak and they are also more 
widely dispersed among hundreds of islands across the province.134 Another reason is there is 
hardly any support from the central government in Jakarta to the Muslim community in NTT 
since Islamic political legitimacy is not very important for the government. Hence, the central 
government can avoid helping to uplift the political status of the Muslim community in NTT 
without being accused of being “un-Islamic” and therefore unfit to govern. It is within this 
context that the poor state of Islamic education in NTT can be explained. 
In contrast, despite its minority status, the Malay-Muslim community in Sarawak has 
managed to persist and prosper in the midst of a Christian-majority environment. This 
political strength is illustrated by the viability of Islamic education in the state, despite 
competition from the far more numerous national schools. The healthy state of Islamic 
education in Sarawak is in no small part due to the politically dominant position of the Malay-
Muslims in the state, which is in turn backed by the might of the federal government in the 
peninsula. Their politically privileged position means that Malay-Muslim leaders in Sarawak 																																																								
134 The head of NTT chapter of MUI claims that census figure is being politicised by the provincial 
government to keep the Muslims weak. He gives the example of Kupang, where the official figure for 
Muslims is about 8 percent of the population but he says that that number should be at least 30 
percent. It means that Muslim community in Kupang deserves a much bigger piece of the political pie 
than what it currently gets. Interview with Abdulkadir Makarim, Kupang, 10 April 2014. 
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are able to distribute resources that would not have been available to them were they in the 
same situation as the Muslims in NTT. Nonetheless, Muslim leaders also need to avoid 
offending the religious sensibility of the non-Muslim majority. Therefore, the religious 
controversies that happen with such regularity in the peninsula are not replicated in Sarawak, 
a testament to the state’s more culturally fluid and diverse society. Until now, Malay-Muslim 
leaders in Sarawak have thus been able to have their cake and eat it too, but it remains to be 
seen how long will they be able to maintain this delicate balance, as Sarawak is slowly being 
sucked into the divisive religious discourse that has predominated in the peninsula.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Fusing the Sacred and the Profane: Integrated Islamic Education in Indonesia and 
Malaysia 
 
It is an error and what an error! – to think that Islam can evolve in the form of an abstract 
theory limited to intellectual learning and cultural knowledge. Beware of this danger, 
beware!1  
 
One growing trend in the field of Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia over the past 
three decades has been the increasing popularity of integrated Islamic schools, especially 
among Muslim middle- and upper-middle class professionals. The driving force behind this 
trend is the pursuit of educational excellence by religiously devout Muslims, who seek the 
best of both general and Islamic educations for their children through combining the two 
types of education. This trend also has socio-political roots, however. Integrated Islamic 
schools in Indonesia and Malaysia trace their origins to campus-based dakwah (Islamic 
propagation) student groups, galvanized by the wave of Islamization that started in the late 
1970s. Groups such as Jemaah Tarbiyah (JT) in Indonesia and Malaysian Islamic Youth 
Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, ABIM) and IKRAM in Malaysia see education 
as an integral part of their socio-political movement, the overarching goal of which is to 
uphold and instil Islamic values in the society. For these groups, therefore, creating an ideal 
Islamic education is not simply about producing students who excel in both professional and 
religious spheres; education also serves as a means to mould and enlist young students into a 
movement to Islamize society, be it in the public or private sector. In short, they see 
integrated Islamic schools as an ideological training ground for future cadres of their 
movement. But ideological indoctrination alone is not enough since for Islamization of the 
society to be successful, the movement’s cadres have to be well placed in the society and hold 
important and strategic positions in the public and private sectors; hence, these schools 																																																								
1 Syed Qutb, Ma’alim fi al-tareeq [Signposts on the Road] (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2006), 
p. 23. 
	 241 
typically focus on creating all-around academic excellence that pays equal attention to both 
general and religious education. 
As we have seen in this thesis so far, the state in Malaysia has been more successful than the 
state in Indonesia in centralizing its control over Islamic education in the country. This 
chapter, in contrast, strives to illustrate that there are three factors that have allowed integrated 
Islamic schools in Indonesia and Malaysia to circumvent control of the state and engage in 
ideological indoctrination of their students: the complicity of state institutions that oversee 
Islamic education; state Islamic orthodoxies that permit such practices to take place; and the 
financial autonomy enjoyed by integrated Islamic schools.  
In Indonesia, even though MORA vets their curriculum, the supervision of integrated Islamic 
schools falls under the jurisdiction of MOEC. In Malaysia, integrated Islamic schools fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Private Education Department of MOE, which like MORA in 
Indonesia, believes that integrated Islamic schools can only be a good addition to the overall 
development of Islamic education in the country.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Indonesia and Malaysia practise starkly different state Islamic 
orthodoxies but, despite their differences, they both allow integrated Islamic schools to 
flourish. The pluralist approach of the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia provides the space 
for deeply conservative values propagated by integrated Islamic schools to co-exist with the 
more moderate ones promoted by MORA. In Malaysia, in contrast, it is precisely the 
conservative values of the state Islamic orthodoxy that permit the theologically conservative 
integrated Islamic schools to operate with relative freedom. 
Finally, the financial autonomy enjoyed by integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia and 
Malaysia allows them to implement their own educational systems, imbued with their 
particular ideological values, without fearing negative repercussions from the state since the 
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schools do not depend on state funding for viability. The presence of such schools, in other 
words, points to the heterogeneity of the country’s Islamic education system.   
The chapter is organized into four sections. The first section discusses the general concept of 
integrated Islamic education and explains why, according to some Muslim thinkers, there 
should not be any separation between general and religious knowledge in Islam. The second 
section explains the historical factors that gave birth to campus dakwah movements, which 
later established integrated Islamic schools as part of their ideological indoctrination efforts. 
The third section delves into the specific ways integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia and 
Malaysia engage in ideological indoctrination through their curricula and extra-curricular 
activities. Finally, the fourth section looks at the schools’ ideological indoctrination practice 
in relation to state Islamic orthodoxy and the political dynamics in the country. The chapter 
concludes by showing that despite the differences in the way the states in Indonesia and 
Malaysia manage their Islamic education system, integrated Islamic schools keep growing in 
popularity and are able to continue their ideological indoctrination unimpeded by the state.        
Integrated Islamic education in general 
According to many Muslim thinkers, Islam, in a normative sense, is a complete way of life 
(ad-deen), where there is no separation between the sacred and the profane, and where all 
aspects of life can and should be predicated on the teachings of Quran and hadiths (traditions 
of Prophet Muhammad).2 In the realm of knowledge, this means that there should not be any 
divide between secular knowledge and divine knowledge. In other words, for every scientific 
explanation that accounts for natural occurrences in the universe Muslims can find in the 
Quran evidentiary support for it. Objective inquiry is solely an “external” pursuit that is 
lacking a centre or an essence, which therefore renders it incomplete and superficial. Divine 																																																								
2 One of these thinkers is Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a prominent Egyptian theologian. See Yusuf Qardhawi, 
Kerangka Idiologi Islam (Bandung: Penerbit Risalah, 1985), p. 33.  
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revelation constitutes the essence of human knowledge, out of which objective inquiry 
emanates.3 In other words, Islamic knowledge, in its perfection, pre-empts all these so-called 
“modern” discoveries. At least that is the view of leading Muslim thinkers such as Ismail Al-
Faruqi, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Osman Bakar on the subject of Islamization of knowledge.   
At the inaugural 1977 World Conference on Muslim Education in Mecca, one of the major 
points discussed and agreed upon by participating Muslim countries was that there should be 
an Islamization of knowledge.4 The focus stemmed from the delegates’ concern that secular 
education was divorced from religious values, and that religious education was devoid of any 
scientific knowledge. They also shared the deep worry that Muslim countries were lagging 
behind Western countries in the production and acquisition of modern knowledge. The 1977 
conference exhorted Muslim countries not to blindly follow the “secular” way of the west, 
and instead to carve their own path in keeping up with the advancements of the modern era. 
The conference delegates pushed for the “Islamic way” of learning by harking back to the 
golden age of Islam to show how Muslims were able to develop the forgotten scientific 
knowledge left by the Greeks in a way that was congruent with the teachings embodied in the 
Quran. The idea for an integrated Islamic education germinated from this desire to combine 
religious and modern learning. 
The notion that Muslim countries had to revamp their Islamic education systems in order to 
remain relevant in the modern era, in fact, long predated the 1977 World Conference on 
Muslim Education in Mecca. At the turn of the 20th century, Muslim thinkers such as Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida were the main proponents of Islamic 
educational reforms to allow Muslims to better face the challenges posed by western 
																																																								
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts 
Society: Cambridge, 2002), p. 13. 
4 Syed Muhammad al-Naquib al-Attas, ed., Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education (Jeddah: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1977), pp. 37-42. 
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colonialism. In the 1920s, a group of young and educated professionals in Egypt called the 
“new effendiyya,” influenced by the previously mentioned thinkers, advocated resistance to 
the encroaching western culture while at the same time condemning the backwardness of the 
traditional Islamic education system, which in their opinion was the main reason that the 
Egyptians were not able to compete with westerners. Some of these new effendiyya went on to 
establish the Muslim Brotherhood (Arabic: Ikhwanul Muslimin) in 1928.5 The same 
revitalizing dynamic also took place in Indonesia and Malaysia during the same period. The 
modernist Muslim organization Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912 in Yogyakarta, was 
motivated to reform the traditional Islamic education in the Netherlands East Indies, which 
Muhammadiyah members perceived as static (jumud) and steeped in practices and beliefs that 
were inimical to progress. Muslim reformists in British Malaya, such as Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi 
and Sheikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin, undertook similar efforts and established some of 
the earliest madrasah (modern Islamic schools) that are still in use today. The lasting impact 
of these and similar reformist Islamic movements in Indonesia and Malaysia is such that the 
curriculum in most of the Islamic schools in these two countries now is comprised of varying 
mixes of general and religious subjects. Furthermore, in the past four decades, dakwah 
activists have adopted the Muslim Brotherhood’s model of education (tarbiyah) in an attempt 
to shape the character of the young generation through the integration of general education 
with Quranic precepts. 
The problem of duality in Islamic education  
The goal of revamping Islamic education is, of course, never monolithic. Different Muslim 
groups always disagree on the percentage of general subjects to be included in a curriculum, 
what religious subjects need to be excluded in order to make room for the general subjects, 
																																																								
5 Ehud Rosen, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Concept of Education,” Current Trends in Islamist 
Ideology 7 (Nov. 2008), pp. 116-117. 
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what should be the new focus of the religious education, and whether there should be an 
integration of teaching of general and religious subjects, among other issues. In the first five 
decades or so following the advent of the reformist movement, Islamic education in Indonesia 
and Malaysia remained bifurcated, meaning that there was a clear demarcation between 
general and religious subjects in the curriculum. General education was (and is still) seen as 
necessary for social mobility, while religious education was seen as a means to inculcate the 
Islamic values that make for a better God-fearing Muslim. The two sides were generally seen 
as being mutually exclusive, and some Muslims perceived the focus on general subjects, for 
example, as being at the expense of religious subjects, and vice versa.  
It was not until the late 1970s, at the onset of the Islamization movement that swept across 
most of the Muslim world, that outspoken Muslim activists who were frustrated with the 
perceived failure of the secular governments of the day, and was motivated by the belief that 
only Islam could provide the solution to all the ills that were plaguing the society, started to 
seriously question the philosophy and practice of duality in modern Islamic education.6 They 
thought the separation between the sacred and the profane worlds to be ludicrous as Islam in 
itself was a complete way of life that did not differentiate between the two. The same logic 
also applied to addressing the problem of duality in Islamic education. These Islamist activists 
believed all knowledge must be firmly couched in the concept of tawhid (oneness of God) as 
it is revealed in the Quran. They considered general knowledge not anchored in religious 
values to be morally deficient and a display of human arrogance against the all-knowing God. 
																																																								
6 These Islamists were namely driven by the political ideas of Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwanul Muslimin) in Egypt and Abul A’la Maududi of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan. Charles 
Adams, “Maududi and the Islamic State,” in John Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Yvonne Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic 
Revival,” in John Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983); Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Maududi and the Making Islamic Revivalism (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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The proposed integration of general and religious knowledge, in other words, the Islamization 
of knowledge, was an extension of the long historical struggle to reconcile the irrevocable 
importance of spiritual nourishment and the unrelenting demands of the modern world. Islam, 
in its pursuit of knowledge and progress, has to carve out its own epistemology of intellectual 
tradition that turns away from the dominant model of western scientific inquiry. According to 
the proponents of Islamization of knowledge, rationalism and objective observation of the 
natural environment as a means of knowledge production and acquisition has to be situated 
within the framework of a priori knowledge that is divinely revealed in the Quran. Ismail Al-
Faruqi, a former professor of religion at Temple University in Philadelphia, states that there 
must not be any conflict between scientific inquiry and revealed knowledge since that would 
either mean that the scientific finding was wrong and needed to be revisited or that the human 
understanding of the revealed knowledge was unclear and incomplete.7 Osman Bakar, a 
former professor of Islamic philosophy at the Universiti Malaya in Malaysia and a student of 
Al-Faruqi, adds that empirical knowledge provided by western scientific inquiry is in fact 
highly valued in the Islamic intellectual tradition but it comes with limitations that only 
religious consciousness is able to transcend. Physical reality, according to Osman Bakar, is 
only an aspect of a whole reality, of which it constitutes the lowest level of reality with the 
highest being God.8 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a professor of Islamic studies at George 
Washington University in Washington D.C., also discusses at length the notion of God as a 
reality, who contends that God in His infinitude contains all possibilities, including ones that 
are unfathomable through empiricism and rationalism, which then can only be unlocked and 
																																																								
7 Ismail Al-Faruqi and Lois Lamya Al-Faruqi, Kumpulan Kertas Kerja Al-Faruqi: Pemikiran Islam 
Al-Faruqi (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1988), p. 70. 
8 Osman Bakar, The History and Philosophy of Islamic Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts 
Society, 1999), p. 7. 
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understood through al-hikmah (religious wisdom).9 In short, without grounding general 
knowledge in the immutability of divine revelation one can never achieve the Truth and will 
always be at the risk of committing immoral acts as one’s lust for material progress is not 
tempered by the deep spirituality that sees everything in the material world as the embodiment 
of God’s virtues.10 Such tenets form the theoretical foundation of integrated Islamic education 
in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Genesis of integrated Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia  
Two socio-economic factors explain the rapid growth of campus-based dakwah groups in the 
1970s that later established the network of integrated Islamic schools we see in Indonesia and 
Malaysia today. Booming economies and the onset of Islamic resurgence in both societies in 
the 1970s marked the critical juncture that gave birth to dakwah movements on campuses. 
These two factors contributed to the growing size and affluence of Muslim middle-classes in 
Indonesia and Malaysia and their desire for a more holistic and academically rigorous Islamic 
education than what the state or the pre-existing private Islamic schools could offer.      
Rising affluence of Muslim middle-class 
The economies of Indonesia and Malaysia have gone through tremendous changes since the 
1970s, with many young educated professionals expanding the ranks of the middle classes. In 
Indonesia, 60 percent of the population was categorized as poor in 1970; however, by 2013 
the percentage was significantly reduced to 11.47 percent.11 On the higher education front, 
only 18.19 percent of the population possessed a high school education and beyond in 1994, 
																																																								
9 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1993), pp. 7-13. 
10 Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, p. 4. 
11 Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia): 
http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=23&notab=7 
(accessed on 7 January, 2015). 
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but the number shot up to 31.41 percent by 2013.12 The growth of affluence is also evident in 
Indonesia’s rapid rise in Gross National Income (GNI) per capita from USD 510 in 1980 to 
USD 3,580 in 2013, the 1997-98 monetary crisis notwithstanding.13  
Malaysia also went through phenomenal economic transformation during the same period. 
GNI per capita in Malaysia rose from USD 1,820 in 1980 to USD 10,430 in 2013.14 There 
was a sizeable reduction in the poverty rate from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 3.8 percent in 
2009.15 Also contributing to the creation of a large Malay-Muslim middle class in Malaysia 
was the government’s affirmative action program, the New Economic Policy (NEP), which 
was first implemented in 1971. Many Malay-Muslims benefitted from NEP’s preferential 
treatment, especially in the field of education, allowing them to significantly improve their 
socio-economic status they inherited from their parents. The number of registered 
professionals broken down by ethnicity is a telling illustration of the educational impact of 
NEP in establishing a vigorous Malay-Muslim middle class: in 1970, only 3.7 percent of 
doctors and 7.3 percent of engineers were Malays. By 2008, Malays made up 53 percent of 
doctors and 53 percent of engineers. Similar trends occurred in other white-collar professions 
such as accountancy, law, and architecture.16  
Islamization of society and its political impact  
Another important dimension that explains growing support for integrated Islamic education 
among Muslim middle-class is the relentless Islamization of society from the late 1970s in 																																																								
12 The official data on the website only goes back to 1994 but it is safe to assume that the number was 
lower in the 1970s and 1980s. Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia): 
http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?kat=1&tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=28&notab=1 
(accessed on 7 January, 2015). 
13 The World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (accessed on 7 January, 
2015). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Malaysia@50: Economic Development, Distribution, Disparities 
(Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), p. 69. 
16 Ibid., p. 87. 
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Malaysia, and from the late 1980s in Indonesia.17 Fervent dakwah activists on campus, with 
the exhortation to make Islam the solution to all social problems, created a heightened 
religious consciousness among university students, many of whom later became parents who 
currently support the development of integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
Since the early 1990s, non-Islamic and prestigious higher institutions of learning such as the 
Universitas Indonesia (UI), Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) and Universitas Gadjah Mada 
(UGM) have provided fertile ground for campus-based dakwah groups to plant the seeds for a 
conservative Muslim middle-class. The dakwah groups saw students of these elite institutions 
as having the potential for career success and to occupy strategic positions within society to 
implement Islamic reforms. Their prospective usefulness made them dakwah targets. On the 
other hand, dakwah activists perceived campuses of Islamic higher institutions such as the 
State Institute for Islamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) to be the bastion of 
liberal Islam and heavily influenced by the progressive ideas of Harun Nasution and 
Nurcholish Madjid.18 This made these campuses unwelcoming toward the conservative brand 
of dakwah propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood-influenced activists.19  
																																																								
17 There are generally four phases of Islamic revivalism in Malaysia: first phase is ‘the reawakening’ 
period (1969-1974); second phase is the ‘forward movement’ period (1974-1979); third phase is ‘the 
mainstream period’ (1979-1990); and fourth phase is ‘the dakwah and industrialized Malaysia’ period 
(1991 onward). Shamsul A.B., “Inventing Certainties: The dakwah persona in Malaysia” in Wendy 
James, ed., The Pursuit of Certainty: Religious and Cultural Formulations (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995). 
18 Harun Nasution, a prominent intellectual and the founder of the IAIN system, was well known for 
promoting the ideas of Mu’tazilah, a rationalist school of thought within Islam, which advocated the 
use of ‘aql (reason) for understanding the deeper spirits of Islam. Fatah Abd Syukur, “Harun Nasution: 
The Reform of Higher Islamic Education” in Rosnani Hashim, ed., Reclaiming the Conversation: 
Islamic Intellectual Tradition in the Malay Archipelago (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2010). 
Nurcholish Madjid, a renowned modernist Muslim intellectual and the first rector of Universitas 
Paramadina, was famous for opposing the idea of forming an Islamic party in 1971, an anathema to 
conservative Muslim activists. “40 Tahun ‘Islam Yes Partai Islam No’ Diperingati,” Republika, 8 
January 2010 (accessed on 6 May 2016). 
19 Yon Machmudi, “Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice 
Party (PKS).” Ph.D diss., The Australian National University, 2008, p. 112. See also M.C. Ricklefs, 
Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: c.1930 to the Present (Singapore: National University of 
Singapore Press, 2012), p. 443. 
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University campuses in Malaysia also went through fervent dakwah activism in the 1970s. 
Major Muslim student groups such as Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia 
Islam Malaysia, ABIM) and Republik Islam, both heavily influenced by the tarbiyah 
(education) methods of the Muslim Brotherhood, contested for dakwah supremacy among the 
bright-eyed Muslim university students. The departure of Anwar Ibrahim in 1982 to join the 
ruling party UMNO – he was the co-founder and President of ABIM at the time – took the 
wind out of ABIM’s sails. This blow allowed Republik Islam, the more conservative of the 
two groups, to gain the upper-hand in dakwah activities and in gaining control of Muslim 
students’ associations on campus. As a result, the campus climate gradually became more 
puritanical.20 Meanwhile, the government established the International Islamic University of 
Malaysia (IIUM) in 1983, with an overarching philosophy to Islamize knowledge and 
promote the training of Muslim professionals to become well versed in both earthly and 
divine matters.21 In contrast to Indonesia, there was a clear and strong symbiotic link between 
the state and the society in Malaysia, evident in the dakwah activists’ efforts to influence the 
political system and the state’s attempts to co-opt the leaders and the ideas of the dakwah 
movement for political survival. In sum, dakwah movements thrived on university campuses 
in both Indonesia and Malaysia, with lesser support from the state in Indonesia, and gave rise 
to the pious Muslim middle-class that would later popularize the idea of integrated Islamic 
education.22  
																																																								
20 Zainah Anwar, Kebangkitan Islam di Kalangan Pelajar (Petaling Jaya: IBS Buku Sdn. Bhd., 1990), 
74-81. See also Shamsul A.B., Inventing Certainties, pp. 112-133.  
21 IIUM’s Philosophy: http://www.iium.edu.my/about-iium/philosophy (accessed on 13 January, 
2015). 
22 Robert Hefner attributed the receptiveness of Muslim university students to Islamic dakwah at this 
time to cultural displacement due to their educational journey from the countryside to the cities. 
Islamic ideals not only provided these students a high degree of moral certitude against the 
perceivably decadent urban lifestyle but also a “neo-santri” anti-hegemonic egalitarian subculture that 
quietly tried to subvert the highly hierarchical elite culture and traditions. Hefner, Islam, State, and 
Civil Society, pp. 12-16.   
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The newfound student piety that permeated university campuses in Malaysia in the late 1970s 
and Indonesia in the late 1980s, also found a receptive environment within the society that 
was also becoming more Islamized as a result of state policies at this time. The wider 
expression of religiosity outside the halls of the ivory towers, however, was not unconstrained 
as the government only encouraged cultural expression of Islam, and severely circumscribed 
or even repressed attempts to politicize religion. States in both Indonesia and Malaysia found 
political utility in controlling the Islamic public discourse as they actively co-opted some 
Islamic social forces while crushing others in order to remain legitimate. Though both states 
instrumentalized Islam to prop up their legitimacy, unlike the UMNO-led regime in Malaysia, 
the New Order regime in Indonesia did not depend on “Islamic credibility” for its survival. 
The New Order state co-opted Islamic social forces as a countervailing support against the 
opposing nationalist faction led by General Benny Murdani. In Malaysia the ruling regime 
employed Islamic discourse to protect itself against the challenge from the opposition Islamic 
party PAS. The discursive competition between the Mahathir’s regime and PAS resulted in a 
highly Islamized society that proved to be conducive to the expansion of the dakwah 
movement beyond university campuses, one way of which was establishing integrated Islamic 
schools to promote its ideology to the society at large. 
INDONESIA 
Background of integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia 
The impetus for integrated Islamic schools (Sekolah Islam Terpadu, SIT) in Indonesia came 
from the active dakwah scene on secular university campuses in the late 1980s.23 The main 
campus dakwah group, Jemaah Tarbiyah (Tarbiyah Group), attracted a sizeable number of 
																																																								
23 Robert Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia” in Robert 
Hefner, ed., Making Modern Muslims: The Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), pp. 70-83. 
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followers precisely because it was seen as “non-political” and capable of bridging the 
ideological differences between traditionalist, modernist, and Salafist Islamic organizations.24 
This positioning was ironically a “political” act in itself, given that other major Muslim 
student organizations such as the Muslim Students’ Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam, HMI) and Indonesian Muslim Students’ Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam 
Indonesia, PMII) were perceived as being co-opted by the New Order regime.25 Furthermore, 
the regime’s introduction of Normalization of Campus Life/Coordinating Body for Student 
Life (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, NKK/BKK) 
policy in 1979, which tightly monitored students’ political activities on campus, had managed 
to gradually steer many Muslim students into dakwah group such as Jemaah Tarbiyah, which 
was considered non-political and therefore non-threatening.26  
The split within the Indonesian military (ABRI) in the late 1980s shook Suharto’s iron grip on 
power and forced him to seek new sources of political support, which included Islamic social 
organizations and prominent Muslim figures.27 The pattern of engagement between the new 
educated Muslim middle-class and the regime at this time was no longer based on antagonism 
and mutual suspicion.28 Instead of agitating for political change, the avenue for which had 
been shut by the regime, the educated Muslim middle-class, also known as “kelas menengah 
neo-santri,” promoted a revised means to achieve its religious aspirations called “Islam 
kultural” or cultural Islam. Islam kultural allowed religious struggle to be waged outside of 
the realm of power politics, specifically through dakwah, educational, cultural, and socio-																																																								
24 Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, pp. 61-66. 
25Ibid., p. 112. 
26 Ashadi Siregar, “Budaya Mahasiswa Pasca NKK” in Fauzie Ridjal and M. Rusli Karim, eds., 
Dinamika Budaya dan Politik Pembangunan (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana Yogya, 1991), pp. 213-219.  
27 Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to 
Democratic Consolidation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 60. 
28 For a detailed study of the relationship between Islamic social forces and the New Order regime in 
Indonesia see: Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
2003). 
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economic arenas. Many from this educated Muslim middle-class joined the civil service and 
assiduously implemented Islam kultural from within the regime. Kuntowijoyo, a prominent 
Muslim reformist intellectual, lists three main characteristics of Islam kultural: 1) 
intellectualism, which focuses on the Islamization of knowledge; 2) ethics, which stresses the 
importance of instilling Islamic moral values in the regime’s development policies; and 3) 
aesthetics, which creates a symbolic environment that is conducive to the everyday practice of 
Islam such as having a musollah (a small prayer room) in an office building.29 In contrast, 
political Islam in the late 1980s was left with its sole and largely toothless regime-managed 
vehicle: The United Development Party (Partai Pembangunan Persatuan, PPP).  
Despite the barren democratic landscape, the political aspiration of Muslim activists to 
capture the state was never completely vanquished. Islam kultural kept the hopes of political 
advance alive, which arrived with the fall of Suharto in May 1998. In the first democratic 
legislative election in 1999, 14 out of 48 parties that contested the seats in parliament were 
Islamic in orientation, a testament to the persistence of political Islam in Indonesia.30 The 
democratic opening also saw the growth of integrated Islamic schools (Sekolah Islam 
Terpadu, SIT), mainly established by the former Muslim campus activists associated with the 
student organization Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia, KAMMI), who were also involved in the establishment of a new 
modernist Islamic party, Partai Keadilan (now Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS).31 
																																																								
29 M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik Tentang 
Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp. 127-137. See also Hefner, Islam, 
State, and Civil Society, pp. 8-12. 
30 Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” South East 
Asia Research 10.2 (July 2002), p. 141. 
31 According to Yon Machmudi, “PKS presents an alternative political vehicle for Muslim activists 
who have not been accommodated by their parents’ political parties, such as PKB, PAN, PPP and 
PBB. They are, in the main, educated outside the traditional education system and have taken different 
paths to learn about Islam. They now claim to struggle for the interests of an Islam undivided by the 
traditionalist and modernist dichotomy.” Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, p. 3. Since its inception in 	
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As the name implies, the dakwah movement’s main focus is education. Its leaders interpret 
dakwah to mean the shaping of the character of an individual Muslim in accordance with the 
dakwah movement’s ideals. The main method of education is through a small study circle 
called halaqa, in which the members are guided by a mentor (murabbi). The content of 
halaqa is typically structured, spiritual and inward-oriented, and the knowledge transmission 
only travels in one direction from the murabbi to the mentees (mutarabbi).32 The inculcation 
of values first starts by transforming the individual person, then moves on to solidify the 
halaqa camaraderie and ultimately ends by connecting the participants to the movement at 
large. Group identity strengthens as the individual slowly subsumes his or her self-interests 
and independent thought within the sacrosanct ideals of the movement.33  
Initially Jemaah Tarbiyah was a “non-political” movement that later ended up forming the 
political Muslim student group KAMMI in 1998, which took part in the large wave of protest 
that toppled Suharto’s New Order regime. KAMMI student leaders subsequently founded the 
conservative modernist Islamic party, Partai Keadilan (now PKS). The decision of Jemaah 
Tarbiyah activists to form a political party was part of the group’s four “orbits” of dakwah. 
The first phase (orbit tanzimi) consists of strengthening individual character and caderisation. 
The second phase (orbit sya’bi) requires members to channel their dakwah energy toward 
social services (layanan masyarakat) as a way to interact with the public at large; establishing 
SIT is part of this second phase. The third phase (orbit muasasi) involves members entering 
politics and the bureaucracy as a way of putting their expertise to serve the greater public 
good and influencing the policy-making process. Finally, the fourth phase (orbit daulah) 
																																																																																																																																																																													
1998, PKS has made tremendous stride in national legislative elections, from merely capturing 1.4 
percent of the votes in 1999 to 7.3 percent in 2004, 7.9 percent in 2009, and 6.8 percent in 2014. 
Komisi Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia: http://www.kpu.go.id/ (accessed on 11 May 2016).      
32 Aay Muhamad Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda 
Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer (Jakarta: Teraju, 2004), pp. 136-140. 
33 Machmudi, Islamising Indonesia, pp. 134-135. 
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entails a complete control of the state, which PKS has yet to realize.34 In short, there is a 
direct connection between Jemaah Tarbiyah, SIT, and PKS. 
 
Table 5.1: Some current examples of connection between PKS and SIT35 
 




Founder, Yayasan Iqro’, SIT 
Iqro’, Bekasi 
National legislative (DPR) 




Founder of JSIT and 
Program Director, Strategic 
Human Resource 
Development, Yayasan Nurul 
Fikri 
 
National legislative (DPR) 
candidate 
Bali Pranowo Founder, Yayasan 
Husnayain, Bekasi 
Head of Provincial Advisory 
Council, Kota Bekasi 
Mahfudz Siddiq Founder, Yayasan Iqro’, SIT 
Iqro’, Bekasi 





Founder of JSIT 
National legislative (DPR) 
candidate and Head of Social 




Founder, Integrated Institute 
of Technology Nurul Fikri 
Former Minister of Research 
and Technology and Head of 
Central Advisory Council 
 
In 1993 Jemaah Tarbiyah activists established five SIT primary schools called Sekolah Dasar 
Islam Terpadu (SDIT). All the schools were situated in the greater Jakarta area (Jabodetabek). 
These pioneering schools were SDIT Nurul Fikri in Depok, SDIT Al-Hikmah in South 
Jakarta, SDIT Iqro in Bekasi, SDIT Ummul Quro in Bogor, and SDIT Al-Khayrot in East 
Jakarta. By 2014, there were 1,926 SIT across Indonesia, including 879 kindergartens, 723 
																																																								
34 Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani: Falsafah Dasar Perjuangan dan Platform Kebijakan 
Pembangunan PK Sejahtera (Jakarta: Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 2008), 
pp. 50-56. 
35 Mahfudz Abdurrahman, Musoli, Bali Pranowo, Fahmy Alaydroes and Suharna Surapranata were 
also founding members of Partai Keadilan (predecessor to PKS) in 1998. Ibid., p. 228; Sekilas Partai 





http://www.pks.or.id/content/kepengurusan (accessed on 9 May 2016).   
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primary schools (SDIT), 256 junior high schools (SMPIT), and 68 senior high schools 
(SMAIT).36 All these schools are registered under the Integrated Islamic Schools Network 
(Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, JSIT), which provides the streamlined educational 
standard. Not all of these schools are linked with PKS and Jemaah Tarbiyah activists but all 
of them share a philosophical belief in integrated Islamic education as the ideal form of 
education for Muslims.  
Like most of Islamic schools in Indonesia, SIT are categorised as private schools, and 
therefore their funding comes from the school fees, donations, irregular grants (hibah) from 
local governments and the foundations that manage the schools. Located mainly in the urban 
and semi-urban areas, SIT serve the needs of middle- and upper-middle class Muslim families 
who typically can afford the higher-than-average school fees.37 Their curriculum is a blend of 
national curriculum from the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and the special standard (standar khusus) curriculum developed by JSIT. The 
provincial office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kanwil Agama), where an SIT is 
located, needs to approve the amalgamated curriculum before it can be implemented in the 
classrooms. SIT’s educational philosophy is summed up in the JSIT’s guidebook as: 
[a] school that instils the organizational approach that combines general education and 
religious education into one interconnected curriculum. With this approach, all 
subjects and all school activities will not be excluded from the frame of Islamic 
teachings and message of values. There is no dichotomy, no separation, no 
“secularization” where education and discourse are free from Islamic values and 
																																																								
36 “10 Tahun JSIT Indonesia Bangun Lewat SIT,” Republika Online, 31 January 2014 (accessed on 19 
January 2015). 
37 One SIT in Depok, SMAIT Nurul Fikri, charges Rp 20,260,000 (USD 1,563) for entrance free and 
Rp 970,000 (USD 75) for monthly tuition. The school is located in Griya Tugu Asri, an affluent gated 
community in Depok, where the residents include PKS politicians such as Tifatul Sembiring (former 
Minister of Communications), Suharna Surapranata (former Minister of Research and Technology), 
and Nur Mahmudi Ismail (former Minister of Forestry and current Mayor of Depok). Interview with 
Joko Prayitno, Principal of SMAIT Nurul Fikri, 10 January 2014.
	 257 
teachings, or “sacralisation,” where Islamic studies is deemed to be non-useful in the 
context of present-day and the future.38  
While there is no blatantly political content in the SIT’s curriculum, this chapter argues that 
these schools engage in subtle indoctrination, often outside of the classroom.39 Some of the 
methods used by Jemaah Tarbiyah in its dakwah campaign on campus can actually be found 
in the pedagogical system of SIT, which lends credence to the assertion that SIT is an 
ideological training ground for future cadres of the dakwah movement.40  
SIT students as future cadres of the Islamic political movement   
While there is an indoctrination channel that connects SIT students with dakwah movement, 
namely through the tarbiyah activities, there is simply no way to know how many of them 
end up supporting PKS, much less becoming full-fledged party cadres. However, in the past, 
the methods of the Jemaah Tarbiyah have certainly helped to create and sustain PKS to the 
present day.41 It is not so far-fetched then to expect the dakwah movement to expand its 
methods of indoctrination to primary and secondary schools, replete with impressionable 
young minds waiting to be moulded and highly supportive parents who themselves are the 																																																								
38 Standar Mutu Kekhasan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, p. 5. 
39 Legally, private schools that adopt the national curriculum are not allowed to engage in any political 
indoctrination in the classrooms. Article 16(4) of Government Regulation 32/1958 regarding Support 
for National Private Schools (Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Nomor 32 Tahun 1958 
tentang Pemberian Sokongan kepada Sekolah Nasional Partikelir) states that “teachers are not 
allowed to give lessons that can disrupt peace and public order, and are not allowed to give lessons 
based on party ideology” (para pengajar dilarang memberi pelajaran yang dapat mengganggu 
keamanan dan ketertiban umum, dan dilarang pula memberi pelajaran berdasarkan kepartaian).  
40 The approach to cultivate school-age students into members of the dakwah movement, whose 
members later found PKS, is not uniquely Jemaah Tarbiyah since the early leader of the dakwah 
movement, Imaduddin Abdurrahim and his Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (LMD) program, along with 
Indonesian Muslim Students Association (Persatuan Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII), had long included 
teenagers in their tarbiyah efforts. Some current PKS leaders such as Aus Hidayat Nur and Tifatul 
Sembiring trace their ideological awakening in the teenage years to the activities ran by LMD and PII. 
Furkon, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, p. 131; Usamah Hisyam, Sepanjang Jalan Dakwah: Tifatul 
Sembiring (Jakarta: Dharmapena Citra Media, 2012), p. 35.  
41 Caderisation efforts form an integral part of the PKS’s organizational agenda, namely to cultivate 
highly disciplined and loyal members. Farish Noor, “The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the 
landscape of Indonesian Islamist Politics: Cadre-training as Mode of Preventive Radicalism?” RSIS 
Working Paper No. 231 (30 November 2011), pp. 1-37. 
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products of the dakwah environment on university campuses since the late 1980s. Indeed, 
establishing an uninterrupted channel for Islamic education that starts from the primary school 
level and goes all the way to university is a key component of SIT’s modus operandi.  
According to Sukro Muhab, primary schools (SDIT) have to be built first, then followed by 
junior high schools (SMPIT) and senior high schools (SMAIT). This structure, in effect, 
creates a seamless upward flow of students who have already internalized the values and spirit 
of the dakwah movement by the time they get to university and who are then ready to put 
their beliefs into action.42 The director of JSIT, Sukro Muhab, however, disagreed with the 
alleged link between SIT and PKS:  
We are not PKS schools! Let me ask you which one was established first: SIT or 
PKS? Yes, SIT was established in 1993 and PKS only came into existence in 1998, so 
how can we be the school for PKS? It just doesn’t make sense.43  
On the other hand, Sukro Muhab also confirmed that many PKS cadres established SIT in 
their communities and sent their children to SIT. He only disagreed with the claim that PKS 
“officially” owns SIT.44 In short, to him there is a clear difference between what PKS does as 
a party and the actions of its cadres. While it is true that PKS as a political party does not 
establish its own network of schools, it is the PKS-related private foundations (yayasan) that 
establish most of SIT. As shown in the preceding table, it is the members of PKS that 
established many of these yayasan that oversee SIT.45 
																																																								
42 Interview with Sukro Muhab, Director of JSIT, 20 January 2014. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “Sukro Muhab MSI: Membangun Generasi Berkarakter,” Republika, 20 February 2011 (accessed on 
6 May 2016). 
45 For example, the leadership of Yayasan Husnul Khotimah, which oversees Pondok Pesantren 
Husnul Khotimah in Kuningan, West Java, is mostly comprised of PKS leaders such as Hidayat 
Nurwahid, Achmad Satori Ismail, Surahman Hidayat, Yusuf Supendi and Achidin Noor. Muslihudin, 
“Model Pesantren Kader: Relasi Ideologi PP Husnul Khotimah dengan PKS, serta Artikulasinya 
dalam Kegiatan Kepesantrenan,” Holistik 14:1 (2013), pp. 16-18. 
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Methods of ideological indoctrination in SIT 
Since ideological indoctrination through the education system is integral to the establishment 
of SIT, what then are the methods used by SIT to instil values of the dakwah movement in 
and shape the character of their students? As a method of indoctrination, classroom learning 
assumes a less important role compared to extracurricular activities as SIT must conform to 
the standards set by the national curriculum and the students need to do well in the national 
exams.46 Therefore, extracurricular activities such as study circles, outdoors trips, camping, 
scouting, educational trips and other overnight activities form the core of the indoctrination 
process.47 While extra-curricular activities like scouting (pramuka) also exist in other schools 
in Indonesia, those practised in SIT are tailor-made to its vision and values.48  One striking 
feature of these activities is the centrality of group dynamic in reinforcing the values the 
schools disseminate to the students. Group dynamic is integral in the inculcation of shared 
values and the sublimation of one’s own self-interests to the nobler ideals of the group: 
Character education, values and discipline in the framework of Islamic values 
(syaksiyyah Islamiyah), becomes the essence in the standard to cultivate the students. 
One of the dominant ways to achieve the aim of syaksiyyah Islamiyah is to have group 
dynamic in the inculcation process.49 
More specifically, SIT share common group-based methods with Jemaah Tarbiyah when it 
comes to indoctrinate their students with the values of the dakwah movement. These methods 
																																																								
46 For examples of supposedly PKS-influenced curricular content in an SIT, see Ibid., pp. 27-29.  
47 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), pp. 122-138. 
48 Standar Mutu Sekolah Islam Terpadu (Jakarta: Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, 2010), p. 619. See 
also Noorhaidi Hasan, “Education, Young Islamists and Integrated Islamic Schools in Indonesia,” 
Studia Islamika 19.1 (2012), p. 97. 
49 Standar Mutu Sekolah Islam Terpadu, p. 599. The habit to obey and be loyal to group norms (patuh 
dan taat terhadap norma kelompok) is instilled as early as the kindergarten level. Standar Mutu 
Kekhasan Sekolah Islam Terpadu (Jakarta: Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, 2014), p. 306.    
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are liqo’/halaqa/usrah (study circle), rihlah/daurah (group retreat), mukhayyam (camping), 
and qiayamul lail (overnight religious activities).  
Integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia implement liqo’ or usrah as part of their extra-
curricular activity. Liqo’, which is typically interchangeable with halaqa and usrah, is a small 
study circle led by a murabbi or naqib (facilitator, who is usually a senior student) and 
consists of 5-10 members (mutarabbi) who meet once a week. In SIT, the term liqo’ is not 
used in the JSIT’s standard guidebook but there is a similar process. Mentoring activity in SIT 
is done in small groups (the guidebook does not specify how many members) that meet once a 
month, facilitated by one mentor and in collaboration with the school’s dakwah agency 
(Lembaga Dakwah Sekolah) that, in turn, appoints the mentors. The activity starts in primary 
school (fourth grade at the latest) with the objective of building the foundations of a 
responsible Muslim, then continues to junior high school, where the students are expected to 
be Muslim role models in their social environment, and finally to senior high school, where 
the students fulfil the criteria of becoming a dai (Islamic preacher).50 
Meanwhile, rihlah means journey, with a focus on outdoor physical group activities such as 
scouting, treasure hunting, and orienteering.51 It is typically combined with daurah, a group 
retreat to learn and discuss specific Islamic themes or issues. The main objective for rihlah 
and daurah is to instil the spirit of teamwork, strengthen the bond between the members of 
the group, and deepen their knowledge of Islam. It also provides the opportunity for members 
to know each other in a less formal way and thus builds stronger trust among them.52 In SIT, 
rihlah is part of the scouting movement, which also includes activities such as qiyamul lail 
(overnight religious activities) and mukhayyam (camping). Scouts in SIT are called Gerakan 
																																																								
50 Standar Mutu Sekolah Islam Terpadu, p. 620-621. 
51 Manan, Gelombang Kebangkitan Dakwah Kampus, pp. 166-167. 
52 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, pp. 132-133. 
	 261 
Pramuka SIT or GP-SIT. GP-SIT is a compulsory extra-curricular activity for all students, 
another example of the importance of group activities in the dakwah movement. Since there 
are many SIT across Indonesia, GP-SIT also organizes its own jamboree, starting from the 
local level (Perkemahan Daerah, KEMDA Ukhuwah, which is every two years) to the 
regional level (Perkemahan Wilayah, KEMWIL Ukhuwah, which is every three years) to the 
national level (Perkemahan Nasional, KEMNAS Ukhuwah, which is every four years).53 
Every student needs to attend these jamborees in order to satisfy the scouting requirement for 
extra-curricular activities. More importantly, the scouting activity, with its constant group 
interaction, helps to cement the sense of brother/sisterhood (ukhuwah), not just within the 
school itself but also with GP-SIT groups in other schools all over the country. GP-SIT 
jamborees serve as a way to show the students that they are an active part of a larger 
nationwide dakwah movement propelled by the virtuous goal of reforming society. 
The practice of qiyamul lail is another activity that campus-based dakwah groups and 
integrated Islamic schools have in common. Qiyamul lail is part of Mabit (Malam Bina Iman 
dan Taqwa), a night filled with religious devotional activities.54 Qiyamul lail entails waking 
up past midnight, typically around 2-3 hours before the subuh (dawn) prayer, to perform 
tahajjud and tasbih prayers in a group. The religious devotional acts (ibadah) are then 
followed by taushiah (an advice in the shape of a sermon) given by an imam. As such, this 
activity requires an overnight stay, typically at the mosque. Junior and senior high school 
students of SIT are expected to perform qiyamul lail at least once a week, which is part of 
their competency indicator (indikator kompetensi).55 Here, group activity again plays a pivotal 
part in instilling and solidifying the movement’s values in the students as together they reflect 
on their own deficiencies as Muslims, the ills that plague Muslim societies around the world, 																																																								
53 Standar Mutu Sekolah Islam Terpadu, pp. 609-619. 
54 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, p. 133-136. 
55 Standar Mutu Kekhasan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, p. 294. 
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and what can they do about such problems. The utter stillness and serenity that accompanies 
the night provides a perfect atmosphere for introspective and repentant acts such that some of 
the participants are known to sob uncontrollably through the night.56 The shared experience of 
intense emotional and devotional acts among the group members during qiyamul lail 
contributes to the solidification of their belief in the nobility and sincerity of the dakwah 
movement.  
In sum, extracurricular activities play a more crucial role in SIT’s ideological indoctrination 
efforts, compared to classroom learning, chiefly for two reasons: the need to teach students to 
successfully pass the national examinations, which leaves little opportunity for SIT to 
promote their values that might not be part of the national curriculum; and the importance of 
close-knit group-based activities in inculcating the students with the schools’ values.  
The instrumental role of the teaching corps in SIT 
Teachers are the most crucial element in guiding and shaping the thoughts and behaviour of 
students in integrated Islamic schools. Their position is analogous to that of the 
aforementioned mentors (murabbi) in campus-based dakwah groups, insofar that it does not 
just consist of teaching but also serves as a role model of the dakwah movement for the 
students to emulate.57 Therefore, it is imperative for the teachers to share wholeheartedly the 
ideals of the dakwah movement.  
The schools’ foundation (yayasan) recruit teachers, including headmasters, through trusted 
networks and on the basis of recommendations to ensure that their teachers’ views accord 
																																																								
56 Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, p. 135. 
57 Integrated Islamic schools’ teachers also spend more time in the school (7am to 3 or 4pm) than their 
counterparts in other types of schools. This intensive and prolonged interaction with students plays an 
important role in the indoctrination process. Hasan, Education, Young Islamists and Integrated Islamic 
Schools, pp. 100-101.  
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with the values and objectives of the school.58 SIT typically prefer to hire fresh graduates and 
students of non-religious universities as their teachers, as opposed to graduates of Islamic 
institutions of higher learning such as State Islamic Universities (Universitas Islam Negeri, 
UIN) and State Islamic Institute (Institut Agama Islam Islam Negeri, IAIN). The preference is 
mainly because, as explained above, the Jemaah Tarbiyah is much more active in non-Islamic 
institutions of higher learning, and because Islamic institutions of higher learning have the 
reputation of being religiously progressive. SIT also explicitly require prospective teachers to 
view the teaching profession as an education-based dakwah mission, which leads us to believe 
that the teachers are recruited solely from the dakwah group on campus, namely Jemaah 
Tarbiyah.59  
In addition to recruiting university students as teachers, JSIT has also recently established its 
own teachers’ training colleges called Pendidikan Guru Sekolah Islam Terpadu (PGSIT) in 
Jakarta and Yogyakarta that it hopes will be able to produce more qualified and dedicated SIT 
teachers.60 One aspect that perfectly illustrates the value placed on shared ideology in the 
teaching corps is the lower-than-average pay SIT teachers receive from the school. The 
schools see the low pay as a sacrifice that teachers make in the name of the movement’s 
higher ideals. They say that willing acceptance of the lower pay is a good indicator of a 
teacher’s unwavering commitment to the movement’s goals.61 Suffice it to say that without a 
																																																								
58 Standar Mutu Kekhasan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, p. 10. 
59 Ibid., p. 16. 
60 So far the bachelor’s degree program is only offered part-time (every Saturday for 8 semesters). 
Hasan, Education, Young Islamists and Integrated Islamic Schools, 99. Also see PGSIT’s page on 
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pages/Pendidikan-Guru-Sekolah-Islam-
Terpadu/144560102251924?sk=info&tab=page_info (accessed on 26 January 2015).  
61 The principal instead phrased it as a commitment to the school’s ideals, which can also be seen as 
interchangeable with the ideals of the Jemaah Tarbiyah. Interview with Joko Prayitno, Principal of 
SMAIT Nurul Fikri, 10 January 2014. See also “Sukro Muhab MSI: Membangun Generasi 
Berkarakter,” Republika, 20 February 2011 (accessed on 6 May 2016). 
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teaching corps that is highly dedicated to and firmly believe in the mission and values of 
Jemaah Tarbiyah and SIT the indoctrination process would be nowhere near effective.62   
State supervision of SIT in Indonesia 
Since the law (PP Nomor 32 Tahun 1958 tentang Pemberian Sokongan kepada Sekolah 
Nasional Partikelir) does not allow national private schools to promote the ideology of a 
political party, so the questions are then how does the state view and monitor the integrated 
Islamic education movement, and if there is a conflict between the versions of Islam 
promoted by SIT and the state orthodoxy? While political parties like the Indonesian 
Democratic Party – Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan, PDI-P) and 
NasDem have their own “schools” that specialize in developing future cadres for the parties, 
party caderisation through the national school system is a novel idea in Indonesia.63 As stated 
earlier, the promotion of party ideology in schools that adopt the national curriculum is 
banned by the law but it is yet an open secret that SIT are closely affiliated with PKS, and are 
sometimes even derisively referred to as Sekolah PKS (PKS Schools). This contradiction 
naturally raises the question of how the state actually perceives and reacts to the notion that 
SIT is a training ground for future cadres of PKS. 
The supervision of SIT falls under the jurisdictions of the Ministry of Education and Culture 
(MOEC) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA). MOEC is in charge of monitoring 
the schools’ pedagogical system, teacher effectiveness, school infrastructure, and financial 
management while MORA deals with the implementation of the Islamic Studies subject 
(Pengetahuan Agama Islam, PAI) and the Islamic dimension of the overall school curriculum. 																																																								
62 Kurniasih Mufidayati, Analisis Hubungan Iklim Organisasi dan Motivasi dengan Kepuasan Kerja 
Tenaga Kependidikan Pada Sekolah Dasar Islam Terpadu (SDIT) Nurul Fikri. MA thesis, Universitas 
Indonesia, 1998, p. 97. 
63 “PDIP Bangun Sekolah Partai di Jl Diponegoro,” Detik News, 16 May 2014; “Cari Calon Pemimpin 
Militan, DPW NasDem Jatim Buka Sekolah Kader,” Tribun News, 12 January 2015 (accessed on 26 
January 2015). 
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According to a principal of one SIT, his school has never had any problems with the ministry 
officials in their supervisory visits to the school as long as the school complies with basic 
standards of the national curriculum.64 This fact is echoed by the director of JSIT, who added 
that ministry officials actually admire SIT since they view the school as a successful 
experiment in the integration of religious values and general education. He also said that if 
SIT is really a PKS school as some people are led to believe then its curriculum would not 
have been approved by the state, much less complimented on.65 His assertion turns out to be 
supported by the Deputy Minister of Education and Culture, Musliar Kasim, who extolled the 
virtues of SIT as a model for the 2013 curriculum.66 While not referring directly to SIT, the 
former Minister of Religion, Suryadharma Ali, also called the 2013 curriculum a catalyst for 
the integration of general and religious knowledge, which coincidentally is the core 
educational principle of SIT.67 Nonetheless, despite a shared focus between the integrated 
Islamic curriculum and the 2013 curriculum in shaping the character of students, there is no 
concrete evidence indicating that the former has influenced the formulation of the latter. What 
is clear though is that both curricula share the common belief in the crucial role of religion in 
developing the students’ character.68     
																																																								
64 Interview with Joko Prayitno, Principal of SMAIT Nurul Fikri, 10 January 2014. 
65 Interview with Sukro Muhab, Director of JSIT, 20 January 2014. 
66 The speech was made during the 10th anniversary celebration of JSIT in Jakarta on 1 February 2014. 
“Wamendik: Kurikulum 2013 Refleksikan Model Pembelajaran di Sekolah Islam Terpadu,” 
Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia, 2 March 2014: 
http://kemdikbud.go.id/kemdikbud/berita/2087 (accessed on 19 January 2015).  
67 “Kurikulum 2013 Momentum Integrasi Ilmu Umum-Agama,” Republika, 30 December 2013 
(accessed on 26 January 2015).  
68 The MOEC stated that the 2013 national curriculum was chiefly designed to improve students’ 
moral character, keep Indonesian education abreast with current global developments, and allow local 
educational actors more flexibility and autonomy to adapt the curriculum to local needs There were 
thirteen principles that informed the formulation of the 2013 national curriculum, among which are 
“Strengthening Faith, Devotion, and Virtuous Behavior” (Peningkatan Iman, Takwa, dan Akhlak 
Mulia) and “Tolerance and Harmonious Religious Communities” (Toleransi dan Kerukunan Umat 
Beragama). Peraturan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik Indonesia Nomor 81A Tahun 
2013 tentang Implementasi Kurikulum (Jakarta: Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Republik 
Indonesia, 2013), pp. 7-10. 
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Despite SIT’s strong association with the dakwah movement and PKS, the connection has not 
aroused suspicions of any relevant educational authority or prompted any investigation for a 
violation of the 1958 law. One official at the provincial office of MORA (Kanwil Agama) in 
Bandung, West Java, said that while he agreed that the culture and orientation of SIT leaned 
heavily toward PKS, its integrated curriculum was to be commended and, in fact, should be 
adopted by the national school system one day since it represented an ideal model for Islamic 
education in that it posited no separation between general and religious knowledge.69  
What accounts for this positive relationship between the state and the SIT? It is apparent that 
both the state and SIT have something to gain from each other. SIT can gain official 
acceptance of its educational system, which can perhaps increase its presence and popularity 
beyond the narrow confines of educated urban Muslim middle-class demographic. The arena 
of Islamic education in Indonesia is highly competitive as Muslim parents get to choose from 
a plethora of Islamic schools of all ideological stripes; it is a buyer’s market. Official 
recognition of SIT success might provide it with a competitive edge over more entrenched 
and numerically superior rivals like pesantren and madrasah. According to Sukro Muhab, the 
strategy is all part of bisnis sekolah (school business), that is to gain market share of Islamic 
education at the expense of other Islamic schools. He also added that the ultimate goal was to 
establish a consortium of all Islamic schools in Indonesia, effectively an oligopoly, and set a 
single standard for Islamic education in the country (presumably dominated by SIT’s 
views).70  
State officials, on the other hand, see the type of Islamic education implemented by SIT – one 
that heavily focuses on students’ character building – as a desirable means to combat 
																																																								
69 Interview with Ahmad Sadudin, Kepala Bidang Pendidikan Agama Islam, Kanwil Agama Jawa 
Barat, Bandung, 4 March 2014. 
70 Interview with Sukro Muhab, Director of JSIT, 20 January 2014. 
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increasing disciplinary problems among students.71 As a result, the 2013 curriculum for 
primary schools increased the weekly instruction time for the subjects Pendidikan Agama and 
Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan from two to four hours in an attempt to bolster 
the students’ moral character.72 While there are dakwah activists working from within the 
state to implement their ideals on society, it is not clear how much influence their support for 
integrated Islamic education has on the formulation of the 2013 curriculum.73 The dakwah 
movement encourages educated Muslim middle-class professionals to populate the ranks of 
the civil service, thus placing them in a position to effect changes from inside the state. In the 
words of two KAMMI activists: 
Since an early age, KAMMI cadres are trained to become candidates for leadership 
through three processes of learning. The three processes are the process of awakening 
one’s identity as a Muslim and a university student, the process of understanding 
one’s functions and duties as an agent of change, and not to forget the process of 
participation as a way to contribute to the society while simultaneously a learning 
process for the future.74  
In short, while there is no real evidence to show if SIT’s curriculum directly influences the 
formulation and implementation of the 2013 national curriculum, it is nonetheless clear that 
both curricula share the common focus in shaping the moral character of students. In the case 
of the 2013 curriculum, the focus on students’ character through emphasis on moral, religious 
and civic subjects was seen as a panacea to the social ills among the school-age children that 
are currently troubling the country. As for SIT, the state’s appropriation of their educational 																																																								
71 “Nuh: Tawuran, Persoalan Sosial Berat,” Kompas, 27 September 2012 (accessed on 27 January 
2015). 
72 “Pendidikan Agama Ditambah untuk Perkuat Karakter Siswa,” Kompas, 5 December 2012 
(accessed on 26 January 2015); “Jam Pelajaran PPKn Ditambah di Kurikulum 2013,” Suara Merdeka, 
12 June 2013 (accessed on 26 January 2015). 
73 Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
Another (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001). 
74 Muhammad Hasanudin and Kartika Nurrahman, “KAMMI: Membentuk Lapis Inteligensia Muslim-
Negarawan” in Claudia Nef Saluz, ed., Dynamics of Islamic Student Movements: Iklim Intelektual 
Islam di Kalangan Aktivis Kampus (Yogyakarta: Resist Book, 2009), p. 178. 
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ideals only serves to boost their reputation among the competitive field of Islamic education 
in Indonesia.  
Influence of state Islamic orthodoxy in integrated Islamic education in Indonesia 
Despite its equal attention to modern progress and the emphasis on professional careers for 
the students, SIT teaches the version of Islam that tends to be more conservative than the one 
espoused by MORA. For instance, my observation of the Islamic Studies (Pendidikan Agama 
Islam, PAI) class at SMAIT Nurul Fikri reveals SIT’s highly conservative view on marriage, 
in contrast to MORA’s more moderate view as illustrated in Chapter 1. The lesson of the day 
was about munakahad (marriage) and the ustadz (male religious teacher) stressed the 
importance of marriage in Islam as a way to prevent humans from marrying animals such as 
horses and dogs like in Western countries. He also went on to say that it is makruh (allowable 
but not encouraged in Islam) for a man to marry a woman who earns more than him since it 
can cause strife in the marriage later on. Therefore, it is best for the wife not to work and 
simply manage the household full-time. This lesson took place in an all-female SMA Kelas 2 
(Class 2 of the senior high school) classroom of 32 students.75   
Other examples of conservative values permeate SIT’s curriculum. Faithful to the educational 
philosophy that there should not be any separation between general and religious knowledge, 
every major scientific principle has to be supported by verses from the Quran, excerpts of 
hadiths, and other religious sources. To wit, according to SIT’s guidebook, the observation of 
Newtonian principles in nature can also be found in the Quran (Surah Ar-Rahman, verse 
60).76 In order to illustrate the religious context of the mathematical concept that determines 
																																																								
75 Author’s classroom observation, SMAIT Nurul Fikri, Depok, West Java, 13 January 2014. 
76 The verse states: tidak ada balasan kebaikan selain dari kebaikan pula (there is no other reward for 
goodness except with goodness). It is an apparent reference to the Newton’s Third Law of Motion: for 
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Standar Mutu Kekhasan Sekolah Islam Terpadu, 
p. 94.   
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the pattern of lines for simple numbers (pola barisan bilangan sederhana), the curriculum 
instructs SIT teachers to use the lyrics from the nasyid (Islamic song) Barisan Jihad (Line of 
Jihad), of which one stanza graphically proclaims: 
Let God’s earth be soaked with the blood of martyrs; let it be red with drenching 
blood; Never retreat even for a single step; never retreat even for a single step.77  
Theologically speaking, the state perceives SIT to be non-threatening, i.e. not violating the 
1965 Blasphemy Law, for example. The Ministry of Education and Culture shares SIT’s 
focus on developing the character of the students through religious education, which explains 
its acceptance of SIT’s curriculum. As a result, the state officials feel they have no reason to 
monitor too closely SIT’s educational activities. An official at Kanwil Agama in West Java 
said that his office generally tolerates differences in opinions and interpretations (perbedaan 
furuqiah) in Islamic schools and that there is nothing sacrilegious or seditious about SIT’s 
curriculum.78 Overall, it is the laissez-faire and heterodox nature of the state Islamic 
orthodoxy that allows SIT to implement a religiously conservative curriculum, especially in 
the increasingly conservative socio-political climate of present-day Indonesia.79 
High institutional complexity is also crucial in explaining why SIT is able to implement a 
curriculum replete with Islamic values that are far more conservative than those promoted by 
MORA and MOEC. High institutional complexity means that there is no coherent 
institutional ideology within MORA and MOEC to allow a diversity of views to co-exist, 
even the conservative ones espoused by SIT. The previous examples of some officials of 																																																								
77 Original excerpt: Biar basah di bumi Allah dengan darah para syuhada; biar merah berlumuran 
darah; Pantang mundur walau selangkah; pantang mundur walau selangkah. Standar Mutu Sekolah 
Islam Terpadu, pp. 316-317. 
78 Interview with Ahmad Sadudin, Kepala Bidang Pendidikan Agama Islam, Kanwil Agama Jawa 
Barat, Bandung, 4 March 2014. But then the post-1998 Indonesian state does have a high tolerance for 
conservative Islamic schools such as Pesantren Al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Central Java, which produced 
four alumni who were involved in the Bali bombing in 2002. “Is Indonesia Ngruki Islamic School 
Teaching Terrorism?” BBC News, 4 November 2012 (accessed on 27 January 2015).    
79 Martin van Bruinessen, Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the 
Conservative Turn (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). 
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MORA and MOEC being wholeheartedly supportive of SIT’s educational values are a clear 
indication of the pluralist ideals of the state Islamic orthodoxy as well as high institutional 
complexity within the institutions that oversee Islamic education in Indonesia.80 In short, SIT 
benefits from the ideological incoherency found within MORA and MOEC, which allows it 
the space and latitude to formulate and implement its conservative values in its curriculum as 
part of its overall effort to indoctrinate and enlist young minds into the dakwah movement.  
MALAYSIA 
Background of integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia 
Integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia share many characteristics with SIT in Indonesia such 
as an origin in the dakwah movement, influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, support among 
Muslim middle-class professionals, and a focus on character development of the students. 
Presently, there are two major dakwah groups that contribute most of the schools in the 
integrated Islamic education network in Malaysia: ABIM and IKRAM. In its early formative 
years (during the first half of the 1970s), ABIM looked to Indonesian Islamic student 
movements such as HMI and Imadudin Abdurrahim’s Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (the 
ideological predecessor to Jemaah Tarbiyah) for inspiration and guidance.81 It is therefore no 
coincidence that ABIM and Jemaah Tarbiyah firmly believe in the power of tarbiyah 
(education) to Islamize society and ultimately turn both Malaysia and Indonesia into an 
																																																								
80 The 2015 controversy of materi radikal (radical material) found in Pendidikan Agama Islam 
(Islamic education) textbook for senior high schools in East Java is a perfect illustration of heterodox 
values found in national curriculum. The “radical material” revolves around a section on Reformist 
movements in Islam that states, among others, it is allowable in Wahhabism to kill non-believers. The 
textbook used the statement on the violence of Wahhabism against non-believers as an example of 
many different strains found in Islam that run the whole ideological gamut. “Buku Memuat Materi 
Radikalisme Ditemukan,” Suara Merdeka, 27 March 2015 (accessed on 20 March 2016).   
81 ABIM later broke with Imadudin as it saw his views being too rigid and not compatible with 
Malaysia’s multicultural society. Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan, p. 105; Anwar, Kebangkitan 
Islam, pp. 44-45.  
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Islamic state. IKRAM came into existence in 1990, much later than ABIM, but shares similar 
dakwah aims and methods.82 
Despite the overall politically repressive atmosphere in Malaysia, there was still space, albeit 
narrow, for Muslim activists to express their political aspirations, especially after the onset of 
Islamic revivalism in the late 1970s. The sheer pervasiveness of the Islamic presence in every 
sphere of life was matched by the growing ferocity of Islamic public discourse as UMNO, the 
Malay-Muslim party, competed with PAS, the Islamic opposition party, to be the sole arbiter 
of Islam in Malaysia. Mahathir Mohamad, upon taking up the prime ministership in 1981, 
made it his first priority to lure Anwar Ibrahim, the then president of ABIM and a vociferous 
critic of the government, into UMNO in a move aimed to weaken the growing Islamic 
opposition in the country. Another former leader of ABIM, Fadzil Noor, had decided to join 
PAS a few years earlier and rose to become the party’s president in 1989.83 The heavily 
Islamized political climate in Malaysia since the late 1970s has allowed many Muslim 
campus activists to engage actively in party politics on both sides of the political divide. 
ABIM, as the main dakwah organization and a self-professed non-political entity, did allow 
many of its members to join the two Malay-Muslim political parties as long as they did not 
exploit ABIM’s reputation for their own political ends.84  
																																																								
82 Article 4(1) of IKRAM’s constitution states that its goal is “to spread Islamic teaching through 
dakwah and to defend it from falsehood (batil) and doubt (syubahat).” Its Article 9(2.5) states that 
“IKRAM strives to advise and propose for Islamic views to be made as a foundation in all social 
aspects including education, learning, law, judiciary, politics, economy, health and governance.” 
Undang-undang Pertubuhan IKRAM Malaysia.  
83 Judith Nagata, The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam: Modern Religious Radicals and Their Roots 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984), p. 88; Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic 
Resurgence in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987), pp. 51-52; Mohammad Nor Monutty, 
“Perception of Social Change in Contemporary Malaysia: A Critical Analysis of ABIM’s Role and Its 
Impact Among Muslim Youth.” Ph.D diss., Temple University, 1990, pp. 96-107.    
84 Mohd. Anuar Tahir, Pendirian Politik ABIM (Petaling Jaya: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1993), 
pp. 16-17.  
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ABIM and IKRAM (formerly known as Jamaah Islah Malaysia, JIM) derive the bulk of their 
membership from the educated Malay-Muslim middle-class; they both place a huge 
importance on their dakwah mission and the ultimate goal of Islamizing society in preparation 
for a true Islamic state in Malaysia.85 Education is an integral part of the dakwah mission of 
both organizations (hewing closely to the Muslim Brotherhood’s playbook), and they run the 
majority of integrated Islamic schools, which have been around since the early 1980s. In 
Malaysia, integrated Islamic education has arisen not in spite of politics, but it has been 
encouraged by it.86 In short, the highly favourable socio-political climate for these Muslim 
activists in Malaysia was not simply the result of increasing religiosity in the society, but also 
strongly encouraged by the ruling regime’s vigorous participation in the Islamization process. 
The dakwah movement in Malaysia embarked on its school-building project almost from the 
outset, evidence of the utmost importance of education and character development in the 
movement’s agenda. As with the Indonesian case, the establishment of schools starts from the 
most basic level to the university level, forming a seamless upward channel for students to be 
educated in this particular ideological stream. The ABIM chapter in Kedah opened the first 
Islamic kindergarten, Taman Asuhan Kanak-kanak Islam (Taski), in 1975. ABIM chapters in 
other Malaysian states followed suit, and by 1983 there were 69 Taski ABIM across the 
																																																								
85 JIM was established in 1990 – much later than ABIM – but in general shares similar ideology with 
ABIM. Saari Sungib, JIM 1991-1993: Membentuk Arah dan Haluan Perjuangan (Kuala Lumpur: 
Pertubuhan Jamaah Islah Malaysia, 1993). 
86 ABIM is somewhat walking on a semantic tightrope when on the one hand it is a non-political 
organization (not explicitly siding with any political parties) but on the other it is also not apolitical as 
evidenced by this statement: “Da’wah yang terpisah dari politik adalah da’wah yang sudah dicemari 
oleh proses sekularisasi – gerakan yang menjurus ke arah deislamisasi seluruh kehidupan umat.” 
[Da’wah that is divorced from politics is a da’wah that is contaminated by the process of 
secularization – a movement that is heading toward the de-Islamization of the life of the Muslim 
community.] RISALAH Juru Bicara Umat, Kumpulan Rencana Pengarang RISALAH Sempena 10 
Tahun Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1971-1981 (Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia, 1981), p. 44. 
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country.87 For some time, ABIM’s educational focus was on the kindergarten programs; it 
was not until January 1989 that ABIM finally opened its first primary school, Sekolah Rendah 
Islam (SRI), in Kajang, a predominantly Malay suburb on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. 
Public reception of ABIM schools was encouraging and it did not take ABIM very long to 
open its first secondary school. In December 1989, ABIM established the Maahad Al Ummah 
in the northern state of Perak, which was quickly followed by new schools in other states. 
ABIM also opened its own teachers’ training institute called Institut Latihan Perguruan 
ABIM (ILPA) and a tertiary-level educational institution called Kolej Dar al-Hikmah 
(formerly known as Institut Pengajian Ilmu-ilmu Islam), both in Kajang (on the outskirts of 
Kuala Lumpur), in 1989. By the end of the 1980s, ABIM had managed to develop a complete 
educational infrastructure that allows for its students to be educated in the same ideological 
stream from kindergarten up to the university level.88 By 2014, ABIM’s network of schools 
consists of fourteen primary schools and five secondary schools.   
IKRAM, on the other hand, was officially established as an organization in 1990, but its 
school came earlier in 1986, with the opening of Sekolah Rendah Islam Al-Amin in Kuala 
Lumpur.89 In the early 1990s, soon after its establishment, IKRAM started to intensify its 
educational effort by opening schools across peninsular Malaysia. There is no major 
difference between the schools of IKRAM and ABIM. Like ABIM, IKRAM also implements 
an integrated Islamic curriculum that combines the national curriculum from the Ministry of 
Education and its own Islamic (diniyah) curriculum into an amalgam called “behaviour/faith-
transcending-curriculum” (akhlak/aqidah merentasi kurikulum). Both sets of schools focus on 
the shaping of a student’s character into a Muslim person who is equally successful in this life 																																																								
87 Mahyuddin Ashaari, “Sejarah Pendidikan ABIM,” Jurnal Pendidikan Islam 10.4 (February 2004), 
p. 11.  
88 Ibid., pp. 12, 16-23. 
89 Pengenalan SRIAAKL: http://www.al-amin.edu.my/sriaakl/index.php/2014-01-20-07-40-
08/pengenalan-sriaakl (accessed on 29 January 2015). 
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and the hereafter.90 Unlike ABIM, however, IKRAM solely focuses on primary and 
secondary schools and does not have its own kindergartens, teachers’ training institute or 
tertiary institutions. Currently, IKRAM’s network of schools consists of 26 primary schools 
and 12 high schools scattered across peninsular Malaysia but mainly located in urban areas.91 
Integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia are under the jurisdiction of both Private Education 
Department (Bahagian Pendidikan Swasta) in the Ministry of Education, and the state Islamic 
agency (Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri, JAIN). Article 7 of the 1996 Education Act (Akta 
Pendidikan 1996) regulates the establishment and operation of all private schools (non-
tertiary level) in Malaysia. Meanwhile, the officials of JAIN are responsible for the vetting 
and supervision of integrated Islamic schools in their respective states. The integrated Islamic 
curriculum has to comply with the national standard set by the ministry and the religious 
standards established by JAIN; both authorities are responsible for approving the integrated 
Islamic curriculum. The ministry presently registers 75 private Islamic schools, which is a 
drop in the proverbial bucket, which is filled with other types of Islamic schools in Malaysia 
such as Sekolah Agama Rakyat, Sekolah Agama Negeri, Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan, 
and Sekolah Menengah Agama Kebangsaan.92 Data for other Islamic schools can also be 
found in JAKIM’s booklet, which puts the total number of private Islamic schools in 
Malaysia at 312, presumably including part-time and non-formal schools. Integrated Islamic 
schools straddle the awkward area where the states’ authority to manage their own Islamic 
affairs, including Islamic education, intersects with the federal government’s control over the 																																																								
90 IKRAM only switched to fully integrated curriculum in 2002. A Change of Paradigm in the 
Curriculum: http://www.al-amin.edu.my/sriaakl/index.php/component/content/article/97-kategori-
berita/pendidikan/219-a-change-of-paradigm-in-the-curriculum (accessed on 31 January 2015). 
91 Pendidikan Musleh IKRAM: http://www.musleh.edu.my/index.php/profail/pengenalan (accessed on 
29 January 2015). 
92 Senarai Sekolah Islam Swasta sehingga 31 Oktober 2014, Bahagian Pendidikan Swasta, 
Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia: 
http://www.moe.gov.my/cms/upload_files/files/Senarai%20Sekolah%20Menengah%20Agama%20Sw
asta%20Sehingga%2031%20Oktober%202014.pdf (accessed on 22 January 2015). See also Data 
KAFA, Sekolah Agama dan Masjid (Putrajaya: Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, 2013), pp. 25-30.  
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national curriculum. Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR) and Sekolah Agama Negeri (SAN) also 
occupy a similar position, as discussed in the previous two chapters. The main factor that sets 
integrated Islamic schools apart from SAR and SAN is the former schools’ financial solvency, 
which allows integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia to maintain a high degree of autonomy 
from the state. 
Maintaining autonomy from the state 
As we have observed in the previous two chapters, financial solvency plays an important role 
in determining the type of relationship that Islamic schools in Malaysia have with the federal 
government and the state Islamic agency (Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri). The federal 
government has taken over many SAR and SAN across Malaysia and turned them into 
Government Assisted Religious Schools (Sekolah Agama Bantuan Kerajaan, SABK). The 
federalization of these formerly autonomous Islamic schools is caused by their bad financial 
health, which means they cannot operate even at the bare minimum level. These schools have, 
for the most part, reluctantly agreed to cede some of their autonomy in exchange for resources 
from the federal government. As of 2015, they are still able to use their old curriculum, 
established by the state Islamic agency, but have lost control over their management of 
infrastructure and human resources.93 The federal government occasionally uses school 
funding as a political tool to keep opposition-friendly Islamic schools in line.94 Integrated 
Islamic schools, in contrast, do not have to deal with this issue since they are on a more solid 
financial ground. Integrated Islamic schools typically charge much higher monthly fees than 
other Islamic schools and the teachers earn lower salaries than their counterparts in the 
																																																								
93 The federal government via JAKIM is currently in the process of finalizing the implementation of a 
single curriculum for all SAR, SAN and SABK. Interview with Azizan Muhammad, Ketua Penolong 
Pengarah Kanan Bahagian Kemajuan Islam (LEPAI), JAKIM, 21 March 2014. 
94 “Bantuan kepada sekolah agama rakyat dihentikan,” Utusan Malaysia, 26 October 2002 (accessed 
on 30 January 2015). 
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federally-managed schools.95 Most integrated Islamic schools are located in areas where 
Malay-Muslim middle- and upper-middle class professionals live; these people have no 
difficulties paying the high fees required by the schools. In short, financial solvency allows 
integrated Islamic schools to operate with a wide degree of latitude from both the state 
Islamic agency and the federal government.  
Their apolitical stance also helps integrated Islamic schools to avoid scrutiny from the federal 
government and the state Islamic agency. Unlike SAR, which have a long history of resisting 
the federal government and the federally-backed state Islamic agency (see Chapter 3 for more 
details), integrated Islamic schools do not profess and practise any explicitly political 
ideology that can be construed as either pro- or anti-government. Such an apolitical stance 
might seem strange for a dakwah movement that fervently advocates that there should no 
separation between the divine and the profane. But by this instance, dakwah activists mean 
that a good Muslim should not shy away from politics and must imbue it with his/her Islamic 
values.96 It is immaterial whether one’s Islamic values lead a person to support the 
government, become a member of the opposition, or neither. ABIM is a perfect case in point. 
ABIM collaborated with PAS in its early years due to its perception that UMNO at the time 
was a secular western-oriented party.97 When Anwar Ibrahim joined UMNO in 1982, and was 
																																																								
95 One integrated Islamic school, Sekolah Menengah Islam (SMI) Al-Amin in Bangi, a conservative 
Malay-Muslim middle- and upper-middle class enclave on the outskirt of Kuala Lumpur, charges 
RM385 (USD99) per month for school fee. The principal justifies the high fee by saying it is needed 
since the school operates longer than others (8am to 4pm) and has to provide lunch for the students. 
Interview with Rohida Jamaludin, former principal of SMI Al-Amin Bangi, 12 June 2013.  
96 Personal communication with Megat Mohamed Amin, Director of MUSLEH schools network, 30 
January 2015. 
97 As ABIM became more politically engaged in the second half of 1970s, it saw the UMNO-led 
government as being unresponsive to its Islamic agenda, which led to a co-operation with PAS. In 
reciprocity, PAS, rivened by internal party conflicts and was at its weakest point, was also looking for 
political partners among Islamic NGOs to help bolster its electoral strength. The ABIM-PAS political 
alliance, however, did not last long, mainly due to cultural divide of the predominantly urban ABIM 
and predominantly rural PAS. Farish Noor, The Malaysian Islamic Party PAS 1951-2013: Islamism in 
a Mottled Nation (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2014), p. 
94; Abdullah, The Politics of Islam, pp. 154, 164.  
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later followed by other ABIM leaders, ABIM shed its ties with PAS.98 The “defection” of its 
leaders to UMNO allowed ABIM to declare publicly its apolitical stance and announce that its 
members were free to join any political party since they all shared the same goal of fighting 
for the interests of Islam.99 IKRAM promotes a similar apolitical stance. For IKRAM, politics 
is an inextricable part of Islam and it is simply unthinkable to stay out of it. IKRAM’s schools 
cultivate their students as future Muslim leaders and expect they will someday lead at all 
levels, from the family unit to the country.100 Therefore, the autonomy of integrated Islamic 
schools actually hinges on a balancing act. They tactfully express their political aspirations, 
but through a generalised Islamic discourse, and so avoid incurring the wrath of the federal 
government or the state Islamic agencies.   
The political dimension of the dakwah movement in Malaysia 
The present political activism of the dakwah movement in Malaysia can be characterized as 
largely non-partisan, though IKRAM and ABIM do support many issues that the government 
deems to be subversive such as the BERSIH demands for clean and fair election system, 
abolition of repressive laws such as the Internal Security Act and the Sedition Act, among 
others, which we return to later.101 In the first decade of its existence, ABIM was unabashedly 
political, especially during the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim. ABIM at this time was at the 
forefront of major mass protests against repressive and unjust government policies such as the 																																																								
98 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, “Patterns of State Interaction with Islamic Movements in Malaysia 
During the Formative Years of Islamic Resurgence,” Southeast Asian Studies 44.4 (March 2007), pp. 
447-457. 
99 Mohd Anuar Tahir, Pendirian Politik ABIM (Petaling Jaya: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1993), 
pp. 14-20.  
100 IKRAM develops students as leaders based on the principles of Quran and hadith, not from the 
political process per se. They then can get involved in politics as agents of change guided by the 
Islamic values they have internalized regardless of political persuasion. Personal communication with 
Megat Mohamed Amin, Director of MUSLEH schools network, 30 January 2015. 
101 BERSIH is a broad-based coalition of civil society organizations pushing for thorough reforms of 
Malaysian electoral system, endorsed by IKRAM and ABIM. http://www.bersih.org/ (accessed on 24 
March 2016). 
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now abolished Internal Security Act, the University and College Act, the Societies Act, and a 
host of development programs that disadvantaged the poor.102 ABIM also formed an alliance 
with PAS in the second half of the 1970s to such an extent that it mobilized its members to 
campaign for PAS in Kelantan in the 1978 election. Some of its leaders, such as Nakhaie 
Ahmad, Fadzil Noor and Syed Ibrahim, were elected to leadership positions within PAS.103 
Overt partisanship cost ABIM dearly as the federal government began to crack down on its 
activities, limiting freedom of assembly on campus and transferring ABIM’s members within 
the federal bureaucracy to unwanted posts in far-flung parts of the country.104 The “defection” 
of Anwar Ibrahim to UMNO effectively broke ABIM’s partisanship and forced the 
organization to rethink its political direction and objectives.105  
Meanwhile, IKRAM, which was known at the time as Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM), came 
onto the dakwah scene in 1990 when the Islamic resurgence was already in full swing. The 
activists of Islamic Representative Council (IRC), a dakwah organization started by 
Malaysian students studying in the UK in the 1970s, founded JIM after a brief unhappy 
flirtation with PAS and ABIM in the 1980s. IRC activists’ joined forces with recent graduates 
of Middle Eastern and American universities to establish a new dakwah vehicle, which also 
shared the belief in the ideals and methods of the Muslim Brotherhood.106 JIM’s raison d’être 
was islah (reform), with the ultimate goal of making Malaysia an Islamic state by the year 
																																																								
102 Monutty, Perception of Social Change, pp. 291-303. 
103 Nakhaie Ahmad later left PAS and joined UMNO. Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Ahmad Shabery 
Cheek, “The Politics of Malaysia’s Islamic Resurgence,” Third World Quarterly 10.2 (April 1988): 
850-851. See also Abdullah, The Politics of Islam, p. 154. 
104 Ibid., pp. 854-855. 
105 There were other issues as well that contributed to the severing of ties between ABIM and PAS. 
ABIM felt at the time that PAS was benefitting more from the alliance due to ABIM’s organizational 
prowess and highly disciplined cadres. ABIM’s non-political programs also suffered harassment from 
the federal government, which was disruptive to its overall operation. Ibid., p. 856. 
106 Maszlee Malik and Hamidah Mat, “Pious Approach to Development: Social Capital and 
Pertubuhan Jamaah Islah Malaysia (JIM),” World Journal of Islamic History and Civilization 4.3 
(2014), p. 109. 
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2010 (later revised to 2020). JIM carried out its Islamizing objective through an approach its 
founder called “homeostasis,” a scientific term that refers to nature’s attempt at finding 
equilibrium. For JIM, the term implies finding an equilibrium between its rigid ideology and 
the complexity of Malaysian multicultural society.107 At the end of 2012, the majority of 
JIM’s members voted to dissolve the organization and reconstitute it as IKRAM, mainly for 
streamlining its resources, with no discernible changes to the movement’s ideals or 
objectives.108          
Both ABIM and JIM label themselves as apolitical. For them, being apolitical is not the same 
as being non-political, which in the Islamic dakwah context means completely staying out of 
worldly political affairs, and instead solely focusing on the spiritual development that can lead 
to a successful life in the hereafter. Such a non-political course is exemplified by groups such 
as Jemaah Tabligh and the now banned Al-Arqam. ABIM and IKRAM are both apolitical in 
the sense that they actively engage in public discourse, especially on issues that directly relate 
to Islam, but at the same time they try to avoid appearing to be partisan. This approach 
requires both organizations to be politically adroit in order to safely navigate the highly 
polarized arena of Malaysian politics. The former Secretary General of ABIM, Mohd. Anuar 
Tahir, stated that: 
We do not talk about party politics, and they [the villagers] know that we do not visit 
them in order to collect votes. Due to the political struggle between UMNO and PAS, 
whole villages are divided in party-political questions and street brawls are in some 
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1995). 
108 “JIM dibubar setelah 22 tahun terlibat dakwah,” Harakah, 2 January 2013 (accessed on 31 January 
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places unexceptional happenings. Our neutrality makes them favour us and accept our 
support.109  
Both ABIM and IKRAM have not been shy in their criticisms of certain government policies, 
such as the introduction of a Goods and Services Tax (GST), increases of highway toll rates, 
electoral reforms and a host of other issues. Despite such criticisms, ABIM and IKRAM find 
that their networks of integrated Islamic schools remain largely unaffected by the iron fist of 
the federal government, a point that will be analysed in detail below. 
The delicate dance of the Malaysian dakwah movement’s apolitical approach         
The sacking and wrongful imprisonment of the former Deputy Prime Minister and president 
of ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1999 jolted ABIM and IKRAM into becoming more proactive 
on national political matters. The tumultuous period in Malaysian politics affected IKRAM 
deeply, which led the organization to become an active member of the Reformasi movement 
that tried to force a change in government through democratic means. The organization’s 
focus shifted almost overnight from “primordial issues relating to Islam to the political 
discourse of freedom, human rights, rule of law, accountability, good governance and civil 
society.”110 Several top leaders of IKRAM such as its president, Saari Sungib, and the head of 
its women’s wing, Fuziah Salleh, contested in the 1999 general election as Parti Keadilan 
(now Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) candidates. IKRAM’s vice president, Syed Ibrahim Syed 
Noh, was also the long-time leader of Gerakan Mansuhkan ISA (Movement to Abolish ISA), 
a civil society group that seeks to end the draconian 1960 Internal Security Act (ISA). 
																																																								
109 Anne Sofie Roald, Tarbiya: Education and Politics in Islamic Movements in Jordan and Malaysia 
(Lund: Lund Studies in History of Religions, Volume 3, 1994), p. 298. 
110 Saari Sungib was arrested in 1998 and 2001 under the Internal Security Act for his involvement in 
the Reformasi movement. He is currently a PAS state assemblyperson for the Hulu Klang area near 
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IKRAM is also involved with the nation-wide BERSIH campaign, a coalition of civil society 
groups and political parties that pushes for serious reforms in the Malaysian electoral system. 
In short, IKRAM sees its dakwah role as extending beyond the narrow confines of the 
theological and the spiritual, and applies to a much broader socio-political context. 
When it comes to controversial religious issues such as the use of the term Allah in Malay-
language bibles and the implementation of hudud (Islamic criminal law), IKRAM has also 
taken a more conciliatory stance that appeals to moderate Muslims and non-Muslims in 
general. IKRAM’s official stand is that the government should not ban non-Muslims from 
using the term but instead expend more effort in strengthening the faith of Muslims.111 
Similarly, IKRAM counsels patience and more deliberation before any serious attempt is 
taken to implement hudud.112 The approach of IKRAM thus consists of direct pressure on the 
government on political issues via broad coalitions, and a middle-of-the-road stance on 
sensitive religious issues. This stance shows that IKRAM tries hard not to associate itself with 
either the government or with PAS.           
ABIM is similar to IKRAM in its proactive participation in public discourse on major 
national issues. Since the late 1990s when the wave of Reformasi hit Malaysia, ABIM has 
been reprising its former role as a political gadfly and has come out with statements that 
criticize many government policies, such as economic and taxation policies, academic 
freedom and freedom of assembly, and a host of other non-religious issues. ABIM also 
endorses the BERSIH campaign to reform Malaysia’s electoral system.113 As for major 																																																								
111 Pendirian IKRAM Berkenaan Isu Kalimah Allah: 
http://www.ikram.org.my/v2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=795%3Apendirian-
ikram-berkenaan-isu-kalimah-allah&Itemid=13 (accessed on 1 February 2015). 
112 “Hudud: Ikram syor beri masa kepada JK Teknikal,” Harakah, 12 May 2014 (accessed on 1 
February 2015). 
113 One can find ABIM’s official statements on various issues of the day under the Siaran Media ABIM 
sub-section of its website: http://www.abim.org.my/siaran-sentral/siaran-media-abim.html (accessed 
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religious issues, such as the use of Allah in Malay-language bibles and the implementation of 
hudud, ABIM has a more conservative approach than IKRAM. ABIM supports both the 
government ban on non-Muslims using the term Allah and the attempt of the state 
government in Kelantan to implement hudud.114  
There are some issues where IKRAM and ABIM are of the same opinion. They both agree, 
for instance, that Shiism is a deviancy and should be banned by the government.115 IKRAM 
and ABIM also spend much of their advocacy efforts on issues that affect the global Muslim 
ummah such as the plight of the Palestinians and the Syrian conflict. ABIM and IKRAM have 
shown that it is possible to proactively engage in the national political discourse and take 
stands opposing the government on some issues; in other words, being political without the 
political label of being associated with the Islamic opposition party, PAS. The question is 
what are the conditions that allow both organizations to operate in such manner and not suffer 
the wrath of the federal government, in particular, on their network of integrated Islamic 
schools?  
Socio-political conditions for the apolitical approach of ABIM and IKRAM       
The wave of Islamization since the late 1970s has permeated every nook and cranny of 
Malaysian society and has created an environment that is thick and heavy with religiosity, 
where Islam as an ideology forms the discursive basis for every issue discussed and debated 
in the public arena, at least among the Malay-Muslim community. The federal government 
responded to the Islamic resurgence with its own Islamization efforts, such as establishing the 
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International Islamic University in 1983, creating an Islamic insurance scheme (Takaful) in 
1984, implementing the 1985 Inculcation of Islamic Values in the Administration Policy 
(Dasar Penerapan Nilai-Nilai Islam Dalam Pentadbiran), making ‘Islamic Civilization’ 
courses compulsory for Muslim university students, and introducing a raft of other Islamic–
oriented programs (see Chapter 1 for more discussion on this topic).116 The parliament, 
controlled by the UMNO-led National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN) coalition, passed Article 
121(1A) to amend the federal constitution in 1988 and effectively elevate the status of syariah 
courts to be on par with the civil courts. The government has tried to co-opt the Islamic 
discourse in this way because it sees its legitimacy and survival as precariously hinging on the 
perception that it is Islamic enough. The resultant heavily Islamized political climate allows 
dakwah groups like ABIM and IKRAM to employ Islam rhetoric in order to engage in 
peaceful oppositional politics without suffering serious repercussions from the federal 
government.117 The status of ABIM and IKRAM as civil society groups also allows them to 
tailor their disagreements with the government to focus on specific issues, rather than offering 
a blanket opposition in the style of a political party.  
Both organizations have so far managed to avoid close scrutiny or control from the federal 
government, mostly due to their schools’ financial solvency. As we saw in Chapter 3, save for 
a few exceptional cases, the federal government typically chooses to negotiate with the 
politically troublesome People’s Islamic Schools (Sekolah Agama Rakyat, SAR), known to be 
strongholds of PAS. The federal government realizes that cracking down too hard on SAR 
would risk it being seen as un-Islamic. Even so, the federal government can exert its control 
over SAR because of the sorry financial state of these schools. Integrated Islamic schools, on 
the other hand, are in financially better shape than SAR, and can thus maintain autonomy 																																																								
116 Chandra, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, pp. 79-80; Ahmad Fauzi, Patterns of State Interaction, 
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117 Ahmad Fauzi, Patterns of State Interaction, p. 446. 
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from the centralizing grip of the federal government. Financial solvency means that schools 
run by ABIM and IKRAM do not have to surrender part of their independence to the 
government in exchange for financial assistance. It also allows ABIM and IKRAM to criticize 
the government without having to fear the withdrawal of financial support from the 
government. The federal government, of course, is able to crack down on the schools operated 
by ABIM and IKRAM if it chose to do so, but has so far opted for an accommodative 
approach.118 IKRAM and ABIM are also well aware that their criticisms risk inviting the 
wrath of the state upon their schools and know they have to tread carefully as they keep 
testing the limits of tolerated dissent.119             
Another reason that explains why there is no direct correlation between organizational 
caderisation in schools run by ABIM and IKRAM with party caderisation for the Islamic 
party PAS is the difference in the constituencies and geographic areas served by the schools. 
PAS has traditionally drawn its support from SAR and pondok in the rural, predominantly 
agricultural parts of Malaysia, namely in the north and the east coast (see Chapter 3 for 
details). Integrated Islamic schools, however, are mostly located in the urban and semi-urban 
areas and serve a constituency of middle- and upper-middle class Malay Muslims. This 
distinction is especially important since it allows ABIM’s and IKRAM’s networks of schools 
to evade the perception that they are hotbeds of Islamic opposition against the government, 
the image that plagues SAR and pondok. It also helps that so far none of the alumni of 
integrated Islamic schools have been involved in armed attempts to overthrow the 
government, unlike some graduates of SAR, which has provided pretexts for severe 
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crackdowns on the latter schools.120 This is not to say that there is no tangible connection 
between integrated Islamic schools and PAS. PAS does draw support from the middle- and 
upper-middle Malay Muslim enclaves where most of the integrated Islamic school are 
located. The legislative representatives for some of these well-to-do enclaves such as Bangi 
and Shah Alam are from PAS, which illustrates the strong appeal of Islam as a form of 
political expression among the educated Malay-Muslim constituencies.121  
Unlike in Indonesia, where there is a continuous and apparent ideological thread between 
Jemaah Tarbiyah, SIT and PKS, as shown above, the same link cannot be made for dakwah 
organizations in Malaysia such as ABIM and IKRAM, their network of integrated Islamic 
schools, and PAS. The overlap between these organizations and PAS is mainly by default, 
since for most of Malaysia’s post-independence history there has been only one formally 
Islamic party contending in the formal political system.122 Since the 1970s, members of 
ABIM and IKRAM who have wanted to express their ideological beliefs through the formal 
political channel have tended to find PAS as the most amenable political vehicle, despite 
UMNO’s best attempts to buttress its Islamic credibility. On the other hand, Muslim political 
activists in the post-1998 Indonesia are spoiled for choice when it comes to expressing their 																																																								
120 The executed leader of the militant group Al-Ma’unah, Mohamed Amin Mohamed Razali, who led 
a failed raid on a government armoury in 2000 was a graduate of SAR. In addition, 19 out of 25 
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political aspirations through party politics. Islamic choices run the ideological gamut from 
middle-of-the-road parties such as PKB and PAN to the more conservative PKS and PPP. 
Party caderisation, therefore, assumes a more instrumental role among Muslim activists in 
Indonesia. In particular, PKS activists see education as a way to ensure party loyalty and 
sustain its membership in the midst of the competitive milieu that is Islamic politics in the 
country. PAS, by contrast, is simply the unintended beneficiary of intensive caderisation 
efforts carried out by ABIM and IKRAM to inculcate their members with religious values that 
happen to coincide with the party’s own political values.123 Therefore, integrated Islamic 
schools in Malaysia do not act as an incubator of future cadres of PAS, unlike their 
counterparts in Indonesia, which mainly act as a supply line for the PKS.  
Ideological indoctrination in integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia 
There is not much difference between integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia and Malaysia 
when it comes to the methods used to inculcate their particular values in their students. In 
fact, the principal of an SIT in Indonesia mentioned that he once took part in a study trip to 
visit several integrated Islamic schools around the Kuala Lumpur area; cooperation between 
integrated Islamic schools in the two countries is also common.124 Campus-based dakwah 
groups such as Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia and ABIM and IKRAM in Malaysia have been 
using similar activities to instil the group’s values in their members. Common methods of 
ideological inculcation come as no surprise considering that dakwah movements in both 																																																								
123 IKRAM members must renounce their membership when they join a political party, in order to 
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countries draw their inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) in Egypt 
and Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan. The transnational linkage has been going on since the mid-
1970s when the Bandung-based Imadudin Abdurrahim and his Latihan Mujahid Dakwah 
program conducted various seminars in Malaysia sponsored by ABIM. Integrated Islamic 
schools in Indonesia and Malaysia pay special attention to character development of their 
students and their capacity as young messengers of the faith (shabab du’at).125 ABIM has its 
own special cadre-training program called tamrin al-kadir with the singular purpose of 
ensuring the continuity of its Islamic struggle into the foreseeable future.126 Therefore, 
methods for ideological indoctrination found in integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia are 
similar to the ones already discussed in the section on SIT in Indonesia, which are 
liqo’/halaqa/usrah (study circle), rihlah/daurah (group retreat), mukhayyam (camping), and 
qiayamul lail (overnight religious activities).  
Integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia introduce usrah activity in primary school as part of 
their tarbiyah (education) program; the study circle continues until senior high school level. 
The schools consider usrah to be an integral part of their efforts to shape and cultivate the 
students’ character, leadership skills, and awareness of problems plaguing society and the 
Muslim ummah.127 Similar to SIT in Indonesia, integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia also 
use usrah as a means to inculcate and deepen Islamic values of their students, and to foster an 
abiding sense of esprit de corps among them. 
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For rihlah (outdoor physical activities), integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia also follow 
similar scouting model as SIT, even regularly joining GP-SIT jamborees in Indonesia.128 
IKRAM-run integrated Islamic schools organize jamborees and camping trips such as 
Perkhemahan Nasional Kadet Remaja Sekolah Musleh and Mukhayyam Latihan Kader Du’at 
(LKD).129 These schools also organize another type of rihlah called Kembara Dakwah 
(Dakwah Tour), where their students spend between one to two weeks living among isolated 
Muslim communities in Sabah, Sarawak, and Orang Asli (indigenous people) villages in 
peninsular Malaysia to help strengthen the Islamic practices of these communities.130 IKRAM 
and ABIM schools in Malaysia organize rihlah and daurah on a regular basis as a key 
component of their ideological indoctrination process and to cultivate new generation of 
Muslim leaders through their programs for Islamic leadership training (latihan kepimpinan 
Islam).131           
Integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia also organize qiyamul lail activity as a mandatory 
component of its extra-curricular program.132 Similar to SIT’s students in Indonesia, 
integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia also make qiyamul lail attendance mandatory and part 
of students’ grade on extracurricular activities. Schools typically combine qiyamul lail 
activities with mukhayyam (camping) and the aforementioned rihlah since qiyamul lail entails 
an overnight stay away from home.133  Like other group-based extracurricular activities 
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organized by integrated Islamic schools, the main purpose of qiyamul lail is to instil into 
students the values of the dakwah movement in a less formal setting, which I have mentioned 
previously is a more effective method of ideological indoctrination than classroom 
instructions.   
The instrumental role of the teaching corps in integrated Islamic schools 
Similar to SIT in Indonesia, integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia also select teachers 
primarily for their commitment to the dakwah movement and the expectation that they fulfil 
their responsibility as murabbi (mentors or known as naqib within the ABIM’s circle). All 
teachers and the administrative personnel have to follow IKRAM’s Program Tarbiyah 
Musleh (Reformist Education Program), which consists of five modules that gradually 
strengthen their religious knowledge, skills, and character. IKRAM expects at least 30 percent 
of participants to reach the third module by 2005 (current data is not available).134 Teachers in 
integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia also receive a lower pay than what they would have 
earned working in government schools, a testament to their commitment to the ideals of the 
dakwah movement.135 In short, highly dedicated teachers who are willing to sacrifice their 
self-interests for the collective good of the dakwah movement are indispensable in ensuring 
the success of the ideological indoctrination efforts by integrated Islamic schools. 
State supervision and implementation of Islamic orthodoxy 
As in Indonesia, the Ministry of Education and the state Islamic agency (Jabatan Agama 
Islam Negeri, JAIN), which oversee all integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia, look at these 																																																																																																																																																																													
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schools in a favourable light. The officials see the growth of integrated Islamic schools as 
providing more educational choices for discerning Malay-Muslim parents. One official at the 
Selangor state educational office relates that: 
This [the popularity of integrated Islamic schools] is a very encouraging trend. It 
shows that nowadays more and more Muslim parents are conscious (sedar) of the 
importance of inculcating Islamic values in their children’s lives from such a young 
age and of preparing them to be good Muslims. This trend therefore can only be a 
good thing.136 
The absence of an anti-establishment history in integrated Islamic schools also helps them to 
remain in the good graces of the ministry and state religious officials, in contrast to the 
aforementioned SAR. The integrated Islamic schools generally try to avoid overt political 
activities in the classrooms in order not to provoke unwanted visits from the authorities. In the 
case of MUSLEH schools, the network of schools run by IKRAM, the schools try their best to 
distance their educational program from the political program of their parent organization 
IKRAM, which is a vocal member of civil society groups that are critical of the 
government.137 The networks of integrated schools run by ABIM and IKRAM have not been 
targeted in any government crackdown. 
When it comes to Islamic education, ABIM has had a long history of working relationship 
with the state, especially since the early 1980s when the then Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamad, and his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, embarked on the state Islamization project. ABIM 
has been a long-time proponent of revamping the “secular” characteristic of the national 
education system, and was instrumental in pressuring the government to formulate a new 																																																								
136 Interview with Shopuan Anuar Ahmad, Sektor Pendidikan Islam, Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri 
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National Educational Philosophy (Falsafah Pendidikan Negara) in 1988 and infuse it with 
religious values, partially quoted below: 
Education in Malaysia is a continuous effort toward the further development of 
individual potential in a holistic and integrative way in order to create a person who is 
balanced and harmonious with respect to intellect, spirit, emotion and physique, 
grounded in the belief in and obedience to God. This effort aims to produce 
Malaysians who are knowledgeable, responsible and capable of attaining inner peace 
while contributing to the harmony and prosperity of the society and country [emphasis 
mine].138      
The adoption of the National Educational Philosophy in 1988 marked the demise of 
“secularism” in the national education system. From this point, the official view was that 
religious values were central to the country’s educational needs. Led by the former head of its 
Education Bureau, Osman Bakar, ABIM had been lobbying the government to change its 
educational philosophy since 1974. In the words of Osman Bakar, with the changes 
introduced in 1988,the National Educational Philosophy was “no longer secular since it now 
comprises principles that satisfy the aims and desire of Islamic educational philosophy.”139 
Seen in this context, since 1988 ABIM and the ministry have shared a similar educational 
philosophy. This in turn means that ABIM’s network of integrated Islamic schools are less 
likely to run afoul of the authorities – at least with regard to its curriculum. The same goes for 
schools run by IKRAM, which also share a common educational philosophy with ABIM.  
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Integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia also implement a conservative curriculum that is in 
line with the ideas promoted by the state orthodoxy.140 With respect to non-religious subjects 
such as science and mathematics, the curriculum pairs every scientific observation and theory 
with verses from the Quran, hadiths, and other religious sources, akin to the SIT curriculum. 
This educational approach is the very essence of the Islamization of knowledge, which forms 
the core philosophy of integrated Islamic education. Nonetheless, one factor that sets 
integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia apart from SIT in Indonesia is the imposition of 
national exams for all subjects by the Ministry of Education. Mandatory national exams for 
religious subjects are one way to force the implementation of orthodox ideas into school 
curricula and teacher lesson plans. Teachers tend to prepare students for the exams and focus 
more on test-taking techniques, instead of encouraging classroom discussions and alternative 
points of views.141 One teacher I interviewed explains that discussions of various perspectives 
not covered in the curriculum would only confuse the students when it comes to exam time. It 
is more important to prepare students so they will do well in the national exams and get into a 
good university when they graduate.142 Classroom discussions are also devoid of controversial 
topics such as politics and race, in order to avoid potential trouble with the ministry.143 In 
other words, the teachers engage in self-censorship, in order to meet national exam 
requirements and pre-empt crackdowns. The caution is understandable since integrated 
Islamic schools promote themselves as the paragon of excellence in modern Islamic 
education; thus, it is imperative for the schools to produce students who score well in the 
national exams and to avoid negative attention that could ruin their reputation. 
																																																								
140 The former principal of SMI Al-Amin says that the school’s curriculum does not contravene in any 
way the religious values and standard set by the authorities since the authorities themselves officially 
approve the curriculum. Interview with Rohida Jamaluddin, 12 June 2013.   
141 Author’s classroom observation, SMI Al-Amin Bangi, 21 June 2013. 
142 Interview with Masyitah Abdul Latif, SMI Al-Amin Bangi, 21 June 2013. 
143 Ibid. 
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Meanwhile, the state religious authority (Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri) and educational office 
(Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri) are more concerned with the spread of Shiite ideology and 
Christianization efforts in schools than in monitoring the curriculum of integrated Islamic 
schools.144 One officer explained that “deviant” Islamic teaching was almost non-existent 
among the schools in his state and that he was more worried about Shia-influenced teachers in 
the classroom and (unnamed) Christian groups that were trying to spread Christianity in the 
national schools.145 In light of these top two concerns, integrated Islamic schools have nothing 
to fear from the authorities. As shown previously, teachers of Islamic integrated schools are 
specially chosen for their ideological commitment, and they go through tarbiyah (education) 
modules that further strengthen their religious resolve. In addition, since the staff and student 
body of integrated Islamic schools are one hundred per cent Muslims, there is no concern 
about Christianization creeping into the schools. The ideology of integrated Islamic schools, 
based on the ideas and practices of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i-Islami, puts them 
firmly in the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah camp, the strand of Sunni Islam that is also shared by 
the government. In short, theologically-speaking, integrated Islamic schools in Malaysia face 
no danger of any government crackdown, unless they allow interpretations of their curriculum 
that support oppositional politics. 
Conclusion 
In the context of the main argument of this thesis, both the factors that have enabled the state 
in Malaysia to be more successful in centralizing its control over Islamic education, and the 
state in Indonesia to be less successful, have contributed to the rising popularity of integrated 
Islamic schools since the early 1990s in Indonesia and the early 1980s in Malaysia – but in 
very different ways. The pluralist nature of the state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia means 																																																								
144 “JAIS tarik balik buku teks SRA,” Kosmo!, 12 April 2014 (accessed on 20 February 2015). 
145 Interview with Shopuan Anuar Ahmad, Sektor Pendidikan Islam, Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri 
Selangor, 5 August 2013. 
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that the state tolerates diversity of religious ideologies in Islamic schools, including the 
conservative ideology found in SIT. In Malaysia, by contrast, the conservative curriculum of 
integrated Islamic schools matches the values propagated by the state Islamic orthodoxy, 
which allows these schools to elude close government scrutiny. Financial viability is another 
factor that permits integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia and Malaysia more autonomy to 
operate than other types of Islamic schools since they do not depend on funding from the state 
for survival. Financial independence is especially pertinent in the Malaysian case, where the 
state has been employing its vast resources to take over the control of many financially 
struggling Islamic schools since the late 1970s. In short, the same factors that have allowed 
the state in Malaysia to increase its control over Islamic education also contribute to the 
growth of integrated Islamic education. The relative laxness of the state in the same field has 
provided similar schools with the space to grow in Indonesia.    
Integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia and Malaysia are the product of the wave of Islamic 
revivalism that swept through the countries in the late 1980s and late 1970s, respectively. 
Dakwah movements such as Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia and ABIM and IKRAM in 
Malaysia, heavily influenced by the ideology and organizing strategies of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and Jama’at-i-Islami in Pakistan, stressed the importance of the role of 
education (tarbiyah) in establishing a true Islamic society. Integrated Islamic education 
serves, primarily, as a means to shape the character of young students as model Muslims who 
practise Islam as a complete way of life, and who excel both in this world and in the hereafter. 
The schools hope that these young students will become productive and influential members 
of society, a society which they will gradually transform into a truly Islamic one. The ultimate 
objective of the dakwah movement is to capture the state and subsequently wield the immense 
power and resources of the state to mould society in its own ideological image. The integrated 
Islamic schools serve a preliminary purpose: that of preparing the Muslim cadres and citizens 
who will be able to pioneer these great transformations.  
	 295 
The nature of the political system in both countries, however, has shaped the nature of these 
educational efforts and how they interact with the world of formal politics. The Indonesian 
political system has opened up tremendously since the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 
1998, which has seen the proliferation of Islamic political parties contending for seats on all 
levels of governance. The dynamism of post-authoritarian politics creates a competitive 
environment for Muslim activists wanting to pursue their agenda in the formal political arena; 
there is a marketplace of Islamic parties imbued with a variety of ideologies. Party 
caderisation thus becomes one of the main strategies for the dakwah activists linked to PKS, 
who hope to ensure the continuation of their political struggle, maintain party loyalty, and 
better compete with other Islamic political parties.  
Meanwhile in Malaysia, the illiberal-democratic political system, which to date has produced 
only one Islamic political party (PAS), leaves dakwah activists with few options for pursuing 
their social transformative agenda through formal political channels. Hence, party 
caderisation takes a backseat to active participation in civil society groups and joining the 
government. The heavily Islamized social climate dominated by the orthodox views of the 
state, which are also shared by dakwah activists, provides them with more avenues to 
propagate their ideals. Being “apolitical,” is a form of non-confrontational political 
participation. The rejuvenation of the civil society as a political force in Malaysia since 1999 
has also pre-empted efforts by ABIM and IKRAM to produce cadres for PAS. The growth of 
a civil society movement amidst the miasmic political climate of Malaysia allows for issue-
based political participation by the dakwah activists.146 They can form temporary alliances 
with any interested stakeholders, including the government and its ruling coalition, to 
advocate certain issues that are part of the dakwah movement’s agenda. The ad hoc and 
																																																								
146 Meredith Weiss, Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in 
Malaysia (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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supple nature of political participation of the dakwah activists is a deft move to avoid political 
labelling, but one that is enabled by the heavily Islamized public discursive sphere.  
The rise of integrated Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia is an indicator of the 
growth of the Muslim middle- and upper-middle classes that have benefitted from rapid 
economic development and increased access to higher education since the 1970s in both 
countries. This type of education is a natural outgrowth of the high expectations such people 
have for their children to achieve equal success in this world and the hereafter (akhirat). The 
promoters of integrated Islamic education are financially and politically savvy enough to 
ensure that their schools escape unwelcome government’s attention, to the extent of even 
successfully inspired the adoption of the core of their educational philosophy by the national 
curriculum. The governments in Indonesia and Malaysia see only the positive side of 
integrated Islamic education and have no intention of exerting more control over this type of 
school. Coupled with the ever prospering Muslim middle- and upper-middle classes in both 
countries, integrated Islamic education as a trend will only continue to grow into the 






The thesis has proceeded on the premise that every state seeks to inculcate the society with its 
ideological values through mass education. In the case of Muslim-majority states, this effort 
encompasses shaping religious discourse by controlling Islamic education. However, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the state’s “regime of truth” is not simply a one-way linear process 
where the state imposes its ideological will on the society with impunity and the society 
absorbs the state’s values unquestioningly. The values propagated by the state are a product of 
dialectical interactions between various components of the state and society, some of which 
can be at odds with each other. Joel Migdal posited that the state and the society are mutually 
constitutive. By accepting the premise that the state and the society are mutually 
transforming, the thesis has sought to tease out the factors that allow the state to project its 
ideological hegemony more effectively by way of centralizing control over the Islamic 
education system. The factors so identified are the ideological makeup of the state 
institutions; the patterns of Islamization in the society that necessitate different reactions from 
the state; and the control of resources by the central government that influences the interaction 
between the center and its periphery. By focusing on the interplay of these three factors within 
the framework of a Migdalian conception of “state-in-society” and an approach drawing on 
comparative historical institutionalism, the thesis has provided an analytical explanation of 
why Islamic education in Indonesia is more decentralized and discursively diverse, while in 
Malaysia it is more centralized and discursively restricted. 
Based on the three aforementioned factors, I have argued that the state in Malaysia has been 
more successful in centralizing its control over the Islamic education system, compared to the 
state in Indonesia. In Malaysia, the state institutions that oversee and manage Islamic 
education are more ideologically coherent; the Islamization of society is more comprehensive 
	 298 
and intense, so much so that Islam has become a basis for state legitimacy. In addition, the 
overwhelming concentration of resources in the hands of the federal government provides it 
with leverage over financially struggling Islamic schools in the regions. In Indonesia, the state 
institutions that oversee and manage Islamic education are ideologically fragmented. The 
Islamization of society, while underway, does not figure prominently in the maintenance of 
state legitimacy. Legal complexities and scarce resources limit the ability of the central 
government to exert more control over financially struggling Islamic schools. An obvious 
result of the centralization of Islamic education in Malaysia is the narrowing of space for 
diverse expressions of religious discourse as evidenced by the sheer domination of 
conservative values propagated by the state Islamic orthodoxy. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the 
decentralized nature of Islamic education allows for a more open and diverse religious 
discourse, exemplified by the heterodox values found in the state Islamic orthodoxy (within 
the context of Islamic education curriculum).  
The thesis has presented three case studies from each country to demonstrate the applicability 
of the three factors and to shed light on the differences of Islamic education systems between 
them. The case studies were paired to allow for controlled comparison of Islamic education in 
similar social contexts. The first pair of case studies was Aceh in Indonesia and Kelantan in 
Malaysia (Chapter 3). Both were chosen for their deep tradition of Islamic learning. The 
thesis shows that while Islamic education in both locations is generally prosperous and 
growing, the federal government has slowly been taking control of Islamic education in 
Kelantan, especially since the late 1970s. This stands in contrast with Aceh, where there is a 
high degree of local control over Islamic education, especially since 2005. The second pair of 
case studies was Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) in Indonesia and Sarawak in Malaysia (Chapter 
4). These two case studies were chosen because they are both Christian-majority areas and I 
wish to explore the fate of Islamic education in such contexts of potential weakness. Despite 
this similarity, the thesis has argued that Islamic education in NTT is much worse off than 
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that in Sarawak, due to the differing power relations between the Muslim minority and the 
Christian majority population. The political strength of Muslims in Sarawak is 
disproportionate to the size of its community, the result of which is the prosperity of Islamic 
schools in Sarawak. In NTT, by contrast, the weak political position of Muslims has resulted 
in a sad state of Islamic education in the province. The final pair of case studies concerns the 
relatively new phenomenon of integrated Islamic schools in middle- and upper-middle class 
Muslim enclaves in Indonesia and Malaysia (Chapter 5). Integrated Islamic schools in 
Indonesia and Malaysia share many qualities since they are one of the products of the dakwah 
movement that emerged from the wave of Islamization in the late 1970s. This thesis posits 
that integrated Islamic schools in both countries engage in ideological indoctrination of their 
students as an effort to enlist them in the dakwah movement, and the three previously 
mentioned factors permit this caderization process to take place without interference from the 
state. However, one critical difference is that many integrated Islamic schools in Indonesia are 
established as the ideological indoctrination place for the Islamic political party, PKS, while 
in Malaysia, integrated Islamic schools are not affiliated with any political parties.   
Ideological makeup of the state institutions 
Throughout the thesis, I have endeavored to show that the major difference between the state 
institutions overseeing Islamic education in Indonesia and Malaysia is their ideological 
orientation. The ideological orientation of any institution in the field of Islamic education is 
essential in determining its identity, and thus, its choice of policies and patterns of interactions 
with other institutions. Institutional ideology can either lead to organizational coherency 
between the various state institutions of all levels of governance, or to conflict between them.  
The thesis has also treated organizational coherence, by which I mean the ability of 
institutions that make up the components of the state to act as one cohesive unit towards 
shared goals, as a function of institutional complexity. High institutional complexity – which 
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is constituted by differences in institutional ideologies and objectives – leads to contentious 
inter- and intra-institutional relations between components of the state, which typically results 
in haphazard policy implementation by the leading ministry and greater control of Islamic 
education by local educational offices and schools. Conversely, low institutional complexity 
allows for seamless policy implementation and enforcement from the ministry to the 
educational offices and schools since there is much less conflict between and within state 
institutions that oversee Islamic education.  
The thesis has shown that the ideological orientation of the state institutions in Malaysia in 
the field of Islamic education has been much more consistent than that in Indonesia, 
especially after the start of the wave of Islamization in the late 1970s. The state in Malaysia 
has made conscious efforts over the past four decades to instil conservative Islamic values in 
its institutions, demonstrated above all by the 1985 Policy on the Inculcation of Islamic 
Values in Administration (Dasar Penerapan Nilai-Nilai Islam Dalam Pentadbiran). The 
federal government has since tasked JAKIM with the responsibility to carry out the 
Islamization of state institutions. JAKIM has effectively held a monopolistic sway over the 
establishment of acceptable Islamic values and norms, not just within the state bureaucracy, 
but also in the society at large. The competition between the ruling Malay party, UMNO, and 
the Islamic opposition party, PAS, to “out-Islamize” each other in trying to prove which party 
has the sole right to speak for Islam in Malaysia has resulted in Islamic values and norms that 
are deeply conservative and highly orthodox. These values and norms have come to permeate 
every nook and cranny of the state bureaucracy as well as the general public in Malaysia.  
Meanwhile in Indonesia, the state has not carried out comparable efforts to Islamize its 
institutions despite experiencing a similar wave of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s. Islam 
has never been a real source of state legitimacy in Indonesia and, therefore, there is no 
pressing need for the state to instrumentalize Islam for its own political ends. In the field of 
Islamic education, the two overseeing state institutions – the Ministry of Education and 
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Culture and the Ministry of Religious Affairs – are regularly at odds with each other, having 
different views on the overall nature and direction of Islamic education in Indonesia. For 
instance, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC) sees the full incorporation of Islamic 
schools under its ambit (single-roof education or pendidikan satu atap) as the only way to 
improve the quality of Islamic education, which, of course, is vehemently opposed by the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), which fears such a policy will lead to secularization. 
Within these institutions, it is also possible to find a diversity of views on the nature of 
Islamic education and its place in the national education system. The decentralization laws of 
1999 further accentuated the gulf between these two institutions by devolving control over 
educational matters to the local level, while retaining the management of religious matters, 
including Islamic education, at the national level. Consequently, state institutions in Indonesia 
are much more fragmented and ideologically incoherent when it comes to devising and 
implementing a vision for Islamic education than their counterparts in Malaysia. 
Despite the influence of local culture and traditions, the degree of ideological coherence of 
state institutions at the national level also seeps down to state institutions at the local level, as 
exemplified in the Malaysian case. This ideological coherency allows the state in Malaysia to 
effectively centralize its control over Islamic education in the country. Nevertheless, this is 
not to say that the values and norms from the national level completely displace pre-existing 
local values and norms. Local values and norms can still influence how national ideology is 
implemented, even if they are not strong enough to resist or meaningfully influence it. The 
thesis has described the institutional identity found at the local level in Malaysia as a 
“federalized” identity, which essentially means that actors in local state institutions believe in 
the uniqueness of their local Islamic learning traditions but at the same time also look to the 
federal government for assistance and guidance. The case studies in Kelantan (Chapter 3) and 
Sarawak (Chapter 4) demonstrate this federalized institutional mindset. In both places, local 
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state institutional actors combine pride in their unique traditions with the desire to carry out 
directives from the ministry.  
In contrast, the fragmented institutional identity at the national level in Indonesia results in a 
great deal of institutional and policy autonomy at the local level in that country. Even at the 
peak of centralization during the New Order era, local state institutions in the field of Islamic 
education still managed to prevent their unique local characteristics from being diluted and 
transformed by ministries in Jakarta. This is best exemplified by the case study of Aceh 
(Chapter 3), where the province managed to maintain and develop its strong tradition of 
Islamic learning in the face of both colonial rule and the subsequent experiences of a 
centralizing post-colonial state. Institutional fragmentation at the national level in Indonesia 
has also reduced the capacity of the state to exert greater control at the local level, leaving 
local traditions of Islamic learning intact by default. The experience of Nusa Tenggara Timur 
(Chapter 4) showed that lack of institutional coherence at the national level not only led to the 
overall worsening of the condition of the local Islamic schools but also allowed local Islamic 
educational actors to find their own locally inspired solutions in dealing with their problems 
such as hiring non-Muslims teachers to teach in madrasah.  
Patterns of Islamization in the society 
The wave of Islamic resurgence that took place in the late 1970s in Malaysia and late 1980s in 
Indonesia affected these countries in markedly different ways. Unlike Islam in Indonesia, 
Islam in Malaysia came to play a much more critical role as a means for regime maintenance. 
This major difference largely flows from the unique political contexts of the two countries at 
the time: the Islamic resurgence hit Malaysia when it was governed by a semi-democratic 
system in which electoral competition figured centrally, while Indonesia was governed by an 
authoritarian system that would pay less heed to political opposition and public opinion.  
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The growing religiosity in Indonesian Muslim society from the late 1980s did not give rise to 
an Islamic political movement that could pose a threat to the New Order regime. The regime 
did not need to control Islamic discourse to maintain legitimacy. Even when President 
Suharto increasingly engaged with Islamic affairs in the late 1980s, he mostly did so to 
countervail the threat presented by the nationalist faction within the military. Therefore, 
despite its highly centralizing tendency, the New Order regime did not believe there was an 
urgent need to consolidating its control over the Islamic education system as a means to shape 
Islamic discourse in its favor. Its legitimacy did not rest upon being seen as Islamic by the 
Muslim community.  
In Malaysia, in contrast, the wave of Islamization that swept society in the late 1970s also 
gave birth to a strident Islamic political movement that challenged the legitimacy of the 
hitherto secular state. In the context of the more competitive electoral politics of Malaysia, 
and the electoral threat posed to UMNO by PAS, the then Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamad, decided to meet the Islamic political challenge by coopting the activists’ Islamic 
agenda and trying to shape religious discourse in a way that was favorable to the state’s 
interests. As a result, in the past four decades Malaysia has seen an active effort by the federal 
government to disseminate and enforce its orthodox values on society, primarily through 
JAKIM, which has at its disposal the full coercive power of the state to stamp out any rival 
Islamic interpretations. One of the ways in which the government has tried to instil these 
values in society has been by centralizing control over Islamic education.           
The different ways in which Islamic resurgence has transformed society has also led to 
differences in the values embodied by state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia and Malaysia. In 
Indonesia, the increasing religiosity within the Muslim community since the late 1980s has 
not resulted in conservative values developing a monopolistic hold over religious discourse. 
Many Islamic organizations, ranging from the conservative MUI, to the moderate Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah, play an equal role in shaping Islamic discourse in the country. In 
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turn, this diversity has produced a state Islamic orthodoxy that is infused with heterodox 
values, as found in the curriculum of Pendidikan Agama Islam established by MORA. In 
Malaysia, in contrast, the wave of Islamic resurgence in the late 1970s permeated the public 
sphere with conservative religious values. Facing a political challenge from Islamist activists, 
the federal government opted to adopt conservative values similar to those of its challengers, 
hoping to shape the religious discourse to maintain its political legitimacy. Consequently, the 
federal government and its Islamist challengers engaged in a bid to “out-Islamize” each other 
and become the sole arbiter of Islamic values in the country. This contest ultimately resulted 
in the state acquiring a monopoly over conservative values, enforced through a state Islamic 
orthodoxy that was propagated and enforced by JAKIM and state Islamic councils. The 
conservative state Islamic orthodoxy in Malaysia has thus led to a centralized control of the 
Islamic education system by the federal government. In contrast, the pluralist character of the 
state Islamic orthodoxy in Indonesia has allowed for a more decentralized and ideologically 
diverse Islamic education system.        
The case studies presented in this thesis have illustrated how varying patterns of Islamization 
have affected the degree of control the state has over Islamic education in various sites. 
Chapter 3 shows that while both Aceh in Indonesia and Kelantan in Malaysia are known for 
their strong Islamic identities, heavily shaped by their contentious relationship with the 
central government, Aceh has been able to maintain autonomous control over Islamic 
education in the province, while the federal government has been slowly taking over control 
of Islamic education in Kelantan since the late 1970s. Chapter 4 shows that Nusa Tenggara 
Timur in Indonesia and Sarawak in Malaysia have not experienced Islamization as in other 
parts of their countries. The Islamic education systems found in these areas are less developed 
than places that have stronger and longer Islamic traditions such as Java, Sumatra, and 
peninsular Malaysia. In Nusa Tenggara Timur, the weak tradition of Islamic learning is 
compounded by lack of support from the central government in Jakarta, compelling local 
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advocates of Islamic education to improvise. In contrast, in Sarawak, efforts to strengthen 
Islamic learning have received significant help from the federal government in Putrajaya. 
Chapter 5 argues that the nature of state Islamic orthodoxy has allowed integrated Islamic 
schools in Indonesia and Malaysia to indoctrinate their students with conservative values as a 
means to recruit them into the dakwah movement, with the difference that integrated Islamic 
schools (SIT) in Indonesia are closely linked to the Islamic political party, PKS. In Indonesia, 
they have been able to do so by taking advantage of the ideological openness of the pluralist 
nature of the state Islamic orthodoxy, which not only allow for moderate values in MORA-
sanctioned curriculum but also conservative values found in the curriculum of SIT. In 
Malaysia, on the other hand, the high level of congruency between the conservative values of 
integrated Islamic schools and the state Islamic orthodoxy means that there is no interference 
from the federal government, especially since the schools do not construe their values in the 
context of political opposition. In short, these case studies have shown how various patterns 
of Islamization found in different parts of Indonesia and Malaysia affect the degree to which 
the state is able exert control over Islamic education in these areas. In Malaysia, the heavily 
Islamized society since the late 1970s has resulted in the state’s monopoly over religious 
discourse, which in turn has allowed it to effectively centralize its control over Islamic 
education.       
Resource control and distribution in the context of center-periphery relations 
Differences in the ability of the two states to provide adequate financial assistance to Islamic 
schools is the third reason why the state in Malaysia has been more effective in centralizing 
its control over Islamic education than the state in Indonesia. The Malaysian Ministry of 
Education is simply in a better financial situation than its Indonesian counterpart, despite the 
much larger population of Indonesia. Straining the educational budget of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs in Indonesia is the large number of Islamic schools, even after taking into 
account the size of the Muslim population (one school for every 4,387 Muslims), compared to 
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Malaysia (one school for every 9,616 Muslims). Moreover, the 1999 decentralization laws in 
Indonesia made it harder for the state to financially support Islamic schools by devolving the 
control of education to the local level and creating legal barriers that made it very difficult for 
MOEC to provide funding for Islamic schools, which still remained under the ambit of 
MORA. In short, the financial power of the state in Malaysia provides it with the means to 
help financially struggling Islamic schools, which in turn effectively erodes the autonomy of 
these schools and centralizes the state’s control over the Islamic education system. In 
Indonesia, the funding quandary faced by the state prevents it from exerting more control over 
the predominantly private and autonomous Islamic schools.           
The case study chapters clearly demonstrate the strong correlation between the control of 
resources by the central government and the centralization of Islamic education. One of the 
reasons that Islamic education in Aceh can be both prosperous and autonomous, as shown in 
Chapter 3, is the financial independence enjoyed by the provincial government especially 
after 2005. In contrast, the federal government has been slowly absorbing Islamic schools in 
Kelantan since the late 1970s, precisely due to the weak financial status of these schools. 
Chapter 4 explains how the financial weakness of MORA and the dearth of support from the 
local government contributed to the lamentable condition of Islamic education in NTT. 
Meanwhile in Sarawak, significant financial assistance from the federal government, given 
because of the role that Sarawak plays as a vote bank that ensures the political dominance of 
the Barisan Nasional government, provides Islamic schools there with enough support to 
develop and prosper. The thesis has also observed how in Kelantan and Sarawak, the financial 
might of the federal government produces a conflicting behavior among the officials of the 
state educational department (Jabatan Pendidikan Negeri), who are proud of their region’s 
unique local identity but at the same time feel that federal assistance is crucial for developing 
Islamic education in their states. The thesis terms the resulting institutional psyche as a 
“federalized institutional mindset.” Chapter 5 explains how the ability of the states in 
	 307 
Indonesia and Malaysia to exert control over integrated Islamic schools through distribution 
of resources is limited by the schools’ healthy financial status, which means that they are not 
dependent on support from the central government. In sum, the vast resources of the state in 
Malaysia have allowed it to centralize control over Islamic education in the country as part of 
its effort to manage Islamic discourse in its favor. In contrast, the overstretched budget of 
MORA, along with legal barriers thrown up by the decentralization laws, is one of the factors 
why the Islamic education system in Indonesia is highly decentralized.  
Final remarks 
This thesis has aimed to fill in a knowledge gap in the study of Islamic education in Southeast 
Asia, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia. Most of the literature on this topic has been 
country-based with little substantive comparison of Islamic education systems in different 
Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia. Islamic education is integral to the national 
education systems in Indonesia and Malaysia, but it has taken divergent paths in these 
respective countries. In Malaysia, the state has gradually centralized its control over Islamic 
education since the late 1970s; in Indonesia, the Islamic education system remains 
decentralized despite experiencing similar Islamic resurgence in the late 1980s. It has been the 
intention of this research to explain such differences. My hope is that this thesis can help to 
spur more transnational research comparing countries that share similar Islamic education 
system and find common threads and points of divergence that explain each country’s 
peculiarities. With regard to the wider field of Comparative Politics, this thesis strives to 
augment Joel Migdal’s notion of “state-in-society”, in which the state and the society are 
mutually constitutive, by illustrating that there are degrees of transformation that take place 
within this dialectical relationship. Migdal contends that in the course of exerting its 
ideological hegemony, the state is not immune from social influences. Nonetheless, this thesis 
tries to show that there are ways for the state to minimize social influences, in order to 
maximize its hegemonic reach into the society. Such is the case with the state in Malaysia 
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when it comes to controlling Islamic education. In short, only by closely comparing state-
society relations in Indonesia and Malaysia, in this case through the lens of Islamic education, 
can we tease out the factors that explain the varying transformative degrees that occur within 
this dialectical relationship.              
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